Battle of Győr

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Battle of Győr
Part of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848
HGM Passini Angriff Dragoner.jpg
Battle of Gyor by
Date28 June 1849
Location
around and in Győr, Kingdom of Hungary
Result Austro-Russian victory
Belligerents
Flag of Hungarian Revolution of 1848.png Hungarian Revolutionary Army Flag of the Habsburg Monarchy.svg Austrian Empire
Flag of Russia.svg Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Flag of Hungarian Revolution of 1848.png Ernő Poeltenberg
Flag of Hungarian Revolution of 1848.png Artúr Görgei
Flag of Hungarian Revolution of 1848.png György Kmety
Flag of the Habsburg Monarchy.svg Julius Jacob von Haynau
Flag of the Habsburg Monarchy.svg Ludwig von Wohlgemuth
Flag of Russia.svg Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin
Strength
Total: 17,480 men
-VII. corps: 10,566
-Detached units of the VIII. corps: 1,832
-the Kmety-division: 5,492
67 cannons
Did not participate:
II. corps: 5,925
37 cannons[1] Those Hungarian units, which participated in the Battle of Ihász, then due to the defeat, were forced to march away towards South, and because of this, they could not participate in the next day, at the Battle of Győr, are also included.</ref>
Total: 69,350 men
-I. corps: 18,523
-III. corps: 17,165
-IV. (reserve) corps: 15,549
-a cavalry division: 4,254
-Panyutyin-division: 11,672
-Other unites: 2,187
-276 cannons
Casualties and losses
Total: 607-706
57-120 dead
161-183 wounded
373 missing
2 cannons[1] The losses in the Battle of Ihász from 27 June, are also included.
Total: 408
78 dead
212 wounded
115 missing[1] The losses in the Battle of Ihász from 27 June, are also included.

The Battle of Győr took place during the Summer Campaign of the Hungarian War of Independence. It was fought from 1848 to 1849 in the Hungarian city of Győr. The Hungarian Revolutionary Army was led by General Ernő Poletenberg and General Artúr Görgei. The Austrian Empire was led by Julius Jacob von Haynau, with assistance from a Russian division led by Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin.

After the Battle of Pered, Haynau's army, joined by the Habsburg emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria, crossed the Danube to the southern bank of the river, unnoticed by the Hungarian troops. They attacked the Hungarian units placed around Győr, Árpás, Marcaltő and Ihász (today a part of Marcaltő), dividing György Kmety's division from the main troops and forcing them to retreat towards Southern Hungary.

The imperials mustered greater than five times the number of Hungarian troops (69 350 imperials - 12 888 Hungarians) at the outset. Görgei was not in the city at the start of the battle, because he was in Pest, and arrived to Győr only towards the end of the battle. He led the Hungarian cavalry and Hungarian troops as they retreated from the city. After the battle, Görgei's troops retreated to the fortress of Komárom, followed by the imperials.

Background[]

Artúr Görgei's failed offensive ended with the Hungarian defeat in the Battle of Pered on 20 and 21 June 1849. This attack was chosen in an unlucky moment, because Austrian Field Marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau on 19 June moved his troops from the northern banks of the Danube to the southern banks, in order to prepare to advance towards the Hungarian capitals of Pest and Buda. But he still had enough troops to deploy with around 15 000 more soldiers in the battle than Görgei, thanks to the Russian division led by Lieutenant-General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin, misleading the Hungarian commander, thinking that the imperials would remain on the northern bank. After the battle Haynau continued undetected, moving his troops to the southern bank.[2]

Győr by Fruhmann Antal 1845

During this time, relations between Lajos Kossuth, the governor of Hungary, the Szemere-government, and its secretary of war, Görgei, worsened, causing a conflict between the political and military leadership. This lasted until the Hungarian Surrender at Világos, disrupting the Hungarian efforts of defence. In the middle of June, Görgei openly declared that he was against the Hungarian Declaration of Independence (proclaimed on 14 April 1849), claiming that this triggered the Russians to send their troops against the Hungarian revolution.[3] However, discussions between the Habsburg empire and the Russian Empire about the Russian intervention had started two weeks before the declaration).[4]

After 21 June, Görgei was both the commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army and the Minister of Defence of Hungary in the Szemere-Government. He was often forced to travel between Pest and his general staff office in Tata.[5] On 24–26 June he was in the capital, participating in a ministry council. He convinced the government to accept his plan of gathering all Hungarian forces (except of those of Transylvania and Southern Hungary) around Komárom, in order to achieve numerical superiority. He proposed to attack Haynau's troops and march against Vienna. Should that fail, he would retreat to Komárom. The cause of this desperate plan was the fact that on 15 June Russian troops crossed Hungary's borders, entering with 193 000 soldiers and 584 cannon.[6] This joined the 165 000 Austrian soldiers with 770 cannon against the 150 000 Hungarians and their 857 cannon (464 field cannon and 393 fortification cannon).[7] Görgei realised that the Hungarians had no chance to win, unless they destroyed Haynau's Austrian forces before the Russian troops arrived.[5] In the ministry council held in the evening of 26 June, despite the majority's anti-Görgei feelings, his plan was accepted.[5] On the morning of 27 June, Görgei returned to take over the leadership of the troops, having heard about the concentration of the imperial troops near Győr.[8] The imperials planned to encircle the Hungarian troops in Győr, forcing them to surrender. Failing that they planned to split the Kmety division from the Hungarian VII corps led by Ernő Poeltenberg, and to force them to evacuate the city.

Prelude[]

On 26 June, the imperial troops attacked. Their plan was for their III corps (the right wing of Haynau's army) to encircle the Hungarian positions from Győr. On 27 June the main body crossed at Árpás, the Gerstner brigade from Marcaltő, and the Schneider brigade from Bodonhely. The Gerstner brigade advanced to Lesháza, taking position on the road towards Pápa, covering the advancement of the main body. The main body of the Austrian army had to advance to Pannonhalma, or, if the IV corps did not defeat the Hungarian troops from Győr, they would march towards Táplán.[9]

Julius von Haynau (Giuseppe Bezzoli, 1853)

On 27 June Görgei learned that the Austrian army was preparing to attack on the line of the river Rába, and during the evening he was informed that the imperials had crossed the river, cutting the Kmety division from the VII Hungarian corps.[8] The imperials encircled the positions of the VII corps, intending a concentric attack the following day. Knowing this, Görgei departed that night towards Győr.[8]

The IV corps (called also the reserve corps) advanced on 27 June towards Lébény, on 28 June to cross the Rába at Rábapalota, and after uniting with the Scheider brigade to attack towards Szabadhegy. They were to be followed by the Benedek brigade and the Russian division led by Fyodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin. At the same time on 28 June the I corps attacked towards Abda. The II corps remained on the southern banks of the Danube, defending Csallóköz and the lower Vág region.[10] 69 350 imperial soldiers faced 17 480 Hungarians.[1]

A lithograph of Ernő Poeltenberg by Elek Szamossy

Poeltemberg's goal was to hold on until he was reinforced. (None would arrive). The Hungarian Operational Office, led by Colonel József Bayer, sent the Hungarian II corps on 28 June to Gönyű, the I corps to Hull, and the III corps to Érsekújvár.[10] On 26 June the Hungarian division led by Kmety, with his 4 530 soldiers and 15 cannon moved away from the Rába-line, retreating towards Pápa. The reason for his move was the crossing of superior imperial troops, before his reinforcements and 4000 cartridges arrived. Even if the reinforcements had arrived in time, Horváth would have had no chance against the four imperial battalions commanded by Colonel Karl Wolf von Wachentreu. During this retreat the Hungarians lost 16 (according to other sources 30) soldiers.[11] Kmety wanted to cross the Rába at Pápoc, and to attack from behind the advancing imperials, but he needed more troops. So he waited for his battalion (which had been sent to Mórichida), but when it returned, he saw that his soldiers were too tired for another march. Instead he was forced to retreat from Marcaltő.[11]

On the morning of 27 June, Lieutenant-Colonel Emil Üchtritz, hearing about the imperial movements, rushed with his half artillery battery to the banks of the Rába just as the Austrians started to make a pontoon bridge over the river. Kmety then arrived to take command. When the Austrian Kaiserjägers started to shoot back, he ordered a retreat to Marcaltő, then to the Ihász farm. Üchtritz later declared that he did not understand why Kmety retreated without trying to defend the Rába line.

Kmety hoped that the reinforcements promised by Poeltenberg would arrive, so he could counterattack.[11] Poeltenberg received Kmety's request for reinforcements on 26 June. He sent the 51st battalion, 2 battalions of the 2nd (Sándor) infantry regiment and four companies of the 16th (Károlyi) Hussar regiment, as well as a cavalry battery to Tét. On 27 June Kupa received the news about Kmety's retreat from the Rába line and Poeltenberg's order to take position at Ménfő. On 28 June at 10–11 the latter decided to attack with 14 cavalry companies, 6 battalions and 21 cannon, hoping to force them to retreat to Mórichida. General György Klapka's (2nd in charge of the main army after Görgei) chief of general staff, Mayor Péter Szillány, ordered Poeltenberg to position his troops between Ménfő, Kismegyer and Szabadhegy, and to stop the imperial advance.[11] Poeltenberg hoped that, during his attack at Ménfő, Kmety would prevent the imperial's southern wing to reinforce the troops he planned to attack.[11]

Kmety indeed entered in battle with the Austrian Gerstner brigade on 27 June, in what was called the Battle of Ihász.

Battle of Ihász[]

The Gerstner brigade had around 5000 soldiers and an infantry battery with around six 8 pound cannon, while the Hungarians had around the same number of soldiers with 15 cannon and 2 rockets.[11] The Gerstner brigade advanced in battle position from the bridgehead of Várkesző to the southern end of Marcaltő in two columns. The first was composed of two battalions, and the other of three battalions, including 6 cannon and two dragoon companies. Two battalions remained to guard the bridge of Marcaltő.[11]

The imperial brigade continued towards Lesháza. Arriving on the heights above Lesháza, the Austrians saw Kmety's troops on the Ihász farm. Kmety positioned his troops in three lines. The first was formed by the 33rd, 45th and 2nd battalions. He put a cavalry battery in the middle, with 6 cannon and two howitzers, adding two cannon from an infantry battery. These were guarded by four companies of Vilmos Hussars. Kmety commanded his troops from there. The second line was formed by the 10th and 23rd battalions. The wings were made of two companies, the Nádor and the Vilmos-Hussars. The 3rd line was the reserve: on the left wing were two companies of jaegers, a newly formed battalion, the 9th infantry battery and a half rocket battery.[11] The Ihász farm included several houses. Kmety's opinion was that the alignment was disadvantageous for a battle, claiming that he only accepted to save his army's honor.[11]

Brocky Károly Kmety György

After the battle Kmety was criticised by his officer Emil Üchtritz, for positioning his cavalry where they could not charge at full speed, and for not deploying all his artillery. He also claimed that he tried to convince Kmety to position the Hungarian troops 6,5–8 km ahead, and to deploy the left wing around the Leháza farm, where the terrain was suitable for the cavalry, and to position the artillery behind the farm, which would have pushed the Austrians into the river at Marcaltő, or force a surrender, but Kmety rejected him. Austrian reports after the battle noted that the Hungarians had made a mistake by not using the Lesháza farm.[11]

Instead the Landwehr battalion of the Nugent infantry from the advance guard of the Austrian troops occupied the farm, without opposition.

The rest of the Austrian troops continued towards Ihász. After arriving, they took position as follows: the first line on the left wing was the 3rd battalion of the Welden infantry. In the middle was the 3rd battalion of the Nugent infantry. In the right wing were four companies of the Landwehr battalion of the Nugent infantry, On the edge, two companies of the same unit held the farm. In the second line on the right wing was the 4th battalion of the Welden infantry. In the middle was the 19th Kaiserjäger battalion. After a while these were sent in front of the Nugent infantry, because the leader of the imperial troops, Lieutenant General Adolf Schütte Edler von Warensberg, was not satisfied with the latter's battlefield behavior. The two companies of the Ficquelmont dragoons were positioned behind the infantry. Schütte positioned three cannon on each side of the road.[11]

The Hungarian artillery started its fire during the imperial troop deployment, destroying one of their cannon, and causing important infantry losses. Schütte ordered his cannon to advance on the heights near Lesháza farm, and to launch a barrage from there, causing some losses to the Hungarian infantry. He then directed fire at Kmety and his staff, leading the Hungarian general to wave his hat every time the cannonballs missed their target. A Hungarian cannonball nearly killed the commander of the Welden infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Schneider, who fell off his frightened horse, but then remounted.[11]

Around 4 o'clock a Hungarian cavalry battery advanced, together with 6 companies of the Vilmos-hussars from the Hungarian right wing, to attack the 3rd battalion of the Welden infantry from the imperial left wing. At that time the 6 pound infantry battery from the Hungarian left advanced, and caught the Austrian infantry in a crossfire. The cannon caused losses and disarray in the imperial's infantry quadrangle, when a horse was killed by them, as the Hungarian hussars were approaching. The Austrian officers managed to quickly rearrange the quadrangle. Schütte sent two companies of dragoons and half of his infantry battery against the hussars. The half battery was hidden by a cornfield and behind a ditch, and allowed the hussars to approach to around 400 meters before unleashing heavy grapeshot against them, killing 15 men and 34 horses. Lieutenant Jenő Fekete was among the wounded: his leg was later amputated. The hussars from the left wing attacked, but they were halted by two companies of the Welden infantry.[11]

At 6 o'clock Schütte ordered a general attack, with the 3rd battalion of the Welden infantry and two dragoon companies on the left wing, the 19th Kaiserjäger battalion in the middle and the 4. battalion of the Welden infantry on the right wing. The Hungarian grapeshot caused 20 deaths among the advancing imperials. According to Lieutenant János Trskó, the cannonballs shot by the Hungarian cavalry artillery swept streets in the dragoon's mass. The Welden infantry's 4th battalion and the 19th Kaiserjäger battalion headed left to flank the Hungarian troops, but the Hungarian artillery's shots caused disarray. The imperial officers reorganised the troops and attacked the Hungarian artillery, which quickly retreated.[11] Seeing this, Kmety ordered the retreat, which was covered by 6 companies of the Vilmos-hussars and a cavalry battery. The battle had lasted from around 3:45-6 in the afternoon.[11]

Historians argue about Kmety's retreat. He was not thought to be a cowardly commander, because two weeks earlier he had won the Battle of Csorna. Afterwards he claimed that he was preparing for a counterattack, when he suddenly saw imperial columns approaching from the flank and the back, threatening his troops with encirclement, leaving no option other than retreat. He was contradicted by several Hungarian officers, who saw nothing. According to Üchtritz, Kmety was informed that an imperial column was moving from Sárvár to Pápa, which could catch his troops in the middle. Among the causes of Kmety's retreat was that his troops had almost run out of ammunition, and that some Hungarian cannon broke down because of the heavy firing.[11]

At the end of the action 5 of the 6 horses that were pulling the last cannon covering the Hungarian troops retreat, were killed by the imperial firing. An imperial battalion wanted to take advantage of this situation, and to seize that cannon, but a Hungarian half battalion pushed them back with a bayonet charge, helped by the cannon's grapeshot.[11]

Kmety took position 3,5 km behind Ihász, but noting that nobody pursued them, he ordered his troops to retreat to Pápa. According to Schütte too, the Hungarians retreated in order, so he did not pursue.[11]

According to Kmety the Hungarian losses were 24 dead, 88 wounded and 32 horses lost. Schütte wrote that the Hungarians left 30 wounded with an officer on the battlefield and that they carried with them many dead soldiers on many wagons. According to Üchtritz, the Hungarians had 87 deaths and 110 wounded. Another source describes the loss of 5 officers and 105 soldiers.[11] The Hungarians evidently lost at most around 200 dead and wounded soldiers. But despite their victory, the Austrian losses were heavier: 65 deaths, 162 wounded, 50 missing (in total 277) and 32 horses.[11]

The most important result of this battle was that the nearly 5 000 soldiers of the Kmety division could not participate in the Battle of Győr, reducing Poeltenberg's force, which he needed against the nearly 70 000 troops of Haynau.[11]

Lieutenant Colonel Hümér Kupa's two divisions, four Hussar companies and 1 cavalry battery did not arrive in time to join the battle of Ihász, retreating to Szemere, where on 27 June, two infantry companies, cut off from Kmety's division, joined them. Poeltenberg sent three infantry divisions, a Tiroler Kaiserjäger division and a half infantry battery of 6 pound guns. Klapka too sent 4 hussar companies and a three pound battery to Szabadhegy. These cavalry units went to Szemere, joining Kupa's troops.[12]

Battle[]

On the morning of 28 June the battle started. Units led by Lieutenant Colonel Hümér Kupa and the Austrian III corps attacked. Other imperial troops crossed the Rába river at Babót marching towards Ménfő, which forced the division led by Lieutenant Colonel Ferenc Liptay to retreat, in continuous fighting, to positions between Ménfő and Csanak, in order not to be separated from the Hungarian forces defending Győr.[13] Poeltenberg sent Liptay and cavalry units to protect Kupa's division from being cut off from Győr, but with this move he weakened his defense. He then had insufficient troops to secure the Győr-Kismegyer-Nagymegyer-Nagybaráti line, a good defensive position. Győr and its fortifications were too large for Poeltenberg's troops, so he decided to slowly withdraw. First he gave away the first defensive line that led West from Győr, and retreated to the smaller second line. At 9 o'clock he assigned Lieutenant Colonel Sándor Kossuth to the city's defense, and rushed towards Ménfő.[13] Kossuth had to work with his infantry division, the smaller part of the cavalry division, the reserve and the reinforcements sent by General György Klapka.[13]

Battle of Győr 28 June 1849 in a battle map collection from the 1850s

On the imperial side, the IV (or reserve) corps led by Lieutenant-general Ludwig von Wohlgemuth tried unsuccessfully to cross the Rába near Rábapatona. Haynau ordered him to attack Győr at its Vienna-suburb, bordered by the Rába and the Rábca rivers. At the same time the I corps led by Franz Schlik attacked between the Little Danube and the Rábca rivers, through Abda against Győrsziget (Győr island). The first Hungarian defensive position was at the bridge from Abda. After a short fight the Hungarians retreated, knowing that Wohlgemuth's troops could attack them from the rear after they occupied the Vienna-suburb. The Austrian I and IV corps followed the retreating Hungarian troops.[13]

Battle of Győr on 28 June 1849. B. Bachmann-Hohmann 1850The emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria enters in Győr leading the Austrian troops.

Görgei departed from Tata early on 28 June traveling to Gőnyű, before continuing towards Győr. At Szentjánospuszta he met with II corps, which was marching towards Győr, and ordered József Kászonyi to move towards Koroncó. When Görgei reached Győr, he learned that the battle was under way. Poeltenberg gave up the first defensive line West of the city. The main fighting took place around Ménfő. Görgei went there, where he met Poeltenberg and ordered him to return to the city, while he continued towards Ménfő, to take command. He knew that his troops could only keep Győr if they could hold until the next day, when he expected II corps to arrive. He needed to hold Ménfő at all costs. Before he arrived there, he received Liptay's report that he was forced to retreat to Szabadhegy.[13]

At 1:00 in the afternoon, the imperials attacked Győr. Görgei knew that if Poeltenberg held on for too long, his troops could be encircled, so he ordered a retreat from Győr to the Galamb tavern. At the same time he ordered Liptay to retreat from Szabadhegy to Hecsepuszta.[14]

After they occupied the bridge from Abda, the imperial Bianchi brigade advanced towards Győrsziget, while the Sartori brigade advanced against the Vienna suburb. Next to them the Benedek brigade was advancing. Franz Schlik took over the leadership of the troops that attacked the Vienna suburb, concentrating 42 cannon, and ordered them to fire at the Hungarian positions for two hours. The Hungarians lost 4 carriages with ammunition, but resisted the attacks.[14]

Battle of Győr 28 June 1848 by Vinzenz Katzler. Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria enters in Győr leading the Austrian troops.

At the location between the Rábca and the Little Danube, Haynau's troops were more successful. The Bianchi brigade, led by Prince Franz de Paula of Liechtenstein, entered in the Sziget suburb of Győr through the Fácános woods by Pinnyéd. They crossed the Rábca and attacked the rear of the Hungarian troops.

At the same time the Reischach brigade occupied Révfalu and restored the Danube bridge towards Moson. Among the imperial troops entering Győr, was Franz Joseph I of Austria.[14]

Because of the imperial successes, the Hungarian troops led by Sándor Kossuth that were defending Győr risked encirclement. Görgei and Poeltenbeg ordered the troops to retreat from Győr at 4:30 PM. At 5 o'clock they complied without pursuit.[14]

The commander of the defending troops, Lieutenant Colonel Sándor Kossuth, was among the last Hungarians to leave. As he left Győr he "bumped into" the advancing imperial infantry, which shot at them, but missed. Kossuth stopped his horse and shouted to them in German:[14]

- Tell your commander, that my name is Kossuth, today I am the last who leaves this town, but tomorrow I will be the first who will enter it again!

- Yeah, right... - answered one soldier. Then Sándor Kossuth turned aside in his saddle, hit his right thigh with his palm, and responded: - So then shoot, you crook! A soldier, whose weapon was loaded, shot him right in the place Kossuth told him to shoot. Kossuth then rode away, without noticing that he was wounded. Sándor Kossuth met Görgei at the Galamb-tavern, where the Hungarian troops had to retreat because they were forced to.The high commander told him: - Go and [tell the medics to bandage] your wound, Sándor, because you are wounded.

- Gosh, the crook really hit [my thigh, right] where I told him to shoot.

Görgei ordered that if the imperial tried to advance towards Vének in the Szigetköz, the Hungarian troops must hold. At 6:00 Klapka arrived on the battlefield, while Görgei was arranging the troops that were retreating from Győr. Görgei entrusted Klapka to lead the Liptay division and the other Hungarian units that joined them at Szentjánospuszta, to build a camp. The next day they would retreat to Ács, then on to the fortified camp from Komárom. He ordered Poeltenberg to move with the infantry and artillery of the right wing to march over to Gönyű. Then Görgei, with the cavalry of the VII corps and a cavalry battery covering his troops, would retreat.[14]

Görgey Artúr

After 1850, Görgei dictated his memoirs about his wartime activity to his brother, István Görgey. He told the latter about what he taught and felt where he was on the lead of the Hungarian hussars, covering his troops retreat:

In that moment the danger appeared in a so huge shape, and the subofficers which were present there, were so insufficient, that I decided to spare no effort in order to make ig possible and assure the simple, unperturbed retreat of the exhausted infantry by personally leading the attack of all the cavalry which was available [in that moment], forcing them to fight with all the force which they had... And then I opened my snuff box, broke down my wife's daguerreotype framed under the glass, and wiped it down from the sheet. The gentlemen which were commanding my divisions, walked cozily to Gönyű and to Szentjános, and saw that the imperial did not even bother, and forgot to think that with only three regiments of hussars I resist for hours to an imperial numbering 66,000 [soldiers], which were drunk of glory, and wishing to achieve a new victory, at Szabadhegy. If then, by chance, I would have been wiped out by a bullet, or killed by a sword, [people] would have said: It is a pity that he put himself in front of danger without any reason. A military commander who selfishly pursues ambitious goals, would not put himself in front of such dangerous, but obscure rearguard fights, in which the achievable public glory is determined by the lesser involvement in them.[5]

Thanks to this fight, Görgei managed to save his army. Poeltenberg's performance in leading the retreat of the infantry and artillery is notable. The imperial main commander, Julius von Haynau and his chief of general staff, Colonel Wilhelm Ramming put up a good performance surprising the Hungarian defence of Győr. However, despite their numerical superiority, the fact that the Austro-Russian army took control over Győr and gained the initiative in the war, they did not severely damage the Hungarian army.[15]

Aftermath[]

After the battle Haynau's troops followed the retreating Hungarians to Komárom. The Austrian commander started a new attack on 2 July, in order to force Görgei's troops to retreat to the fortress, opening his road to Budapest.[16] Except for losing that important city, the military consequences were not severe for the Hungarians. However, the situation worsened because of other, mostly political, reasons.

When Lajos Kossuth first learned about the defeat, he did not consider the situation grave for the Hungarian cause. After reading the letters of government commissioner János Ludvigh, who tried to convince him and the government to leave, arguing that the imperial could soon occupy the capital, and hearing the news sent by General Józef Wysocki that the Russian troops had occupied Miskolc, he gathered the ministry council, and Görgei's absence decided to leave the Hungarian capital, ordering Görgei to retreat with the main Hungarian army from Komárom, and move to Southern Hungary with the government.[17] Görgei consented, despite considering this decision a mistake, promising that he would depart with his troops on 3 July. Despite this, a misunderstanding between Kossuth and Görgei brought the Hungarian military situation near a tragic turning point. On 30 June Görgei sent two letters to Kossuth, which he read in reverse order, and because of this he thought that Görgei disobeyed him. He ordered Görgei to be replaced with Lieutenant General Lázár Mészáros, an untalented commander who had lost all his battles.[17] On 2 July, Mészáros was on a steamboat on his way to Komárom with the order of replacement in his pocket, when he heard the sounds of the second battle of Komárom, which was in progress. He did not arrive in time to play a role in this battle in which Görgei forced Haynau's twice bigger army to retreat.[5]

References[]

  1. ^ Jump up to: a b c d Hermann 2004, pp. 293–294.
  2. ^ Hermann 2004, pp. 282, 288.
  3. ^ Hermann 1998, p. 90.
  4. ^ Hermann 2001, pp. 315.
  5. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e Görgey 2004.
  6. ^ Hermann 2001, pp. 315–316.
  7. ^ Hermann 2001, pp. 318.
  8. ^ Jump up to: a b c Hermann 2004, pp. 288.
  9. ^ Hermann 2004, pp. 288–289.
  10. ^ Jump up to: a b Hermann 2004, pp. 289.
  11. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Hermann 1999.
  12. ^ Hermann 2004, pp. 289–290.
  13. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e Hermann 2004, pp. 290.
  14. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Hermann 2004, pp. 291.
  15. ^ Hermann 2004, pp. 292.
  16. ^ Hermann 2001, pp. 345.
  17. ^ Jump up to: a b Hermann 2001, pp. 344.

Sources[]

  • Bona, Gábor (1996). Az 1848–1849-es szabadságharc története ("The history of the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848–1849) (in Hungarian). Budapest. ISBN 963-8218-20-7.
  • Bóna, Gábor (1987). Tábornokok és törzstisztek a szabadságharcban 1848–49 ("Generals and Staff Officers in the War of Independence 1848–1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó. p. 430. ISBN 963-326-343-3.
  • Görgey, Artúr (2004). Életem és működésem Magyarországon 1848-ban és 1849-ben- Görgey István fordítását átdolgozta, a bevezetőt és a jegyzeteket írta Katona Tamás (My Life and Activity in Hungary in 1848 and in 1849). István Görgey's translation was revised by Tamás Katona, and also he wrote the Introduction and the Notes. mek.oszk.hu. Neumann Kht. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
  • Hermann, Róbert (1999). "AZ IHÁSZI ÜTKÖZET EMLÉKKÖNYVE 1849-1999". mek.oszk.hu. Pápa. Retrieved 18 May 2021.
  • Hermann, Róbert (2001). Az 1848–1849-es szabadságharc hadtörténete ("Military History of the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848–1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Korona Kiadó. ISBN 963-9376-21-3.
  • Hermann, Róbert (2004). Az 1848–1849-es szabadságharc nagy csatái ("Great battles of the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848–1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Zrínyi. ISBN 963-327-367-6.
  • Hermann, Róbert (2002), "Kossuth és Görgei (Kossuth and Görgei.)", Korunk
  • Pusztaszeri, László (1984). Görgey Artúr a szabadságharcban ("Artúr Görgey in the War of Independence") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó. p. 784. ISBN 963-14-0194-4.

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