Aggravated felony

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The term aggravated felony was created by the United States Congress as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to define a category of serious criminal offenses.[1][2] It basically covers documented convictions from anywhere on Earth for which imposition of one year or longer of imprisonment was possible under the controlling law of a country or locality.[3] The INA says that for asylum in the United States, any alien "convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime."[4][5] Every legal immigrant or non-citizen U.S. national that has been convicted of any aggravated felony is ineligible for citizenship of the United States, and other than a refugee under INA section 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157,[6][7][8][9][10] every alien who has been convicted of any aggravated felony is ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted to the United States, if his or her "term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."[1][11][5][12][13]

When the term "aggravated felony" was introduced in 1988, it encompassed only murder and felony trafficking in drugs and/or firearms (but not long shotguns, long rifles, and/or ammunition of such legal weapons).[14][15] Every aggravated felony conviction manifestly encompassed a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.[14][3] The 1996 enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) tremendously expanded the "aggravated felony" definition by adding a great many more criminal convictions.[16][17] This expanded definition, however, does not apply to a person who had already taken an action to violate the law (or was arrested for the offense(s)) before September 30, 1996.[17][5] To such a person, only the pre-September 1996 definition of "aggravated felony" applies (regardless if his or her conviction was entered before or after 1996).[18][12][13] All the aggravated felonies are listed in the chart at the very bottom.[2]

Background[]

Further information: Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
John Lennon's 1976 green card issued by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

"The [INA] makes removable any alien who is convicted of an 'aggravated felony' after admission into the United States."[19][20][21][22] A refugee that is admitted under section 1157 soon becomes an "immigrant" and then a "special immigrant" after receiving a green card.[23][24] That "immigrant" status is conferred for life on such a stateless person and cannot ever be taken away under any circumstances.[10] For this reason Congress uses the term "any immigrant" in section 1182(h)(1)(A), which plainly covers every person that was admitted under section 1157 (irrespective of such person subsequently losing the permanent resident status as a result of an INA violation).[9][12][13] Any such immigrant that is not inadmissible to the United States is not deportable from the United States.[20][8][7][9][10]

Removable aliens mainly refer to the INA violators among the 75 million or so foreign nationals who are admitted each year as visitors or guests,[25][26] the 12 million or so illegal aliens,[27] and the INA violators among the hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals residing in the United States under the temporary protected status (TPS).[28] A legal immigrant, particularly one who was admitted as a stateless refugee under section 1157, can either be a national of the United States or an alien,[29] which requires a case-by-case analysis and depends mainly on the number of years he or she has been a permanent resident.[9][7][30] Removing such a protected person from the United States not only violates U.S. laws but also international law,[31][32][33][34] especially if he or she qualifies as an American or has continuously resided in the United States for at least 10 years without committing (in those years) any offense that triggers removability.[35][36][37]

In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court reminded all immigration officials that "once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly."[38] That opinion was issued after Congress and the Reagan administration firmly resettled in the United States thousands of refugee families from totalitarian states such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, etc.[39][40][41][42][43][44] As U.N.-recognized refugees, these legal immigrants had permanently lost their homes, farms, businesses, properties, livelihood, families, relatives, pets, etc. They similarly lost their former nationalities after obtaining permanent resident cards (green cards) of the United States, and thus gradually became like the rest of Americans.[45][46][47][48][49][10]

Expansion of "nationals but not citizens of the United States"[]

Further information: Oath of Allegiance (United States) and United States nationality law
A U.S. passport that is issued only to a non-citizen national of the United States.

In 1986, less than a year before the CAT became effective, Congress augmented the group known as "nationals but not citizens of the United States" by adding paragraph (4) to section 1408, which states that:

the following shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth: .... (4) A person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a national, but not a citizen, of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than seven years in any continuous period of ten years—(A) during which the national parent was not outside the United States or its outlying possessions for a continuous period of more than one year, and (B) at least five years of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years.[48][5]

The natural reading of section 1408(4) demonstrates that it was not exclusively written for the 55,000 Samoan Americans but also for any legal immigrant who qualifies as a "non-citizen national" of the United States.[50][48][12] This means any such immigrant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets (or at any time has met) the requirements of sections 1408(4), 1427, 1436, etc., and thereafter claim to be a non-citizen U.S. national.[51][37] Such legal claim must be plausible and not frivolous because anyone who knowingly makes a false United States citizenship or nationality claim can be prosecuted and even removed from the country.[52] "Deprivation of [nationality]—particularly American [nationality], which is one of the most valuable rights in the world today—has grave practical consequences."[53][31][32][33][34][54][55]

Latest amendments made to the term "aggravated felony" under section 1101(a)(43)[]

In 1988, Congress introduced the term "aggravated felony" by defining it under section 1101(a).[14] Its definition was amended over the years. It basically refers to a crime for which imprisonment of one year or longer may be imposed under the controlling law of the country or locality.[3] As of September 30, 1996, an "aggravated felony" only encompasses a conviction "for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."[1][12]

After those 15 years successfully pass, a legal immigrant automatically becomes eligible for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, voluntary departure, waiver of inadmissibility, etc.[7][9][56] He or she may (at any time) request these immigration benefits depending on whichever is more applicable or easier to obtain.[57][58] It makes no difference if the aggravated felony was committed in the United States or in any other country.[12] Also, the current expanded definition of "aggravated felony" does not apply to a person who had engaged in a criminal activity (or was arrested for the offense(s)) anytime before September 30, 1996.[17][5] To such an individual, only the pre-September 1996 definition of "aggravated felony" applies (regardless of the date of conviction).[17][18][12][13] Everything to the contrary leads to an absurd result and deprivation of rights under color of law, which is a serious federal crime.[31][32][33][34][54]

Consequences of an aggravated felony conviction[]

Further information: Cancellation of removal and waiver of inadmissibility (United States)
Sample of a permanent resident card (green card), which lawfully permits its holder to live and work for lifetime in the United States similar to that of all other Americans.

In February 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a presidential directive in which he warned the Attorney General and others by stating the following:

Our efforts to combat illegal immigration must not violate the privacy and civil rights of legal immigrants and U.S. citizens. Therefore, I direct the Attorney General... and other relevant Administration officials to vigorously protect our citizens and legal immigrants from immigration-related instances of discrimination and harassment....[54]

Despite what President Clinton said in the above directive, some plainly incompetent immigration officers began deporting admitted refugees (i.e., potential Americans).[37] These legal immigrants are permanent residents with green cards, Social Security numbers, driver's licenses, state ID cards, corporations, bank accounts, credit cards, insurances, etc. They own homes, businesses, vehicles and other properties in the United States under their names. Such people statutorily qualify as Americans after continuously residing in the United States for at least 10 years without committing (in those years) any offense that triggers removability.[48][13] Those that were originally admitted as stateless refugees under section 1157 naturally owe permanent allegiance to the United States, and that makes them nothing but Americans. Anything to the contrary could lead to deprivation of rights under color of law, which is a crime that entails capital punishment.[31][32][55][33][34][53][54]

Unlike a non-citizen national, any alien convicted of any aggravated felony statutorily becomes "removable" from the United States,[20] but only if his or her "term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."[1][12][13] In other words, such alien cannot:

  • have his or her removal proceeding terminated without a written legal order issued by an immigration judge, the BIA, a court of appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States.[59][60][61][62]
  • be admitted (or readmitted) to the United States prior to being granted cancellation of removal or a waiver of inadmissibility, unless he or she was previously admitted to the United States as a refugee under section 1157,[6][8][9][10] or granted "a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several States."[63]
  • obtain asylum in the United States unless he or she was previously admitted to the United States as a refugee under section 1157,[6][7][8][9] or his or her aggravated felony was shown not to be a particularly serious crime.[4] An alien convicted of a particularly serious crime may still receive asylum if he or she is a non-violent person,[6][7][9] or deferral of removal under the CAT if he or she is a violent individual.[64]
  • obtain adjustment of status unless he or she was previously admitted to the United States as a refugee under section 1157.[7][9]
  • obtain voluntary departure.[65]

Challenging an aggravated felony charge[]

Further information: Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Supreme Court of the United States
Any person accused of being an aggravated felon may take the case to the U.S. Supreme Court

To determine if a person has been convicted of any aggravated felony, government officials and federal courts apply what is "called the categorical approach."[66] This "analytical technique" requires comparing the statute(s) of conviction(s) with the listed offenses under section 1101(a)(43) to determine which subparagraph(s) can be used against the person.[19] If no logical match can be made then the person is innocent and any removal proceeding must be terminated.[67][59] There is at least one case in which a long-established legal immigrant has been removed from the United States without applying any categorical approach.[37]

An order of removal or deportation may be investigated and corrected at any time.[57][68][61][5] Habeas proceedings that resulted in miscarriage of justice, either before or after the Real ID Act of 2005, can be reopened under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[69][70] The review of the order does not require the alien (or the American) to remain in the United States. It can be requested from anywhere in the world via mail (e.g., DHL, FedEx, UPS, etc.) and/or electronic court filing (ECF),[71] and the case can be filed in any federal court the alien (or the American) finds appropriate.[72] Every illegal deportation claim, gross miscarriage of justice claim, United States nationality claim, etc., is adjudicated under section 1252 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 et seq.[73][68][29][69][33][61][60]

All people wrongfully placed in removal proceedings equally have a federal statutory right to request declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and/or damages.[61][68] This applies regardless if they are inside or outside the United States.[60][51] A "notice to appear" that contains material false information (and/or omits a material fact) legally makes the entire removal proceeding void ab initio.[74] Under 8 CFR 1239.2, any Immigration Judge may at any time terminate the removal proceeding of any person who: (1) turns out to be a national of the United States; or (2) one that is simply not removable under the INA.[59][20] In this regard, Congress has long warned every government official and judicial officer by stating the following:

'Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens,' shall be subject to specified criminal penalties.[75][31][33][34][54][53]

Effect of parole or supervised release on an aggravated felony conviction[]

Further information: Criminal sentencing in the United States

Subparagraphs (F), (G), (J), (P), (R) and (S) of section 1101(a)(43) require that the related offense must be punishable by one year or longer of imprisonment under the pertinent controlling law, and that at least one year of imprisonment must be imposed by the trial or sentencing court.[76] Subparagraph (T) further explains that the failure to appear conviction must relate to "a felony for which a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment or more may be imposed."[77]

The above subparagraphs (F) to (T) do not cover situations where a judge (using the pertinent controlling law) imposes less than one year of imprisonment.[78] In other words, when a court orders an individual to serve "four months" in any prison then the entire sentence imposed is "four months",[79] regardless if the advisory sentencing guidelines state a higher maximum sentence.[80] Under the INA, the term "sentence" in any conviction explicitly and exclusively refers to imprisonment (i.e., punishment, penalty, or physical restraint) that must be served inside an institutional setting such as a prison.[3] It includes any pretrial confinement such as time spent as a detainee inside a police station, a hospital, a youth detention center, etc. Any "street time" (i.e., the months or years of parole or supervised release) ordered by the trial court as part of a defendant's overall sentence is separate and does not constitute imprisonment.[81] A sentence in a conviction with both "imprisonment" and "parole" (or "supervised release") is referred to as a "bifurcated sentence" in some jurisdictions.[82] In such convictions, only the portion that had to be spent in prison is relevant for INA purposes.[79][3] Neither portions of such sentences are suspended,[83] and it is not only wrong but also a crime to misrepresent any supervision as a term of imprisonment.[84][81][82][31][32] That is like somebody absurdly viewing students residing in dormitories at boarding schools or universities as inmates in prisons. In some jurisdictions the highest courts have held that even house arrest is not imprisonment.[85]

Section 921(a)(20) applies to the entire Chapter 44 (§§ 921-931) of title 18.[14] As such, section 921(a)(20) controls 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), especially subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F) and (G). Under section 921(a)(20), Congress says this: "What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." This means that the federal felony definition controls in all aggravated felony-related cases.[86] More importantly, section 927 states that "[n]o provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter...."[87][5] That chapter covers (among other crimes) every crime of violence.[88]

Precedents relating to "crime of violence" under U.S. law[]

In 2001, the Fifth Circuit held "that because intentional force against the person or property of another is seldom, if ever, employed to commit the offense of felony DWI, such offense is not a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)."[89] Later in the same year, the Third Circuit held that unintentional vehicular homicide is not an aggravated felony.[90] In Leocal v. Ashcroft (2004), the Supreme Court held that driving under the influence is not an aggravated felony if the statute that defines the offense does not contain a mens rea element or otherwise allows a conviction for merely negligent conduct. It has also been held that a misdemeanor "simple assault" does not constitute an aggravated felony.[91] "And the Supreme Court recently declared... that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, cannot be the basis for an aggravated felony."[92]

Statute of limitations of an aggravated felony conviction[]

Further information: Statute of limitations

For removal purposes, in nearly all cases a "crime involving moral turpitude" (CIMT) has to be committed within five years from the date of the alien's admission into the United States.[3] A CIMT also requires that it be punishable under the controlling law by at least one year of imprisonment.[93] If a court of law has no legal authority to impose at least one year of imprisonment then the conviction cannot make any legal immigrant removable.[3][20] An aggravated felony conviction has a 15-year statute of limitations, which begins from the date the term of imprisonment is completed. After this period runs out, the alien may still be removable on other grounds but no longer as an aggravated felon. In this regard, Congress explicitly stated in the penultimate provision of section 1101(a)(43) the following:

The term ["aggravated felony"] applies to an offense described in [section 1101(a)(43)] whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the term ["aggravated felony"] applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996. (emphases added).[1][12][13]

The part in the first sentence that states, "whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country", in the above-quoted text, has no significance for the 15-year statute of limitations because the listed offenses under section 1101(a)(43) are naturally in violation of every law on Earth. Some courts in the past have bizarrely attempted to make a distinction between local and foreign criminal convictions.[94] In regards to that, the findings and assertions of those courts must be rejected as being clearly erroneous dicta. Also, as explained earlier, the current expanded definition of "aggravated felony" does not apply to people who had already taken actions to violate the law (or were arrested for the offense(s)) anytime before September 30, 1996.[17][5] Only the pre-September 1996 definition of "aggravated felony" applies to those specific people, even if their convictions were actually entered anytime after April 1, 1997, the effective date of IIRIRA.[16][18][12][13] "The ordinary meaning of 'notwithstanding' is 'in spite of,' or 'without prevention or obstruction from or by.'"[95] The above-quoted penultimate provision controls every conflicting statutory and decisional law.[96] "In statutes, the [notwithstanding clause] 'shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash.'"[95]

The overall purpose of section 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate provision is to protect the United States and the over 13 million green card holders against lawless actions.[97][98][99][100][31][32][55][101][102] In other words, the lives of these vulnerable legal immigrants should not be in the hands of a small number of judges,[54][103][104] who often make serious reversible errors in immigration-related cases.[105] An unknown number of these legal immigrants statutorily qualify as Americans.[36][35][47][45][46][37] "The proliferation of immigration laws and regulations has aptly been called a labyrinth that only a lawyer could navigate."[106] The law equally protects everyone in the United States,[107][101][102][108][109] not only those who merely possess a simple paper proving U.S. citizenship. Such documents are sometimes forged and/or criminally obtained.[110][111][112][113]

Consequences of illegal re-entry after deportation[]

Further information: Deportation of Americans from the United States
U.S. Customs and Border Protection on patrol near the U.S.-Mexico border.

Every nonimmigrant convicted of any aggravated felony and lawfully removed "must remain outside of the United States for twenty consecutive years from the deportation date before he or she is eligible to re-enter the United States."[114] This does not apply to legal immigrants that were originally admitted as refugees under section 1157.[24][6][7][8][9][115] Many previously removed people are believed to be residing inside the United States, some of whom have been removed from the United States about a dozen of times.[116][117]

According to the INA, it is a federal crime for any non-criminal alien to illegally enter the United States after that alien has been legally denied entry, excluded, removed, deported, or if he or she has departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding. The maximum sentence for this crime is 2 years of imprisonment.[118] However, if he or she was a criminal alien and "whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both."[119]

The penalty can be increased to as high as 20 years of imprisonment in the case of an alien who was convicted of a particularly serious crime or an aggravated felony and then illegally reentered the United States. Such penalty, however, is extremely rare since no alien has received that many years of imprisonment. Most defendants in such cases receive around 5 years of imprisonment. The only person saved from guilt and serving any imprisonment for illegal reentry after deportation is someone who "was not originally removable as charged, and so could not be convicted of illegal reentry."[120]

List of aggravated felonies[]

The following is a list of all the aggravated felonies in the INA.[2]

List of aggravated felonies
Letter Grade 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor;
(B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18);
(C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921 of title 18) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title);
(D) an offense described in section 1956 of title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000;
(E) an offense described in — (i) section 842(h) or (i) of title 18, or section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title (relating to explosive materials offenses); (ii) section 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r) or 924(b) or (h) of title 18 (relating to firearms offenses); or (iii) section 5861 of title 26 (relating to firearms offenses);
(F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of title 18 (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom);
(I) an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of title 18 (relating to child pornography);
(J) an offense described in section 1962 of title 18 (relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations), or an offense described in section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to gambling offenses), for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be imposed;
(K) an offense that — (i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business; (ii) is described in section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of title 18 (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial advantage; or (iii) is described in any of sections 1581–1585 or 1588–1591 of title 18 (relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons);
(L) an offense described in — (i) section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting national defense information), 798 (relating to disclosure of classified information), 2153 (relating to sabotage) or 2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of title 18; (ii) section 421 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents); or (iii)section 421 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents);
(M) an offense that — (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000;
(N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this chapter;
(O) an offense described in section 1325(a) or 1326 of this title committed by an alien who was previously deported on the basis of a conviction for an offense described in another subparagraph of this paragraph;
(P) an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instrument in violation of section 1543 of title 18 or is described in section 1546(a) of such title (relating to document fraud) and (ii) for which the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this chapter;
(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more;
(R) an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(S) an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment or more may be imposed; and
(U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.

References[]

This article in most part is based on law of the United States, including statutory and latest published case law.

  1. ^ a b c d e 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
    • "Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 19, 2016. p. 1627. The whole point of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence is to make clear that a listed offense should lead to swift removal, no matter whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law.
      • "Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. January 15, 2002. p. 211. This penultimate sentence, governing the enumeration of crimes in section 101(a)(43) of the Act, refers the reader to all of the crimes 'described in' the aggravated felony provision.
      • "Zivkovic v. Holder, 724 F.3d 894". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 31, 2013. p. 911. Because Zivkovic's aggravated felony convictions were more than a decade old before the 1988 statute took effect, they cannot be used as a ground for removal (although they can be used for many other purposes under the statute).
      • "Ledezma-Galicia v. Holder, 636 F.3d 1059". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 29, 2010. p. 1080. Ledezma-Galicia is not removable by reason of being an aggravated felon, because 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to convictions, like Ledezma-Galicia's, that occurred prior to November 18, 1988.
  2. ^ a b c "Chery v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 18-1036". Second Circuit. Casetext.com. October 15, 2021. p. 32.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) ("(A) The term 'conviction' means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. (B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.") (emphases added)
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) ("Any alien who—(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years ... after the date of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable.") (emphasis added)
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)
      • "United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 10, 2019. p. 1224. In sum, the Supreme Court has held that courts must consider both a crime's statutory elements and sentencing factors when determining whether an offense is 'punishable' by a certain term of imprisonment.
      • "United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 28, 2019. p. 844. None of McAdory's prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.
      • "United States v. Williams, 5 F.4th 973". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. July 16, 2021. The panel held that the Washington offense of theft from a vulnerable adult in the second degree was not 'punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year' when the statutory maximum sentence exceeded one year but the maximum sentence allowed under the State's mandatory sentencing guidelines did not. Accordingly, the district court erred in determining that the defendant committed a Grade B supervised release violation.
      • "United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881". Eighth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 25, 2011. p. 884.
      • "United States v. Hisey, ___ F.4th ___, No. 20-3106". Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. September 14, 2021.
  4. ^ a b 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i)
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h "Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 11, 2001. p. 153. The word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command. (internal quotation marks omitted)
  6. ^ a b c d e 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3)
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h "Matter of C-A-S-D-, 27 I&N Dec. 692". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. November 1, 2019. p. 694. Section 209(c) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may waive certain criminal grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the Act 'with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.' (emphasis added)
    • "Matter of H-N-, 22 I&N Dec. 1039" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. October 13, 1999. p. 1040. Pursuant to section 209 of the Act, an alien admitted into the United States as a refugee under section 207 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), may have his or her status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. In making such a determination, it is clear from the statute that the Attorney General has the power to grant a waiver of inadmissibility to an alien who may be inadmissible. (emphases added)
      • "City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. July 1, 1985. p. 439. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.
  8. ^ a b c d e 8 U.S.C. § 1181(c) ("The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to an alien whom the Attorney General admits to the United States under section 1157 of this title.")
    • "Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 28, 2012. p. 263. An alien seeking 'admission' to the United States is subject to various requirements, see, e.g., § 1181(a), and cannot gain entry if she is deemed 'inadmissible' on any of the numerous grounds set out in the immigration statutes, see § 1182.
  9. ^ a b c d e f g h i j "Matter of N-V-G-, 28 I&N Dec. 380". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 17, 2021. A person who enters the United States as a refugee and later adjusts in the United States to lawful permanent resident status is not precluded from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2018), based on a conviction for an aggravated felony, because he or she has not 'previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence' under that provision.
    • "Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. May 12, 2015. An alien who adjusted status in the United States, and who has not entered as a lawful permanent resident, is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), as a result of an aggravated felony conviction.
    • "Matter of Michel, 21 I&N Dec. 1101" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. January 30, 1998. An alien who has not previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is statutorily eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)), despite his conviction for an aggravated felony.
      • "De Leon v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1224". Tenth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 22, 2015. p. 1232. Mr. Obregon next claims that even if he is removable, he should nevertheless have been afforded the opportunity to apply for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Under controlling precedent from our court and the BIA's recent decision in Matter of J-H-J- he is correct.
      • "Sambare v. Attorney General, 925 F.3d 124". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. May 28, 2019. p. 126. In October 2013, however, an Immigration Court granted Sambare's application for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and thus restored his status as a lawful permanent resident.
      • "Zamora v. Attorney General, 633 F. App'x 570". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 11, 2015. p. 573. More is required, however, to be eligible for a § 212(h) waiver on the basis of an 'extreme hardship,' 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B), to a qualifying relative.
  10. ^ a b c d e "Romanishyn v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 175". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 20, 2006. p. 185. That the INA addresses termination of refugee status in only one provision—8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4)—might suggest, as Mr. Romanishyn argues, that refugee status persists indefinitely unless it is terminated pursuant to that provision. (emphasis added)
    • "Reznik v. U.S. Department of Justice, INS, 901 F. Supp. 188". U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. March 28, 1995. p. 193. Congress granted the President and Attorney General wide discretion in determining the admission of refugees to the United States.
      • "Matter of B-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 119" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. May 3, 2013. p. 120 n.2. Section 101(a)(42) of the Act provides in pertinent part: The term 'refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .
  11. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) ("Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.")
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h i j "Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 26, 2004. p. 534. It is well established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms. (quotation marks omitted)
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h "Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 18, 1997. p. 341. The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.
    • "United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 24, 2019. p. 2323. In our constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all.
      • "Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (2016)". Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. June 20, 2016. p. 661. We also agree with Appellee and his amicus that a sentence based on an unconstitutional statute that is incapable of severance is void.
        • "Commonwealth v. Michuck, 454 Pa. Super. 594, 686 A.2d 403". Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. November 19, 1996. p. 602. An unconstitutional statute 'is ineffective for any purpose since its unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment and not merely from the date of the decision holding it so.'
  14. ^ a b c d "Subtitle J—Provisions Relating to the Deportation of Aliens Who Commit Aggravated Felonies, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4469-79, § 7342" (PDF). U.S. Congress. U.S. Government Publishing Office. November 18, 1988. p. 289–90. Retrieved 2018-09-26. Section 101(a) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: '(43) The term 'aggravated felony' means murder, any drug trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code], or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices as defined in section 921 of such title, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act, committed within the United States.' (emphases added)
  15. ^ 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(17); 26 U.S.C. § 5845; see also 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6102; 18 U.S.C. § 927 ("Effect on State law").
  16. ^ a b "Othi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 259". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 29, 2013. p. 264.
  17. ^ a b c d e "Subtitle B—Criminal Alien Provisions, Sec. 321. Amended Definition of Aggravated Felony" (PDF). U.S. Congress. U.S. Congress. p. 628. Retrieved 2021-10-27. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred....
  18. ^ a b c "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 25, 2001. p. 320.
    • "Francisco-Lopez v. Attorney General, 970 F.3d 431". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 13, 2020. p. 436. Retroactivity is not favored in the law. This applies with full force to the BIA's retroactive application of new law.
    • "Jaghoori v. Holder, 772 F.3d 764". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 18, 2014. p. 769. Although we generally defer to agency interpretations of statutes that are ambiguous, 'a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed ... to be unambiguously prospective.'
    • "Jeudy v. Holder, 768 F.3d 595". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 15, 2014. p. 605. Applying § 1229b(d)(l)(B) in this case would impose a new disability on pre-IIRIRA conduct without a clear statement from Congress indicating its intent to impose that disability. We therefore hold that Jeudy's 1995 drug conviction did not 'stop time' for his continuous residence in the United States.
    • "Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 22, 2006. p. 1192. We also hold... that the permanent stop-time rule of § 240A(d)(l) ... may not be applied retroactively to prevent Sinotes-Cruz from fulfilling the sevenyear continuous residence requirement ... for cancellation of removal.
  19. ^ a b "Matter of Reyes, 28 I&N Dec. 52". Attorney General. U.S. Dept. of Justice. July 30, 2020. p. 53.
  20. ^ a b c d e 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) ("The term 'removable' means—(A) in the case of an alien not admitted to the United States, that the alien is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, or (B) in the case of an alien admitted to the United States, that the alien is deportable under section 1227 of this title.")
  21. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) ("The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.") (emphasis added)
  22. ^ "Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 27, 2018. p. 855. The term 'or' is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings. (quotation marks omitted)
  23. ^ "Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. July 7, 2021. p. 1182-83. The INA generally defines the words 'admission' and 'admitted' as 'the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.'
    • "Matter of D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. 761" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. April 12, 2012. p. 766. With regard to refugees, the language of both the Act and the regulations states that they are 'admitted' to the United States.
  24. ^ a b
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) ("The term 'immigrant' means every alien except an alien who is within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens....")
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) ("The term 'special immigrant' means—(A) an immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad....")
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(2) ("Any alien who is found upon inspection and examination by an immigration officer pursuant to paragraph (1) ... as an immigrant under this chapter....") (emphasis added)
  25. ^ "Destination USA: 75 million international guests visited in 2014". share.america.gov. Retrieved 2018-09-30.
  26. ^ "International Visitation to the United States: A Statistical Summary of U.S. Visitation" (PDF). U.S. Department of Commerce. 2015. p. 2. Retrieved 2018-09-30.
  27. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b) ("An illegal alien ... is any alien ... who is in the United States unlawfully....")
  28. ^ See generally
  29. ^ a b
  30. ^ "NBC Asian America Presents: Deported". NBC. March 16, 2017. Retrieved 2018-10-11.
  31. ^ a b c d e f g "Deprivation of rights under color of law". U.S. Dept. of Justice. Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under 'color of law' include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials....
  32. ^ a b c d e f "United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 31, 1997. p. 264. Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
    • "Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 27, 2002. p. 739. Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U. S. C. §242.
      • "United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 30, 2006. p. 136. Section 241 proscribes conspiracies that seek to 'injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person' in connection with exercising or enjoying constitutional rights.
  33. ^ a b c d e f "Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved 2021-10-27.
  34. ^ a b c d e "Chapter 11 - Foreign Policy: Senate OKs Ratification of Torture Treaty" (46th ed.). CQ Press. 1990. p. 806–7. Retrieved August 8, 2018. The three other reservations, also crafted with the help and approval of the Bush administration, did the following: Limited the definition of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading' treatment to cruel and unusual punishment as defined under the Fifth, Eighth and 14th Amendments to the Constitution.... (emphasis added).
  35. ^ a b Sakuma, Amanda (October 24, 2014). "Lawsuit says ICE attorney forged document to deport immigrant man". MSNBC. Retrieved 2018-10-22.
  36. ^ a b Stanton, Ryan (May 11, 2018). "Michigan father of 4 was nearly deported; now he's a U.S. citizen". www.mlive.com. Retrieved 2018-10-22.
  37. ^ a b c d e "Ahmadi v. Attorney General, 842 F. App'x 777". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. April 7, 2021. p. 778. The BIA ultimately affirmed the Immigration Judge's determination that Ahmadi was subject to removal due to the nature of his convictions and ruled that he was not eligible for withholding of removal.
    • Ahmadi v. Attorney General, No. 19-2713 (audio (2:20—3:04)). Third Circuit. July 9, 2020. Your Honors, this is a case that shocks the conscience. It is about an illegal deportation of a non-violent person from the State of Pennsylvania who was: 1) admitted to this country as an 11-year-old refugee from a totalitarian state pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2)(A); 2) became a lawful permanent resident, LPR, of the United States pursuant to § 1159(a)(2); 3) rightfully and successfully became a recipient of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, CAT, relief on September 26, 2000; and 4) was naturalized or admitted as a national of the United States under the Child Citizenship Act, CCA, of 2000.
    • "Ahmadi v. Attorney General, 659 F. App'x 72". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 27, 2016. p. 73. He was removed from this country in February 2003.... He maintains that he once more showed the BIA that he was entitled to CAT protection, a waiver of inadmissibility, and naturalization.
    • "Ahmadi v. Ashcroft, et al., No. 03-249". U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. PACER (law). February 19, 2003. p. 1. Petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding, entered the United States on September 30, 1982 as a refugee from his native Afghanistan. Two years later, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the 'INS') adjusted Petitioner's status to that of a lawful permanent resident, retroactive to September 30, 1982.
  38. ^ "Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 15, 1982. p. 32.
  39. ^ "Matter of Izatula, 20 I&N Dec. 149" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. February 6, 1990. p. 154. Afghanistan is a totalitarian state under the control of the [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan], which is kept in power by the Soviet Union.
  40. ^ "Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec. 66" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. May 19, 1995. p. 72. We further find, however, that the past persecution suffered by the applicant was so severe that his asylum application should be granted notwithstanding the change of circumstances.
  41. ^ "Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 2, 2004. p. 1120. Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.
  42. ^ "Cambodia: Khmer Rouge leaders guilty of genocide, court rules". Al Jazeera. November 16, 2018. Retrieved 2018-11-19. Verdict after years of trial is first time any Khmer Rouge leaders were found guilty of genocide for 1975-79 terror.
  43. ^ Federis, Marnette (March 3, 2018). "Some Vietnamese immigrants were protected from deportation, but the Trump administration may be changing that policy". Public Radio International (PRI). Retrieved September 25, 2018.
  44. ^ Levin, Sam (November 10, 2017). "Detained and divided: how the US turned on Vietnamese refugees". The Guardian. Retrieved September 25, 2018.
  45. ^ a b "U.S. citizen mistakenly put in deportation proceedings finally returns to America". NBC News. February 4, 2020. Retrieved 2021-10-27.
  46. ^ a b "Cambodian refugee who advocates say was wrongly deported returns to U.S." NBC News. February 28, 2020. Retrieved 2021-10-27.
  47. ^ a b "First Cambodian to return after deportation inspires others after gaining U.S. citizenship". NBC News. July 16, 2020. Retrieved 2021-10-27.
  48. ^ a b c d 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (emphases added)
  49. ^ "Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 17, 2014. p. 393.
  50. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1452(b) ("Application to Secretary of State for certificate of non-citizen national status....")
  51. ^ a b "Saliba v. Attorney General, 828 F.3d 182". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 8, 2016. p. 189. [A]n applicant for naturalization has the burden of proving 'by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets all of the requirements for naturalization.'
  52. ^ See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1015
  53. ^ a b c "Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 18, 1963. p. 160. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
    • "Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 25, 2012. p. 395. Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.
  54. ^ a b c d e f "60 FR 7885: ANTI-DISCRIMINATION" (PDF). U.S. Government Publishing Office. February 10, 1995. p. 7888. (emphases added)
    • "Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 114". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 25, 2018. p. 122. The Constitution protects both citizens and non-citizens.
    • "Calderon-Rosas v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 378". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. April 27, 2020. p. 385. The Supreme Court has explained that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings... because the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. (citations and quotation marks omitted)
    • "Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General, 859 F.3d 208". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 12, 2017. p. 213. In other words, petitioners must receive 'a full and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf, and a decision on the merits of their claim by a 'neutral and impartial arbiter.' (citations omitted)
  55. ^ a b c 18 U.S.C. § 2441 ("War crimes").
  56. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)
    • "INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 3, 1999. p. 420.
      • "Luziga v. Attorney General, 937 F.3d 244". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. September 5, 2019. p. 251-52. Withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief that prevents removal of a noncitizen to a country where that individual's life or freedom would be threatened because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
  57. ^ a b "Reopening or reconsideration before the Board of Immigration Appeals". National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved 2021-10-27. The Board may at any time' reopen or reconsider a case in which it has rendered a decision on its own motion solely in order to correct a ministerial mistake or typographical error in that decision or to reissue the decision to correct a defect in service.... The time and numerical limitations set forth in [8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)] shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings... (v) For which a three-member panel of the Board agrees that reopening is warranted when the following circumstances are present, provided that a respondent may file only one motion to reopen pursuant to this paragraph (c)(3): (A) A material change in fact or law underlying a removability ground or grounds specified in section 212 or 237 of the Act that occurred after the entry of an administratively final order that vitiates all grounds of removability applicable to the alien; and (B) The movant exercised diligence in pursuing the motion to reopen.... (emphases added)
    • "Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Attorney General, 870 F.3d 108". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 29, 2017. p. 111. [T]he 90-day time bar (and restriction to file only one motion) will be waived for motions to reopen that (1) apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation that are (2) based on changed country conditions and (3) supported by material evidence unavailable at the previous hearing.
    • "Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. March 30, 2021. p. 718 n.8. We have held that these regulations also apply to claims under the Convention Against Torture.
    • "Nolasco-Amaya v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 20-70187". Ninth Circuit. Ninth Circuit. September 28, 2021. p. 5. Petitioner's Notice of Appeal was sufficiently specific to inform the BIA of the issues challenged on appeal, given her status as a pro se litigant.
    • "Vega-Anguiano v. Barr, 982 F.3d 542". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. November 19, 2019. p. 545. A petition for review filed under § 1252(b)(1) triggers judicial review and the exercise of jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(1). Because Vega-Anguiano filed his petition for review of his reinstatement order under § 1252(b)(1), he may bring any collateral attack authorized by § 1252(a)(1).
    • "Gonzalez-Cantu v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 302". Fifth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 1, 2017. p. 306.
    • "United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 1, 2006. p. 352. Having determined that we may review Charleswell's attempt to collaterally challenge the 1991 Deportation order, we next address whether he is able to meet the Mendoza-Lopez requirements.
  58. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v)
  59. ^ a b c "Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 462". Attorney General. U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 18, 2018.
  60. ^ a b c "Cheneau v. Garland, No. 15-70636". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. May 18, 2021. p. 3. Cheneau is a citizen of the United States. Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA's decision, and REMAND with instructions to terminate Cheneau's removal proceedings.
    • "Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 10, 2014. p. 1119. The government has failed to carry its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Medina has been convicted of an aggravated felony or a controlled substance offense....
    • "Addo v. Barr, 982 F.3d 1263". Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. December 14, 2020. p. 1268 n.4. We note that Petitioner's removal has not mooted his petition for review because, 'in the event this court grants his petition, [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] would facilitate his return to the United States pursuant to its Facilitation of Return Policy.'
    • "Singh v. USCIS, 878 F.3d 441". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 22, 2017. p. 443. The government conceded that Singh's removal was improper given the Ninth Circuit's stay. Consequently, in May 2007, Singh was temporarily paroled back into the United States by the Attorney General, who exercised his discretion to grant temporary-parole to certain aliens.
    • "Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 12, 2016. p. 589-90.
    • "Orabi v. Attorney General, 738 F.3d 535". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 2, 2014. p. 543. The judgment of the BIA will therefore be reversed, with instructions that the Government, pursuant to its August 12, 2013 letter, be directed to return Orabi to the United States in accordance with the ICE regulations cited.
      • "Avalos-Palma v. United States, Civil Action No. 13-5481(FLW)". U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Casetext.com. July 16, 2014. p. 3. On June 2, 2012, approximately 42 months after the improper deportation, ICE agents effectuated Avalos-Palma's return to the United States.
        • "In re Vikramjeet Sidhu, A044 238 062". Board of Immigration Appeals. Scribd. November 30, 2011. p. 1-2. As related in his brief on appeal, the respondent was physically removed from the United States in June 2004, but subsequently returned to this country under a grant of humanitarian parole.... Accordingly, the proceedings will be terminated.
  61. ^ a b c d "Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 27, 2001. p. 74. [I]njunctive relief has long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.
    • "Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 22, 2009. p. 428. When a court employs 'the extraordinary remedy of injunction,' Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982), it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive powers.
    • Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, ed. (July 3, 2014). "Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 2810. Under our precedents, '[a]n injunction is appropriate only if (1) it is necessary or appropriate in aid of our jurisdiction, and (2) the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.'
    • Chief Justice Roberts, in chambers, ed. (September 30, 2010). "Lux v. Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306 (2010)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 1307. To obtain injunctive relief from a Circuit Justice, an applicant must demonstrate that the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear. (citation and quotation marks omitted)
  62. ^ Chung, Andrew (April 17, 2018). "Supreme Court restricts deportations of immigrant felons". Reuters.
  63. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi)
  64. ^ "Anwari v. Attorney General, No. 18-1505". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. November 6, 2018. p. 6. To qualify for deferral of removal under the CAT, an applicant must show that he is 'more likely than not' to be tortured.
    • "Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270" (PDF). Attorney General. U.S. Dept. of Justice. March 5, 2002. p. 279. Although the respondents are statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal by virtue of their convictions for 'particularly serious crimes,' the regulations implementing the [CAT] allow them to obtain a deferral of removal notwithstanding the prior criminal offenses if they can establish that they are 'entitled to protection' under the Convention.
  65. ^ "United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 15, 2013. p. 1013-14 n.2. Voluntary departure is not available to an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony.
  66. ^ "Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 17, 2018. p. 1211.
  67. ^ "Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 3, 2006. p. 36. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a provides that the burden of proof is on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable.
    • 8 CFR 1240.8(a) ("A respondent charged with deportability shall be found to be removable if the Service proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged.")
    • 8 CFR 1240.46(a) ("A determination of deportability shall not be valid unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.")
      • "Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630 (1967)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 23, 1967. p. 636.
      • "Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. December 12, 1966. p. 286. We hold that no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.
      • "Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 14, 1960. pp. 351–56.
      • "Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 9, 1953. p. 596-97. It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law.
      • "Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 18, 1945. p. 149. [D]etention under an invalid order of deportation is established where an alien is ordered deported for reasons not specified by Congress.
        • "Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 27, 2006. p. 138. In this case, however, because Francis is a permanent resident, the government bears the burden of proof, which it must meet by adducing 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.'
        • "Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 6, 1990. p. 670 n.7. The Supreme Court has held that the burden of proof is upon the INS to show the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.
        • "United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 26, 2009. p. 349. To convict him of this offense, the government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (inter alia) he is an 'alien,'
        • "Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 15, 2013. p. 605. In addition to the Ninth Circuit and our Circuit, the First, and the Fifth Circuits have faced the same fact pattern and have held that the government must prove inadmissibility by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.
        • "Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 15, 2015. p. 417. We ... hold that 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' is the familiar intermediate standard used in civil cases when particularly important individual interests are at stake.
  68. ^ a b c 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) ("Judicial review of a final order of removal ... is governed only by chapter 158 of title 28, except as provided in subsection (b)...."); 28 U.S.C. § 2344 ("The petition shall contain a concise statement of—(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which review is sought; (2) the facts on which venue is based; (3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and (4) the relief prayed.") (emphasis added)
  69. ^ a b "United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 26, 1993. p. 736.
    • "Baxter v. Bressman, 874 F.3d 142". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 18, 2017. p. 149. Rule 60 has no applicability where, as here, a party requests relief from a final judgment in response to an opponent's alleged fraud on the court.
    • "Howell v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 978 F.3d 54". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. October 21, 2020. p. 59. The overarching question in this case is whether Howell has made a sufficient showing of actual innocence to gain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) – relief that would serve as a gateway past the procedural default of his having untimely filed his habeas petition, thus allowing the petition to be considered.
    • "Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. August 17, 2020. p. 638. Under Rule 60(b), a party may seek relief from a final judgment under limited circumstances, including fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or any other reason that justifies relief.
    • "Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 13, 2014. p. 1134. A federal habeas petitioner can overcome a procedural default, including a failure to comply with the statute of limitations, by demonstrating actual innocence of the crime underlying his conviction.
    • "Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 28, 2011. p. 1047. A petitioner is actually innocent when he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.
    • "Luna v. Bell, 887 F.3d 290". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 5, 2018. p. 294. Under Rule 60(b)(2), a party may request relief because of 'newly discovered evidence.' The movant needs to show by clear and convincing evidence (1) that it exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence and (2) that the evidence is material, i.e., would have clearly resulted in a different outcome.
    • "United States v. Handy, No. 18-3086". Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. July 18, 2018. p. 5. [W]hen Rule 60(b)(4) is applicable, 'relief is not a discretionary matter; it is mandatory.' And the rule 'is not subject to any time limitation.' (citation omitted)
    • "United States v. Sierra, No. 17-12418". Eleventh Circuit. Casetext.com. January 29, 2018. p. 6-7.
    • Hague, David R. (March 2016). "Fraud on the Court and Abusive Discovery, 16 Nev. L.J. 707 (2016)". Nevada Law Journal. William S. Boyd School of Law. 16 (2): 725.
  70. ^ "Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 8, 2017. p. 20 n.9. In determining whether Congress intended [§ 1252(b)(1)] to be jurisdictional, we consider context, including this Court's interpretations of similar provisions in many years past, as probative of Congress' intent... we have made plain that most statutory time bars are nonjurisdictional. (brackets, citations and quotation marks omitted)
  71. ^
  72. ^ See, e.g.,
    • "Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 19, 2016. p. 969. We join the noncontroversial holding—shared by the nine other circuits which have addressed this issue in detail—that § 1252(b)(2)'s venue provision is not jurisdictional.
    • "United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 1, 2001. p. 590. Venue is not jurisdictional....
  73. ^ See, e.g.,
  74. ^ See, e.g.,
    • "Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 5, 1997. p. 38.
    • "Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 10, 1962. p. 567. The evidence upon which the Board relied was irrelevant; that on which the hearing officer relied is insufficient to support the charges made. Accordingly, it is determined that the order of deportation is invalid, and the order is set aside.
    • "Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 9, 2003. p. 884-85.
    • "Cantor v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 19-73085". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. November 3, 2021. p. 4. [T]he stop-time rule applies to only the two circumstances set out in the statute, and a final order of removal satisfies neither.
      • "Matter of M-F-O-, 28 I&N Dec. 408". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. November 4, 2021. p. 416. Accordingly, the court reasoned that a respondent accrues physical presence for purposes of section 240B(b)(1)(A) from the moment he enters the United States until he is served with a single document providing him with all the information required by section 239(a) of the Act. We agree with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and will apply it nationwide.
  75. ^ "United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 31, 1997. p. 264-65 n.3. (emphases added)
  76. ^ See, e.g.,
  77. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(T)
  78. ^ See, e.g.,
  79. ^ a b See, e.g.,
    • "Vartelas v. Holder, 620 F.3d 108". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 9, 2010. p. 110. That offense carried a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. The range of imprisonment recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines ('Guidelines') was 4-10 months; the prison term imposed on Vartelas was four months.
    • "Romano v. Luther, 816 F.2d 832". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 3, 1987. p. 837. The Sentencing Reform Act makes a major change in federal sentencing and parole practices by replacing indeterminate sentences and parole with determinate sentences and no parole.
    • "Hanif v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 479". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 14, 2012. p. 482.
    • "Shaya v. Holder, 586 F.3d 401". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 9, 2009. p. 403. [W]hen using Michigan indeterminate sentences as the predicate for classifying someone as an 'aggravated felon', the term must be measured by the sentence actually served or the minimum sentence given, whichever is greater, as this better incorporates the judge's discretion and determinations than the statutory maximum term.
    • "Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 23, 2002. p. 206. On January 22, 1999, Valansi was sentenced under United States Sentencing Guideline § 2B1.1, the Sentencing Guideline for theft offenses, to six months imprisonment followed by five years supervised release, the first six months of which to be served at home under electronic monitoring.
    • "Garcia-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 26, 2003. p. 844. Whether a 'wobbler' is determined to be a misdemeanor or a felony is controlled by Cal. Penal Code § 17(b), which sets out the range of judgments by which an offense is categorized 'for all purposes' subsequent to judgment.
      • "Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898 (1996)". Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. March 29, 1996. p. 583. This question arose because section 26 of the Parole Act, 61 P.S. § 331.26, provides that paroles from imprisonment for less than a maximum period of two years shall be granted by the sentencing court....
  80. ^ See, e.g.,
    • "Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 6, 2017. p. 890. At the time of petitioner's sentencing, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines included a residual clause.... Because we hold that the advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause, we reject petitioner's argument.
      • "United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 5, 2007. p. 563. The Sentencing Reform Act required the district judge to impose a sentence within the 'base' range recommended by the Guidelines, established solely by the facts of conviction, unless certain enumerated circumstances were found to be present.
      • "United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 10, 2007. p. 316. The District Court did not provide a statement of reasons sufficient to allow us to review whether Ausburn's sentence was reasonable under the circumstances; therefore, we must vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing proceeding.
      • "Garcia-Mendoza v. Holder, 753 F.3d 1165". Tenth Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 2, 2014. p. 1169. In § 1101(f)(7), Congress intended to bar aliens from establishing good moral character when an alien was 'confined, as a result of [a] conviction,' for 180 days or more. This language focuses on the actual period of confinement, and does not reference the ordered term of imprisonment.
        • "Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 592 Pa. 120, 923 A.2d 1111 (2007)". Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. May 31, 2007. p. 132. It is well established that the Sentencing Guidelines are purely advisory in nature. As this Court explained in Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775, 780-81 (1987), the Guidelines do not alter the legal rights or duties of the defendant, the prosecutor or the sentencing court. The guidelines are merely one factor among many that the court must consider in imposing a sentence.
        • "Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002)". Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. December 19, 2002. p. 424. The Sentencing Guidelines enumerate aggravating and mitigating circumstances, assign scores based on a defendant's criminal record and based on the seriousness of the crime, and specify a range of punishments for each crime.
  81. ^ a b See, e.g., "Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 29, 1972. p. 482. The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime.
    • "United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 9, 2002. p. 483. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473 tit. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, replaced most forms of parole with supervised release overseen by the sentencing court.
    • "United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 2, 2004. p. 361. A person who is on parole, although subject to some restraints on liberty, is not 'imprisoned' in the sense in which the term is usually used. For example, if a parolee were informed at the end of a parole revocation hearing that the outcome was 'imprisonment,' the parolee would not think that this meant that he was going to be returned to parole.
  82. ^ a b "State v. Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 2003 WI 59, 663 N.W.2d 700 (2003)". Wisconsin Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 19, 2003. p. 177.
    • "Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976)". Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. January 29, 1976. p. 133. The sentence must be imposed for the minimum amount of confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
      • "Commonwealth v. Stein, 39 A.3d 365". Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. February 7, 2012. p. 367 n.1. The usual practice in this Commonwealth is that the minimum sentence cannot exceed one-half of the maximum sentence, and a flat sentence is an illegal sentence.
  83. ^ See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) ("In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) ... the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person ....")
  84. ^ See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371; 18 U.S.C. § 1001; 18 U.S.C. § 1349; 18 U.S.C. § 1512
  85. ^ See, e.g.,
  86. ^ See, e.g.,
    • "Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. December 4, 2007. p. 37. Congress framed § 921(a)(20) to serve two purposes.... It sought to qualify as ACCA predicate offenses violent crimes that a State classifies as misdemeanors yet punishes by a substantial term of imprisonment, i. e., more than two years.
    • "Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. December 5, 2006. p. 50. The question raised is whether conduct made a felony under state law but a misdemeanor under the Controlled Substances Act is a 'felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.' 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2). We hold it is not.
  87. ^ 18 U.S.C. § 927
  88. ^ See generally
  89. ^ "United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921". Fifth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 1, 2001. p. 928.
  90. ^ "Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 16, 2001. p. 164.
  91. ^
  92. ^ "Dent v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 1075". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 17, 2018. p. 1085.
  93. ^ See, e.g.,
  94. ^ "Levesque v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 152". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 18, 2015. p. 155.
  95. ^ a b "NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 21, 2017. p. 939.
  96. ^
    • "Make The Road New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612". D.C. Circuit. Casetext.com. June 23, 2020. p. 631 n.13. It is well established 'that the specific governs the general.'
    • "Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 31, 2016. p. 1075. When two statutes come into conflict, courts assume Congress intended specific provisions to prevail over more general ones....
    • "United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720". Fifth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 18, 1972. p. 722. Moreover, where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.
  97. ^ "Estimates of the Lawful Permanent Resident Population in the United States: January 2014" (PDF). James Lee; Bryan Baker. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Retrieved 2018-06-29. In summary, an estimated 13.2 million LPRs lived in the United States on January 1, 2014, and 8.9 million of them were eligible to naturalize.
  98. ^ "ICE attorney sentenced to nearly 18 years on corruption charges stemming from multi-agency probe involving ICE OPR". U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security. March 21, 2011. Retrieved 2018-08-29.
  99. ^ "Homeland Security agents took $15M in bribes, closed their eyes". Ron Nixon, The New York Times. The Seattle Times. December 28, 2016. Retrieved 2018-08-29.
  100. ^ Saul, Josh (May 19, 2017). "Immigration Officer Bribe Arrest Adds to Homeland Security Corruption Woes". Newsweek. Retrieved 2018-08-29.
  101. ^ a b Michels, Holly (August 2, 2017). "Deportation blocked for Mexican national who settled Montana jailhouse rape claim". Independent Record. Retrieved 2018-08-22.
  102. ^ a b Amy Lieu, ed. (August 19, 2018). "Former ICE agent arrested on sexual assault, rape charges, agency says". Fox News. Retrieved 2018-08-19.
  103. ^ Brittny Mejia, ed. (June 28, 2018). "It's not just people in the U.S. illegally — ICE is nabbing lawful permanent residents too". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2018-06-29.
  104. ^ "In a secretive court system with a huge backlog of immigration cases, ICE and others draw little accountability". Deborah Sontag and Dale Russakoff. Philadelphia Media Network. April 17, 2018. Retrieved 2018-08-29.
  105. ^ See, e.g.,
  106. ^ "Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 14, 2005. p. 1098.
  107. ^ See, e.g.,
    • "United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 28, 1990. p. 217.
    • 18 U.S.C. § 242 ("Notes: 1994—.... Pub. L. 103–322, § 320201(b), substituted 'any person in any State' for 'any inhabitant of any State' and 'on account of such person' for 'on account of such inhabitant'....")
  108. ^ Christine Hauser, ed. (June 28, 2018). "Former ICE Lawyer Who Stole Immigrants' Identities Gets 4 Years in Prison". The New York Times. Retrieved 2018-07-23.
  109. ^ Vince Lattanzio, ed. (March 3, 2015). "Federal Immigration Agent Stole Cash from Deportees, Nabbed in Sting: DA". WCAU. Retrieved 2018-07-23.
  110. ^ "Illegal Alien Convicted Of Passport Fraud, False Claim Of U.S. Citizenship And Aggravated Identity Theft". U.S. Dept. of Justice. August 14, 2013. Retrieved 2018-08-30.
  111. ^ Chardy, Alfonso (January 9, 2016). "Immigrant pleads guilty to using fake birth certificate to obtain a U.S. documents". Miami Herald. Retrieved 2018-08-30.
  112. ^ "Illegal immigrant from Mexico pleads guilty to using fake identity to steal $361,000 in government benefits". Fox News. March 4, 2018. Retrieved 2018-08-30.
  113. ^ Liza Hearon, ed. (August 30, 2018). "Trump Administration Denies Passports To Americans Living On Border: Report". Huffpost. Retrieved 2018-08-30.
  114. ^ 8 CFR 1212.2
  115. ^ "Board of Immigration Appeals". U.S. Dept. of Justice. March 16, 2018. BIA decisions are binding on all DHS officers and immigration judges unless modified or overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court.
    • 8 CFR 1003.1(g)(1) ("Except as Board decisions may be modified or overruled by the Board or the Attorney General, decisions of the Board and decisions of the Attorney General are binding on all officers and employees of DHS or immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the United States.")
    • "Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. 197" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. October 17, 2013. p. 199. The [Supreme] Court has also emphasized that the Chevron principle of deference must be applied to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions, even where a court has previously issued a contrary decision and believes that its construction is the better one, provided that the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
  116. ^ Katherine Lam, ed. (July 16, 2018). "Illegal immigrant accused of attacking wife with chainsaw was deported 11 times, officials say". Fox News. Retrieved July 16, 2018.
  117. ^ Lucia I. Suarez Sang, ed. (August 10, 2018). "Mexican citizen previously deported with long rap sheet arrested in US for 10th time". Fox News. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
  118. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
  119. ^ 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1)
  120. ^ "United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 17, 2014. p. 629.
    • "United States v. Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 7, 2017. p. 1210. Because Valdiviar-Flores's drug trafficking conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach, it cannot support the asserted basis for Valdivia-Flores's 2009 removal. Valdiviar-Flores was therefore prejudiced from his inability to seek judicial review for that removal. He thus satisfies all three elements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), and his collateral attack on the underlying deportation order should have been successful.
    • "United States v. Ochoa, 861 F.3d 1010". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 3, 2017. p. 1013. Reviewing de novo, United States v. Alvarado-Pineda, 774 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014), we hold that Defendant was not originally removable as charged, and so could not be convicted of illegal reentry. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction.

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