Barahoti

Barahoti Wu-Je
Pasture land
Barahoti
Barahoti Barahoti Show map of UttarakhandShow map of IndiaShow all
Coordinates: 30°50′00″N 79°58′00″E / 30.8333°N 79.9667°E / 30.8333; 79.9667Coordinates: 30°50′00″N 79°58′00″E / 30.8333°N 79.9667°E / 30.8333; 79.9667
Country	India
District	Chamoli
State	Uttarakhand
Elevation	4,700 m (15,400 ft)
Time zone	UTC+5:30 (IST)

Barahoti (Bara Hoti or Greater Hoti or Hoti Plains or Wu Je), located in the Indian state of Uttarakhand, Chamoli district, is an 80 square kilometres (31 sq mi) sloping pasture. It is south of the Tunjun-la Pass, on the Ganges side of the Sutlej–Ganges water divide.^[1]

Barahoti was the first location in Indian territory to be claimed by China since 1954, and along with Lapthal and Sangchamalla remain the only disputed territories in central sector.

Geography[]

Surrounded by snowy mountain peaks, Barahoti is the lone grazing ground of a now-extinct trans-Himalayan trade-route.^[2] South of the Tunjun-la pass, it is accessible from the Indian side, after a steep descent from the Barahoti ridge.^[3] From Barahoti, Gildungf may be approached by Silikank Pass or Niti via Marchauk Pass.^[4]

History[]

1700s[]

Two land-deeds —one sanctioned by P’olha in 1729 and another by 7th Dalai Lama in 1737 — support that the boundary lay just north of Barahoti, in the opinion of India. In contrast, China interprets the documents to regard Barahoti (Wu-je) as part of Daba Dzong.

1842-1887[]

Frontier villages in the Kumaon —that served as important conduits in the trans-Tibetan trade of Bhotias— were exempted from paying any taxes to the British authority at the behest of then-commissioner G. T. Lushington, c. late 1842.^[5] By and large a fiscal tactic to revitalize a thawed trade, the policy was warmly welcomed by Bhotias and met with success.^[5][a] However, that Tibet collected a variety of taxes (incl. land tax) from these areas, Lushington was soon advised to assert territorial sovereignty; he refused to tamper with "long established" customs lest it fomented a needless enmity with Tibet and affected the trade.^[5]

Lushington died six years later but his policies would be practiced for about the next fifty years despite occasional disturbances, as at Barahoti.^[5][b] K. Gopalachari, an Indian officer of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs writing for the International Studies Journal, notes Barahoti to have had paid taxes to Garhwal Kingdom, since at-least 1815.^[6]

In 1848, explorer R. Strachey remarked the area to be claimed by Tibet, despite lying within the watershed (and falling within Britain's understanding of their boundary with Tibet). He went on to note that the native Bhotias had hardly any ideas about the precise boundaries, and found the issue unworthy of any settlement — "geographers on both sides may [be] left to put the boundary in their maps where they please". The following year, he would pass through Barahoti into Tibet via the Tunjun-la pass and consider it to be British territory in his maps.

In 1866, surveyor Nain Singh had noted of Lhasa's frontier-camp to be situated at Lapthal — he was interrogated about the purpose of his visit.

1888[]

Tibetan intrusions into Barahoti were first reported in June 1888 — explorer Kishan Singh observed some ten or twelve Tibetans to have set up a camp, locally known as the Guard House.

1889[]

A near-similar event occurred around September 1889 and they even compelled the touring Assistant Commissioner of Kumaon to withdraw to safety.

The local Patwari (Durga Dutt), unable to resist the intrusion, intimated the Commissioner of Kumaon Division who in turn, informed the Foreign Office. Also, Dutt arranged for a letter to be dispatched to the governor of the adjacent Tibetan province about violations of boundary via two of the intruding Tibetans themselves (Jampal and Panda) but the letter was returned back without being opened, a few days later.^[6] Soon, commissioner Erskine confirmed that a Tibetan customs-house was operating in what was British territory, but felt no need to raise any hullaballoo over.

However, back in the Foreign Office, Undersecretary G. R. Irwin (and others) deemed of it to be an encroachment which ought not be tolerated and a 200 strong column of sepoys was dispatched from Sobha around early November, 1889. But by the time they reached Barahoti —late November— winter was in its peak, and Tibetans had long retreated back. Major Pulley remarked that Barahoti exhibited not a sign of life and it was hard for him to imagine a more desolate and inhabitable place.

C. W. Brown, in his magnum opus on Tibetan-Bhotia trade, feels Britain to have had fundamentally misunderstood Tibet's actions. Lhasa had went about its usual practice of vesting ordinary natives (typically two to four) from its frontier villages as messengers to declare the trading session open, collect due trade-taxes from a temporary outpost, and prevent non-complying (Bhotiya) traders from entering into Tibet. There was no motive to usurp territory.

1890[]

In early June 1890, a few Tibetans were back at Barahoti and a picket was reestablished. To and fro discussions proliferated within the concerned ministry about tackling the issue though some doubted whether it was a cause, significant enough to pursue. However, the government soon perceived the traders to be acting on behalf of Tibet in that they enforced certain "bonds" on natives. Brown.

On 29 June the Government decided to ask the North-Western Provinces to deal with these intrusions strictly, and enforce territorial claims at Barahoti. Two days later, on the basis of a letter from the local patwari (Durga Dutta), the ministry evaluated that Tibet had acknowledged British sovereignty over Barahoti, and only engaged in routine cross-border trade. However, the letter was "not lucidly written" and officials proposed that a civil officer be sent to the disputed territory for dual purposes of conducting a detailed investigation as well as enforcing territorial sovereignty.

In November, the Deputy Collector of Kumaon (Dharma Nand Joshi) was sent down to convince the Serji about the alignment of international boundary along a series of mountain-passes and the watershed, running north of Barahoti. However, he was suggested to take his concerns to Lhasa.^[6]

1905[]

In 1905, Charles A Sherring, a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society (and Deputy Commissioner in the Indian Civil Services) toured across Western Tibet from India. He noted of Barahoti to lie in Indian territory, and the border pass at Tunjun-la.

1914[]

In the Simla Convention, Charles Alfred Bell intimated Paljor Dorje Shatra about Barahoti lying within British territory; the border was claimed to pass through Tunjun-la pass and a map was provided to the same effect.

According to India, that Tibet failed to raise any objections, the principle of acquiescence applies. China rejects this interpretation. Shatra had only wished to "investigate the matter" and Tibet continued to send troops for years, implying a rejection of Bell's arguments.

1952[]

In July 1952, a note prepared by the Intelligence Bureau of India —titled "Border Disputes and Collection of Taxes by Tibetans in Garhwal District"—found the Tibetans to have had re-established their post at Barahoti for the last few years. It noted of an incident in 1951, when the Dzongpen of Doba took much umbrage at Indian traders establishing posts in the region and even served notices. The IB cautioned that the Garhwal authorities had never bothered with any presence in the region, due to its barren nature and if the Tibetans were allowed to continue their annual affair, they may eventually claim the territory.^[7] A suggestion by the Deputy Commissioner of Garhwal to visit Barahoti annually with armed forces and hoist the Indian flag was supported.

Pursuant to the note, the Ministry of Defense opined that Barahoti and some other disputed areas were extremely hard to access and defend from a military POV. Accordingly, the Ministry of External Affairs chose to assert customary rights rather than install military units. In late December 1952, responding to the Ministry of External Affairs and acknowledging the IB note, the Home Secretary of Uttar Pradesh^[c] rejected that any encroachment had taken place in any area barring the odd Tibetan tax-collector, who nonetheless went back on persuasion. Also, mountaineers Gurdial Singh and R. Greenwood had noted in 1951 that the Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary had set up a camp in Barahoti on June 24 and were to stay till September.^[d]

1953[]

Further, Indian negotiators made a mistake at the time; in Beijing, they only named six passes without delineating other locations on the border. China saw the opportunity and started claiming numerous areas including the area south of the , where the plain of Barahoti is located.^[8][7]

1954[]

In June 1954, Chinese forces entered into Barahoti for the first time, claiming a rightful ownership of what they called "Wu-je". A month later, on 17 July, China would lodge an official complaint about thirty Indian troops invading into "Wu-je of the Ali area of the Tibet region of China", having crossed Niti Pass; details of these invaders were provided on 13 August. On 27 August, India not only refuted the charges —the nearest unit was stationed at Barahoti, which laid to the South of Niti Pass— but also counter-accused Tibetan officials of trying to enter Barahoti without proper documents.

These accusations and counter-accusations kept on happening for the next three years.

1955[]

On 28 June 1955, India alleged that Chinese troops were camping at Hoti without proper documents. China rejected the claims and very next month, complained about 25 Indian troops having invaded Wu-je in late June to construct fortifications, close to their forces. In a reply, MEA emphasized that such steps were only taken in Barahoti and expressed doubt about the exact location of Wu-je — Chinese ambassador had noted it to lie 12 miles north of Tunjun-La while Barahoti laid 2 mile south of the pass.

In August, India noted that a Tibetan official had trespassed into Hoti to collect grazing taxes from Indian herdsmen only to meet with a refutation and counter-claims of Indian troops engaging in recon-ops at Wu-je. In November, yet again, India mounted a complaint about Chinese intrusion into Barakoti and reiterated that its troops did not cross north of the Tunjun-La. Finally, winter brought and end to these disputes.

1956-57[]

The next year, as the area became approachable with the advent of summer and yet simmering for dispute, Beijing proposed that a joint-expedition to these areas be mounted. It further suggested that both the sides agree to not send any troops until the cartographic dispute was resolved via diplomatic channels. However, it asserted of "historical records" bearing evidence to the fact of Tunjun-la being in Chinese territory, rather than some border pass. A memorandum was submitted to these effects on 8 June.

A week later India accepted the proposal but it was subject to China accepting Tunjun-la as the border. Some futile negotiations notwithstanding, neither parties budged and around October, the investigation was dropped. However, India accepted the clause of not using forces and China affirmed it in February 1957. Thus, no disputes would arise throughout the year. Later that year, China would again raise requests for holding a conference (followed by a joint-investigation) on Barakoti.

1958-61[]

Conference[]

In February 1958, Subimal Dutt (Foreign Sec. of India) proposed to Nehru that India agree to hold a conference — it would allow a glimpse into the workings of Chinese mind on at least one border-dispute even if India were to accept the superiority of Chinese claims. Accordingly, one was held from 19 April to 3 May 1958.

The talks failed with Dutt highlighting, in particular, about how China refused to divulge the precise geographic coordinates of Wu-je —vaguely defined as south of Tunjun-la; ran for 15 kms (north to south) and 10 kms (east to west)— and instead proposed a joint-investigation, which was likely a tactic to map their claims. He also found out India's case to be far stronger than he had presumed, and while India had nothing to lose from accepting a southward shift of border at Barahoti, there were far integral issues at play — China sought to reject all British maps as tools of colonial knowledge and repudiate the principle of watershed. If India conceded once, it would be hard to negotiate other border disputes. He then sought Nehru's consent to have civil officials regularly visit Barahoti, that China did not accept India's proposal to prohibit such visits.

Nehru would later intimate premier Zhou about how the Chinese delegation failed to provide any material evidence contrary to the "extensive documentary evidence", submitted by Indian side.

Disputes[]

Hardly had the talks ended, than China complained of armed Indian officials arriving in the area on July 8. India deemed it to be routine "revenue settlement operations" by Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, mounted only as a reciprocation to China sending their civil officials on 29 June but rejected the charges of carrying arms. Later that year, according to Indian Government, once winter set in and Indian border posts were dismantled, two adjacent areas (on east and west) —Lapthal and Sangchamalla— were intruded by Chinese troops only for China to claim all the three places (individually) next year.

On 23 January 1959, in a letter to Nehru, Zhou regretted the delay in arriving at a settlement about Wu-je, being hampered by the lack of on-spot investigations; he went on to refer to all relevant disputes as "minor affairs", which were impossible to avoid pending a formal delineation of boundary.

In May 1959, Nehru claimed in the Lower House of Parliament that as Indian troops made to Barahoti in summer (c. a couple of weeks back), they did not spot any Chinese forces and as of then, the only inhabitants were an unarmed police party from the Uttar Pradesh Government. He emphasized that pending renewal of negotiations on a rather minor affair, the territory was being considered as a neutral zone and the government did not plan on tackling the characteristic winter aggression of China by stationing forces.^[e]

in 1960, China would claim the composite area spanning across the three places were included in '59 as disputed territories.

1962[]

1963 - 2000[]

2000 - present[]

The border continue to be undemarcated in the area and the plains remain a demilitarised zone patrolled by Indo-Tibetan Border Police who do not carry firearms.^[9][10] As per an agreement in 2005, firearms in the area are not allowed.^[8]

In 2013, the Chief Minister of Uttarakhand told New Delhi that 37 incursion attempts had been made between 2007 and 2012 in Barahoti.^[11] In contrast, an IB note had documented 120 intrusions across 2010 and 2011.^[12] Transgressions have been reported by the Indian media almost every year.^[8][9][10] Small Hindu shrines, established by Indian patrol parties, have reportedly been pulled down multiple times.^[11]

Anthropologist notes that Barahoti remains a forgotten non-state space and is hardly visible in local discourse — it is primarily used by the Bhotiya tribesmen and their Tibetan counterparts as a grazing ground.

Notes[]

References[]