Supreme War Council

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This article is about the Allied central command during World War I. For other uses, see Supreme War Council (disambiguation).
Meeting of Supreme War Council in August 1921; on the front, left to right: British Foreign secretary Lord Curzon, British Prime minister Lloyd George, French Prime minister Briand, Italian Prime minister Bonomi, Italian Minister of Foreign affairs Della Torretta, American ambassador to UK Harvey, Japanese ambassador to UK baron Hayashi, Japanese ambassador to France viscount Ishii; on the second row, left to right: interpreter , British Cabinet secretary Hankey, French Secretary to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Berthelot, French Minister of Liberated regions Loucheur

The Supreme War Council was a central command based in Versailles that coordinated the military strategy of the principal Allies of World War I: Britain, France, Italy, the US and Japan.[1] It was founded in 1917 after the Russian revolution and with Russia's withdrawal as an ally imminent.[2] The council served as a forum for preliminary discussions of potential armistice terms, later for peace treaty settlement conditions, and it was succeeded by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920.

Formation[]

British Prime Minister David Lloyd George had grave concerns regarding the strategy of Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Sir Douglas Haig, the Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, in response to the Allied losses at the Somme and Flanders.

Also, following the Italian defeat at the Battle of Caporetto, in which the Germans and Austro-Hungarians surprised the Italian forces, Lloyd George proposed the formation of a Supreme War Council at the Rapallo Conference of 5–7 November 1917.

Japan and Russia were not to be included, and the Italians and French, worried that Salonika (Serbia) might be evacuated, wanted issues confined to the Western Front.[3]

Permanent Military Representatives[]

Each Allied nation would be represented by their head of state, and an appointed senior military officer known as the Permanent Military Representative (PMR). The French PMR was Ferdinand Foch, later replaced by Maxime Weygand and Joseph Joffre. The British were represented by Sir Henry Hughes Wilson. Italy was represented by Luigi Cadorna.

The United States, which was "An Associated Power" of the Allies, was not involved with the political structure, but sent a Permanent Military Representative, General Tasker H. Bliss.[4]

General Wilson and his staff conducted numerous research projects into offensives against Turkey, culminating in "Joint Note# 12".[5]

At the Supreme War Council (30 January – 2 February) Maurice Hankey recorded that the national Commanders-in-Chief, national Chiefs of Staff and PMRs "all gave different advice" creating "a worse state of chaos than I have ever known in all my wide experience". Lloyd George, whose main goal was to thwart Robertson, blocked a suggestion by Foch (French Chief of Staff) that the proposed Allied Reserve be controlled by the national Chiefs of Staff, possibly prompted by the notes Wilson was passing him across the table. It was eventually agreed that Foch should command the Reserve, with Wilson as his deputy.[6]

The Allied Reserve eventually slipped from the agenda as the Commanders-in-Chief, Haig and Pétain refused to hand over sufficient troops. Early in 1918 Wilson replaced Robertson as CIGS and at the end of March Foch became Allied Generalissimo. After April 1918 all Allied troops on the Western Front were placed under the command of the  [fr] (GQGA), a multi-national general staff that developed from the Supreme War Council. The GQGA was on similar lines to the GQG and came under General Ferdinand Foch, who since 21 March 1918 had overall command of all Allied troops.[7] Without its two main personalities the military machinery at Versailles became less important.

Meetings[]

Although the military council sat about once a week (90 meetings took place between November 1917 and November 1919), formal Interallied Conferences with Prime Ministers in attendance took place ten times during the lifespan of the Supreme War Council (SWC). Those meetings are listed below.[8]

Wartime Meetings[]

5-7 November 1917[]

At the Rapallo Conference, the formation of the Supreme War Council was approved by the Allied war leaders in the town of Rapallo, Italy (close to the French border).[9] The idea was thought up by the British, accepted by the French, and approved at a British War Cabinet meeting on 2 November 1917.[10] It was also decided that its headquarters would be in Versailles. [11]

29 Nov to 3 Dec 1917[]

The first Interallied Conference in France took place in Paris at the Quai d'Orsay.[12] This was the first appearance of Prime Minister Clemenceau, who took office on 14 November 1917. The four heads of state represented were Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, Vittorio Orlando, and Colonel Edward House (for President Woodrow Wilson). Supporting the four were their permanent military representatives: General Maxime Weygand (France), General Henry Wilson (UK), General Luigi Cadorna (Italy) and General Tasker Bliss (US). The conference ended with the drafting of eight resolutions.[13]

30 Jan to 2 Feb 1918[]

The third SWC Interallied Conference was held at Versailles, just outside Paris.[14] The Council agreed to a defensive plan on the Western Front for 1918, with an offensive operation against Turkey.[15] Also, it was here that an Allied General Reserve was approved, consisting of 14 French, 9 British, and 7 Italian divisions.[16] It was to be under the control of the SWC military chiefs, who, it was thought, would be in the best position to allocate manpower to the front in the event of a German attack. To streamline decision making, an Executive War Board was established, headed by General Ferdinand Foch.[17][18] Between the third and fourth SWC meetings, resistance to the General Reserve by British General William Robertson caused him to be replaced. In early March, it was found that his subordinate, B.E.F. Commander Douglas Haig, also refused to follow the SWC order. Allied with General Petain and Prime Minister Clemenceau, both of whom opposed the measure, the advocates of a General Reserve were thwarted. With a massive attack from Germany thought to be imminent, Lloyd George decided that it was too late to replace Haig and follow through with the plan. In addition to the establishment of a General Reserve, Prime Minister Clemenceau made an attempt at establishing unity of command. However, Prime Minister Lloyd George refused, citing "home politics" and problems with Parliament and the public.[19] Lloyd George repeated his stand when talking to General Haig at GHQ.[20]

14–16 March 1918[]

The fourth SWC Interallied Conference was held in London. Here, the General Reserve plan was cancelled. It was thought it would take three months to reposition divisions for the Reserve, when, in fact, the German attack was just 8 days away. This caused a great debate between General Ferdinand Foch and Prime Minister Clemenceau, and Prime Minister Lloyd George considered replacing General Haig.[21][22] In the absence of a General Reserve, the allies had to rely on a verbal mutual support agreement between General's Haig and Petain. The Council also put out an official statement about the Brest-Litovsk "peace" treaty made between Germany and Russia.[23] Prime Minister Clemenceau made another attempt at establishing unity of command, but was rebuffed by Lloyd George, who said Foch's appointment to the Executive War Board was a "great concession". General Henri Mordacq, Clemenceau's aide, said Britain only turned for unity of command at the last minute when her armies were about to be thrown into the sea.[24]

1–2 May 1918[]

The fifth SWC Conference was held in Versailles and Abbeville, France. The matter of American troops was discussed.[25][26] A separate agreement made in late January between the United States and England provided that America would supply six complete divisions to France, transported in British ships, and trained by the British Army.[27] Due to Operation Michael, the German attack on March 21, 1918, and the need for battlefield replacements, the SWC military generals issued Joint Note #18, which asked that the United States only send infantry and machine gun units to France. General Pershing agreed to the arrangement, but wanted to take it one month at a time. Prime Minister Clemenceau drafted the final agreement, which extended the plan for two months.

At the mayor's house in Abbeville, at 10am on May 2nd, a secret meeting took place to discuss the matter of a B.E.F. embarkment from the Channel Ports.[28] In a time of crisis, if the Germans pushed the English toward the Channel Ports, should the B.E.F. retreat to England or move south and link up with the French? It was known that both General Haig, and General Robinson's replacement, General Henry Wilson, both favored embarkation. This matter was discussed by the military generals before the official conference started. Marshal Foch, who was present, would have none of it. When asked, he repeatedly answered, "Ne lachez pas pied" (Don't let go).[29] At the start of the war, instructions from General Kitchener to General French (B.E.F. Commander at the time) authorized him, in the event of "unusual circumstances", to retreat to the Channel Ports, but not to evacuate. "The view taken at Abbeville was that the British should retire behind the Somme and abandon the Channel ports rather than lose touch with the French."[30][31] Henry Wilson says this was unanimously agreed to.[32] Because of this, instructions were reinforced on 21 June 1918 to order Field Marshal Haig to retreat south and link up with the French.[33] Remarkably, twenty two years later, Lord Gort faced the same exact predicament when the Germans invaded France and the armored spearheads of the Wehrmacht advanced rapidly toward the Channel Ports.[34] In defiance of orders, Gort asked for an evacuation, and he ordered the B.E.F. to retreat to the Channel Ports, where a hastily arranged embarkation took place.[35] Although the Miracle of Dunkirk may have saved the British Army, Lord Gort was sidelined for the rest of his career.

1–3 June 1918[]

The sixth SWC Conference took place in Versailles. Here, the United States was asked for more reinforcements. Other issues discussed were amalgamation (the integration of US troops with the B.E.F.), and the pooling of allied supplies.

Allied pessimism prevailed at this meeting. French divisions were down to 50% strength,[36] and the English were not fairing much better.[37] The English, French and Italian Prime Ministers signed a letter to President Wilson that said, "there is a great danger of the war being lost ... owing to the allied reserves being exhausted before those of the enemy", and that the United States would have to raise 100 divisions, requiring the call up of 300,000 conscripts a month, to raise an army of 4 million men.[38][39] General Pershing also cabled Washington D.C., saying, "It should be most fully realized at home that the time has come for us to take up the brunt of the war and that France and England are not going to be able to keep their armies at present strength very much longer."[40] Also, "If the Allies had seen this a year or even six months earlier and had given us assistance in shipping"..."they could have assisted in the formation of a powerful American Army". Instead, "the number of training infantrymen in America will be practically exhausted by the middle of July, they [the allies] still insisted on a program of infantry personnel", and, "The Prime Ministers and General Foch appeal most urgently for trained or even untrained men." In his memoirs, Pershing says about raising the army, "In its execution as a whole, the achievement stands out as a lasting monument to our War Department, marred only by the lack of foresight that made it necessary to send over untrained men and units in precipitate haste."[41] Per Lord Milner, some of the troops, "hardly knew how to handle a rifle".[42]

Originally planned for an army of 500,000 men, the draft had to be expanded four times before a 4 million man army could be raised.

1–4 July 1918[]

The seventh SWC Conference, held at Versailles, was attended by British Dominion Prime Ministers from Canada, Australia, Newfoundland, New Zealand, and South Africa. This was the most difficult SWC yet, with Lloyd George angry with the French at completely directing the war, and the French upset with Lloyd George's plan to reduce British forces on the front to reinforce Palestine.[43] General Foch wanted a commitment that the British would keep their strength at 59 divisions, and he wanted to create a sixtieth from category "B" troops (those unfit for combat, but suitable for home defence). Lloyd George said manpower resources made this impossible.[44] Meanwhile, the mission to Murmansk moved forward.[45]

5 October 1918[]

The British receive news that Germany, Austria and Turkey informed the US Government that they were ready to negotiate peace on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points,

30 Oct to 10 Nov 1918[]

The eighth, and longest SWC Conference took place in Versailles. Here, the Armistice terms were drafted for the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Germany.[46]

Peacetime Meetings[]

During the Paris Peace Negotiations, which took place from 12 January to 26 June 1919, the Supreme War Council became the "Council of Ten" in mid January, and later the "Council of Four" (Big Four) in mid March, as President Wilson and Prime Ministers Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando did most of the work constructing the Treaty of Versailles.[47]

14–16 January 1920 in Paris, France[]

This meeting was held four days after the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Lloyd George proposed dropping the blockade of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic by starting negotiations with the "Russian people" in the form of the centrosoyuz, which at that time was not controlled by the Bolsheviks. This was agreed, with a communique from the Council being published on 16 January. In the event, the negotiations soon became simply between the United Kingdom and a bolshevised centrosoyuz, leading to the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement.

6–16 July 1920 in Spa, Belgium[]

Main article: Spa Conference of 1920

This was attended by German delegates to discuss war reparations. Related documents:

  • "Agreement between the Allies for the settlement of certain questions as to the application of the Treaties of Peace and complementary agreements with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria"[48]
  • "Protocol of the Conference at Spa on July 16, 1920"[49]
  • "Inter-Allied Agreement in regard to advance to the German Government in accordance with Protocol of July 16 regarding coal deliveries"[50]

References[]

  1. ^ Renshaw, Patrick (2014-07-10). The Longman Companion to America in the Era of the Two World Wars, 1910-1945. ISBN 9781317895497.
  2. ^ Greenhalgh, Elizabeth (2005-12-08). Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War. ISBN 9781139448475.
  3. ^ Woodward, 1998, pp191-2
  4. ^ Woodward, 1998, pp191-2
  5. ^ Woodward, 1998, pg194-5
  6. ^ Woodward, 1998, pp197
  7. ^ Lagarde, Lieutenant Benoît. "Grand Quartier Général des Armées Alliées, 1914–1918" (PDF). Sous-Serie GR 15 NN – Répertoire Numérique Detaillé (in French). Service Historique de la Défense. Retrieved 5 July 2017.
  8. ^ The Supreme War Council, pgs. 36 & 37
  9. ^ Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Vol IV, pgs. 491-503
  10. ^ National Archives, CAB 23-4, pgs. 298-300 of 579
  11. ^ Callwell, Sir C.E. "Field Marshall Henry Wilson", Volume II, pg. 23
  12. ^ Loyd George, David, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Vol V, pg. 215
  13. ^ Supreme War Council, pgs. 347-380
  14. ^ Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Vol V, pgs. 240-250
  15. ^ Powell, Geoffrey, "Plumer: The Soldier's General", pg. 249
  16. ^ Ibid, pg. 249
  17. ^ Wright, Peter, "At The Supreme War Council", pgs. 59-61
  18. ^ Mordacq, Henri, "Unity of Command: How it Was Achieved", pgs. 31-32
  19. ^ Mordacq, pg. 34
  20. ^ Mordacq, pg. 37
  21. ^ The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, pgs. 285 & 286
  22. ^ Amery, Leo, "My Political Life", pg. 145
  23. ^ Supreme War Council, pgs. 40 & 41
  24. ^ Mordacq, pgs. 39-40
  25. ^ Lloyd George, David, Vol. V, pgs. 440-441
  26. ^ Palmer, Frederick, Bliss, peacemaker, the life and letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss, pgs. 261-262
  27. ^ National Archives, CAB 23-5, pg. 194 of 475, minute 6
  28. ^ Roskill, Stephen, "Hanky: Man of Secrets", pg. 536
  29. ^ Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Vol. VI, pgs. 41 & 42
  30. ^ Marlowe, John, "Milner: Apostle of Empire", pg. 308 (quoting Lord Milner's memorandum)
  31. ^ X Committee Minutes, CAB 23-17, pgs. 41-42 of 206
  32. ^ Callwell, Vol II, pg. 98
  33. ^ Cooper, Duff, "Haig, The Second Volume", London: Faber and Faber, 1936, pg. 453 (par. 2)
  34. ^ Colville, "Man of Valour", pgs. 125, 126
  35. ^ Ibid, pgs. 216, 217
  36. ^ X Committee Minutes, pg. 69 of 206
  37. ^ Powell, pg. 256
  38. ^ Pershing, John J., My Experiences in the World War, Vol. II, pg. 80
  39. ^ Lloyd George, David, Vol. V, pg. 446
  40. ^ Ibid, pg. 82
  41. ^ Ibid, pg. 84
  42. ^ X Committee Minutes, pg. 23 of 206
  43. ^ O'Brien, "Milner", pg. 310
  44. ^ Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, Foch in Command, pg. 383
  45. ^ Palmer, Frederick, pgs. 305-306
  46. ^ Supreme War Council, pgs. 47-57
  47. ^ Shotwell, James, "At the Paris Peace Conference", pgs. 36-37, 117
  48. ^ LG/F/148/4/1 in Lloyd George papers, see /www.portcullis.parliament.uk
  49. ^ LG/F/148/4/2 in Lloyd George papers, see /www.portcullis.parliament.uk
  50. ^ LG/F/148/4/3 in Lloyd George papers, see /www.portcullis.parliament.uk

Sources[]

Further reading[]

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