Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations)

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Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations)
Supreme Court of Canada
Hearing: December 1, 2016 Judgment: November 2, 2017
Citations	2017 SCC 54
Prior history	on appeal from the
Ruling	Appeal dismissed.
Holding
Freedom of religion protects people and their actions, but not the sites where religious ceremonies occur.
Court membership
Reasons given

Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations) is a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which concerns whether or not a First Nation can block real estate development on sacred sites by virtue of the concepts of freedom of religion and the duty to consult and accommodate (the honour of the Crown).

The majority held that the Ktunaxa Nation's rights were not violated by the decision of the Province of British Columbia to allow the Jumbo Glacier ski resort to expand into area within Ktunaxa territory known as Qat’muk where Grizzly Bear Spirit is believed to live. This is because the belief in Grizzly Bear Spirit and the ability to act upon it were not impinged, only the location, and so is not within the scope of s.2 of the Charter. The majority held that the Ktunaxa still do have a S.35 right to be consulted and accommodated regarding lands where there has been no proven Aboriginal title, but that a religious connection could not be invoked to establish title in the context of overturning an administrative decision. Ktunaxa title to the area would have to be tried separately.^[1]

The minority held that the duty to consult and accommodated was met, but that freedom of religion was impinged. However the provincial minister's infringement on freedom of religion was reasonable under s.1, and so the application for an injunction could be denied by the lower courts.

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