New Policies (Song dynasty)

Wang Anshi (1021–1086)

The New Policies (Chinese: 新法; pinyin: xīnfǎ), also known as Xining Reforms (熙宁变法; Xining being the first era name used by Emperor Shenzong), Xifeng Reforms (熙丰变法; Xifeng being the portmanteau of the two era names used by Emperor Shenzong, Xining and Yuanfeng) or Wang Anshi Reforms (王安石变法),^[1] were a series of reforms initiated by the Northern Song dynasty politician Wang Anshi when he served as minister under Emperor Shenzong from 1069–1076. The policies were in force until the emperor's death, then repealed, then enacted again and were a focus of court politics until the end of the Northern Song. In some ways, it continued the policies of the aborted Qingli Reforms from two decades earlier.

Background[]

Illustration of Wang Anshi from the Wan Xiao Tang （晩笑堂）, 1743.

During his time in the local administration, Wang Anshi gained an understanding of the difficulties experienced by local officials and the common people. In 1058, he sent a letter ten thousand characters long (Wanyanshu; 万言书/Yanshishu; 言事书/Shang Renzong Huangdi yanshi shu; 上仁宗皇帝言事书) to Emperor Renzong of Song, in which he suggested reforms to the administration in order to solve financial and organizational problems. In the letter he blamed the downfall of previous dynasties on the refusal of their emperors to deviate from traditional patterns of rule. His letter was ignored for ten years until Emperor Shenzong of Song succeeded the throne. The new emperor faced declining taxes and an increasingly heavy burden of taxation on commoners due to the development of large estates, whose owners managed to evade paying their share of taxes.^[2] This led him to seek advice from Wang. Wang was first appointed vice counsellor (can zhizheng shi; 参知政事), and a year later was made chancellor (zaixiang; 宰相).^[3]

Objective[]

The primary objectives of Wang Anshi's New Policies (xinfa) were to cut government expenditure and strengthen the military in the north. To do this, Wang advocated for policies intended to alleviate suffering among the peasantry and to prevent the consolidation of large land estates which would deprive small peasants of their livelihood. According to Wang, "good organization of finance was the duty of the government, and the organization of finance was nothing else than to fulfill public duties,"^[4] and "The state should take the entire management of commerce, industry, and agriculture into its own hands, with a view to succoring the working classes and preventing them from being ground into the dust by the rich."^[5]

Above all, Wang saw himself as the defender of family farms and small shopkeepers against rapacious rentier landowners and the great merchant houses, whom he castigated as “aggrandizers.” Wang feared that unbridled market exchange created imbalances in the distribution in wealth and was vulnerable to manipulation by merchant cartels. To forestall such inequities he advocated state intervention in commerce and moneylending. Wang created new state agencies to manage wholesale trade at the capital and provide credit for retail businesses, turned private brokers into government agents, tightened the state’s control of foreign trade, and extended the existing monopoly on salt production to include much tea cultivation as well.^[6]

— Richard von Glahn

Implementation[]

Wang Anshi was promoted to vice counselor in 1069.^[7] He introduced and promulgated a series of reforms, collectively known as the New Policies/New Laws. The reforms had three main components: 1) state finance and trade, 2) defense and social order, and 3) education and improving governance.

Equal tax law[]

The equal tax law (junshuifa; 均税法), also known as the square field law (fangtianfa； 方田法) was a land registration project meant to reveal hidden land (untaxed land). Fields were divided into squares 1,000 paces in length on each side. The corners of the fields were marked by earth piles or trees. In the autumn, an official was dispatched to supervise the surveying of the land and to place the soil quality in one of five categories. This information was written in a ledger declared legally binding for the purposes of sale and purchase, and the taxation value assessed appropriately. The law was highly unpopular with land owners, who complained that it restricted their freedom of distribution and other purposes (avoiding tax). Although the square field system was only implemented around the region of Kaifeng, the land surveyed made up 54 percent of known arable land in the Song dynasty. The project was discontinued in 1085. Emperor Huizong of Song (r. 1100-1125) tried to revive it but the implementation was too impractical and gave up after 1120.^[8]

The system of taxation for mining products (kuangshui difen zhi; 矿税抽分制) was a similar project to the equal tax law, except for regulating mining projects.^[9]

Green sprouts law[]

The green sprouts law (qingmiaofa; 青苗法) was a loan to peasants. The government loaned money to buy seeds, or seeds themselves from state granaries, in two disbursements at an interest rate of 2 percent calculated at an average of ten years. Recollections occurred in the summer and winter. Local officials abused the system by forcing loans on the peasants or extracting more than 2 percent interest.^[10]

From the outset the New Policies aroused fierce opposition. Orthodox Confucians condemned the intrusion of state power into the private economy both on principle and because of the deleterious effects of Wang’s initiatives. Perhaps the most vilified initiative was the Green Sprouts program. Critics charged that local officials forced farmers to borrow money from the state, turning the loan program into a regressive tax. It seems that fiscal goals indeed superseded commitments to social welfare. Revenues from the Green Sprouts loan program – which in its early years yielded roughly 3 million guan annually, or a net profit of 27 percent on its capital – were appropriated to finance flood control and famine relief and to provision frontier armies. Despite the lower interest rates, defaults – even after repeated deferrals – were common, and by the 1080s the program began to suffer deficits. The state’s injection of new credit into the rural economy apparently reinforced rather than remedied the perpetual cycle of indebtedness that afflicted many farming families.^[6]

— Richard von Glahn

Hydraulic works law[]

The hydraulic works law (shuilifa; 水利法) was meant to improve local organization of irrigation works. Instead of using corvée labor, each circuit was supposed to appoint officials to loan money to the people using the local treasury, so that they could hire laborers. The government also encouraged planting mulberry trees to increase silk production.^[11]

Labor recruitment law[]

The labor recruitment law (muyifa; 募役法) aimed at replacing corvée labor as a form of tax service with hired labor. Each prefecture calculated the funds needed for official projects in advance so that the funds could be distributed appropriately. The government also paid a premium of 20 percent in years of crop failures. Effectively, it transformed labor service to the government into a monetary payment, increasing tax revenue. However, people who were previously exempt from corvée labor were forced to pay taxes for labor on official projects, and thus protested the new law. Although officially abolished in 1086, the new labor recruitment system existed in practice until the end of the Northern Song dynasty in 1127.^[12]

Certainly the New Policies increased government revenues substantially, by at least 18 million guan annually. Tax receipts in coin rose by nearly 40 percent, primarily as a result of the monetization of labor services and the income generated by the Green Sprouts program; commercial sources, apart from the Sichuan tea monopoly, yielded only modest revenues. Although we lack complete figures for national accounts, estimates suggest that money payments reached a peak of 81 percent of central government revenues during the New Policies era, compared to 48 percent c. 1000. At the same time tax receipts in cloth, a staple of state finance since the Eastern Han, virtually disappeared. From this time forward silver essentially replaced textiles in the Song fiscal system, and silk ceased to serve any monetary functions.^[13]

— Richard von Glahn

Balanced delivery law[]

The balanced delivery law (junshufa; 均输法) was meant to curb the prices of commodities purchased by the government and to control the expenditures of the local administration. To do this, circuit level financial institutions in southeast China were made responsible for government purchases and their transport. The central treasury provided funds for the purchase of low cost goods wherever they were available, their storage, and transport to areas where they were expensive. Critics claimed that Wang was waging a price war with merchants.^[14]

Market exchange law[]

The market exchange law (shiyifa; 市易法), also called the guild avoidance law (mianshangfa; 免商法), targeted large trading companies and monopolies. A metropolitan market exchange bureau was set up in Kaifeng and 21 market exchange offices in other cities. They were headed by supervisors and office managers who dealt with merchants, merchant guilds, and brokerage houses. These institutions fixed prices for not only resident merchants but also itinerant traders. Surplus commodities were purchased by the government and stored for later sale at a lower price, disrupting price manipulation by merchant monopolies. Merchant guilds that cooperated with the market exchange bureau were allowed to sell goods to the government and buy commodities from government storehouses using money or credit at an interest rate of 10 percent for six months or 20 percent for a year. Small or mid-sized companies and groups of five merchants could provide guarantee with their assets for credit. After 1085, the market exchange bureau and offices became profit making institutions, and bought cheap goods and sold at higher prices. The system stayed in place until the end of the Northern Song dynasty in 1127.^[15]

Baojia law[]

The baojia system, also known as the village defense law or security group law, was a project to improve local security and relieve local government of administrative duties. It ordered groups of ten, fifty, and five hundred men security groups to be organized. Each was to be led by a headman. Initially each household with more than two male adults had to provide one security guard, but this unrealistic expectation was decreased to one per five households later on. The security groups exercised police powers, organized night watches, and trained in martial arts when no agricultural work was required. Essentially it was a local militia with the main effect being a decrease in government expenditures, since the local population was responsible for its own protection.^[16]

General and troops law[]

The general and troops law (jiangbingfa; 将兵法), also known as the creation of commands law (zhijiangfa; 置将法) targeted improving the relationship between high officials and common troops. The army was divided into units of 2,500 to 3,000 men that combined a mixed force of infantry, cavalry, archers, as well as tribal troops, instead of each belonging to their own individual unit. This did not include the metropolitan and palace army. The system continued until the end of the Song dynasty.^[17]

Three college law[]

The three college law (sanshefa; 三舍法), also called the Three Hall system, regulated the education of future officials in the Taixue (National University). It divided the Taixue into three colleges. Students first attended the Outer College, then the Inner College, and finally the Superior College. One of the aims of the three-colleges was to provide a more balanced education for students and to de-emphasize Confucian learning. Students were taught in only one of the Confucian classics, depending on the college, as well as arithmetics and medicine. Students of the Outer College who passed a public and institutional examination were allowed to enter the Inner College. At the Inner College there were two exams over a two-year period on which the students were graded. Those who achieved the superior grade on both exams were directly appointed to office equal to that of a metropolitan exam graduate. Those who achieved an excellent grade on one exam but slightly worse on the other could still be considered for promotion, and having a good grade in one exam but mediocre in another still awarded merit equal to that of a provincial exam graduate.^[18]

In 1104, the prefectural examinations were abolished in favor of the three-colleges system, which required each prefecture to send an annual quota of students to the Taixue. This drew criticism from some officials who claimed that the new system benefited the rich and young, and was less fair because the relatives of officials could enroll without being examined for their skills. In 1121, the local three-college system was abolished but retained at the national level.^[18]

Contention over the reforms[]

The reforms created political factions in the court. Wang Anshi's faction, known as the "Reformers", were opposed by the ministers in the "Conservative" faction led by the historian and Chancellor Sima Guang (1019–1086).^[19] As one faction supplanted another in the majority position of the court ministers, it would demote rival officials and exile them to govern remote frontier regions of the empire.^[20] One of the prominent victims of the political rivalry, the famous poet and statesman Su Shi (1037–1101), was jailed and eventually exiled for criticizing Wang's reforms.^[20]

The Green Sprouts program and the baojia system were not conceived as revenue-generating policies but soon were changed to finance new state initiatives and military campaigns. Within a few months of the start of the Green Sprouts program in 1069 the government started to charge an annual interest of 20-30% on the loans it made to farmers. As the officials of the Ever-Normal Granaries who were managing the program were evaluated based on the revenue they could generate, this resulted in forced loans and lack of focus on the disaster relief, which was the original task of the Ever-Normal Granaries. ^[21]

In 1074, a famine in northern China drove many farmers off their lands. Their circumstances were made worse by the debts they had incurred from the seasonal loans granted under Wang’s reform initiatives. Local officials insisted on collecting the loans as the farmers were leaving their land. This crisis was depicted as being Wang’s fault. Wang still had the emperor's favor, though he resigned in 1076. With the emperor's death in 1085, the reforms were abolished under the regency of Dowager Empress Xiang, only to be reinstituted when the new Emperor Zhezong came of age in 1093. The policies largely continued under the reign of Emperor Huizong until the end of the Northern Song dynasty in 1126.

Following the deaths of Wang Anshi and Shenzong in 1085, Wang’s enemies came to power and began to dismantle his reforms in the name of fiscal austerity. In 1093, however, proponents of the New Policies regained control of the court and revived the reform agenda. But incompetent leadership, a deteriorating military situation, and factional struggles at the court resulted in increasingly erratic fiscal policies and predatory taxation that inflicted enormous damage on the economy. The rapid collapse of the Song state in the face of the Jurchen invasion in 1126 was widely blamed on the fiscal mismanagement and private venality of Wang Anshi’s self-anointed disciples. The refugee court that reconstituted Song rule in South China after the fall of Kaifeng in 1127 repudiated Wang Anshi’s political philosophy and repealed most of the New Policies. But the powerful presence of the fiscal state endured.^[22]

— Richard von Glahn

References[]

Bibliography[]

• von Glahn, Richard (2016), The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century