Menu dependence

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Roughly speaking, in decision theory, game theory, and rational choice, menu dependence arises when the evaluation of alternatives for choice or the mode of selection guiding choice varies parametrically[clarification needed] with what collection of alternatives is available for choice (i.e., with what "menu" or decision problem a decision maker is facing). Menu dependence can be accompanied by violations of various so-called consistency (or coherence) constraints, such as Sen's condition α (also known as Chernoff's Axiom, a contraction condition) and Sen's conditions γ and β (expansion conditions). While the phenomenon can arise in a variety of ways, menu dependence is often informally associated with a change in a decision maker's preferences among alternatives with the addition of irrelevant alternatives.

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Further reading[]

  • Sen, Amartya (1994). "The Formulation of Rational Choice". The American Economic Review. 84 (2): 385–390. JSTOR 2117864.
  • Sen, Amartya (1997). "Maximization and the Act of Choice" (PDF). Econometrica. 65 (4): 745–779. doi:10.2307/2171939. JSTOR 2171939.
  • Sen, Amartya (2002). Rationality and Freedom. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 165ff. ISBN 9780674013513.
  • Sniderman, Paul M.; Bullock, John (2004). "A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion and Political Choice: The Hypothesis of Menu Dependence". Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change. pp. 337–358. doi:10.2307/j.ctv346px8.16. ISBN 9780691188386. S2CID 15958075.


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