Kiev Offensive (1920)

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Kiev Offensive (1920)
Part of Polish-Soviet War
Polish bomber in Kiev
Polish Breguet 14 operating from Kiev airfield
Date25 April–13 June 1920
Location
Ukraine
Result Soviet strategic victory; start of the major Red Army counter-offensive
Belligerents
 Poland
Ukrainian PR		  Russian SFSR
 Ukrainian SSR
Commanders and leaders
Józef Piłsudski
Edward Rydz-Śmigły		 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Alexander Yegorov
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Semyon Budyonny
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Iona Yakir
Strength
8 infantry divisions
1 cavalry division
2 understrength Ukrainian divisions; 80,000 men initially		 8 infantry divisions
2 cavalry divisions
later also 1st Cavalry Army
Casualties and losses
Uncertain; estimated 10,000–15,000 killed, at least 10,000 captured, and numerous wounded Around 32,000 men lost, including 2,000 from 1st Cavalry Army

The 1920 Kiev Offensive (or Kiev Expedition, Kiev Operation), considered to be the campaign that started the Polish–Soviet War proper,[1] was an attempt by the armed forces of newly re-emerged Poland led by Józef Piłsudski, in alliance with Ukrainian exiled leader Symon Petliura, to seize the territories of modern-day Ukraine which fell under Soviet control after the October Revolution as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.[1] The operation led to a Soviet counter-offensive resulting in the creation of the short-lived Galician Soviet Socialist Republic. The Polish-Soviet War ended with the Peace of Riga of 1921,[2] which settled the border between Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

The stated goal of the operation was to create a formally independent Ukraine, although its dependence on Poland was inherent to Piłsudski's plans.[3] Some Ukrainians greeted the Polish and allied Ukrainian forces as liberators,[4] although Ukrainians fought on both sides of the conflict.[5]

The campaign was conducted from April to June 1920. It was a major military undertaking of the Polish Army, which operated in the Treaty of Warsaw alliance with the forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic led by Petliura. Their primary adversary was Soviet Russia; it claimed most of the contested territories for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic afterwards.[5] Initially successful for the Polish and Ukrainian armies which captured Kiev (Kyiv) on 7 May 1920, the campaign's progress was dramatically reversed,[6] chiefly due to the actions of the cavalry of Semyon Budyonny.[2]

Prelude[]

Polish Chief of State Józef Piłsudski (left) and Edward Rydz-Śmigły in 1920
Polish General Antoni Listowski (left) and exiled Ukrainian leader Symon Petliura (second from left) in Berdychiv following Petliura's alliance with the Poles

The government of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) faced from early 1919 mounting attacks on the territory it claimed. It had lost control over most of Ukraine, which became divided among several disparate powers: Anton Denikin's Whites, the Red Army and pro-Soviet formations, the Makhnovist Partisan Army claiming the territory of Makhnovia, the Kingdom of Romania in the southwest, Poland, and various bands lacking any political ideology. During the Polish–Ukrainian War, Symon Petliura's forces fought the Polish Army. An armistice was signed by the combatants on 1 September 1919; it foresaw common action against the Bolsheviks.[7]

The city of Kiev had undergone numerous changes of government. The Ukrainian People's Republic was established in 1917; a Bolshevik uprising was suppressed in January 1918. The Red Army took Kiev in February, followed by the Army of the German Empire in March; Ukrainian forces retook the city in December. In February 1919, the Red Army regained control. In August, it was taken first by Symon Petliura's men and then by Denikin's army. The Soviets were in control again from December 1919.[8]

By the time of the Polish offensive, the forces of the exiled Ukrainian leader Petliura, who formally represented the Ukrainian People's Republic, had been defeated by the Red Army and controlled only a small sliver of land near the Polish border.[9][10] Under these circumstances, Petliura saw no choice but to accept Piłsudski's offer of joining an alliance with Poland despite many unresolved territorial disputes between the two nations.[3][11] On 21 April 1920, Piłsudski and a three-man Directorate of Ukraine, led by the Cossack Hetman Petliura, signed the Treaty of Warsaw.[10][12] In exchange for agreeing to a border along the Zbruch River, Petliura was promised military help in regaining the Soviet-controlled territories, including Kiev. He would assume there the authority of the Ukrainian People's Republic again.[13][14][15]

Petliura accepted the territorial gains Poland made in the course of the Polish–Ukrainian War, when it defeated the West Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR), a Ukrainian statehood attempt in Volhynia and eastern Galicia, largely Ukrainian populated but with significant Polish minority. A military convention regarding common action and subordination of Ukrainian units to Polish command was signed by Petliura and Piłsudski on 24 April.[10] On 25 April, the Polish and the UPR forces began an offensive in the direction of Kiev.[10]

Column of Polish FT-17 tanks near Lwów, c. 1919

Following the formal restoration of Ukrainian independence, the Ukrainian state was then supposed to subordinate its military and economy to Warsaw.[3] Ukraine was going to join the Polish-led Intermarium federation of states in central and eastern Europe. Piłsudski wanted a Poland-allied Ukraine to be a buffer between Poland and Russia.[16][17] Separate provisions in the treaty guaranteed the rights of the Polish and Ukrainian minorities within each state and obliged each side not to conclude any international agreements against each other.[3][9][18] Piłsudski also needed an alliance with a Ukrainian faction as cover for the action perceived abroad as military aggression.[3]

As the treaty legitimized Polish control over the territory that Ukrainians viewed as rightfully theirs, the alliance received a dire reception from many Ukrainian leaders, ranging from Mykhailo Hrushevsky,[19] former chairman of the Central Council of Ukraine, to Yevhen Petrushevych, the leader of the West Ukrainian People's Republic who was forced into exile after the Polish–Ukrainian War.

Piłsudski had been assembling a large military force throughout the winter. He had become convinced that the White movement and its forces, largely defeated by the Red Army, were no longer a security threat to Poland and that he can take on the remaining adversary, the Bolsheviks.[12] On 17 April, the Polish General Staff ordered the armed forces to assume attack positions. The Red Army, which had been regrouping since 10 March, was not fully ready for combat.[20] One important factor that limited the Soviet response to the Polish attack was the peasant Pitchfork uprising that took place in February–March and was taken very seriously by the Bolshevik leadership. It distracted the Soviet Commissar of War Leon Trotsky so much that he had temporarily left Ukraine and Belarus poorly defended.[21]

The Kiev Expedition, in which 65,000 Polish and 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers took part,[22] commenced on 25 April 1920.[23] It was carried out by the southern group of Polish armies, under Piłsudski's command.[20] The military goal was to outflank the Soviet forces and destroy them in a single battle. After winning the battle in the south, the Polish General Staff planned to quickly withdraw the Polish 3rd Army and use it to strengthen the northern front, where Piłsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. The Polish southern flank was to be held by Polish-allied Ukrainian forces under a friendly government of Ukraine.

The operation was prepared and carried out by Piłsudski and his allies. Piłsudski was convinced that the Soviets did not have major military forces at their disposal and that the Ukrainian population would generally support the Polish-led effort.[23]

Piłsudski's forces were divided into three armies. Arranged from north to south, they were the 3rd, 2nd and 6th, with Petliura's forces attached to the 6th Army. Facing them were the Soviet 12th and 14th Armies led by Alexander Yegorov. For the most part, they refrained from challenging Piłsudski's armies and withdrew.[23]

Battle[]

Polish advance[]

Polish soldiers in Kiev in May 1920

The Polish advantage on the southern Ukrainian front caused a quick defeat of the Soviet armies and their displacement past the Dnieper River.[20] Zhytomyr was captured on 26 April. Within a week, the Soviet 12th Army had become disorganized. The Polish 6th Army and Petliura's forces pushed the Soviet 14th Army out of central Ukraine as they quickly marched eastward through Vinnytsia.[9] In Vinnytsia, Petliura organized his government and prepared further offensive in the direction of Odessa.[23] The Soviet 12th Army evacuated from Kiev on 6 May.[24] The Polish offensive stopped at Kiev and the front was formed along the Dnieper.[25] The combined Polish-Ukrainian forces under General Edward Rydz-Śmigły entered the city on 7 May.[20][25] Only 150 Polish soldiers died during the entire operation.[12] On 9 May, the Polish troops celebrated the capture of Kiev with the victory parade on Khreshchatyk, the city's main street. Control over Kiev was given to the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian 6th Division was garrisoned there.[20] However, the military achievement turned out to be incomplete, as the Bolshevik armies, contrary to the Polish objectives, avoided decisive confrontations and had not been destroyed.[23] The Polish command soon felt compelled to transfer some of its units to the northern Belarusian front.[20]

The military and political developments elicited a sharp response in Russia, where Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky appealed to national sentiments and called for total war with expansionist Poland. General Aleksei Brusilov, former chief commander of the Russian Empire's tsarist army and from 2 May chairman of the new Council of Military Experts, appealed to his former officers to re-enlist with the Bolshevik forces and 40,000 of them complied. A large army of volunteers had also been raised and sent to the Western Front; the first units departed Moscow on 6 May.[20][24]

Vladimir Lenin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian SFSR, delivers a speech to motivate the troops to fight in the Soviet-Polish war, 1 May 1920

What appeared to be a highly successful military expedition to a city that symbolized the eastern reaches of Polish history (harking back to the intervention of Bolesław I the Brave in 1018) caused enormous euphoria in Warsaw and elsewhere in Poland.[25] The Polish Sejm declared the need to establish such "strategic borders" that would make a future war improbable already on 4 May.[20] Piłsudski was lionized by the public and by politicians of different orientations. On 18 May in Warsaw, he was greeted in the Sejm by its Marshal Wojciech Trąmpczyński, who spoke of a tremendous triumph of Polish arms and said to Piłsudski: "The victories of our army accomplished under your leadership will influence the future in our east".[25]

On 26 April in Zhytomyr, in his "Call to the People of Ukraine", Piłsudski assured that "the Polish Army would only stay as long as necessary until a legal Ukrainian government took control over its own territory".[23][26] Many Ukrainians were both anti-Polish and anti-Bolshevik,[27] and were suspicious of the advancing Poles. The Soviet propaganda also had the effect of encouraging negative Ukrainian sentiment towards the Polish operation and Polish-Ukrainian relations in general.[28][29]

The success of the joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign depended on the creation of a strong Ukrainian army capable of defeating the Soviets in Ukraine. While initially successful, the campaign ultimately failed. The local population was tired of hostilities after several years of war. Efforts to generate Ukrainian popular support for the idea of the country's alliance with Poland had failed.[23][25] The growth of Petliura's Ukrainian forces was slow: there were about 23,000 soldiers in September 1920.[30]

Soviet counterattack[]

Semyon Budyonny

Mikhail Tukhachevsky resolved to launch an assault on the Belarusian front before Polish troops arrive from the Ukrainian front. On 14 May, his 15th and 16th Armies attacked the weaker Polish forces there and penetrated the Polish-held areas to the depth of 180 kilometers.[20][24] The transfer of Polish divisions from the Ukrainian front had to be expedited.[23] Because of the energetic Polish counter-offensive led by Kazimierz Sosnkowski and Leonard Skierski, by 8 June the Poles recovered the bulk of the lost territory, Tukhachevsky's armies were withdrawn to the Avuta and Berezina Rivers, and the front had remained inactive until July.[20][24]

Alexander Yegorov, commander of the Russian Southwestern Front, having received considerable reinforcements, initiated on 28 May an assault maneuver in the Kiev area. In addition to the main army, the special formations of Iona Yakir and of Filipp Golikov, as well as the highly regarded 1st Cavalry Army of Semyon Budyonny, became especially important in attacks on the Polish positions. After a week of storming the Polish defenses in vain, on 5 May the 1st Cavalry Army found an opening between two Polish armies and was able to infiltrate and disorganize the rear infrastructure of Polish lines, eliminate many smaller units, and cause extensive destruction.[20][24]

Polish retreat[]

Before the Polish advance. Central and Eastern Europe in December 1919
Polish Kiev Offensive at its height. June 1920
Soviet offensive successes. Early August 1920

On 10 June, Edward Rydz-Śmigły evacuated the 3rd Polish Army from Kiev.[20][24] The Soviets were back, which was, supposedly, the 16th regime change in Kiev since the beginning of the Russian Revolution.[12] For the next two months, while fighting the Soviets, the Polish armies kept retreating toward the west.[23] On 19 July, the Poles engaged a substantial Soviet force and fought the enemy for two weeks, which culminated in the Battle of Brody. The offensive battle was terminated by Piłsudski, who withdrew two Polish divisions and sent them north, one to strengthen the force concentration at the Wieprz River and one to defend Warsaw.[20][24]

Ultimately, the Polish armies were forced to withdraw to their initial positions. The Russian forces also remained in western Ukraine and become involved in heavy fighting for the area of the city of Lviv, which had been under 1st Cavalry Army's siege from 12 August.[31]

The Kiev Expedition ended with a loss of all the territories gained by the Poles and their Ukrainian allies in the course of the campaign, and also of Volhynia and parts of Eastern Galicia. However, the retreating Polish forces avoided destruction by the Soviet armies.

Aftermath[]

In the aftermath of the defeat in Ukraine, the Polish government of Leopold Skulski resigned on 9 June, and a political crisis gripped the government for most of June.[32] Bolshevik and later Soviet propaganda used the Kiev Offensive to portray the Polish government as imperialist aggressors.[33]

The Kiev Expedition's defeat dealt a severe blow to Piłsudski's plans for the Intermarium federation, which had never materialized.[34] From that perspective, the operation may be viewed as a defeat for Piłsudski, as well as for Petliura.

On 4 July, a northern offensive was launched in Belarus by Russian armies led by Mikhail Tukhachevsky. They reached the vicinity of Warsaw in the first half of August.[25]

Accusations of misconduct[]

Both parties of the conflict made mutual accusations of violations of the basic rules of war conduct. They were rampant and full of exaggerations. Norman Davies wrote that "Polish and Soviet newspapers of that time competed in which could produce a more terrifying portrait of their opponent."[35] Soviet propaganda claimed that the Poles destroyed much of Kiev's infrastructure, including the passenger and cargo railway stations and other purely civilian objects crucial for the city's functioning, such as the electric power station, the city sewerage and water supply systems, as well as its monuments.[36] The Poles denied that they had committed any such acts of vandalism, claiming that the only deliberate damage they carried out during their evacuation was blowing up the bridges in Kiev across the Dnieper River, for strictly military reasons.[37][38] According to some Ukrainian sources, incidents of more controversial destruction in the city, not warranted by military needs of the retreating Polish Army, had also occurred. Among the destroyed objects were the mansion of the General-Governor of Kiev at Institutskaya street,[39] and the monument to Taras Shevchenko recently elected on the former location of the monument to Olga of Kiev.[40]

Richard Watt wrote that the Soviet advance into Ukraine was characterized by mass killing of civilians and the burning of entire villages, especially by Budyonny's Cossacks; such actions were designed to instill a sense of fear in the Ukrainian population. Davies noted that on 7 June Budyonny's 1st Army destroyed the bridges in Zhytomyr, wrecked the train station and burned various buildings. On the same day it burned a hospital in Berdychiv with 600 patients and Red Cross nuns. Such terror tactics he characterized as common for Budionny's Cossacks.[41]

Isaac Babel, a Red Army war correspondent, wrote in his diary about atrocities committed by the Polish troops and their allies, murders of Polish POWs by Red Army troops, and looting of the civilian population by Budyonny's Red Cossacks. Babel's writings became well known and Budyonny himself protested against the "defamation" of his troops.[35]

Order of battle[]

The following is the Order of Battle of Polish and Bolshevik forces taking part in the struggles in Ukraine, as of 25 April 1920. The command structure of both sides changed during the operation. The Russian forces were joined by Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army in the latter part of the operation, while a large part of the Polish forces was withdrawn by then to Belarus.[citation needed]

Among the participating Polish Airforce formations was the 7th Kościuszko Squadron.[citation needed]

Poland / Ukrainian People's Republic[]

Polish Army Unit Polish name Commander Remarks
  General Command of the Polish Army – Gen. Józef Piłsudski (supporting armies)
6th Army
Wacław Iwaszkiewicz 		5th Infantry 5 Dywizja Piechoty
12th Infantry 12 Dywizja Piechoty Marian Żegota-Januszajtis
18th Infantry 18 Dywizja Piechoty Franciszek Krajowski
2nd Army
Antoni Listowski 		13th Infantry 13 Dywizja Piechoty
15th Infantry 15 Dywizja Piechoty
6 січова стрілецька дивізія Marko Bezruchko
  Assault Group – Józef Piłsudski
Assault Group
Józef Piłsudski 		4th Infantry 4 Dywizja Piechoty Leonard Skierski
Cavalry Division Dywizja Jazdy Jan Romer
Rybak Operational Group
 1st Mountain Bde 1 Brygada Górska Stanisław Wróblewski
VII Brygada Kawalerii Aleksander Romanowicz
Rydz-Śmigły Operational Group
Edward Rydz-Śmigły 		1st Legions 1 Dywizja Piechoty Legionów Edward Rydz-Śmigły
7th Infantry 7 Dywizja Piechoty Eugeniusz Pogorzelski
III Brygada Kawalerii

Soviet Russia / Soviet Ukraine[]

Red Army Unit Russian name Commander Remarks
  South-Western Front – Gen. Alexander Yegorov
12th Army
Sergei Mezheninov 		7th Rifle Division 7. стрелковая дивизия
44th Rifle Division 44. стрелковая дивизия transferred to the Fastov Group of Forces, May 1920
45th Rifle Division 45. стрелковая дивизия transferred to the Fastov Group of Forces, May 1920
47th Rifle Division 47. стрелковая дивизия (1st formation) merged into the 58th RD on May 3, 1920
58th Rifle Division 58. стрелковая дивизия
17th Cavalry Division 17. кавдивизия dissolved in the middle of May 1920
25th Rifle Division 25. стрелковая дивизия arrived at the end of May 1920
Bashkir Cavalry Brigade Башкирская кавбригада arrived at the end of May 1920
14th Army
Ieronim Uborevich 		41st Rifle Division 41. стрелковая дивизия
47th Rifle Division 47. стрелковая дивизия (2nd formation) formed on June 9, 1920
60th Rifle Division 60. стрелковая дивизия
1st Cavalry Army
Semyon Budyonny
arrived in
early June 1920 		4th Cavalry Division 4. кавдивизия
6th Cavalry Division 6. кавдивизия
11th Cavalry Division 11. кавдивизия
14th Cavalry Division 14. кавдивизия
13th Army
Ivan Pauka
Opposite Wrangel 		3rd Rifle Division 3. стрелковая дивизия
15th Rifle Division 15. стрелковая дивизия arrived opposite Wrangel in May 1920
40th Rifle Division 40. стрелковая дивизия arrived opposite Wrangel in June 1920
42nd Rifle Division 42. стрелковая дивизия arrived opposite Wrangel in June 1920
46th Rifle Division 46. стрелковая дивизия
52nd Rifle Division 52. стрелковая дивизия
Latvian Rifle Division Латышская стрелковая дивизия
1st Horse Corps 1. конкорпус arrived opposite Wrangel in June 1920
2nd Cavalry Division 2. кавдивизия arrived opposite Wrangel in May 1920
8th Cavalry Division 8. кавдивизия transferred to the 14th Army, May 1920

See also[]

References[]

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  38. ^ editor's note to "The War with Poland, Postal Telegram No.2886-a" from "The Military writings of Leon Trotsky", Volume 3: 1920
  39. ^ Druh, Olha; Dmytro Malakov (2004). Osobnyaki Kyieva. Kyi. p. 124. ISBN 966-7161-60-9.
  40. ^ Александр Анисимов, "Время возводить памятники…" (The time to erect monuments...), Кіевскій Телеграфъ, №33 (76), September 3–9, 2001.
  41. ^ Davies, White Eagle..., Polish edition, pp. 123–124

Further reading[]

  • Lech Wyszczelski (1999). Kijów 1920. Warsaw: Bellona. ISBN 83-11-08963-9.
  • Norman Davies (2003). White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20. London: Pimlico. ISBN 0-7126-0694-7.
  • Józef Piłsudski (1937–1991). Pisma zbiorowe (Collected Works). Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza (reprint). ISBN 83-03-03059-0.
  • Mikhail Tukhachevski (1989). Lectures at Military Academy in Moscow, February 7–10, 1923 in: Pochód za Wisłę. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie. ISBN 83-218-0777-1.
  • Subtelny, Orest, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-8390-0.
  • Janusz Cisek (1990). Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku. Wybór dokumentów. (Neighbours Attitude Towards the War of 1920. A collection of documents, English summary). London: Polish Cultural Foundation Ltd. ISBN 0-85065-212-X.
  • Isaac Babel (2002). Red Cavalry. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-32423-0.
  • Korzeniewski, Bogusław;, THE RAID ON KIEV IN POLISH PRESS PROPAGANDA, Humanistic Review (01/2006)

External links[]

Coordinates: 50°27′N 30°31′E / 50.450°N 30.517°E / 50.450; 30.517

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