Donald A. Gillies

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For other people named Donald Gillies, see Donald B. Gillies.
Donald A. Gillies
Born1944
Alma materCambridge University
London School of Economics
EraContemporary philosophy
RegionWestern philosophy
SchoolAnalytic
InstitutionsUniversity College London
Doctoral advisorImre Lakatos
Other academic advisorsKarl Popper
Doctoral studentsDavid Corfield
Main interests
Philosophy of mathematics
Philosophy of artificial intelligence
Notable ideas
Non-Bayesian confirmation theory
Influences
Influenced

Donald A. Gillies (/ˈɡɪliːz/; born 1944) is a British philosopher and historian of science and mathematics. He is an Emeritus Professor in the Department of Science and Technology Studies at University College London.

Career[]

After undergraduate studies in mathematics and philosophy at Cambridge, Gillies became a graduate student of Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos (his official PhD supervisor) at the London School of Economics, where he completed a PhD on the foundations of probability.[2]

Gilles is a past President[2] and a current Vice-President[3] of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. From 1982 to 1985 he was an editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.[2]

Gillies is probably best known for his work on Bayesian confirmation theory, his attempt to simplify and extend Popper’s theory of corroboration. He proposes a novel "principle of explanatory surplus", likening a successful theoretician to a successful entrepreneur. The entrepreneur generates a surplus (of income) over and above his initial investment (of funds) to meet the necessary expenses of the enterprise. Similarly, the theoretician generates a surplus (of explanations) over and above his initial investment (of assumptions) to make the necessary explanations of known facts. The size of this surplus is held to be a measure of the confirmation of the theory, but only in qualitative, rather than quantitative, terms.

Gillies has researched the philosophy of science, most particularly the foundations of probability; the philosophy of logic and mathematics; and the interactions of artificial intelligence with some aspects of philosophy, including probability, logic, causality and scientific method. In the philosophy of mathematics, he has developed a method of dealing with very large transfinite cardinals from an Aristotelian point of view.[4]

Books and articles (selection)[]

  • Gillies, Donald and Chihara, Charles S. (1988). "An Interchange on the Popper-Miller Argument". Philosophical Studies, Volume 54, pp. 1–8.
  • Gillies, Donald (1989). "Non-Bayesian Confirmation Theory and the Principle of Explanatory Surplus". The Philosophy of Science Association, PSA 1988, Volume 2, pp. 373–380.
  • Gillies, Donald ed. (1992). Revolutions in Mathematics. Oxford Science Publications. The Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, New York.
  • Gillies, Donald (1996). "Artificial intelligence and scientific method". Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Gillies, Donald (2000). Philosophical Theories of Probability. London: Routledge.
  • Gillies, Donald (2010). An objective Theory of Probability. London: Routledge.
  • Gillies, Donald (2011). Frege, Dedekind, and Peano on the Foundations of Arithmetic. London: Routledge.

References[]

  1. ^ Corfield interviewed by McLarty - Thales + Friends
  2. ^ Jump up to: a b c Wenceslao J. González, Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science. Netbiblo, 2006, ISBN 0-9729892-3-4; pp. v-vi
  3. ^ BSPS Officers and Committees 2009-2010, British Society for the Philosophy of Science. Accessed January 25, 2010
  4. ^ Gillies, Donald (2015). "An Aristotelian approach to mathematical ontology". In Davis, Ernest; Davis, Philip J. (eds.). Mathematics, Substance and Surmise. Cham: Springer. pp. 147–176. ISBN 9783319214726.

External links[]

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