Charles Theodore Te Water

Charles Theodore Te Water
President of the Assembly of the League of Nations
In office 1933–1934
Preceded by	Paul Hymans
Succeeded by	Rickard Sandler
Personal details
Born	(1887-02-04)4 February 1887 Graaff-Reinet, Cape Colony
Died	6 June 1964(1964-06-06) (aged 77) Cape Town, Cape Province

Charles Theodore Te Water (4 February 1887 – 6 June 1964) was a South African barrister, diplomat and politician who was appointed as President of the Assembly of the League of Nations.^[1]

Diplomat in London and Geneva[]

Born in Graaff-Reinet, Cape Province, on 4 February 1887, the son of Dr Thomas Te Water, a South African doctor and politician, Charles Te Water was educated at Bedford School and at Christ's College, Cambridge.^[2][3] Like all Afrikaners, te Water was of Dutch, German and French descent. He became a barrister of the Inner Temple in 1910, and was a member of the Pretoria bar between 1910 and 1929. He represented Pretoria for the National Party in the Union Parliament between 1924 and 1929, and was High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London between 1929 and 1939. He was the Union of South Africa's delegate to the League of Nations between 1929 and 1939, and was appointed as President of the Assembly of the League of Nations between 1933 and 1934.

Te Water was an Afrikaner nationalist who saw the League of Nations as a useful way to make the case for greater South African autonomy within the British Empire.^[4] South Africa had been granted Dominion status in 1910 as the Union of South Africa, but the British government still had certain powers such as the right to declare war on behalf of the entire British Empire, which had been most dramatically illustrated in 1914 when South Africa together with all of the Dominions was committed to war when Britain declared war on Imperial Germany. Not until 1931 with the Statute of Westminster were the Dominions formally given the power to declare war on their own. As a diplomat, te Water consistently stressed his belief that the Dominions were only bound to Britain on a voluntary basis, being held together by ties of history and sentiment, and fiercely resented any claim by the British government to speak on behalf of South Africa.^[5]

Beyond making the case for greater South African autonomy, te Water was keenly interested in the League because of South West Africa (modern Namibia), which South Africa administered as a mandate for the League of Nations.^[6] Through South Africa actually ruled South West Africa, technically the territory belonged to the League of Nations, which in theory could take it away from South Africa. South Africa's aim was always to annex South West Africa to become the fifth province of South Africa, but to do so required the consent of the German settlers in Southwest Africa as the League's mandate stated that to change the status of Southwest Africa required the consent of its "civilized" (i.e white) people.^[7] The German settlers in Southwest Africa believed in the dolchstoßlegend and as such contending that Germany actually won World War One-being defeated by the alleged "stab-in-the-back"-felt it was only a matter of time before South West Africa was returned to Germany.^[7] The German settlers wanted South West Africa to remain a League mandate in order to await for the day that they believed that the League would order South West Africa returned to Germany, which in effect blocked South African plans to annex South West Africa.^[7] South Africa tried hard to be an ideal member of the League at least in part to improve its chances of annexing South West Africa. Though the idea of the League of Nations was the brainchild of the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, the actual design of the League was the work of Lord Cecil and Jan Smuts who devised the structure of the League at the Paris peace conference in 1919. As one of the "fathers" of the League was a South African, the South African media consistently held a keen interested in the League.^[8]

One of te Water's first acts as High Commissioner in London was to host a grand ball where the guests of honour were King George V and Queen Mary, who both gave speeches saying that they were glad that the wounds caused by the Boer War had healed and praised South Africa as a successful Dominion in Africa.^[9] Te Water's predecessor as High Commissioner, Eric Louw, was a republican Afrikaner nationalist whose relations with the British were stormy to say the least, accounting for his very short term as High Commissioner, and the British welcomed te Water in 1929 as a great improvement over Louw.^[10] Even te Water's accent was considered an improvement as unlike Louw who spoken English with Afrikaans accent, te Water's English was spoken with a mixture of an Afrikaans accent tinged with an upper class English accent he had acquired during his time at Cambridge.^[11] Te Water represented South Africa at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1932-34, where his most notable speech was in 1932 calling for South Africa to have a stronger air force "in view of the long distances and semi-barbarous people which his government had to control".^[12] On 22 June 1933, he formally opened the South Africa House as the new home of the high commission where the guests of honour were again the King and the Queen.^[13] Much to te Water's private displeasure, one of the guests who gave a speech at the opening of the South Africa House was the poet Rudyard Kipling whose jingoistic statements during the Boer War had made him unpopular with the Afrikaners, but as Kipling praised modern South Africa in his speech, including him in the ceremony was felt to be a sign of reconciliation.^[14] As a diplomat, he successfully lobbied Lord Reith to have the BBC give more favorable coverage to South Africa, charging that the BBC mostly ignored South Africa and even when it did mention South Africa too often played into the Boer stereotype.^[15]

Te Water cut an impressive figure in London, with one person remembering him as: "He was of striking appearance, tall, good-looking, and always immaculately groomed; his suits were tailored, I think, in Conduit Street, shirts and shoes bespoke; he favored a narrow-brimmed Homburg, short black coat, striped trousers, suede gloves and a stick".^[16] By all accounts a man of much charisma and charm, te Water was widely admired by his staff at the South Africa House and was regarded by British decision-makers as the most able and intelligent of all the Dominion High Commissioners in London.^[17] The Afrikaners had once called themselves the Boers ("farmers") because that was what they were, but as the 20th century progressed, many had moved to urban areas and entered the middle classes, leading to the new name Afrikaner being adopted. The popular Boer stereotype was and (still is) that of a gun-toting ferocious farmer living out on the veld, fierce in the defense of his family and his farm, and profoundly ignorant of everything beyond farming, horses, guns and the dogma of the Dutch Reformed Church. The suave, elegant diplomat te Water was seen in both Britain and South Africa as the image of the modern Afrikaner who had moved beyond the Boer stereotype.^[16] At the same time, the fact that te Water was an active sportsman with an athletic build and had what the British press called a very "masculine appearance" led him to conform enough to the Boer stereotype of a tough and hardy people that there were no fears of him having "gone soft".^[11]

An aloof, arrogant man, te Water hated what he called "socialising", regarding the balls and parties he was expected to attend as boring, but was willing to do so in order to make social connections with the British elite.^[18] Fluent in both English and French, te Water was regarded as "an orator of remarkable power" and his speeches before the League's General Assembly in Geneva were always well received.^[19] One contemporary report from 1932 about the possibility of applying sanctions on Japan for seizing Manchuria from China stated: "The most forceful of the three Dominion speakers and one of the most dynamic within the whole Assembly was te Water".^[20] Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary between 1931-35 who sometimes spoke before the League General Assembly (through Simon hated Geneva and tried to avoid the city as much as possible), was widely believed to resent the way that te Water's speeches outshone his speeches.^[20] One speech te Water gave before the League Assembly in early 1932, suggesting that the League should impose sanctions on Japan for bombing Shanghai, led to Simon's ire who complained that the Japanese embassy in London assumed that te Water was speaking for Britain, and that he was forced to deal with the resulting Japanese protests.^[20] Reflecting his moderate Afrikaner nationalism, the diplomat whom te Water was closest to in London was the Irish High Commissioner John Dulanty, who like him had to balance his nationalism with membership in the Commonwealth.^[21] Te Water, who was distantly related to the executed Irish nationalist Robert Emmet, was sympathetic towards Dulanty's efforts to quietly move the Irish Free State away from the British sphere of influence.^[21]

In March 1933 as president of the General Assembly of the League of Nations, te Water oversaw the stormy session where the Lytton Report was presented, which concluded that Japan had committed aggression against China in 1931 by seizing Manchuria and that Manchukuo was a sham.^[22] In his speech before the Assembly, te Water condemned Japan for its actions and urged sanctions be imposed.^[22] The session ended with the Japanese delegate Yōsuke Matsuoka announcing that Japan was leaving the League effective immediately.

Appeasement: For and Against[]

Because South Africa had South West Africa as a League of Nations mandate, te Water did not want to see the League weakened, which in turn would weaken South Africa's claim to South West Africa.^[6] Through te Water believed that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh towards Germany, he was opposed to the German demand to have South West Africa returned to the Reich, supporting the Treaty of Versailles as long as it allowed South Africa to gain territory.^[6] During the Abyssinia crisis of 1935-1936, te Water had been initially opposed to League of Nations sanctions against Italy for invading Ethiopia, but once the sanctions were applied, he was a strong advocate of maintaining them, believing that the crisis was a "test case" of the League.^[6] As such, te Water, despite his hatred of "socialising", he cultivated Anthony Eden, the British minister responsible for the League of Nations affairs and known as the strongest voice within the cabinet for sanctions against Italy.^[18] Te warned Eden that if the League failed to stop Italy, it would being the end of the League's moral authority.^[18] Te Water was not particularly concerned about Ethiopia, instead being more concerned that if the League's moral authority collapsed, then Germany would have a stronger case for taking back South West Africa as Adolf Hitler demanded in various speeches that all of the former German colonies in Africa "go home to the Reich".^[6] In his reports to Pretoria from Geneva, te Water was largely indifferent to Ethiopia as he mostly stressed that Germany would have a much stronger case for the return of South West Africa if the League's moral authority were lost.^[6] The issue was especially pressing as the German community in Southwest Africa had become thoroughly Nazified by the 1930s and was very vocal in demanding that Southwest Africa "go home to the Reich", holding parades and protest meetings under the banner of the swastika.^[23] When the League Assembly voted for sanctions against Italy in October 1935, te Water joined the League's Co-ordinating Committee for the sanctions.^[24]

In the winter of 1935-36, te Water was opposed to the efforts of other League members to weaken the sanctions that had been applied against Italy, writing with much contempt about how economic self-interest trumped the self-proclaimed vaulted moral principles that the Italian aggression against Ethiopia was unacceptable.^[25] Te Water was one of the delegates to the League who supported oil sanctions against Italy, which would had shut down Italy's economy had oil sanctions been applied, but the possibility of a French veto on the League Council ensured that oil was never added to the League's sanctions list ^[26] At the time, te Water told Eden of his fears that the United Kingdom "is at its old game of temporising and subordinating morals to the exigences of the situation".^[27] However, te Water favored a different line with Germany. During the crisis caused by the remilitarization of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, te Water stated that there was no possibility of South Africa going to war to keep the Rhineland demiltarised, saying that it was regrettable that Germany had just violated the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno treaty in this manner, but the issue was not worth a war.^[28] The American historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that it was clear "...by 13 March that the British Dominions, especially the Union of South Africa and Canada, would not stand with England if war came. The South African government in particular was busy backing the German position in London and with the other Dominion governments"^[29] When it was announced that the League was ending the sanctions imposed on Italy in July 1936 despite the fact that Italy just conquered Ethiopia, te Water was opposed, warning in a speech: "The memory of Black Africa never forgets and never forgives an injury or an injustice".^[30] Te Water's outspoken criticism of the League's failure in Ethiopia led one Foreign Office official to comment: "He is often ruder than he knows".^[31]

During his time in London, Te Water was close to the other Dominion High Commissioners to co-ordinate diplomacy.^[32] Starting in May 1936, te Water attended weekly meetings at the house of the Canadian high commissioner Vincent Massey to discuss matters of common concern for the Dominions, and as such te Water became close to Massey together with the Australian High Commissioner Stanley Bruce.^[32] One result of these meetings was a tendency for the Dominion High Commissioners in London was to work together closely to achieve common goals such as pressuring Britain to pursue a policy of appeasement towards Germany.^[32] In September 1936, te Water met the mildly Anglophobic Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King when the latter visited London, and the two bonded over a shared dislike of the Dominions Office.^[33] King told te Water that the Dominion Office was "just a glorified Colonial Office" whose officials did not treat him with respect, an assessment that te Water shared.^[33] The main division in Canadian politics at the time was the line between continentalism (i.e. moving Canada closer to the United States) and imperialism (which in a Canadian context meant closer ties to Britain). King belonged to the continentalism school, and spoke highly to te Water about the benefits of closer ties to the United States as a way of weakening British influence.^[33] In September 1937, te Water visited Ottawa as the guest of Mackenzie King where the two men agreed to establish diplomatic relations between Canada and South Africa.^[34]

All of the Dominion high commissioners shared certain common beliefs about the problems of Europe and how best to resolve them. The Dominion high commissioners as a group all accepted the claim that the Treaty of Versailles was far too harsh towards Germany and believed that the treaty was in need of drastic revision in favor of the Reich.^[35] Accordingly, the Dominion high commissioners saw France with its efforts to maintain the Versailles system as the main trouble-maker in Europe and felt that the Britain should be more aggressive and forceful in trying to make the French "see reason".^[36] Alongside the belief that France rather than Germany was the principle trouble-maker was a very strongly held conviction that another war with Germany would be a disaster for the West that would only benefit the Soviet Union, the nation that the Dominion high commissioners all saw as utterly evil and feared the most.^[37] Te Water believed in the event of another Anglo-German war would weaken so much whatever power emerged victorious that the Soviet Union would easily eliminate the victor.^[38] As a group, the Dominion high commissioners consistently pressed for appeasement, making it clear that there was no possibility of their nations joining Britain in another war against the Reich unless it was clear that the Commonwealth itself was in danger.^[39] Te Water supported the Chamberlain government's "limited liability" rearmament policy, where the bulk of the defense budget went to the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy while the British Army was staved of funds.^[40] The purpose of the "limited liability" policy was to rule out the "continental commitment" (i.e. send an expeditionary force to France on the same scale as World War I), which te Water felt was a contribution towards peace as he believed that the lack of the "continental commitment" (which the French wanted very badly) would make France more dependent on Britain.^[40]

In contrast to his support for appeasement of Germany, te Water was opposed to any appeasement of Japan, favouring having Commonwealth nations take a tougher line with the Japanese.^[41] In part this was due to the influence of Bruce, who in common with almost all Australians at the time feared Japanese ambitions in the Pacific, and in part due to the fact that Japan was an Asian power whose ambitions were seen by te Water as a threat to white supremacy.^[35] Despite his fear of the Soviet Union, the possibility of a Soviet-Japanese war was highly welcome to him, believing that this would distract the two powers from posing any threat to the British Empire.^[42] For the same reasons, te Water welcomed the Sino-Japanese war, hoping that China and Japan might fight to a stalemate which would weaken the two Asian giants so much as to end any possibility of further challenges to the dominant position of the British Empire in Asia.^[43] Likewise, te Water favored a tougher line with Italy, whose ambitions to dominate the Mediterranean he considered a threat to the British empire, but for him, the Italian threat only added another reason for the appeasement of Germany.^[44] Te Water believed that Benito Mussolini was banking on an Anglo-German conflict to achieve his Mediterranean ambitions, and that an Anglo-German "general settlement" would end the developing Italo-German alliance, and hence the Italian threat.^[44] An additional worry for te Water about Italian ambitions was the Mediterranean was the prospect of the Mediterranean being closed to British shipping, which would increase the importance of the sea lane around the Cape of Good Hope, which in turn would hamper South Africa's drive for more autonomy.^[45] Despite his support for League sanctions against Italy in 1935-36, te Water supported the Anglo-Italian Easter Accords of 1938, under which Britain recognised King Victor Emmanuel III's claim to be the Emperor of Ethiopia, which in effect meant recognising the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936.^[46] By 1938, te Water felt Ethiopia was a lost cause and while Britain should block further Italian expansionism in Africa, the cause of Ethiopia should be written off.^[46]

The government of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain greatly valued the opinions of the Dominion high commissioners and unusually for the secretive Chamberlain government, the Dominion high commissioners were kept well informed by the Colonial and Dominions Secretary Malcolm MacDonald about where Whitehall stood on the issues facing Britain.^[47] The efforts of the Chamberlain government to keep the high commissioners "in the loop" was due to the knowledge that the victory of 1918 would had been impossible without the Dominions and it was accepted by all of the decision-makers in Whitehall that Dominion support was essential if another world war should break out.^[48] The Chanak crisis of 1922 when Canada refused to join Britain when it was on the brink of war with Turkey revealed that Dominion support for the "mother country" could not be automatically taken for granted as it had been assumed in London until then. As such, the views of the Dominion high commissioners in London were highly influential with the Chamberlain government during the Sudetenland crisis of 1938 and the Danzig crisis of 1939.^[48]

The Sudetenland crisis[]

Britain had no obligation to defend Czechoslovakia, but under the terms of the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924, France was obligated to go to war if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia. ^[49] However, it was believed in London that in any Franco-German war would result in a German victory, which would upset the balance of power in Europe too much, thus forcing Britain to intervene to save France.^[49] With Germany threatening Czechoslovakia, and with the French government resisting pressure from Britain to renounce the alliance with Czechoslovakia, the British government felt it had no choice, but to become involved in the Sudetenland crisis by pressuring Czechoslovakia to give in to the German demands.^[49] The way in which the French refusal to renounce the alliance with Czechoslovakia had caused Britain to become involved was very much resented by te Water and the other Dominion high commissioners who saw the French premier Édouard Daladier as the trouble-maker who was causing the Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš to act as they saw it in an irresponsible and reckless manner by resisting the German demands regarding the Sudetenland.^[50] On 22 March 1938, the South African Prime Minister J. B. M. Hertzog instructed te Water to tell the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax that South Africa had no interest in the affairs of Eastern Europe and under no conditions would go to war in defense of Czechoslovakia.^[51] Hertzog added that he hoped that Britain would not also go to war for the sake of Czechoslovakia, but that if the United Kingdom did, South Africa would declare neutrality.^[51] On 25 May 1938, Lord Halifax told a meeting of the high commissioners that his government's preferred solution to turn Czechoslovakia from an unitary state into a federation, which he believed would balance out Czechoslovakia with its mixture of Czechs, Slovaks, volksdeutsch (ethnic Germans), Poles, Hungarians and Ukrainians.^[52] Te Water together with Bruce objected to Halifax's plan, saying it would be better just to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. Undeterred, Halifax took Massey aside after the meeting to ask him how English-Canadians and French-Canadians got along in Canada-which he saw as a model for the Czechs and Sudeten Germans-as he maintained that Canadian style federalism was the best solution he envisioned for Czechoslovakia.^[52] In July 1938, te Water reported to Hertzog approvingly that Lord Halifax had during his most recent trip to Paris had applied very strong pressure on France to in turn apply pressure on Czechoslovakia to settle the Sudetenland crisis in favor of Germany.^[53] Te Water also reported that Lord Halifax had been given a promise that France would not make no military move without consulting with Britain first, which te Water saw as a hopeful sign for peace.^[53]

In early September 1938, the Sudetenland crisis escalated dramatically with Beneš making the dramatic offer of a "Fourth Plan" for a new constitution for Czechoslovakia that was rejected by the Sudeten German leader Konrad Heinlen who instead launched a failed revolt in the Sudetenland. With the Czechoslovak Army fighting the Sudeten Freikorps, the German media started a hysterical campaign against Czechoslovakia. On 12 September 1938, Hitler in his speech at the Nuremberg Party Rally for the first time laid claim to the Sudetenland (before then, he had merely demanded autonomy for the Sudetenland)-a new demand that made a peaceful resolution of the crisis far more difficult.^[54] Reflecting the level of tension, starting on 12 September 1938 MacDonald started daily meetings with the Dominion high commissioners to keep them informed about what was happening.^[55] Throughout the 1938 crisis, te Water cast the matter entirely as a matter of national self-determination, arguing that since the majority of the Sudeten Germans wanted to "go home to the Reich", it was entirely right that they should.^[56] On 14 September 1938, te Water met with Massey where both men agreed that as to the prospect going to war to save Czechoslovakia, this "astonishing episode" was utterly absurd.^[56] Te Water reported to Pretoria that both he and Massey felt that self-determination for the Sudetenland was "acknowledged as a sound ethical basis for a fair and proper settlement of the dispute".^[50] Te Water further stated that if Germany should invade Czechoslovakia, in his opinion it would not be a case of aggression on the part of Hitler as he argued that the real "aggressors" would be were Daladier and Beneš, and Chamberlain as well if he failed to make Daladier and Beneš "see reason".^[50] Te Water expressed much frustration with the Dominion decision-making during the crisis, charging that Mackenzie King was too timid while the Australian prime minister Joseph Lyons was too indolent, leading him to write to Hertzog "The Powerful Party shows the way" while public opinion "like a flock of sheep follows blindly" and the Dominion governments found themselves following the British government whatever they wanted to or not, leading to a loss of "our national discretion".^[57] Te Water personally favored neutrality for South Africa, but was afraid that there were enough pro-British elements in South Africa to force the government into any potential conflict with Germany.^[57] Te Water felt that was needed was something like the Imperial War Cabinet of 1917-1918 with the Dominion prime ministers making policy jointly with the British prime minister, charging that the current system under which MacDonald briefed him and the other commissioners gave the British government too much power in deciding policy.^[57] In his reports to Pretoria, te Water was especially hostile towards Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London, whom he accused of trying to engineer an Anglo-German war to allow the Soviet Union to take over the world.^[38]

As part of an effort to prevent a peaceful resolution of the crisis, Hitler brought in Polish and Hungarian demands against Czechoslovakia, stating that if even the Sudetenland were allowed to join Germany that he might still attack Czechoslovakia if the Polish and Hungarian demands were rejected, an aspect of his diplomacy that stunned many at the time.^[50] Most of the Dominion high commissioners rejected this linkage, but te Water felt best "to administer the whole does of caster oil" by having Czechoslovakia cede Teschen to Poland and Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary.^[50] However, te Water also reported that he seen evidence from the Foreign Office that Germany was encouraging both Poland and Hungary to make demands against Czechoslovakia, and obliquely admitted in a dispatch to Pretoria on 21 September 1938 that Hitler was only doing so as a "deal-breaker", not because he really cared about the Hungarian and Polish claims.^[50] On 19 September 1938, MacDonald told the high commissioners that Britain was considering "guaranteeing" Czechoslovakia in return for Beneš ceding the Sudetenland, an offer that alarmed te Water who preferred that Britain stay out of the quarrels of Eastern Europe altogether.^[58] Te Water at first told MacDonald that there was no possibility of South Africa joining in any "guarantee" of Czechoslovakia, saying in a telegram to Hertzog that Bruce had told him "he will be more cautious in the future".^[59] Later the same day, te Water again met MacDonald to tell him that South Africa just might join a "guarantee" of Czechoslovakia if was brought in under the rubric of the League of Nations and if Hitler could be induced to sign a non-aggression pact with Czechoslovakia.^[59] However, he admitted that such a "guarantee" was unlikely, which he understood would be against "unprovoked aggression and not of the new boundaries".^[59] He stated in a dispatch to Hertzog that Chamberlain was putting his hopes on a German-Czechoslovak non-aggression pact rather on an international "guarantee" of Czechoslovakia.^[59] In the same dispatch, he stated that the Chamberlain government had "rather a queer mind, as always thoroughly illogical, but in a more volatile state than I have ever known it".^[59] Te Water stated he could not understand Chamberlain's policy with its willingness to accept the German demands on Czechoslovakia, but at the same time rejected the Polish and Hungarian demands, and was willing to consider a "guarantee" of a nation that te Water considered to be highly unstable.^[59] Despite his doubts, te Water argued in a telegram to Hertzog stated that "the incalculable Hitler might yet astonish everyone by playing his part".^[54]

Following the rejection of Hitler's ultimatum issued during the Anglo-German summit at Bad Godesburg on 23 September 1938 the world was on the brink of another world war.^[60] The days from 22 to 28 September 1938 were a time of high tension with te Water reporting to Hertzog that London was a city preparing for war with children being sent out to the countryside to escape the expected bombing, people wearing gas masks on the streets in case of chemical bombs being dropped and buildings being boarded up.^[61] Te Water reported to Hertzog that Chamberlain "must find a way out".^[62] Te Water admitted that Hitler's Bad Godesburg ultimatum was extreme, all the more so for the insulting language in which it was phrased, but added that he still regretted that the British and French governments had both rejected it.^[63] At a meeting of the Dominion high commissioners, a difference of opinion emerged with Bruce supporting the cession of the Sudetenland, but opposed to the Bad Godesburg ultimatum as too humiliating whereas Massey, te Water and Dulanty all supported accepting the Bad Godesburg ultimatum.^[64] In attempt to find a compromise, te Water put forward what he called "a liberal interpretation of principle", calling for Czechoslovakia to hand over the Sudetenland to an international force who in turn would hand it over to Germany.^[65] However, a motion put forward by Bruce calling for a "honorable settlement" that see the Sudetenland go to Germany in exchange for a promise from Hitler to allow the rest of Czechoslovakia to continue as an independent state was accepted by all of the Dominion high commissioners.^[65] On 26 September 1938, te Water had the South Africa House boarded up and reported to Hertzog: "Zero hour is very nearly reached, issue hanging on Hitler's acceptance or rejection".^[61]

On 26 September 1938, te Water told Chamberlain and Lord Halifax that if Britain should go to war for the defence of Czechoslovakia, it was "unthinkable" that South Africa would also join in.^[66] Te Water argued that Czechoslovakia was not worth fighting for, all the more so because Czechoslovakia had signed an alliance with the Soviet Union (which put Czechoslovakia beyond the pale in his opinion), and stated his belief that Britain should find a peaceful way of resolving the crisis.^[66] During the same meeting, te Water called the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924 "a menace to peace" and asked it was possible that Britain could just pressure France into renouncing it, which would turn any German-Czechoslovak war into just a local war instead of a world war.^[67] Te Water reported that: "Chamberlain found it difficult to understand the type of mind and methods of the Chancellor, while Hitler appeared to be at a loss to understand Mr. Chamberlain's astonishment at the tone of the Hitler ultimatum, which latter described as merely a memorandum".^[68] Te Water reported to Hertzog: "Bruce, Massey, Dulanty and I left nothing unsaid in explaining again the dangers to the Commonwealth system of Great Britain involving the Dominions in a war with which they were out of sympathy and on grounds which in their opinions did not constitute a direct threat to its security".^[69]

In a dispatch to Pretoria, te Water stated his displeasure with Chamberlain's guarded statements that Britain might go to war if Germany should invade Czechoslovakia, but he also argued that Chamberlain was far preferable to any of the alternatives such as the Labour Party; the Liberals; the "renegade Tories" such as Anthony Eden and "his paper", the Yorkshire Post plus Winston Churchill who was "fishing as always in troubled waters"; and finally the "disloyal" Foreign Office mandarins who were leading Chamberlain "up the garden path" by pushing for stronger British statements in favor of Czechoslovakia.^[70] Te Water complained in late September 1938 that Chamberlain had lost control of the situation where criticism of his policy was being heard in the press and from the Conservative backbenches in the House of Commons, where Churchill was starting to gather a following, which worried te Water.^[71] In particular, te Water was upset at the way that the primary issue, namely the status of the Sudetenland had been settled at the Anglo-German summit at Berchtesgaden where it was agreed that the Sudetenland would go to Germany, but the progress had been derailed by a secondary issue, namely the time-line for handing over the Sudetenland. After the Bad Godesburg summit, the issue was now only the question of the time-line for transferring the Sudetenland with the German government insisting that it had to be October 1, 1938 while the British and French governments wanted the transfer to happen after October 1. However, te Water blamed Chamberlain, not Hitler, for the failure of the Bad Godesburg summit.^[71] Te Water felt that Chamberlain had not been understanding enough of Hitler and charged that if he had been, "the document might have been reshaped and the tragic possibilities now threatening avoided".^[71] Had te Water been aware of the split in the British cabinet between Chamberlain and Lord Halifax who favored a tougher line with Germany he would had been more concerned.^[71]

In a private meeting with Chamberlain at 10 Downing Street on 27 September 1938, te Water complained: "It seemed intolerable that French commitments should be the cause of the British Commonwealth of Nations being drawn into war", and asked "why it is thought wrong to insist that the French should contribute to his peace efforts by another approach to their allies the Czechs".^[67] As an Afrikaner, te Water felt a certain sympathy with the Germans, another people who had "experienced the bitterness of defeat in war" as he reported about his meeting with Chamberlain:

"I was a little uncertain of his reading of Hitler's character and motives, which I felt could only be truly judged by a people and its leaders who had actually experienced the bitterness of defeat in war. We would not for instance read as readily deep-laid and sinister motives into Hitler's words and actions he [Chamberlain] confessed he did. I implored him not to allow his suspicions in this regard to govern his judgement of the Hitler plan. I gave Hitler's constant reiteration of the phrase, "I am no coward". "History cannot judge me a coward" as the simple and safer key to his insistence on immediate occupation of the ceded territories by a certain date. That and his lack of faith in Allied undertakings and their actions in the past and in Benes's character".^[68]

Chamberlain's statement to te Water that he found Beneš "an unreliable and unsatisfactory character" was much approved of by the latter.^[72] Te Water appealed to Chamberlain "to set aside pride, prejudice, and even those feelings of false honor which in the face of the ultimate calamity would be ashes in other men's mouths. I told him that we and millions of men and women gave him our admiration and confidence and looked to him to stand firm against the influences of disruption".^[73] Te Water reported that Chamberlain seemed very moved by his appeal and stated he would try once more to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.^[73] To apply further pressure, te Water warned Chamberlain that another war would "endanger the future unity and cohesion of the Commonwealth", stating it would strengthen the appeal of the extreme Afrikaner nationalists who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the Boer War.^[69]

On 28 September 1938, te Water reported to Pretoria that there was a breakthrough in the crisis as Mussolini had proposed an emergency summit in Munich, which Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier had all agreed to attend.^[74] Te Water wrote: "I believe the situation has been saved".^[61] When Chamberlain boarded the plane that was to take him to Munich, te Water together with Massey were there to wish well in Munich.^[61] However, te Water found fault with Beneš who was complaining that he had not been invited to attend the Munich conference.^[74] The Dominion high commissioners as a group appealed to Halifax to send a "very stiff" telegram to Sir Basil Newton, the British minister in Prague, to say "that the obstructive tactics of the Czech government were unwelcome to the British and Dominion governments".^[74] Both Massey and te Water wanted to remove the sentence asking Beneš "not to tie Chamberlain's hands" as that suggested that Beneš had that power, which both Massey and te Water insisted that he did not.^[74] Te Water cast Beneš as the principle problem, saying that he refused to understand the Munich conference would probably "whittle down" Chamberlain's most recent offers instead of expanding them in favor of Czechoslovakia.^[74] On 29 September 1938, the day before the conference in Munich, te Water argued: "If the states of the Commonwealth are to be used to preserve the balance of power in Europe the system must inevitably break...collective action for the preservation of peace would work. Collective action for the making of war will break it".^[69] The Munich conference ended the crisis and when Chamberlain flew back from Munich to land at Heston airport to make his famous statement that he had secured "peace in our time", te Water was there to congratulate him.^[75] Te Water praised the Munich Agreement as a "considerable advance", noting that Hitler had backed down from his more extreme demands made in Bad Godesberg ultimatum.^[76]

The fact that Hitler had not raised the question of the former German colonies in Africa once during the Sudetenland crisis was a source of much relief to te Water who was afraid that Chamberlain might promise Hitler that South West Africa would be returned to Germany.^[77] Te Water hoped that Hitler's interests were in Eastern Europe, not Africa, and was looking forward to an Anglo-German agreement whereby Britain would accept Eastern Europe as being in the German sphere of influence in exchange for Germany dropping its demand for the return of its former colonies in Africa.^[77] In October 1938, Hertzog proposed that South Africa pay Germany a certain sum in gold and cash to be determined to drop its demand for the return of South West Africa, a plan that te Water approved of.^[77] Te Water wrote in October 1938: "It would be sheer lust if Europe went to war now".^[77] Te Water had read Mein Kampf and reported to Hertzog that Hitler's advocacy of an anti-Soviet Anglo-German alliance in Mein Kampf gave him significant hope that such an alliance might actually occur in the near-future, now the Munich Agreement had apparently resolved the main issues between Germany and Britain.^[78] Te Water painted a picture to Hertzog of a world dominated by an Anglo-German alliance which would maintain white supremacy around the globe and keep the dreaded Soviet Union at bay.^[78] Like many other white South Africans at the time, te Water viewed the rising anti-colonial movements around the world, such as the Indian independence movement, as a threat to his much cherished principles of white supremacy.^[78] After the Munich agreement was signed, te Water reported that Maisky had told him of his "unutterable disgust with the Chamberlain policy" and stated his fears that the Munich Agreement was a start of a four-power alliance of Britain, Italy, France and Germany meant to isolate the Soviet Union.^[38] Te Water added that he believed that the Labour Party's leaders such as Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin shared Maisky's views.^[38]

The Danzig crisis[]

On 15 March 1939, Germany violated the Munich Agreement by occupying the Czech half of the rump of Czecho-Slovakia (as Czechoslovakia had been renamed in October 1938). Te Water reported to Pretoria that the British public opinion was outraged by this egregious violation of the Munich Agreement and that "appeasement is dead".^[79] Te Water reported that prior to 15 March 1939, he had known many British officials and leaders from Prime Minister Chamberlain on down who believed that Hitler could be trusted to keep his word, but that after 15 March 1939 no-one in Whitehall trusted Hitler.^[79] On 31 March 1939, Chamberlain issued the famous "guarantee" of Poland during a speech in the House of Commons, saying that Britain would go to war if the independence of Poland was threatened. Te Water was opposed to the "guarantee" of Poland, telling Chamberlain that he considered it rash and unwise.^[80] Te Water further complained that Chamberlain had issued the "guarantee" without telling him in advance, which he found to be highly rude, saying that the British government should treat the South African government as an equal.^[80] Te Water together with Massey both told Chamberlain during the same meeting that Germany "had a genuine claim to Danzig", which made it an "extremely bad reason" to risk a war.^[80] At a meeting with Sir Thomas Inskip, te Water was more abusive and rude, lecturing him in an angry tone that Hitler should be given "one more chance of saving face", and felt that the "guarantee" was a provocation of Germany that should not have made.^[81] By this point, te Water's arrogance had notably increased after almost ten years in London, and many British officials were finding him increasingly unpleasant to deal with.^[81]

During the Danzig crisis of 1939, te Water was broadly supportive of British plans for a "peace front" to deter Germany from war, but was adamantly opposed to including the Soviet Union in the "peace front".^[82] During a visit to 10 Downing Street, te Water told Chamberlain it was completely unacceptable for both him and his government to have the Soviet Union join the "peace front" and asked him to stop the negotiations with Moscow, warning darkly that any Anglo-Soviet alliance would be highly dangerous.^[82] The German media and government obsessively attacked the proposed "peace front" of 1939 as "encirclement" of the Reich, using the same phrase that had been used before 1914, which led te Water to urge that the work of building the "peace front" to be done cautiously and slowly.^[82] Te Water believed that a peaceful settlement of the Danzig crisis could be arranged and felt the best outcome would be for Britain to pressure Poland to allow the Free City of Danzig to "go home to the Reich".^[83]

Unlike in 1938, the Chamberlain put less attention to te Water. In 1938, only prime minister Michael Joseph Savage of New Zealand had promised to go to war if Britain did. By contrast, the situation in 1939 was very different. Prime minister Lyons of Australia had died in April 1939 and his successor as prime minister, Robert Menzies, was much more supportive of Britain. It was accepted in London that should the Danzig crisis should lead to a war, both Australia and New Zealand could be counted upon to declare war on Germany.^[84] Mackenzie King was vacillating and equivocal as usual, refusing to give a straight answer about what he would do if Britain declared war, but a Royal visit by King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Canada in the summer of 1939 had been a great success, leading to huge pro-British demonstrations.^[85] The royal visit had been a success even in Quebec where the king was tactful enough to give his speeches in French. It was felt that Canadian public opinion would force Mackenzie King's hand.^[85] Only South Africa was considered to be a "wild card" as it was well known that Hertzog wanted to declare neutrality in the event of war, but Sir William Clerk, the British high commissioner in Pretoria, believed that pressure from the Anglos (white South Africans of British descent) and pro-British Afrikaners would "probably" bring South Africa into the war.^[86] However, even if Hertzog did succeed in declaring neutrality, having New Zealand, Australia and Canada in the war was considered to be a vast improvement in 1938 when only New Zealand had firmly committed itself to going to war. Through te Water was still considered the most able of the high commissioners in London, his views were given less attention in 1939 as compared to 1938.

During much of the summer of 1939, te Water was out of London on an extended vacation in Ireland, which weakened his influence with the Chamberlain government.^[87] Only on 23 August 1939 did te Water return to London, where the main thrust of his diplomacy was to argue that Poland was the principle problem in refusing to allow Danzig to rejoin Germany, and to argue that Britain should pressure Poland in the same manner that it had pressured Czechoslovakia.^[87] In September 1939, when the Danzig crisis led to World War Two, Hertzog attempted to have South Africa declare neutrality, leading to a crisis in Pretoria that Hertzog deposed as prime minister while the new Anglophile prime minister, Jan Smuts declared war on Germany. Hertzog's motion for neutrality in parliament saw 67 MPs vote for neutrality while another 80 MPs led by the former prime minister Smuts voted for war.^[88] Hertzog then went to the Governor-General Sir Patrick Duncan to ask him to dissolve parliament for a general election (which he expected to win, running on a platform calling for South African neutrality); instead Duncan dismissed Hertzog as prime minister and appointed Smuts as the new prime minister.^[88] One of Smuts's first acts as prime minister to sack te Water, who was closely associated with Hertzog, as the South African high commissioner in London.^[89] Te Water for his part was embittered by what he saw as an illegal action on the part of Duncan in dismissing Hertzog and had already submitted his resignation in protest.^[90]

Apologist for apartheid[]

He was Ambassador at large for South Africa between 1948 and 1949.^[91] In 1948, the Afrikaner nationalist National Party won the elections and the new Prime Minister D. F. Malan brought in a new policy towards the non-white populations of South Africa called apartheid (Afrikaans for "apartness"), a policy of racial segregation that consigned the non-white peoples of South Africa to a second-class status. Even in 1948, the policy of apartheid caused criticism of South Africa and as such Malan appointed te Water as his special ambassador with the instructions to justify apartheid as a just and rational policy.^[92] As such, te Water toured the world, arguing the case for apartheid.^[92] Te Water not only supported apartheid, but also advocated to Malan that South Africa expel the entire Indo-South African population to the newly independent nation of India, a procedure he very misleadingly called "voluntary reparation", arguing that the Indo-South Africans were a danger to white supremacy in South Africa by their very presence.^[93] The fact that India was especially outspoken in its criticism of apartheid led te Water to perceive India as one of South Africa's principle enemies.^[94]

In September 1948, te Water held a series of meetings in London with what he called the "lords of the press", whose purpose was find out the reasons for "their papers' persistent unfriendliness towards all things South African" and to change the media coverage of South Africa.^[95] Te Water had known many British media magnates since his time as high commissioner in London and seemed to be genuinely strung by the criticism of apartheid.^[95] Besides for defending apartheid, te Water during his trip to London pushed for ambitious scheme for Anglo-South African military alliance under which South Africa would take the responsibility for defending all of the British African colonies from the Soviet Union in exchange for which Britain would use its influence throughout the world to dampen criticism of apartheid.^[96] Through South Africa did not declare itself a republic until 1961, there was considerable mistrust in London of the republican and anti-British tendencies in the National Party government in Pretoria, and the "Africa Plan" as it was known went nowhere.

In December 1948, te Water visited Ottawa where he met the Canadian prime minister Louis St. Laurent to lobby him to have Canada vote against condemning South Africa at the United Nations for its apartheid policy, saying it greatly mattered to his government that the fellow members of the Commonwealth should stand with South Africa.^[97] The meeting went badly where te Water's argument that apartheid was justified because there was a natural "place" for the different races of South Africa was rejected by St. Laurent who stated that as a French-Canadian he knew of a similar theory in Canada which held that the natural "place" of French-Canadians was as the inferiors of English-Canadians. St. Laurent also declared that as a devout Catholic that it was his belief that Christ had died for the sins of all humanity and that God thus loved all of humanity, leading te Water to declare in some exasperation that he had come to Ottawa to discuss how to hold the Commonwealth together and to stop Communism in Africa by winning international support for apartheid, not to discuss "philosophical problems".^[98] St. Laurent told te Water "how opposed he was in principle to the philosophy which lay beyond the Union's racial policies", saying that Canada would vote at the UN to condemn South Africa for apartheid.^[97] Te Water had more success during the American log of his journey where his picture of apartheid as a mutually beneficial arrangement for all the people of South Africa was accepted by those committed to Jim Crow laws, but was criticized by American liberals.^[99] After his American visit, te Water reported that: "Our relations with the U.S. are expanding and will continue to grow and expand to the great advantage of the Union".^[100] Te Water felt that the way that American investors were rapidly replacing British investors as the principle foreign investors in South Africa would allow his nation to take a more assertive stance regarding the United Kingdom.^[100] Te Water was awarded an honorary doctor of laws degree by Wits University in 1955.^[101]

Chancellor of the University of Pretoria between 1949 and 1964, Charles Te Water died in Cape Town on 6 June 1964, at the age of 77.^[102]

References[]

Citations[]

Sources[]

External links[]

• Portraits of Charles Theodore Te Water at the National Portrait Gallery, London