1st Maine Cavalry Regiment
The 1st Maine Cavalry Regiment was a volunteer United States cavalry unit from Maine used during the American Civil War.
Service history[]
The regiment was organized in Augusta, Maine, on October 31, 1861, and served for three years. The original members were detached from the regiment on September 15, 1864, when their service was up, and mustered out back in Portland on November 25. Later recruits, along with the Maine men of the 1st District of Columbia Cavalry (men recruited in the Augusta, Maine[1] area between January and March 1864 and consolidated into seven companies) and those who chose to reenlist, were retained in the regiment. The regiment was split into three battalions of four companies each. One battalion was made up of former 1st District men and the other two were a mix of 1st Maine veterans and DC men. These three battalions continued until the regiment's mustering out at Petersburg, Virginia, on August 1, 1865.[2]
Initial organization in 1861[]
Maine had responded to Lincoln and Congress's April 25, 1861, call for ten regiments of infantry of which eight had been organized and left the state by the end of August.[3] That month the federal government had put out a call for five more regiments of infantry, six batteries of light artillery, a company of sharpshooters, and a regiment of cavalry to serve three years.
This cavalry regiment was intentionally raised at large from all counties of Maine and organized into twelve companies.[4] The regiment's staff consisted of a colonel (COL), lieutenant colonel (LTC), three majors (MAJ), a first (1LT) or second lieutenant (2LT) as adjutant (1LT), surgeon, assistant surgeon, chaplain, regimental quartermaster, regimental commissary of subsistence, and three first (1LT) or second lieutenants (2LT) serving as battalion quartermasters.[5] The regiment rated a sergeant major (SMAJ), a sergeant (SGT) as a chief bugler, a veterinary surgeon, a regimental quartermaster sergeant (QMSGT), regimental commissary sergeant (CSGT), hospital steward, saddler sergeant, sergeant farrier, and an ordnance sergeant. A captain (CAPT) commanded each company in the 1st Maine with a first lieutenant and a second lieutenant commanding the two platoons. The company commander also had the aid of a company first sergeant (1SGT) a company quartermaster sergeant, a company commissary sergeant, a farrier, and a sergeant (SGT) acting as the company commander's orderly. Each lieutenant in the platoon had two sergeants, four corporals (CPL), a bugler, and 39 privates (PVT). This gave each company a paper strength of 100 men.[6]
The regiment had high standards for its recruits and the quality of its mounts.[7] Recruiters were to enlist "none but sound, able-bodied men in all respects, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years of correct morals and temperate habits, active, intelligent, vigorous, and hardy, weighing not less than one hundred and twenty-five or more than one hundred and sixty pounds"[8] While the average United States Infantryman was 26 and 5′ 8.25″ tall and 155 pounds, the average United States Cavalryman was the same age but slightly shorter at 5′ 7″ and lighter at 145 pounds[9]). It encamped at Augusta at the State Fairground, renamed Camp Penobscot, where recruits initially learned military discipline and drill. Horses would arrive in December.
The 1st Maine Volunteer Cavalry Regiment mustered into federal service at Augusta on November 5, 1861, as a three-year volunteer cavalry regiment.[10] It was commanded by COL John Goddard from Cape Elizabeth. A Regular Army cavalry officer, LTC Thomas Hight, was the second-in-command. Another regular, CAPT Benjamin F Tucker served as the Adjutant with the rest of the field and staff officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) being Maine men. In the companies, apart from the Company H commander, CAPT George J. Summat and the 1st Lieutenant in Company L, 1LT Constantine Taylor, all the company officers and NCOs were Maine volunteers.
The 1st Maine had an advantage in recruiting over the infantry and artillery. Many recruits found the idea of riding rather than walking incredibly attractive. Also, the cavalry had an air of glamor and romance that the other branches did not have:[11]
There hung about the cavalry service a dash and an excitement which attracted those men who had read and remembered the glorious achievements of 'Light Horse Harry' and his brigade, and of 'Morgan's Men' in the revolutionary war, or who had devoured the story of 'Charles O'Malley,' and similar works. In short, men who had read much in history or in fiction, preferred the cavalry service.[12]
It is unclear whether the 1st Maine received either the 1854 cavalry shell jacket or 1857 sack coat or both. The army did issue all ranks the same standard sky-blue double-breasted winter overcoat with attached cape and a rubberized poncho for rainwear.[13] They also received the special sky-blue wool cavalry trousers with the reinforcing double layer in the seat and inside leg due to the expected extended time in the saddle.[14]
Training, deployment, and operations in 1862[]
There were prejudices against the cavalry in the War Department as it was originally thought it would not be of much use during the expected short period of conflict.[15] MGEN George McClellan felt that it took a minimum of two years to professionally train volunteer cavalry and that they would have nothing to do but be couriers and pickets.[16] There was also the added factor that the cost to equip and mount a Union cavalry regiment in 1861 was between $500,000 and $600,000, or roughly twice that of an infantry regiment.[17] Some of the leadership in the command understood the lack of faith:
The men of the south were born horsemen, almost. Old and young were nearly or quite as much at home on horseback as on foot, and the horses, also, were used to the saddle. Therefore, they could put cavalry regiments into the field with great facility and in comparatively good fighting condition, as witness the famous Black Horse Cavalry. In the northern and eastern states, it was different. Equestrianism was almost one of the lost arts. Few, especially in cities, were accustomed to riding, and the great majority of men who would enlist in the cavalry must learn to ride and to use arms on horseback, as well as learn drill, discipline, camp duties, and the duties of service generally. "A sailor on horseback," is a synonym for all that is awkward, but the veriest Jack tar on horseback was no more awkward than was a large proportion of the men who entered the cavalry service in the north and east.[18]
While the federal government figured out where to send the regiment, they continued training at the camp living in army issue camp tents through a cold winter. The recruits were soon finding the reality of cavalry life to be quite different from their preconceived notions.[19] The command stressed the importance of caring for their mounts and had a stable built before the first horses arrived. The necessary caring for their means of mobility, their mounts, made the men's days busier and longer than the infantryman's. During the cold, in which the regiment lost 200 men to disease and injuries, the men noted that their horses "had quarters that winter more comfortable than did the men, in comparison with the usual accommodations for man and beast."[20]
When Edwin Stanton replaced the disgraced Simon Cameron as Secretary of War, the 1st Maine narrowly avoided disbandment before they even saw service.[21] They were saved by the intervention of an officer who was impressed by their enthusiasm and rapid learning.[22] As training continued, the men and horses gradually meshed into a cohesive unit overcoming the fact that many horses had no prior experience with being ridden and some of the men had no prior experience riding.[23]
COL Goddard resigned his commission on March 1, 1862, and in response, MAJ Samuel H. Allen was commissioned Colonel by the governor and took command. To replace him, CAPT Warren L. Whitney of Company A was promoted to Major. In turn, 1LT Sidney W. Thaxter was made Captain and new Company A commander. Due to being passed over in favor of Allen, LTC Hight resigned and returned to command his company, in the 4th U.S. Cavalry.[24] At that time, the regiment was organized into three battalions: 1st Battalion (under MAJ Warren L. Whitney with companies A, D, E and F), 2nd Battalion (under MAJ Calvin S. Douty with companies B, I, H and M), and 3rd Battalion (under MAJ David P. Stowell with companies C, G, K and L).[10]
Still without weapons, the 1st Maine's training was drawn from the experience and training of the regular army personnel assigned to the regiment and concentrated on getting the men and their horses to work efficiently as a team in the various formations called for by cavalry regulations. The officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) read and studied their copies of two manuals, McClellan's Regulations and Instructions for the Field Service of the United States Cavalry in Time of War and Cooke's, Cavalry Tactics, or, Regulations for the instruction, formations, and movements of the cavalry of the army and volunteers of the United States (both published in 1861 at the start of the conflict).[25] Through these manuals and the guidance of the regulars, the Maine troopers learned the various formations for travel and combat, the basics of setting up pickets and vedettes, and the various bugle calls to command and coordinate all these activities.
Dismounted drill was of secondary importance, but it was not forgotten. The lack of sabers was part of the shortage that plagued the U.S. volunteer cavalry organizations during the first year of the war led to "some ludicrous improvisations."[26] The 1st Maine's solution was to buy wooden laths:
Some time during the winter laths were procured, for the purpose of learning and practicing the sabre exercise. These were made into swords of the most grotesque shape by the men, and the exercise was looked upon very generally as a farce, was 1aughed at by outsiders, and was discontinued after a very short time; yet there is no doubt that the rudiments of the use of the sabre learned with the aid of those wooden swords was never forgotten, and proved to be of advantage when the real sabre was put into the hands of the· men. No arms were furnished, except a few old muskets for use on guard duty, till the regiment arrived at Washington."[27]
Departure for Washington and the front[]
Finally, in March the regiment was ordered to the front in Virginia. 1st Battalion left for Washington on Friday, March 14, 1862, under command of COL Allen, arriving on Wednesday, the 19th without COL Allen who had fallen sick and was hospitalized in New York City.[28] Delayed by a late winter snowstorm, 2nd Battalion departed Augusta on Thursday, March 20, under MAJ. Douty, arriving on Monday, the 24th. On that day, 3rd Battalion under MAJ Stowell left and pulled into DC on the 28th.The battalions all entrained in box cars in Augusta, eight horses and men per box car, and rode to New York city via Portland, Boston, and Providence. After a ferry across the Hudson, the detachments had a more comfortable transit to Washington with the horses in the box cars, but the men in passenger cars.[29]
As each company in the regiment detrained and reported at the Washington Depot or New Jersey Avenue Station, each trooper received his official government arms issue of a Model 1860 Light Cavalry Saber and a pair of Colt Model 1860 revolver.[30] The regiment also received an issue of ten breech-loaded Sharps Carbines per company, however, by now, a number of the regiment's men had privately purchased breech-loaded Sharps, Burnsides, Smith, and Merrill carbines in Maine before departure or from one of the merchants along the rail route, to give themselves a weapon with a greater range. This meant that the 1st Maine had a slightly higher proportion of carbines than the average U.S. Volunteer cavalry regiment.[31] In Washington, the regiment pitched their tents with other reinforcements on Capitol Hill on the 29th.[32] In camp, the regiment immediately began grinding and sharpening their newly issued blades.[33]
On Sunday, March 30, the regiment received orders to send send five companies to Harper's Ferry and join the Federal troops providing security for the Baltimore & Ohio's link between Washington and the Ohio Valley. On that day, the line had reopened, and the War Department wanted to guard it against rebel raids. MAJ Douty took five companies with the largest number of carbines[34] and organized them into a new 1st Battalion. The remainder of the regiment would stay in Washington awaiting the return of COL Allen.[10] The regiment, "five months after its organization, was at Washington, armed and equipped, and a portion of it under marching orders."[33]
The 1st Battalion, comprising companies A, B, E, H, and M, loaded on box cars Monday, March 31 for Harper's Ferry, by way of Frederick and joined the " Railroad Brigade" commanded by COL Dixon Stansbury Miles, which guarded the important logistical route. The battalion's companies were separated and assigned to duty at different points along the railroad.
The remainder of the regiment remained in Washington DC. They spent the days after the 1st Battalion's departure honing their sabers and "in drill, mounted and dismounted, and in the manual of arms, and in generally preparing for active service."[35]
The Shenandoah, the "Middletown Disaster," and First Winchester[]
To win the war, the United States needed to defeat the Confederate armies in the field. To win the war, the rebels had to break the will of the Federals to fight. The Shenandoah Valley, between the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Appalachians, figured in both of those war aims and ergo its control was strategically important. Known as the breadbasket of the Confederacy, the Shenandoah Valley provided a route for rebel attacks into Maryland, Washington, and Pennsylvania, thereby cutting the link between Washington and the midwest[36] — directly attacking the United States' will to fight. The valley "was rich in grain, cattle, sheep, hogs, and fruit and was in such a prosperous condition that the Rebel army could march itself down and up it, billeting on the inhabitants."[37] which meant that Yankee control of the valley would weaken the rebel armies helping to defeat them. Because of its strategic importance it was the scene of three major campaigns. The valley, especially in the lower northern section, was also the scene of bitter partisan fighting as the region's inhabitants were deeply divided over loyalties, and Confederate partisan John Mosby and his Rangers frequently operated in the area. Due its strategic importance, the valley saw an ebb and flow between the contesting armies until the last autumn of the war.
Transport of goods from the valley to the east was done via a network of macadamized pikes/turnpikes and rail between the larger towns supported by numerous smaller dirt roads and canals knitting them further. Much of this system had been put in place by Virginia Board of Public Works (VBPW) under the guidance of Claudius Crozet. The main north–south road transportation was the Valley Turnpike,[38] a public-private venture through the VBPW running 68 miles (109 km) from Martinsburg up through Winchester, Harrisonburg, and ending at Staunton.[39] There were several other macadamized roads running between the larger towns and railroads. Three rail lines were the main east–west routes with B&O in the lower valley, Manassas Gap in the middle/upper, and the Virginia Central in the upper, southern end all connecting to the Valley Pike. The B&O met it at Martinsburg, the Manassas Gap met it at Strasburg after passing through the Blue Ridge Mountains at Manassas Gap at Front Royal, and the Virginia Central met it at Staunton after comin through the mountains in Crozet's Blue Ridge Tunnel.
Rebels under Jackson had severed the B&O at the northern end of the lower Shenandoah Valley during the late spring and summer of the prior year. Repeated raids and operations by Jackson's cavalry subordinate Turner Ashby and his the 7th Virginia Cavalry ("Ashby's Brigade"[40]) damaged so much railway infrastructure that it took over ten months to reopen the line on March 30, 1862. The paved roads were a great asset to the rebels in the valley being unaffected by inclement weather.[41] An official report described Martinsburg as "on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, at the northern terminus of the Valley Pike—a broad macadamized road, running up the valley, through Winchester, and terminating at Staunton."[37] Besides being a node between road and rail, Martinsburg was also home to the large, important B&O maintenance shop and roundhouse.
For the United States, the Maine men in the five companies were vital to keeping the B&O open. The battalion (and the rest of the regiment that remained in D.C.) would have an eventful Spring in 1862 marked by participation in operations against Jackson in the Shenandoah Campaign.
The Railroad Brigade[]
MAJ Douty and his five companies arrived in Harper's Ferry and were immediately posted to key facilities along the line.[42] CAPT George M. Brown's Company M remained in Harper's Ferry. The rest were loaded aboard the B&O and sent to their posts. MAJ Douty and CAPT Sidney W. Thaxter's Company A were the first stop and offloaded at the B&O maintenance shop in Martinsburg.[43] CAPT Black Hawk Putnam's Company E was the next to detrain at Back Creek where the B&O crossed it before flowing past Allensville and emptying into the Potomac.[44] Company H commanded by CAPT George J. Summat was dropped off along the rail line opposite Hancock, MD. CAPT Jonathan B. Cilley and Company B was furthest west and last off at the Berkely Springs resort.[45]
As well as scouting and patrolling along the rail beds, the companies patrolled out from their bases along several of the macadamized pikes. In this period along the important artery, the men of the 1st Battalion learned their craft well gaining valuable experience in the saddle.[46] There were a handful of skirmishes, and the men of the 1st Maine captured some rebel prisoners during this period, successfully defending the line and keeping it open. On April 14, MAJ Douty received a promotion to Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment.[47] During their time on this duty, the men of this battalion began to learn what a valuable source the local black population, enslaved and free, was for intelligence as well as who and where the local Unionists were.[48] Of note the men in Company A were greatly pleased to be in Martinsburg where the overwhelming majority of Unionists caused the rebels to call it "Little Massachusetts".[49]
Joining Banks[]
Throughout April and May, Banks and his Department of the Shenandoah had been receiving direct tasking from Secretary of War Stanton on coordinating with MGEN John C. Fremont's Mountain Department and MGEN McDowell's Department of the Rappahannock. This had led to stripping of assets from Banks and changing orders between joining with one of the other departments. As April rolled into May, Banks continued to receive frequent directives daily from the War Department over the telegraph. This revolution in communications hindered Banks in that it kept him on a tether of sorts inhibiting his freedom of action.
On Friday, May 9, 1862, the 1st Battalion came together from the various company posts to Martinsburg and went up the valley (south) to join MGEN Nathaniel P. Banks' forces at Strasburg. They joined BGEN John P. Hatch's cavalry brigade. By May 13, the men of the 1st Maine found that Banks had divided his force to an extent that he only had 6,500 men with him astride the Valley Pike in Strasburg and 2,500 in Front Royal, fifteen miles east-southeast on the east side of the valley. On that day, BGEN Shields had departed from Front Royal on the Manassas Gap Railroad to go east and join McDowell's department. The small garrison (COL John Kenly, his Union 1st Maryland Infantry, and Companies B and D of 5th New York Cavalry[50]) at the Front Royal station was to prevent rebel movement along the Manassas Gap rail line. Hatch's brigade covered the approaches to Strasburg with Hatch encamped at Middletown.[51] On May 20, Douty was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.[52]
At the point in the valley where Banks had advanced, the Manassas Gap rail met another macadamized road, Winchester-Front Royal Pike, that ran eighteen miles along the eastern side of the valley and met Valley Pike at Winchester, 25 miles southwest of Harper's Ferry. Valley Pike passed seven miles over Cedar Creek down to Middletown, three miles further to Newtown (present day Stephens City), and finally seven miles into Winchester where it met the Winchester-Front Royal road. Several dirt roads ran between these to paved roads on either side of the valley.[53] The men of LTCOL Douty's battalion go to know the lay of the land during their patrols in the upper Shenandoah Valley in the next couple of weeks. They learned who the Unionists were and where the back roads went.[54]
Soon, Banks started getting intelligence from the local Unionists and black population that MGEN Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's corps of 17,000 men, fresh from whipping MGEN John C. Frémont's at McDowell was heading his way. Banks had been stripped of men and artillery so that his force of 23,000 at the beginning of May to 9,000 by the 21st.[55] Since Jackson was now positioned to block him from joining with Fremont, Banks began wondering if his now reduced force around Strasburg and Front Royal, fifteen miles east-southeast on the east side of the valley, would be able to resist any contact with Jackson. On May 23, Banks received reports of Jackson attacking the garrison at Front Royal before the telegraph link was severed and decided to begin withdrawing to Winchester taking the Valley Turnpike so that he could take as much of his supply train with him.[56] By 03:00, on May 24 the twelve-mile-long column of Banks' wagons began to roll north down the Valley Turnpike to Winchester.
Jackson advances[]
By 07:00 on May 24, 1862, a Saturday, MGEN Banks at Strasburg wired Secretary Stanton when he confirmed that Jackson's 17,000 had completely routed the garrison at Front Royal "with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners.[57]" and were closing on him, turning his position. Under these circumstances, Banks figured that if he could reach Winchester, he would preserve his lines of communication and increase the odds of reinforcement before contact.[58] At dawn, Banks called Hatch forward from Middletown and had him push patrols to Woodstock and along Manassas Gap Railroad. He also tasked Hatch to round up any stragglers and put to torch any supplies of military value that could not be carried off.[59] He then began his retreat north along the Valley Pike. Doughty's battalion and two companies of the 1st Vermont under MAJ William D. Collins,[60] just returned from patrol toward Woodstock at 02:00, (all told, a force of around 400 men) had temporarily camped at historic Belle Grove plantation[61] Banks pulled them onto the road at 07:00 as a rear guard escort up the road to Middletown. Banks was anxious and wanted to know where the rebels were. He sent two companies of the 29th Pennsylvania Infantry and elements of the 1st Michigan Cavalry to head east on Chapel Road, a country lane which connected Middletown, four miles north, with Cedarville (modern North Front Royal) the site of Kenly's surrender, in turn, four miles north of Front Royal.[62]
The 1st Battalion and the two companies took up position in the rear guard of the column as Banks' column set out on the road to Winchester. As the column passed through Middletown, Banks still had not heard from the 29th Pennsylvania and 1st Michigan. In "one of the smartest moves he made all day,"[62] Banks erred on the side of caution, sent messengers to LTC Douty, then waiting for the rear of the column at Toms Brook, to come up to headquarters with his command.[63] The five companies of the 1st Battalion under LTC Douty and the squadron of the 1st Vermont were sent north to Newtown to turn east down Chapel Road until they met, identified, and observed any Rebels. Feeling a bit more secure, at 09:00, Banks ordered the 500-wagon train to continue the 20-mile trek to Winchester. The 1st Battalion's duties were the normal cavalry tasks "to ascertain if the enemy was in force in that vicinity, to gain all possible information of his movements, and report often. If [they] met the enemy advancing [they were] told to hold him in check if possible."[64]
Unknown to the 1st Battalion, they were about to meet Jackson's plan to trap Banks between Strasburg and Newtown on the Valley Turnpike.[65] Jackson and Richard S. Ewell had spent the night at Cedarville and were up before dawn with his army ready to move. Still ignorant of Banks' precise location, Jackson had Ewell out on the Front Royal-Winchester Turnpike by 06:00. Jackson sent BGEN George Hume Steuart, in command of the 2nd and 6th Virginia Cavalry, ahead of the infantry to three miles north of Nineveh and cut west, off the roads and cross country to Newtown on the Valley Pike between Middletown and Winchester "to observe the movements of the enemy at that point."[66] At the same time, he directed COL Turner Ashby and his 7th Virginia Cavalry to send two companies east along the rail line from Front Royal to watch his rear, and three companies west along the rail line to scout the Federals in Strasburg. The remainder of the 7th would scout to the west of the Font Royal-Winchester pike and screen Jackson's infantry.[67]
Initial contact[]
Steuart's force reached Newtown and found the road crowded with the lead portion of Banks' wagon train. Steuart charged the United States forces, captured prisoners, spread panic. While his troopers scattered the teamsters, they did not burn the wagons which would have trapped the rest of Banks' train.[68] They advanced south along the pike and met the main body of Banks' army a mile south of Newtown where they were driven off by infantry.[69] Steuart reported his contact back to Jackson.
During the breakfast halt, Trimble drew Jackson's attention to a column of smoke coming from the direction of Strasburg.[70] Receiving Steuart's report and opting to intercept Banks at Middletown, Jackson retraced his route to Cedarville. Ewell's division with the 1st Maryland Infantry, and supporting artillery, were to advance from Cedarville up Front Royal Pike to turn at Nineveh and be ready for Jackson's order to advance on Newton and meet Steuart.[71] Meanwhile, COL Turner Ashby and BGEN Richard Taylor with his and BGEN Isaac Trimble's brigades were to advance west to Middletown on the dirt Chapel Road, made muddy by a morning rain shower, with his men from the 7th Virginia Cavalry and probe across the fields toward Strasburg, followed by the rest of the army.[68] The slogging through the mud was laborious and none of the Confederate columns knew what to expect to their front.[72] This force would be coming right at the Maine and Vermont cavalry troopers.[73]
Two miles short of the Front Royal Pike (three-quarters of a mile short of Molly Camel Run),[59] at 10:00, Ashby's scouts had observed an earlier patrol of the 29th Pennsylvania Infantry and 1st Michigan Cavalry who had not seen them. The earlier patrol had also missed seeing Jackson's his cartographer, MAJ Jedediah Hotchkiss with a small cavalry detachment scouting further up Chapel Road toward Middletown.[72] Their force had only advanced three mile toward Cedarville when they received a few carbine shots. Instead of ascertaining who they had met, they retreated hastily to Middletown. A local Unionist who was on Banks' staff, David Hunter Strother, later wrote that they had failed through timidity and incompetence thereby blinding Banks to his true situation.[74]
When Douty's scouts spied Rebel trropers coming along the track, they raced back to warn him. Douty threw out skirmishers to right and left of the road and sent the men armed with carbines ahead as skirmishers into the woods along the road. He sent riders back to the signal officer in Middletown for relay to Hatch and Banks.[59]
As the rebels' advance men came into view, the Maine and Vermont troopers drove them back with heavy fire, and the Confederates retreated out of sight.[75] Douty consulted with Collins and both realized that the woods would prevent them from seeing any flanking movements by the rebels from their position. at 11:00, having seen no more sign of the rebels, Douty called in his skirmish line and left out vedettes in the road and in the fields to keep watch. At the advice of MAJ Collins,[76] he pulled the rest of his small command two miles back toward Middletown to Providence Church (present-day Reliance United Methodist Church) where they were able to see the fields for miles on either side of the road. Hotchkiss had returned to Jackson to report contact, leading Ashby to change direction from Strasburg to Chapel Road.[77]
At 12:00, the vedettes came up the road and rejoined with word that Rebel cavalry and infantry were following them. Within fifteen minutes, Hotchkiss, and his party with two companies of the 8th Louisiana Infantry appeared, halted, and kept out of carbine range.[59] In the ensuing half-hour, the rebels brought up artillery and unlimbered them in the road.
Around 12:45, the rebel artillery opened on Douty and his men and the infantry and dismounted cavalry advanced. Holding fire until the regrouped, reinforced rebels came into range, Douty's men kept up a heavy fire that threw back the enemy,[73] particularly the 21st North Carolina Infantry from Taylor's Brigade. This led Hotchkiss to believe he was facing a much larger force of infantry in the woods as well as Douty's cavalry astride the road.[76] This managed to buy Banks more time as Jackson sent word to Ewell's Division to halt until he knew against whom he was fighting.[78]
In response, rebel artillery continued firing on the 1st Maine and the now empty woods. This led Douty to bring in his skirmishers and make fighting withdrawal. "stubbornly for every inch of ground"[79] back to Middletown. As they withdrew, the rebels pushed forward. He executed a steady and deliberate withdrawal the four miles back along Chapel Road to Middletown, causing enough uncertainty in Jackson's mind that it delayed the advance by nearly two hours. Under the pressure of the advance, Douty got his command back to Middleton with the loss of a horse. At 14:30 Douty turned off the Chapel Road and onto Church Street a block east of Valley Turnpike.[78] The signal officer on duty told him that Banks had already through and BGEN Hatch was expected at any moment. Douty led his men into the village of Middletown, south of the crossroads, to wait for Hatch.
The 8th Louisiana now appeared north of town and the accompanying guns of Chew's Battery from Steuart's Brigade began shelling Douty's and Collins' men. Douty was about to call for a withdrawal back to Strasburg when Hatch arrived[59] around 15:30.[73] He deployed Douty and Collins into the side streets and fields east of the turnpike, and waited for 5th New York and the remainder of the 1st Vermont to catch up from burning the last of the stores at Strasburg.
At the same time, Ashby's men appeared on the high ground on their flank to the southeast of town. Despite the macadam, travel along the shoulders had thrown up a great cloud of dust all along the pike.[80] Within minutes, 8th Louisiana had moved down from the high ground, cut the pike, and began plundering the wagon train while Chew's artillery began firing on wagons further north.[81] Hatch kept Douty's command in a skirmish line to the east between Jackson's Corps and the town. The 1st Battalion and the Vermonters kept the 1st Virginia and 21st North Carolina at bay.[82]
At 16:00, Hatch realized his command was surrounded when messengers sent to contact Banks' retreating wagon train returned with news that the Valley Pike was blocked by wagons and manned by rebels. Hatch said to LTC Douty, "We must cut our way through."[83] This was the seed of the 1st Maine's "Middletown Disaster".
"The Disaster"[]
Hatch had the 1st Maryland Cavalry and 5th New York Cavalry with him as well as Douty's small command. COL Charles H Tompkins and the remaining ten companies of the 1st Vermont Cavalry and future Medal of Honor winner Charles H. T. Collis and his independent company of Pennsylvania Zouaves d'Afrique (manning wagons) were still en route from Strasburg. He sent riders back to warn Tompkins and Collis to skirt to the west of Middletown and take back roads to Winchester since the rebels held the Valley Turnpike.[59]
As rebel artillery continued to sporadically fire shells into downtown Middletown, Hatch formed up his brigade along the turnpike by the town square in columns of fours. The 1st Battalion and the 1st Vermont fell in at the rear of the brigade's column at the southern edge of Middletown.[79] Taking the lead, Hatch moved out on the turnpike. Already receiving sporadic rifle fire before going very far, Hatch took the column off the pike onto a dirt road a half-mile out of town.[84]
Upon contact with the enemy on this road, Hatch charged and the whole column galloped down the road shooting and slashing at any rebels in their path. This generated a cloud of dust that obscured the turn off the Valley Turnpike. At the head of the column as the charge continued, Hatch saw that Ashby had managed to get one of his batteries behind a wagon barricade back on the turnpike and supported it with elements of the 21st North Carolina.[65] Seeing more rebels moving off the pike and cutting a dirt lane parallel to the pike by several hundred yards, Hatch continued west on his path and smashed through the handful of Ashby's cavalry on that road, bypassing the artillery.[82]
Looking back over the fields, the column could see see the two companies of the 1st Vermont followed by the Maine battalion continuing in a charge down the Valley Turnpike. Unfortunately for the 1st Battalion, the huge cloud of dust had obscured the column departing the macadam from MAJ Collins. The rebels had seen them, as well, and a quick-thinking officer on Jackson's staff, LT Douglas quickly rushed a company of infantry to a stonewall in a blocking position over the Turnpike.[85] LTC Douty had been at the rear seeing to a severely wounded CAPT Cilley of Company B when he noticed the Vermont companies moving out at the trot.[59] When MAJ Collins and two 1st Vermont companies missed the turn and came out of the dust cloud, they saw a rebel battery supported by an infantry blocking the Valley Turnpike. With the stone walls alongside the road leaving no other option, at point-blank range, they charged:[86]
Moving at a rapid rate in sections of four, in a cloud of dust, supposing they wore following their General, coming suddenly upon this battery in a narrow road where it was impossible to maneuver, a terrible scene of confusion followed. Those at the head of the column wore suddenly stopped, those in the roar unable to restrain their horses rushed upon each other, and men and horses were thrown in a confused heap. And as they wore all the while exposed to the shot, and shell, and bayonets, of the enemy, it is not strange that their loss was severe, numbering one hundred and seventy men with an equal number of horses. At the same time companies A and B at a little distance were under a severe fire, during which [Captain] Putnam, and Lieutenant Estes were wounded.
Escaping from this perilous position, Lieut. Colonel Douty fell back on the pike, and taking an intersecting road and making a detour to the left. After a hard march rejoined the main column at Newtown [sic, actually Winchester] the next day, and was immediately ordered to support a battery.[87]
As the column had moved out, Douty had mounted his horse and rode toward the head of the Vermont companies to join Collins. Before passing the last company, the column had already broken into a gallop and "was charging up the pike amid a shower of shell and bullets."[59] He found the dust so thick that he could see nothing but what was close by him. He began seeing men and horses strewn on the wayside. By the time he reached the third company from the end, Company M, the bodies of horses and men, alive and dead, were contained so tightly that they could not continue, and men started retreating.[88] The battalion spilled over the stonewalls and into the surrounding fields cutting their way through the rebels. Many Maine men were unhorsed by the collision with those ahead of them as well as by rebel artillery and musketry. Many these were taken prisoner by Wheat's "Louisiana Tigers" in Taylor's Brigade. Many took off on foot to try to escape. Luckily for those who were able to put some distance between themselves and the enemy, the presence of abandoned wagons from Banks' train loaded with supplies provided a welcome distraction as more and more of Trimble's and Taylor's left the firing line to men rifle through it.[89] This gave Douty and his men the chance escape.[90] Douty gathered what men he could and pulled back into Middletown.
He reformed his command in the center of town. A company of Ewell's infantry formed up at the southern end of town and opened fire on the New England cavalrymen.[91] LTCOL Douty pulled his men back out of their range and turned left down the side-streets and rode west out of Middletown out of sight of the rebels.[59] Eventually, he turned his group north the Middle Road and found Hatch and the brigade after a two-mile gallop.[92]
At Winchester[]
The rest of Hatch's brigade who had seen the debacle across the fields had continued parallel to the Valley Turnpike but found that every time they tried to regain the pike and join Banks, their way was blocked by Ewell's troops.[59] They ended up cutting through Ashby's cavalry and rejoined Banks at Newtown. There Hatch found Col George Henry Gordon and his brigade with five companies of the 1st Michigan Cavalry giving ground slowly. Hatch's men joined in the rear-guard action making Winchester at 22:00, Saturday evening.
At dawn on Sunday, May 25, BGEN Charles Winder's Stonewall Brigade occupied the hill due south of the town. As Winder attacked down toward Winchester, Banks' artillery soon found their range and began an effective, punishing fire. The 1st Battalion was ordered to provide support for one of these batteries.[81] The Stonewall Brigade stalled in their attack. Jackson ordered Taylor's Brigade to outflank the Union right which they did with a strong charge pushing the right flank back into town. At the same time, Ewell's men got around the extreme left of the Union line. With the impending double envelopment, around 07:00, Banks' line pulled back through the streets of town. The 1st Battalion covered the battery as they limbered up and headed north on the Valley Pike.
As the U.S. troops pulled out of the town, the Maine troopers noted that the local secessionist civilians were jeering them, throwing boiling water, and even shooting at them.[93] Along with the rest of Hatch's brigade, they found themselves fighting their way out of the town under attack from all sides.
Instead of a wild flight, Jackson later wrote that Banks's troops "preserved their organization remarkably well" through the town. Elated, Jackson rode cheering after the retreating enemy shouting "Go back and tell the whole army to press forward to the Potomac!"[94] Luckily for the 1st Battalion in the rearguard, the Confederate pursuit was ineffective. Ashby and the rest of the rebel cavalrymen had conducted vigorous pursuits of U.S. forces to the south and east. By the time they rejoined Jackson, their horses were blown and men too exhausted to effectively chase down Banks' rearguard leading Jackson to write, "Never was there such a chance for cavalry. Oh that my cavalry was in place!"[95]
As Hatch's brigade swept back and forth at the rear to keep the occasional pursuer at arm's length[96] the outnumbered Federals fled relatively unimpeded for 35 miles in 14 hours, crossing the Potomac River into Williamsport, Maryland after dark around 21:00, Sunday evening. Hatch noted the fine performance of the 1st Maine Cavalry in his post action reports.[59] Union casualties were 2,019 (62 killed, 243 wounded, and 1,714 missing or captured),[65] Confederate losses were 400 (68 killed, 329 wounded, and 3 missing).[97]
Aftermath[]
First Winchester had proven costly to the 1st Maine. Several the companies in the 1st Battalion suffered more than half their number as prisoners after the mess in the road with the rebel battery. Company A suffered the most, arriving at Winchester with eighteen men. During this action, the battalion lost three killed, one mortally wounded, nine wounded, twelve wounded and taken prisoner, one mortally wounded and taken prisoner, forty-nine taken prisoner of whom five would die in rebel captivity, and 176 horses and equipment.[98] Over the next three weeks, many men who had eluded capture or had escaped captivity straggled in to rejoin the regiment. On Tuesday, forty odd men arrived with COL DeForest of the 5th New York Cavalry with thirty-two wagons of supplies that they had managed to spirit away from Confederate hands at Middletown, having been forced by rebel pursuers to cut through the mountains and ford the Potomac upriver by Clear Spring.[99] Some stragglers arrived on foot having lost their mounts in the fighting. A group of twenty had been held in Winchester when they encountered MAJ Whitney and his small command en route to MGEN Banks on June 3.[100] Additionally, thirty or more of the men being transported south on the Valley Turnpike to captivity in Richmond managed to escape the night of the May 24 and make their way back to the 1st Maine in Maryland.[101] A group of fourteen troopers from Companies A and L managed to report back in to the regiment at Westport on May 27 after escaping through the mountains via Pughtown and Bath.[102] Some mpore men arrived on
In Williamsport, while Douty worked diligently remounting his command,[103] the news of Banks's ouster from the Valley caused a stir in Washington lest Jackson continue north and threaten the capital. Lincoln, who in the absence of a general in chief[104] was exercising day to day strategic control over his armies in the field, took aggressive action in response. He planned trap on Jackson using three armies. Frémont's would move to Harrisonburg on Jackson's supply line, Banks would move back in the Valley, and 20,000 men under McDowell would move to Front Royal and attack Jackson driving him against Frémont at Harrisonburg.
Unfortunately, this plan was complex and required synchronized movements by separate commands. Banks declared his army was too shaken to move. It would remain north of the Potomac until June 10. Frémont and McDowell bungled it completely. Jackson defeated the two in detail – Frémont at the Battle of Cross Keys on June 8 and McDowell at Battle of Port Republic on June 9. Of note, one of the 1st Maine's nemeses, Turner Ashby died on Chestnut Ridge near Harrisonburg in a skirmish with Frémont's cavalry.[105]
On June 12, the 1st Battalion crossed the Potomac and returned to Winchester. Company K continued down the Valley Pike to Strasburg. Companies E and M traveled south on the also macadam Front Royal-Winchester Road to Front Royal,[106] where they were joined on the 20th by companies A and B, and the brigade[107] placed attached to BGEN Crawford's infantry brigade.[108] The remainder of LTC Douty's command's time in the Shenandoah was uneventful save a brief skirmish at Milford, on July 2 (CAPT Thaxter commanding). On July 9, Douty received orders to rejoin the regiment at Warrenton.
In the Department of the Rappahannock[]
The main body of the regiment had remained in Washington, DC while the 1st Battalion operated in and around the Shenandoah Valley. On April 2, 1862, orders arrived for a march to Warrenton, VA on Friday, April 4. The troopers spent Thursday sharpening their sabers and checking their equipment. When their departure was delayed by a day, the regiment continued honing their edged weapons. On Friday evening, the men were given a patriotic send-off including a concert sung by ladies from Maine who were residing in Washington.[109]
At midday Saturday, the regiment departed their encampment on Capitol Hill led by MAJ Stowell (COL Allen was still recuperating in New York). The inexperienced regiment "accompanied by a baggage train long enough for a whole corps later in the war,"[110] rode down Maryland Avenue SW and crossed the Potomac on Long Bridge.[28]
Into rebel territory[]
On the Virginia side, it checked in at Fort Runyon.[111] At the fort, they received orders to report to BGEN McDowell's Department of the Rappahannock's[110] forces at Warrenton Junction (present day Calverton, Virginia) via the Columbia, Little River, and Warrenton Turnpikes. The regiment crossed the Alexandria Canal and climbed up the Columbia Turnpike passing Fort Albany[112] on the left as they crested the rise. The regiment continued on and could see Robert E Lee's home, Arlington House on a rise to the right. The men of the 1st Maine were taking in the sights as they traveled for the first time in rebel territory.
The first impressions of Virginia were not very favorable. The roads were muddy and in bad order, and houses were few, far between, not particularly good, even before the war, and now presenting a dilapidated, tumble-clown appearance. The whole country wore a deserted, unhealthy look, to which the earthworks, abandoned camp-grounds, and the waste and destruction which accompany an army, even when not in active operation, added an extra gloom.
Here the men saw for the first time the desolating effects of war. On their line of march to and from this point nearly every house,was deserted of its owners. Its doors and its windows and the fences that enclosed it, and the birds that sang and the flowers that bloomed around it, all were gone. The music of singing birds and the sweeter music of children's voices had ceased ... The pleasant dwellings had been left desolate, and no cheerful salutations of neighbors and no ringing laugh of youthful glee was heard. Instead of these the streets resounded with the roll of the drum, the stern word of command and the heavy tramp of armed men
Samuel H. Merrill, Chaplain, 1st Maine Cavalry[114]
As Lee's home faded into the distance, the men descended a small vale to Arlington Mills Station crossing both 4 Mile Run and the Alexandria, Loudoun, and Hampshire Railroad (AL&H).[115] The men noted heavy use of the railway as they crossed it seeing other troops and supplies at the station.[116] A mile beyond the railway and above the dell, at 15:00, the regiment briefly stopped at Bailey's Crossroads to water their horses. They had taken three hours to travel the nine miles from the encampment on Capitol Hill to the crossroads.[117] Once the horses were watered, the regiment mounted up and continued down Columbia Turnpike. At Padgett's Tavern, the regiment turned right on the Little River Turnpike another macadamized road. They crossed the unfinished new rail cut that would run from the Orange and Alexandria Railroad through Annandale and Fairfax to Haymarket. By sunset on Saturday, April 5, 1862, the 1st Maine had reached Fairfax Courthouse.[118]
The men in the regiment were familiar with the history of the courthouse "where the eloquence of a Patrick Henry and a ·William ·Wirt bad exerted its magic power.[119]" While dismayed at its state of ruin, the troopers still were fascinated by the building, the grounds, and the various remnants of the county records strewn about the location. Picketing the horses in the Courthouse's yards, the troopers were crammed into the Courthouse's various buildings.[120]
The regiment was up at dawn on Sunday morning, April 6. By 09:00, they had groomed their horses, broke fast, and were on the Little River Turnpike once more heading west. A mile down the pike, the command made a left turn in the village of Germantown and rode onto the Warrenton Turnpike heading west-southwest where Centreville, VA lay six miles away. They continued passing vacant fields on either side of the road. Ahead on a slight ridge on either side of the pike, the men saw some of the rebel "Quaker guns," manned with stuffed dummies that the rebels had placed there to give their pickets on the rise the look of a fortified position from the distance. At noon they passed them and entered Centreville. A water halt was made there for the horses, and after seeing to their mounts, the men inspected the effigies with great interest.[121] Within an hour, the command had remounted and left Warrenton Pike and turned onto a dirt road heading south to Manassas Junction. Shortly, they found themselves crossing Bull Run over a partially rebuilt bridge which had been destroyed by the Confederates when they retreated. Although on the edge of the battlefield, the Maine men saw solitary chimneys where houses used to be. Dead rotting horses generated "that peculiar stench which afterwards became familiar to all soldiers."[121] As the march continued, many a Maine trooper was sobered by the sight of numerous soldiers' graves on the roadside along Warrenton Turnpike.[122] At dark the regiment was at Manassas Junction. Their horses were picketed by the side of the road and the men had their first experience (of many) in sleeping out-of-doors. The weather was fair, and morale was high, and the "boys, though tired, were in good spirits, and inclined to make the best of the circumstances.[121] The command had marched 17 miles from Fairfax Courthouse.
Monday, April 7, 1862, was a gray, drizzly day, as the 1st Maine traveled along the dirt road that paralleled the Orange & Alexandria past Bristoe Station and Catlett's Station all the way to Warrenton Junction. They saw ripe wheat fields and fine manors, all abandoned. It started drizzling in the late morning, and after a midday water stop, the rain increased. The muddy road and numerous fords over creeks made the march a difficult one, but after twelve miles, around 15:00 they reported to McDowell's Department of the Rappahannock in Warrenton Junction.[123] The baggage train were still on the dirt road having been held up at a ford that was too deep for their transit.
Training and patrolling[]
After scrounging for rations the first day in camp, the wagons finally caught up with the regiment having taught the men a valuable lesson – always have some rations and extra ammunition on their person or mount.[124] Graced with an early spring snowstorm on Tuesday, the men made the best of camp life, drilling, and seeing to their horses.[125]
First assigned to Gen. Abercrombie's brigade, and soon afterwards to Gen. Ord's division within McDowell's department, the 1st Maine was learning its job. The occasional patrols were the primary means for this on-the-job-training. Companies were detached singly, in twos, threes, and more to conduct these reconnaissances. Friday, April 11, they spent the night scouting Warrenton and returned Saturday morning. They made several more such patrols through the remainder of April and into May.[126] In this time, they became adept at river-crossings, bringing the right amount of gear for a mission, and handling their horses while also learning how valuable a source of intelligence both the enslaved and free black population would be.[127]
On Tuesday, April 15, Company C under CAPT Dyer made a patrol down the Orange & Alexandria to the Rappahannock where they saw black slaves building earthworks on the opposite side of the river north of the railroad. As they moved north, they could see a large, white plantation house which they surmised to be the rebel headquarters. Two slaves who had escaped across the river estimated that there were between 5,000 and 7,000 troops total in the area. Examination of the field works through binoculars led Dyer to believe they alone could hold 3,000–4,000 men. As they turned to report back, three rebel batteries opened fire on them.[128] After getting out of range and sight of the rebels, they learned from some black women the identities of several locals who were visiting their camp and reporting back to the rebels.
The next evening, Wednesday, April 16, LTC Willard Sayles, commander of the 1st Rhode Island Cavalry, took a squadron of his regiment and Companies D and F of the 1st Maine on a patrol toward Liberty Church to interrogate and arrest the reported rebel informants.[129] After receiving accurate intelligence from the suspects' slaves, three men were arrested and turned over to the brigade headquarters.
On Tuesday, April 22, COL Allen rejoined his command. The regiment was being moved around and attached to various infantry brigades. Sometimes various companies were detached for provost or courier duties. Other than these command duties their time was spent on picket duty and scouting patrols for their various attached commands. Their constant reassignment led, by mid-May, to the common query among the men, "whose kite are we going to be tail to next?"[130] In fact, this problem affected not only the 1st Maine but all volunteer cavalry regiments in the eastern theater. The Army of the Potomac's cavalry would not serve as a unified force until the upcoming Maryland Campaign.[131]
Culpeper reconnaissance[]
The only patrol where the regiment operated as one body was a reconnaissance patrol to Culpeper Court House on Sunday, May 4, 1862, through Monday, May 5.[132] Under BGEN Hartsuff's direction, the 1st Maine took up their line of march Sunday, May 4, 1862, at 17:00, for reconnaissance to the Rappahannock River and beyond Culpeper Courthouse. The expedition was led by MAJ Stowell due to COL Allen's continued infirmity.[133] and the men were tasked with bringing three days rations with them. After proceeding en miles in the darkness, Stowell halted at 20:30 and obtained a local Unionist as guide who took them two miles further to the road along the north side of the Rappahannock. The command then took this road two miles further north to Beverly's Ford. With the water up to five feet deep and a strong current, the regiment did not finish crossing until midnight.[134]
The guide suggested that the best place for a horse and water was the Cunningham plantation, or Elkwood Plantation, Farley Hill, by Farley Road over Ruffian's Run, the late headquarters of the Confederate Army.[135] Around 01:00, the command gained access to the main house from the overseer who provided valuable intelligence on the geography of Culpeper County and the local rebel order of battle.
At 04:00, the 1st Maine resumed their march, with the overseer guiding them. Instead of taking a dirt track (present day Farley Road) which went through a wood and low land, Stowell accepted the guide's suggestion to ride along Fleetwood Hill that gave a view of the river and railroad as well as of the surrounding country, thus precluding being surprised by the enemy. Pushing on toward Brandy Station, Stowell had thrown out a company of skirmishers and a formidable rear guard, which covered more than a mile of the country.[136]
Stowell found the general appearance of the country favorable, gently rolling, open, highly cultivated, and fruitful, rich plantations, with an abundance of forage and subsistence. He noted the brush was much heavier than about Warrenton Junction. After crossing the river, the men had found no real road leading south and on their left until they arrived at Brandy Station.[136] There they found remains of an old plank road, connecting the Fredericksburg and Culpeper Plank Roads with the Old Carolina and Kelly's Ford Roads.
The patrol found that the rebels on the Rappahannock had fallen back to Gordonsville, and there has been no force this side of there of any great amount. Stowell noted that the "planters on our route, as near as I could judge, are nearly all secesh [sic], and a little bleeding would reduce their fever a little and do them good."[136]
Advancing on from Brandy Station to Culpeper Court House around 09:00, the 1st Maine found that the middle and upper classes were secessionist who could not be trusted to give accurate information, but that the blacks and poor whites were exceptionally reliable, giving corroboration, and very willing to give all the intelligence they had.[136] Two miles beyond Brandy Station, Stowell heard that a line of pickets was established about three miles this side of Culpeper, ergo about two miles ahead of them. Further interrogation of a civilian intercepted coming from the courthouse indicated that the rebels there were two companies of cavalry all equipped with carbines.[137]
After leaving this man by the wayside and advancing about one mile, at 10:15, Stowell received a messenger from CAPT Taylor commander of L Company, the advance guard, that LT Vaughan had found the pickets, charged them, put them to flight, and now Company L and Taylor were chasing them down the railroad. Stowell ordered the column forward as fast as possible. On arriving within a half-mile of the town, he detached men to high ground to the north and south of town to avoid surprises. He next sent two companies forward to support Taylor and Company L which had continued pursuit through the town and out the other side. The men on the high ground reported seeing horses being driven into a yard northwest of town.[138] Stowell sent CAPT Smith forward to investigate.
Not having heard from either Taylor or Smith, Stowell kept the command spread out while he and Company C searched the courthouse and questioned the civilians. While the men in Culpeper were "sour-looking and reserved,"[139] they again found that the black people and handful of Unionists and poor whites were reliable sources. According to the friendly locals, the regiment's approach generated quite a stir, and two couriers immediately rode to the Rapidan, some eight miles beyond Culpeper, for two regiments of infantry which were stationed there. Stowell also learned that the rebels mounted the horses without regard to ownership, and very many without stopping to saddle them. The man intercepted and interrogated on the way in had proven to be accurate as per the composition of the force posted at the courthouse
Considering the short distance to the two regiments of rebel infantry (they were just a few stations up the Orange & Alexandria rail line) and not hearing from CAPT Taylor, Stowell became concerned about the regiment's quite critical situation. While searching stables and yards for horses to seize, the returned CAPT Smith and several company and platoon officers alerted him to a force of cavalry on the south side of the town. Initially thought to be rebels as the force had light-colored horses and some of it light clothing, it turned out to be CAPT Taylor. He had taken some prisoners were riding some of the light-colored horses and dressed in light clothing.[140]
At 11:00, after finding no papers of great consequence except a handful of rifles, carbines, shotguns, and pistols, the command began its trek back to its base. Stowell remarked that by following the railroad, they could tear up the track at any time if the cars should approach us with infantry. Stopping at Jonas Run about 13:30 to water and feed their horses, and then returned to the Rappahannock by 16:30.[136] Stowell deemed it unwise to stop on the south side for the night, lest rebel infantry catch them by railroad. Since only their cavalry could ford the river, which the Maine troopers did not fear, Stowell turned the column north along the riverbank toward Beverly's Ford as it started top rain.[141]
Arriving about 18:30, the command began across finding the water about higher than the night before and consequently a difficult two-hour evolution. Originally intending on camping on the north side for the night, Stowell found a consensus to push on home through the stormy weather twelve miles farther.[136]
Stowell cleared the last of his men into camp and reported to COL Allen at 23:00. While not encountering any meaningful contact, the 1st Maine had successfully scouted the furthest distance south over the Rappahannock of any United States unit thus far in the war covering 60 miles over the course of 31 hours and returning with confirmed enemy order of battle, transportation infrastructure intelligence, enemy supply/logistics status, and eight prisoners. The command was duly praised for its competence and professionalism.[136]
Move to Falmouth[]
After several successful foraging and scouting expeditions that netted a handful of prisoners, on Friday, May 9, the brigade, now commanded by BGEN Hartsuff, received orders to pack its gear and move to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock, twenty-five miles to the southeast. On Monday, May 12 at noon, the brigade departed Warrenton.[142] The five companies of the 1st Maine served as advance and rear guards during the march.
At 17:00, after traveling eight miles, Companies D, K, and L, the advance guard, halted and set camp.[143] The brigade found the travel very difficult, and the rear guard did not arrive at camp until 21:30 Monday evening.[144]
Reveille at 04:00 got the men up to care for their horses and prepare for the day's march. Companies C, F, G, and I rotated to take the advance guard on Tuesday and were stepping out at 06:30. After all the infantry and wagons got out of the camp, D, K, and L finally got on the road at 08:30. COL Allen's command noted the number of "large plantations of rare beauty" along the march.[137] May 13, 1862, was a hot and humid day and the heat almost insufferable, with a dense cloud of dust that made the horses in front of the troopers almost invisible. The infantry in the brigade suffered greatly as the column spun out for miles. The advance guard halted at Stafford Court House at 14:00, but the rear companies did not arrive until 18:30.[144] The men in the brigade were impressed with the relatively untouched countryside, quite amid the spring green, as they passed through.
As the column had progressed during the day, they had attracted a large following of escaped slaves, or "contraband," who seized their freedom by joining the column. Again, these local black residents proved exceedingly valuable sources of intelligence.[145]
The next morning, the Maine troopers rose earlier than their exhausted infantry brothers to prepare their horses for the last leg of the journey south to Falmouth. Again, the companies rotated between advance and rear guard and resumed the march with an awake and fed infantry by 07:00. Within an hour that Wednesday morning, it began raining which spared the brigade from the heat of the day before but added a wet chill to the march.[146]
Hartsuff's brigades's advance guard of Companies D, K, and L reached Falmouth, on the opposite side of the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg, by mid afternoon. The remainder of the brigade streamed in until 20:00.The march of 30 miles through Virginia mud had been difficult. Nearly half of the infantry fallen out by the wayside at some point of the march. Despite the rigor, the 1st Maine troopers noticed several large, beautiful plantations, indicating fine taste. They also noticed again the support and value of the local black population as intelligence sources. The column had met many groups of slaves acting as agents of their own emancipation by escaping to Federal lines.[147]
Falmouth and the Shenandoah Valley[]
Through April and May of that spring, the men of the 1st Maine had followed the progress of McClellan in his Peninsula Campaign through the Northern newspaper available in camp as well as the enemy press available along the route of march. The forces at Fredericksburg were commanded by McDowell to block any advance on Washington and to tie down Confederate troops marking them across the river at Fredericksburg. While the confederates had reduced their numbers at Fredericksburg, the U.S. forces increased in number yet did not advance.
While at Falmouth, Hartsuff's brigade with Rickett's brigade now formed a division under a prior commander, Ord, Ord's division was reviewed by Gen. McDowell, and three days later, Friday, May 23, President Lincoln, accompanied by Secretary of War Stanton, M. Mercier, the French Minister, and other distinguished gentlemen, as well as by Mrs. Lincoln, Mrs. Stanton, and other ladies, reviewed McDowell's whole force. In camp at Falmouth, the regiment received new shelter tents (today known as pup tents) so that every two men would always he supplied with a tent for shelter. Despite initial misgivings, the troopers eventually found them much better tents than their original ten- and twelve man tents.[148]
Sunday, May 25, the regiment, with the 2nd Maine Light Battery (CAPT James A. Hall), the 5th Maine Light Battery (CAPT George F. Leppien), and the 1st Pennsylvania Light Battery (CAPT Ezra W. Matthews), all under command of COL Allen, marched to Alexandria. The command was in motion at 18:00 in the evening, and after a tedious march went into bivouac on the road at 23:30, having made five miles in as many hours, owing to continuous delays caused by the artillery and wagons getting stuck in the mud. By 07:00, they were on the road to Alexandria again. At 12:00, however, a courier caught up with COL Allen with orders for them to march to Manassas Junction instead. Allen had the small command go into camp planning on an early start on Tuesday.
McDowell had received reports of the rebels in considerable force near Centreville, and he decided to consolidate his forces at Manassas. On the road by 05:00, the regiment and three batteries bivouacked on the roadside on Tuesday evening and made Manassas by midday, Wednesday, May May 28, joining the remainder of McDowell's corps, camping there that night.
On Thursday morning, Washington ordered McDowell to the Shenandoah Valley to assist Banks so the whole force, with the 1st Maine in the advance, took up the line of march for Front Royal. Washington was intent on this force cutting Jackson's force off in the lower valley between McDowell and Banks.[149]The regiment passed through Thoroughfare Gap and camped Thursday night on the other side of the Blue Ridge Mountains. On Friday, they went fifteen miles further and camped on the estate of the late Chief Justice Marshall, and the third day, Saturday, May 31, reached Front Royal at dark in the rain camping just outside the village on the Manassas Gap Road.[150]
MAJ Whitney's mission[]
One week prior to the 1st Maine's arrival as part of Ord's Division, Saturday, May 24, Jackson's forces, after demolishing the 1st Maryland Cavalry at Front Royal, had met their brethren in the 1st Battalion with LTC Douty and driven MGEN Banks' up the other side of the valley to Winchester following up with driving Banks further out of the valley and across the Potomac into Maryland on Sunday. At Front Royal, the regiment met a handful of their comrades from the 1st Battalion who had been captured after The Disaster with MAJ Collins from the 1st Vermont. The day before, Friday May 30, the 1st Rhode Island had liberated these men when MGEN Shields' forces retook the town.[151] Unknown to the regiment, more of their comrades were being held temporarily at several locations in the valley.[152]
At Front Royal, McDowell, now in command, found it very important to open communication with General Banks, who had moved downriver from Williamsport to Harper's Ferry at the lower end of the valley. On Sunday, before his arrival, Shields had heard the artillery fire from Jackson's clash with Fremont at Fisher's Hill but refrained from moving to his assistance because he wanted to wait for McDowell and all of his forces to arrive.[153] While he now knew Jackson may have slipped away at Strasburg, he also wanted to get a picture of the disposition of Confederate forces between him and Winchester, specifically if Jackson and his main body of troops were still threatening Washington. Accordingly, the next day Monday, June 2, he ordered a small force to attempt to make contact. COL Allen upon receiving the orders sent MAJ Whitney with Companies C and D to reconnoiter in that direction, and if possible, open a line of communicate with Banks. The mission was risky as the rebels now commanded the valley.
MAJ Whitney and his little command started late in the afternoon at 16:00. In moderate rain, they traveled up the macadamized Front Royal-Winchester Road, passing through Cedarville and Nineveh without seeing any enemy. The sun set at 19:30 and with the mountains' shadows, it was too dark to continue so Whitney halted his men in the woods about two miles from Winchester. They had heard from the local black population that the Confederates were holding Winchester but that Jackson's main body had already slipped into Strasburg the same day they had arrived ten miles away.[154] This would be valuable intelligence for both Banks and McDowell as well as the fact that they had not seen any rebels troops during their journey in the rain. They remained in the woods that night in a driving rain without fires to hide their presence from the enemy. Without shelter, they were "cold, wet, and decidedly uncomfortable," but the Maine troopers knew the storm and darkness were advantageous to their dangerous mission.[155]
At early dawn, Tuesday, the command dashed into town and through it, creating a complete surprise to the rebel force of about 300 who held the town. This force was left by Jackson to guard about 200 Union soldiers captured by Jackson's forces the week before including a handful of 1st Maine troopers,[152] The rebels had not expected any threat between them and Jackson's main body and failed to put pickets south of the town. They were completely surprised as well as the local citizenry who remembering, "their barbarous conduct toward the retreating troops of General Banks, a few days before, they anticipated a fearful retribution."[156] As the little force, at an hour when few in the town were stirring, swept like a whirlwind into the town, they were very naturally supposed' to be the advance of a heavy force.
The consternation and frightened looks and actions of soldiers and citizens, as well as the joyous surprise of the prisoners, amused the Maine troopers. The panic seized rebel soldiers and the civilians that beds were suddenly vacated, toilets neglected, garments forgotten or ludicrously adjusted, and rebel soldiers threw down their arms in dismay while others took safety in flight. Taking advantage of the enemy's sudden panic and disorganization, many prisoners with their wits about them took off north on the road to Harper's Ferry where friendly forces lay. A few of these men were some captured from LTCOL Douty's battalion at Middletown Several of these men obtained mounts and joined Whitney's expedition.[100]
The whole number of Union prisoners in the town might have been liberated, but since this was not in the mission's orders, Whitney did not stop to do so. His first objective of the mission to scout between Front Royal and Winchester was accomplished. The orders being next to communicate with MGEN Banks and not stop to fight, Whitney's command pushed on. MAJ Whitney found a guide who stated that a rebel force was in camp just beyond Winchester, but instead, after marching a few miles he found Banks' pickets who told him Banks was now at Harper's Ferry. He soon reached the general's headquarters by 10:00, delivered his orders, received new ones, dropped off the liberated Maine troopers with LTC Douty, and started back on the return to Front Royal. Around 17:00, the command once again swept through Winchester again causing confusion and camped in the same woods On Tuesday night that they had on Monday night.[157] Rising at dawn's light on June 4, the command lit off on the road to Front Royal and met no rebel forces along the way. Arriving by 11:00, MAJ Whitney reported with COL Allen to MGEN McDowell with Banks' messages and his report on rebel dispositions between Front Royal and Winchester.
On that Wednesday, the same day, as a result of Whitney's report of only the handful of rebels at Winchester, Banks moved his command back into Winchester. Entering the town, the U.S. troops found "not a solitary person appeared in sight, but hundreds of unfriendly eyes were peering through all manner of crevices, expecting momentarily to see the torch applied to all places whence shots had been fired and hot water thrown on the morning of the twenty-fifth day of May."[158] In this action, Whitney's colleagues in the 1st Battalion scouted up the Valley Turnpike for Banks.
Reunification[]
The regiment was reunited at Warrenton, VA, on July 10, and attached to Bayard's brigade, with which it took part in the Battle of Cedar Mountain. This was the unit's first encounter with elements of the Army of Northern Virginia, albeit only a portion under the command of Stonewall Jackson. Due to the confusion and the large number of prisoners taken in the valley in May and June, forty or more 1st Maine troopers who were being transported to Richmond at this time succeeded in escaping and eluding their guards and rejoined the company in a day or two.
Cedar Mountain[]
General Robert E. Lee responded to Pope's dispositions by dispatching Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson with 14,000 men to Gordonsville on July 13. Jackson was later reinforced with another 10,000 men by MGEN A.P. Hill's division on July 27.[159] On August 6, Pope marched his forces south into Culpeper County with the objective of capturing the rail junction at Gordonsville, to draw Confederate attention away from MGEN George B. McClellan's withdrawal from the Virginia Peninsula.[160] In response to this threat, Jackson chose to go on the offensive, attacking Pope's vanguard under Banks, before the entire Army of Virginia could be brought to bear on his position at Gordonsville.[161] After defeating Banks, he then hoped to move on Culpeper Court House, 26 miles (42 km) north of Gordonsville and the focal point of the Union arc about Northern Virginia, to keep Pope's army from uniting. This would allow Jackson to fight and hopefully defeat each of the Union Corps separately, as he had done during the Valley Campaign. Accordingly, Jackson set out on August 7 for Culpeper.[162] The cavalry under BGEN Beverly Robertson was sent ahead to dispatch the Federal cavalry guarding the fords of the Rapidan River and occupying Madison Court House, threatening the Confederates left flank as they marched northward. This task was easily accomplished by Robertson on August 8.[163]
Jackson's march on Culpeper Court House was hindered by the severe heat wave over Virginia at the beginning of August, as well as by his characteristic secrecy about his plan, which caused confusion among his divisional commanders as to the exact route of advance. As such, the head of his column had only progressed 8 miles (13 km) by the evening of August 8. The Federal Cavalry, though easily dispatched by Robertson, quickly returned to Pope and alerted him of the Confederate advance. In response, Pope ordered Sigel to Culpeper Court House to reinforce Banks, and Banks was ordered to maintain a defensive line on a ridge above Cedar Run, 7 miles (11 km) south of Culpeper Court House.[164]
On the morning of August 9, Jackson's army crossed the Rapidan River into Culpeper County, led by MGEN Richard S. Ewell's division, followed by BGEN Charles S. Winder's division, with MGEN A.P. Hill's division in the rear. Just before noon, BGEN Jubal Early's brigade, the vanguard of Ewell's division, came upon Federal cavalry and artillery occupying the ridge above Cedar Run, just to the north-west of Cedar Mountain. Early brought up his guns and an artillery duel began between the opposing forces as Early's infantry formed a line on the eastern side of the Culpeper-Orange Turnpike (present day U.S. Route 15) on the high ground on the opposite bank of Cedar Run.[165] As the rest of Ewell's division arrived, they formed on Early's right, anchored against the northern slope of the mountain and deployed their six guns on its ridge. Winder's division formed to Early's left, on the west side of the Turnpike, with BGEN William Taliaferro's brigade closest to Early, and Col. 's on the far Confederate left in a wheat field at the edge of a woods. Winder's artillery filled a gap on the road between the two divisions. The Stonewall Brigade, led by Col. , was brought up in support behind the guns. A.P Hill's division, still marching up the Turnpike, was ordered to stand in reserve on the Confederate left.[166]
Union position[]
The Federals formed a line on a ridge above Cedar Run, with BGEN Samuel W. Crawford's brigade forming the Union right in a field across from Garnett and BGEN Christopher C. Augur's division on the Union left to the east of the Turnpike. BGEN John W. Geary's brigade was anchored on the Turnpike opposing Taliaferro, while Brig. Gen Henry Prince's brigade formed the far-left opposite Ewell. BGEN George S. Greene's understrength brigade (only two regiments) was kept in reserve in the rear.[167]
Union attack[]
A little before 17:00 as the artillery fight began to wane, Confederate BGEN Charles S. Winder fell mortally wounded. He had been ill that day and was taken onto the field in an ambulance wagon. While attempting to direct his troops, he was struck by a shell fragment. Winder's left arm and side were torn to pieces, and he died a few hours later. As a result, command of the division devolved on William Taliaferro, who was completely ignorant of Jackson's battle plan. Dispositions on his part of the field were still incomplete; Garnett's brigade was isolated from the main Confederate line, with its flank dangerously exposed to the woods. The Stonewall Brigade was to have come up to support them but remained a half-mile distant behind the artillery.[168] Before leadership could properly be restored to the division the Union attack began. Geary and Prince were sent against the Confederate right. The Federal advance was swift and threatened to break the Confederate line, prompting Early to come galloping to the front from Cedar Mountain where he was directing troop dispositions. Early's stabilizing presence and the raking fire of the Confederate guns halted the Union advance on the Confederate right.[167] On the left Crawford attacked Winder's division, sending one brigade directly at the Confederate line and another brigade through the woods on a flanking movement. The Federals came from the woods directly into the flank of the 1st Virginia Infantry, who under the pressure from attack on two fronts broke for the rear. The Federals pushed on, not waiting to reform their lines, rolling through the outflanked 42nd Virginia until they found themselves in Taliaferro's and the artillery's rear. The Stonewall Brigade came up and was swept aside by Crawford's troops before it had a chance to react. Jackson ordered the batteries withdrawn before they were captured, but Taliaferro and Early's left were hit hard by the Union advance and threatened to break.[169]
Confederate counterattack[]
At this dire point, Jackson rode to that part of the field to rally the men and found his old brigade finally being brought up to reinforce the line. Intending to inspire the troops by waving his sword, he was forced, due to its being rusted and stuck in its scabbard from infrequent use, to unbuckle the sword and scabbard from his belt and wave it all over his head. Then grabbing a battle flag from a retreating standard bearer, he ordered his men to rally around him.[170] The Stonewall Brigade, inspired by their leader, attacked the Union troops, and drove them back. By this point, Banks's men were becoming tired and disorganized, with their ammunition nearly gone. Without any support, his men had been unable to follow up on their initial success. The Stonewall Brigade maintained contact in pursuit of the U.S. troops but soon found themselves beyond the Confederate line alone and unsupported. Banks's line reformed and counterattacked, driving the 4th and 27th Virginia back. The Stonewall Brigade's attack had bought time allowing Jackson's line time to reform and A.P Hill's troops to come up and fill the gaps from Winder's broken regiments.[165] Jackson ordered Hill and Ewell to advance. He encountered BGEN Lawrence O'Bryan Branch (a career politician) making a lengthy speech to his troops and urged him to press forward. The Union right immediately collapsed. Ewell, having difficulty silencing his guns, was delayed, but the Union left began to waver at the sight of Crawford's retreat and were finally broken by a charge down Cedar Mountain by BGEN Isaac R. Trimble's brigade.[171]
Confederate pursuit[]
Despite bringing up Greene's reserve brigade in support, by 19:45, the Union line was in full retreat. In a last-ditch effort to help cover his infantry's retreat, Banks sent two squadrons of cavalry at the Confederate line. They were met with a devastating volley from the Confederate infantry posted behind a fence on the road, allowing only 71 of 174 to escape.[172] The Confederate infantry and Brig. Gen William E. Jones's 7th Virginia Cavalry hotly pursued the retreating Federals, nearly capturing Banks and Pope, who were at their headquarters a mile behind the Federal line.[173] After a mile-and-a-half of pursuit, Jackson grew wary as darkness set in, as he was unsure of the location of the rest of Pope's army. Finally, several Union infantrymen captured by the 7th Virginia informed the Confederates that Pope was bringing Sigel forward to reinforce Banks. Accordingly, Jackson called off the pursuit and by around 2200 the fighting had ceased. By this point, BGEN James Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was arriving, which effectively covered Banks's retreat.[174]
Aftermath[]
Losses were high in the battle: Union casualties of 2,353 (314 killed, 1,445 wounded, 594 missing), Confederate 1,338 (231 killed, 1,107 wounded).[175] Crawford's brigade had lost over 50% of its total strength, including most of its officers. Prince's and Geary's brigades suffered 30–40% casualty rates. Both generals were wounded, and Prince was also captured.[176] Confederate BGEN Charles S. Winder was mortally wounded by a shell.
For two days, Jackson maintained his position south of Cedar Run on the western slope of the mountain, waiting for a Federal attack that did not come. Finally, receiving news that all of Pope's army had arrived at Culpeper Court House, on August 12, Jackson fell back on Gordonsville to a more defensive position behind the Rapidan River.[177]
Weather and poor communication with his divisional commanders had robbed Jackson of the initiative in the fight. Still expecting to face the same cautious opponent from the Valley, he was taken by surprise and very nearly driven from the field. Excellent commanding by the Confederates at the crucial moment of the battle and the fortuitous arrival of Hill staved off defeat, eventually allowing their numerical superiority to drive the Federals from the field. For his part, Banks, having been soundly defeated by Jackson in the Valley, was anxious to make up for previous losses. Rather than fighting a defensive battle from a strong position because he was outnumbered 2 to 1, giving time for the rest of Pope's army to arrive, he decided to take the initiative and attack Jackson before he could fully form his lines. The bold move very nearly paid off, but in the end, he was again defeated by his old foe.[178]
With Jackson on the loose, wreaking havoc against Union forces, General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck became apprehensive and called off Pope's advance on Gordonsville, thereby giving Lee the initiative in the Northern Virginia Campaign. The battle effectively shifted fighting in Virginia from the Virginia Peninsula into northern Virginia.[173]
Skirmishing at Brandy Station and the Rappahannock}[]
After that debacle, 1st Maine Cavalry participated in the retreat of Gen. Pope's forces to Fairfax Court House, where it arrived on Sep 3 and reported to BGEN Jesse L. Reno, having engaged the enemy at Brandy Station on Aug 20, and been present at the Second Battle of Bull Run on the 30th, under Brig.-Gen. Elliott of Pope's staff.
Arriving in Washington on Sep 4, it was attached to Burnside's Corps and engaged the Lee's forces at Frederick, MD, on September 12, 1862. Company G, acting as BGEN Reno's bodyguard, took part in the Battle of South Mountain, Companies M and H, under MGEN Porter, in that of Antietam. The regiment (except Companies G, M, and H) remained at Frederick, from Sep 12 to Nov 2, up to which period it had lost in action and worn out in service nearly 700 horses.
In December 1862, during Battle of Fredericksburg, the regiment's battalions and companies were spread through MGEN William B. Franklin's Left Grand Division of the Army of the Potomac. The 1st Maine got through the Fredericksburg campaign relatively unscathed by the Army of Northern Virginia. It went into winter quarters outside Fredericksburg and mounted pickets and security patrols to fend off marauding rebels through the Holiday Season and into the new year.[144]
Hard service in 1863[]
In camp before the onset of activity in the Spring, the 1st Maine as well as the entire of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac received breech-loading carbines (two Michigan regiments received repeating Spencer rifles). The whole of the cavalry now had the firepower that would enable them to hold, tie down, and delay rebel infantry until their own infantry could arrive on the scene of battle. While not as rapid in fire as the later repeating carbines and rifles, the breech loaders still increased the rate of fire to three and four times that of the rebel muzzle-loading Enfields and Springfields and could outrange the rebel cavalry's shotguns.[179] The standard trooper in the 1st was now armed with a saber, two Colt .44 "Army" pistols, and a single-shot Burnside breech-loading carbines (some kept privately purchased Sharps Carbines).[180] As with the rest of the Cavalry Corps, the saber and pistols were for combat from the saddle and the carbine was for dismounted combat.
The year would be the turning point in the Eastern Theater, and the severity of the service to which the men of this regiment were subjected during the campaigns of 1863, may be inferred from a bare recital of the battles in which they were subsequently engaged and from data showing some of their heaviest losses. The battles, in addition to those above mentioned, occurred during the following campaigns/expeditions.[181]
Stoneman's raid and the Chancellorsville Campaign[]
In April 1863, MGEN Joseph Hooker sent MGEN George Stoneman to cut Lee's line of supply on the Orange and Alexandria and Virginia Central Railroads at the town of Gordonsville. Hooker hoped Lee would withdraw from Fredericksburg since he would be cut off from supplies and transportation. Hooker assured Stoneman that he would keep in communications with him while he was on the raid.[182] This expedition was also a significant change in the use of Federal Cavalry. The cavalry was beginning to expand from their traditional screening/scouting roles and add the role of a mounted strike force tasked with finding and fighting the enemy. Hooker directed Stoneman in his orders on April 12, 1863, "Let your watchword be fight, and let all your orders be fight, fight, fight."
The raid would be conducted with the men carrying light loads concentrating on weapons and ammunition. Sustenance for man and beast were to be taken from rebel territory. The 1st in the lead of COL Kilpatrick's 1st Brigade of BGEN David McM. Gregg's 2nd Division seized the bridge across the river at Rappahannock Station, but further reconnaissance found the roads beyond to be nearly impassable in the rain and mud.[183] The men's eagerness was thwarted as heavy spring rains kept the bulk of the force on the Federal side of the river looking for a suitable spot to get across in force. To keep the force undetected, Stoneman had given the order that no fires would be allowed after dark for the duration of the march.
Rebel scouts had noticed some cavalry moving out of Falmouth but were ignorant of its intent. The 1st Maine's LT Stone of Company A was acting as the assistant brigade quartermaster when he was captured by a small party of Mosby's Rangers and taken to Warrenton to get back across the river for interrogation. The rain had increased the size and speed of the river at the ford so that his captors were reluctant to move into the stream. To goad his men, the party's commander, a LT Paine, spurred his horse into the river, and was promptly swept off. Despite being a prisoner, Paine moved into the river downstream, while his other captors dithered and grabbed his captor saving his life. In return, he was promised he would be sent directly to Lee's headquarters with a recommendation to be returned without exchange as reward for this act. While being transported to Richmond, Paine, on Stone's horse, and his party were in turn captured by the 8th Illinois in COL Horace B. Sargent's 1st Brigade of BGEN William W. Averell's 1st Division of this expedition. Stone spent barely a week away from the regiment and was back with his horse by Wednesday, April 22.[184]
By the evening of April 19, Stoneman had the command shed "all men and horses not in good condition, and all extra baggage, to the rear, and prepare for long and rapid marches, day and night, as the cavalry was about to show an indulgent government that the money and pains taken to render this arm of the service efficient was not thrown away.'"[185] The rain and the mud still hindered the force to the extent that by Wednesday, April 22, the 1st Maine found itself in Warrenton, VA still on the Federal side of the river. The men found a respite in that being within a town, they were allowed to light fires. They remained in Warrenton through Saturday, April 25.
Moving out[]
On April 25, the orders were modified to cross the Rappahannock north-west of Fredericksburg on the evening of the 28th, or the morning of the 29th, and move in two columns, operating on the line of the Orange & Alexandria railroad and Culpeper Road. After moving out during the night of April 28/29, the column was in motion, and before noon was at Kelly's ford, on the Rappahannock, where it crossed on a pontoon bridge. Once across, the force dismounted a short distance beyond the river until dark when they mounted up and moved toward Richmond. Keeping the horses saddled and the men under arms, Stoneman split his force in three for the next day's movement. Once again, Stoneman had his subordinates cull any men or mounts deemed unfit for the remainder of the expedition sent back across the river.
The 1st Maine was in Kilpatrick's 1st Brigade of Gregg's 2nd Division riding with Stoneman to arrive on the Virginia Central's rail line at Louisa Courthouse southeast of Gordonsville from the southeast while Averell's 1st Division with three brigades would come down the Orange & Alexandria from the north. A beefed-up reserve brigade with four regular cavalry and one volunteer regiments under BGEN John Buford followed equidistant behind the two wings.[186] The operations the next day, the 30th, after crossing, consisted in driving in the outposts which were encountered on both roads. The 1st provided security for crossing the Rapidan at Raccoon ford, and troopers were pleased to find that the copper and brass rounds for their carbines were unaffected by the fording of the swollen streams and the torrential rains.[187]
Still not lighting campfires to avoid rebel detection, the forces continued their advance south through Unionville and Thornhill to get between the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond and east of Gordonsville. unopposed by any significant opposition. This had a further positive effect on the Federal Cavalrymen's self-esteem as well as a break in the weather. The men of the 1st noted that they were capturing prisoners, weapons, horses, mules, and fodder with every small skirmish[182] yet they were seeing no signs of the Army of Northern Virginia's retreat from the vicinity of Fredericksburg. Instead, the men of the 1st saw the tracks of infantry and cavalry heading to Fredericksburg and points upriver on the Rappahannock. Stoneman reported these indications back to Hooker, but received no response so was unaware of the result of his intelligence.
Arriving at Louisa[]
After slogging through rain and fog for three days, with the 1st Maine acting as its division's rear guard, the rains cleared as they crossed the North Anna River.[184] On May 1, the unit rotated to the advance guard and at 01:00 (at night) on May 2, arrived at Louisa Courthouse on the Virginia Central Railroad thirteen miles southwest of the junction at Gordonsville. Stoneman consolidated his forces at Louisa Court House on the Virginia Central Railroad at 10:00 where they began destroying the rails and equipment found there. He had Averell come south through Gordonsville to meet him at Louisa. As he waited for Averell, Stoneman sent the regular officer, the 1st Maine's Adjutant, CAPT Tucker, with its Companies B and I northwest up the railway toward Gordonsville to find the enemy. Stoneman had not heard anything from Hooker and was unaware of any effect that his presence and actions were having on Lee's army. Men of the 1st and the rest of the force were ignorant of the impending doom facing XI Corp roughly 30 miles to the northeast.
Three miles outside Louisa, the two companies made contact and drove back the rebel pickets only to find themselves facing five companies of rebel cavalry. They managed to cut their way out of an encirclement and made it back to the main force. Stoneman opted to send out small parties to destroy as much infrastructure and supplies as possible from his stop at Louisa. Averell joined him on May 3. While these forays had commenced, Stoneman received orders that day from Hooker (the first communication sent his way since crossing the Rappahannock) recalling him to the main body of the Army of the Potomac then heavily engaged at Chancellorsville.[182] At the same time, he was seeing the limit of endurance for his men and horses nearing.
Stoneman began sending patrols east toward the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad on May 4, with the intent to move closer between Richmond and Fredericksburg and destroy as much rail equipment and military supplies as he could on the way back to the army. The 1st drew rear guard duty again and were instructed to build large numbers of fires around Louisa to deceive the 500 odd rebel cavalrymen who had mixed it up with CAPT Tucker and monitored the expedition from a distance. Instead of going into camp for the night, the column headed east on the Richmond Pike, a clear macadamized road. Making good progress on the hardtop, the column halted at Thompson's Crossroads. Stoneman again divided his force into several expeditions sent out in different directions.
The 1st Maine, with Gregg, was sent to Rockville fifteen miles northwest of Richmond and west of Ashland Station on the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac line. From there even smaller detachments fanned out. After burning bridges across creeks and rivers, firing warehouses, and rolling stock, on May 6, Gregg moved his group north to rejoin Stoneman.
As the elements were regrouping, Stoneman found that a brigade-sized contingent under Kilpatrick (not including the 1st Maine) sent southeast had been cut off by an aroused rebel cavalry and forced to return to Union lines down at Yorktown. Unknown to him, the rebels having defeated Hooker were turning their attention to the raiders. As he was finding out, "To take the enemy by surprise and penetrate his country was easy enough; to withdraw from it was a more difficult matter."
Heading back[]
To keep the rebel forces marshalling against him from seizing the initiative, Stoneman had sent Buford back to Louisa and Gordonsville on May 5. With the 1st rotated back to the advance guard, the force crossed the Pamunkey River and made camp to wait for its outliers to return. By May 6, Buford had returned to Stoneman. Crossing the Rapidan again at Raccoon ford, the force was shadowed by ever increasing numbers of rebel horsemen on the 7th reaching Kelly's ford at midnight. The three days of rain made the ford risky to cross in the darkness.
At daybreak on May 8, Stoneman's remaining force began swimming across the Rappahannock with the men of the 1st Maine again realizing no debilitating effect on their metal carbine cartridges. At the end of the day, the 1st Maine was one of the first units of the expedition to get to the encampment at Bealton, twenty miles upriver from the Army of the Potomac's headquarters at Falmouth. By May 10, all the regiments less Kilpatrick's were reunited at Bealton. While bone weary, the Federal cavalrymen were in high morale in stark contrast to the rest of the army stung by a particularly galling defeat at the Battle of Chancellorsville.
Aftermath[]
This raid took a toll on the regiment, but it and the rest of the army's cavalry branch were gaining in combat effectiveness. Regardless of the success or failure of the daring Stoneman's raid, it instilled a growing sense of competence and confidence among the men of the Federal cavalry. Chaplain Merrill called the raid "one of the most remarkable achievements in the history of modern warfare" and one of the men encapsulated the new-found confidence writing, "It was ever after a matter of pride with the boys that they were on Stoneman's Raid." Reflecting on the raid twenty years later, Edward Tobie wrote:
Starting with but two days' rations, after that was gone the boys lived on ham, flour and meal obtained from the country, cooked when they had time to cook, and eaten raw when necessary. As for rest and sleep, five nights there was no sleep exceed what was stolen in the saddles, and the rations of sleep were short and of an inferior quality during the rest of the time ; some of the men seemed demented at times from loss of sleep, and acted half crazed. Three days and nights there was continuous marching, fighting, scouting, and picketing, and in fact pretty much of the whole time the boys had been actively employed.[188]
Gettysburg campaign[]
Regrouping, resupplying, and training further with their new carbines, the regiment prepared for the next engagement. Although the morale of the Cavalry Corps was high due to the perceived success of Stoneman's Raid, Hooker used Stoneman as a scapegoat and relieved him of command. The 1st Maine remained under Kilpatrick in the 1st Brigade of Gregg's 3rd Division. The brigade was joined by a company of cavalry from the District of Columbia under CAPT William H Orton (who would later join the 1st Maine the following year with the remainder of the 1st DC Cavalry). BGEN Pleasanton was promoted to command the Corp with BGEN Buford taking over his 1st Division.
After Chancellorsville, Lee began an invasion up the Shenandoah into the Maryland and Pennsylvania with two goals in mind. The first was to attack the US public's will to fight, and the second was to give the agricultural economy of northern Virginia a chance to rebound from the Army of the Potomac and produce a harvest that could sustain the rebel armies in the field by foraging and plundering the lush, productive country of south central Pennsylvania. To do this successfully, he would need MGEN Stuart's Confederate cavalry force to scout and screen for his main body. This would lead to the 1st Maine having an eventful experience during the ensuing Gettysburg Campaign.
Brandy Station[]
"[Brandy Station] 'made' the Federal cavalry. Up to that time confessedly inferior to the Southern horsemen, they gained on this day that confidence in themselves and in their commanders which enable them to contest so fiercely the subsequent battle-fields ..."
Major Henry B. McClellan, Stuart's adjutant[189]
Around Brandy Station, Stuart had about 9,500 men in five cavalry brigades, led by BGENs Hampton, Robertson, and Jones, and COL Munford (temporarily commanding Lee's brigade), plus horse artillery.[190] He was unaware that Pleasanton had organized his command into two wings of 11,000 men across the Rappahannock River. Buford, accompanied by Pleasanton, led the right wing of three cavalry brigades and horse artillery augmented by an infantry brigade from the V Corps.[191] The 1st Maine rode in the left wing, led by Gregg, similarly composed and augmented in the 3rd Cavalry Division, led by Gregg.[192] To remove the threat of Stuart raiding his supply lies from Brandy Station,[193] Hooker ordered Pleasonton to make a "spoiling raid,"[189] to "disperse and destroy" the Confederates.[194] In Pleasonton's attack plan, the 1st Maine in Gregg's wing would cross at Kelly's Ford, six miles (10 km) downstream to the southeast of Brandy station as the left pincer in a planned double envelopment. Buford's wing would cross further north at Beverly Ford. At dawn on June 9, 1863, the U.S. forces advanced.
Buford's wing made first contact and surprised the Confederates at St. James Church. Buford failed to turn the Confederate left and dislodge the artillery that was blocking the direct route to Brandy Station. Men of the 1st Maine could hear cannon fire from Buford's force as they crossed Kelly's Ford.[195] After initial heavy losses, Buford's men were amazed to see the Confederates began pulling back. Gregg's wing, finding their planned route blocked by Robertson's brigade, found a completely unguarded and more circuitous route surprising the rebels and forcing the withdrawal from Buford.
The 1st Maine was in the second bride to arrive on scene. Between Gregg and Buford at St. James battle was Fleetwood Hill, Stuart's headquarters the previous night,[196] which Stuart and most of his staff had left for St. James Church. A howitzer, left in the rear because of inadequate ammunition, fired a few shots that delayed the Union advance as they sent out skirmishers and returned cannon fire. When the first brigade in Gregg's wing under COL Wyndham charged up the western slope of Fleetwood and neared the crest they put to flight, the lead elements of Jones's brigade, which had just withdrawn from St. James Church.[194] Wyndham set up a battery on the hill next to the rebel howitzer.[197] The 1st Maine, in the next brigade, led by COL Kilpatrick, swung around east of Brandy Station and formed up on the southern end and the eastern slope of Fleetwood Hill on the right of Wyndham's brigade. A furious scrap began with charges moving back and forth over the hill by Wyndham and his foe, Jones.
Kilpatrick kept feeding his brigade into the fight alongside Wyndham's brigade and seemed to be gaining the upper hand. His former regiment, the 2nd New York (also known as the Harris Light Cavalry) flooded up the hill, only to discover that their appearance coincided with the arrival of Hampton's brigade, with a battery of five guns to augment the howitzer, who drove them back over the crest and captured the Federal battery. The regiment was shattered and fled back down the hill. While rallying the remnants of his old regiment, Kilpatrick galloped up to COL Douty asking, "Colonel Douty, what can you do with your regiment?" Douty answered confidently, "I can drive the rebels."[198] At that, Kilpatrick turned to the regiment and shouted, "Men of Maine! You must save the day! Follow me!"[199] This call had an immediate effect on the regiment.
With a shout at the top of their lungs, "in one solid mass this splendid regiment circled first to the right, and then moving in a straight line at a run struck the rebel columns in flank. The shock was terrific! Down went the rebels before this wild rush of maddened horses, men, biting sabres, and whistling balls."[200] The charge of the 1st Maine saved the Federal guns near Fleetwood Hill from capture. The Federal battery was manned and withdrew off the hill.[201]
During the charge and pursuit, the regiment separated into two groups. One remained near the crest of Fleetwood Hill mopping up in melee with dismounted rebels. Some of the regiment dismounted and opened fire with their carbines on Confederates withdrawing to the north along the crest. LTC Smith, in command of this contingent, soon found himself alone and almost cut off. He quickly rallied and gathered more than half the regiment around him. Once gathered, Smith led his group down the hill to join COL Douty. As they left the crest, no one manned or removed the Confederate guns on the crest.
COL Douty, meanwhile, was with the other group further along in pursuit of fleeing rebel horsemen[198] and began trying to reform this group to avoid a dissipation of his combat power.[179] Douty quickly realized while the chase had carried them over a mile of open ground, he had woods on either side into which rebels had fled. As he rallied his command, he could see the enemy massing for an attack in his rear. He formed his group in column and charged the still-forming line of Hampton's men. He smashed through the line, wheeled around on the other side, and charged again thoroughly scattering the rebel troopers.[202]
As Smith and his contingent came up to meet Douty, they realized that they were surrounded. The rebels had flooded back toward the hill in small groups including artillerymen who had taken back their abandoned guns. The two groups rallied around COL Doughty and LTC Smith. With Smith in the lead, the regiment advanced on the battery at pace "as if inviting death."[203] Firing from the rebels died off as their troopers moved out of the battery's line of fire and the gunners sighted their guns. When Smith saw the battery preparing to fire, he ordered the column to turn right just before the guns fired loads of grape and shell. The abrupt move left the discharge tearing through empty space and the column reformed before the battery could reposition their weapons and swept around to the right of the crest.[204]
The regiment lost no men in the last action and made it back over the crest to the origin of their charge. In the last action, the Maine men had learned the valuable lesson that that cohesion gave them power and safety in numbers as demonstrated in Douty's two charges in the open ground and Smith's turn to dodge grape and shell from the rebels. Several sweeps over the hill during the day had left it remaining in Confederate hands.[205] Near sunset, Pleasonton ordered a general withdrawal, and the ten-hour battle was over.[206]
The 1st Maine's losses in casualties and prisoners were almost all troopers who had been separated from the main two bodies. All told, this action had cost the regiment one killed, two wounded, seven ·wounded and taken prisoner, and twenty-eight taken prisoner.[207] They had also taken seventy-six rebel prisoners and 2nd South Carolina's colors. Two rebel artillery pieces were taken off the hill but abandoned in the withdrawal back across the Rappahannock.[208]
Much like the earlier raid (that is, not really succeeding in its initial objectives) the men of the 1st Maine gained more confidence from their action. Although a rebel tactical victory (although derided as a defeat in rebel press as a defeat[209]), for the first time in the War, they matched the rebel cavalry in skill and determination.[210] As they recouped, Edward P. Tobie observed, "[A] higher value attaches to Brandy Station as affecting the [1st Maine]. ... It was ... the first time it had ever tasted ... the fruit of victory. The battle aroused its latent powers, and awoke it ... to a new career. It became self-reliant, and began to comprehend its own possibilities. It became inspired with an invincible spirit that never again forsook it."[211]
Of note, the battle had "indisputably delayed Robert E. Lee's advance northward by one full day" which would have a knock-on effect on the Army of Northern Virginia and its movements in the remainder of the campaign.[212]
Battle of Aldie[]
The Battle of Aldie took place on June 17, 1863, in Loudoun County, Virginia. It was the first in a series of small battles along the Ashby's Gap Turnpike in which Stuart's forces successfully delayed Pleasonton's thrust across the Loudoun Valley, depriving him of the opportunity to locate the Army of Northern Virginia which was trying to get a jump on the Army of the Potomac into Pennsylvania via the Shenandoah Valley.
Despite the positive performance of the Cavalry Corps at Brandy Station Hooker grew increasingly frustrated with Pleasonton's inability to locate Lee's main body. Pleasonton reorganized his corps again from two wings into three divisions. He relieved COL Alfred N. Duffié with the 1st Maine's brigade commander, Kilpatrick. The Maine men were now part of Gregg's 2nd Division's 3rd Brigade now commanded by Gregg's cousin, COL John Irvin Gregg. Pleasonton took Company I to serve as escorts and orderlies at his headquarters. Company L detached, under CAPT Constantine Taylor to do the same at MGEN John F. Reynolds 's I Corps' headquarters. The remaining ten companies stayed under COL Douty's command in the 3rd Brigade.
On June 17, Pleasonton decided to push the 2nd Division twenty miles from Manassas Junction westward down the Little River Turnpike to Aldie. Aldie was tactically important in that near the village the Little River Turnpike intersected both the Ashby's Gap Turnpike and Snicker's Gap Turnpike, which respectively led through Ashby's Gap and Snickers Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, a ridge east of the Blue Ridge Mountain into the valley.[213] The 1st Maine arrived there with the 3rd Brigade at 14:00 to find a severe cavalry fight already underway.[214]
Just east of the village Kilpatrick's division led by 1st Massachusetts had driven COL Thomas T. Munford's's pickets back upon initial contact through the town. Around the same time, the rest of Munford's brigade under the COL Williams Carter Wickham arrived at Dover Mills, a small hamlet on the Little River west of Aldie where the U.S. forces realized that Munford's regiments outnumbered them. The rebels set up a position west of the town that controlled the road leading from it. Wickham ordered COL Thomas L. Rosser to take the 5th Virginia to locate a campsite closer to Aldie. As they moved east, they ran into and easily drove back Kilpatrick's right flank regiment, the 1st Massachusetts, through Aldie to the main Union body. Rosser pulled back through town and deployed west along a ridge that covered the two roads leading out of Aldie and waited the arrival of Munford.[215] As Rosser withdrew west, he repulsed a swift counterattack by 1st Massachusetts and 4th New York securing his hold on the Ashby's Gap Turnpike with a sharpshooter detachment under CAPT Boston behind a stonewall east of the William Adam farmhouse at the foot of the hill at Snicker's Gap.
Kilpatrick then turned his attention towards the Snicker's Gap Turnpike. As Mumford brought forward the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Virginia Cavalry, an artillery duel ensued. A furious fight erupted, which at first went in favor of Munford as Federal charges were met, stopped, and then forced back by the withering volley of sharpshooters entrenched along a stone wall. The 1st Massachusetts Cavalry was trapped in a blind curve on the west of Snicker's Gap Turnpike and was mauled, losing 198 of 294 men in the eight companies that were engaged. Gregg sent the 1st Maine to the left to report to Kilpatrick on his left. When Gregg found himself actively engaged in close combat on the east side of the hill at Snicker's Gap Turnpike, he recalled the 1st Maine ordering them to wheel right and attack over the crest with sabers drawn. Douty had only six companies with him as four under LTC Smith had gone too far west to recall.[214]
As Douty formed the companies, they were met by Kilpatrick and the withdrawing 1st Massachusetts:
"Kilpatrick was among them, but when he saw an unbroken front of live men, with glistening sabres drawn, he instantly stopped. His moistened features were covered with dust; his countenance was dejected and sad; the fire and the flash of his eyes were gone, and he looked indeed "a ruined man." "What regiment is this?" he asked, in tones that did not betray him. "First Maine!" shouted a dozen throats. The response was electric. Then we heard the· old, familiar, clear-ringing tones, and saw his countenance brighten to a smile, his eyes flash, and his whole frame fill with enthusiasm, as commanded: "Forward. First Maine! You saved the field at Brandy Station, and you can do it here! Are there twelve men who will follow me?" He turned instantly, and forty boys of Co. H, followed by Co. D. with deafening yells and flashing sabres, charged down the hill and met the victorious rebels, brave, bold, determined fellows, just at the road, and in an instant we were among them; nor would they turn till they felt the steel borne by braver and stronger arms than theirs."[216]
COL Doughty and CAPT Summat were on the extreme left of the regiment as they had been between the fourth and fifth company in the line of march. As Kilpatrick turned around to the rebels, Doughty and Summat galloped alongside him in front of the rest of the regiment. The regiment cleared all rebels before it. On its right, the 6th Ohio overran Boston's detachment at the stonewall beyond the Adam farmhouse on Ashby's Gap Turnpike, capturing or killing most of his men. As the charge met the rebels, LTC Smith had rejoined and immediately fell in the sweep down the hill. In the ensuing action, three sergeants of Company H captured the colors of the 4th Virginia. As the tide finally turned in the fading light, the Maine troopers found COL Doughty and CAPT Summat fatally shot from their saddles.[217] LTC Smith assumed command of the regiment.
The fighting died down around 20:00 as Munford withdrew his command west towards Middleburg. Despite Pleasonton's tactical victory, Munford had accomplished his mission of keeping Hooker from knowing Lee's location.[218]
Despite their high morale from their successful charge and the capture of enemy colors, the 1st Maine had suffered the notable loss of its commander, COL Douty, as well as a popular company commander, CAPT Summat. The scrap had been costly with the loss from this battle being five men killed, one mortally wounded, seventeen wounded, one mortally wounded and taken prisoner, one wounded and taken prisoner, four taken prisoner, and over 200 horses[207] – a significant blow to the command.
Middleburg[]
Moving north[]
Gettysburg[]
Bristoe campaign[]
Mine Run campaign[]
Union cavalry supremacy 1864–1865[]
It also moved with the cavalry corps on Gen. Sheridan's first raid. May 9, 1864, until within 3 miles of Richmond. In the engagement at Trevilian Station, June 24, 1864, its loss was 10 officers and 58 enlisted men. During August of this year its loss in killed, wounded and missing was 49 men and 75 horses, and the total casualties during 1864 amounted to 295 officers and enlisted men.
In August 1864, seven companies of the 1st D. C. cavalry were transferred and assigned to the several companies of this regiment by a special order of the war department. The original members of the regiment whose term of service expired November 4, 1864, were mustered out at Augusta, ME, on November 25, while the regiment, now composed of veterans, recruits and members of the 1st D. C. cavalry whose term had not expired, participated in the closing battles of the war; was mustered out of the U. S. service at Petersburg, VA, August 1, 1865, and arrived in Augusta, ME., on August 9, 1865.
Affiliations, battle honors, detailed service, and casualties[]
Organizational affiliation[]
The 1st Maine Volunteer Cavalry Regiment was organized at Augusta, ME and served with the following organizations:[219]
- March 1862, Miles' Brigade defending Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (2nd Battalion)
- April 1862, Hatch's Cavalry Brigade. Brig., Banks' V Corps, and Department of the Shenandoah (2nd Battalion).
- March 1862, Abercrombie's Cavalry Brigade, McDowell's, Department of the Rappahannock (1st and 3rd Battalions)
- May 1862, Bayard's Cavalry Brigade, Department of the Rappahannock (1st and 3rd Battalions).
- June 1862, Bayard's Cavalry Brigade, III Corps, Army of Virginia (Reunited Regiment.).
- September 1862, Bayard's Cavalry Brigade, Cavalry Division, Army of the Potomac.
- January 1863, 1st Brig., 3rd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac.
- June 1863, 3rd Brig., 2nd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac.
- August 1863, 2nd Brig., 2nd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac.
- October 1864, 3rd Brig., 2nd Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac.
- May 1865, Department of Virginia
Mustered out August 1, 1865.
List of battles[]
The official list of battles in which the regiment bore a part:[220]
- First Battle of Winchester
- Battle of Cedar Mountain
- Second Battle of Bull Run
- Battle of South Mountain
- Battle of Antietam
- Battle of Fredericksburg
- Second Battle of Rappahannock Station
- Battle of Brandy Station
- Battle of Aldie
- Battle of Middleburg
- Battle of Upperville
- Battle of Gettysburg
- Battle of White Sulphur Springs
- Battle of Shepherdstown
- Battle of Mine Run
- Kilpatrick's Raid on Richmond
- Battle of Old Church
- Battle of Todd's Tavern
- Ground Squirrel Bridge
- Battle of Haw's Shop
- Battle of Cold Harbor
- Battle of Trevilian Station
- Battle of Saint Mary's Church
- First Battle of Deep Bottom
- Second Battle of Ream's Station
- Battle of Vaughan Road
- Battle of Boydton Plank Road
- The Bellfield Raid
Detailed service[]
1861[]
- Organized at Augusta and mustered on November 5, 1861.
1862[]
- Regiment ordered to Washington DC
- Companies "A," "D," "E" and "F" transit March 14–19
- Companies "B," "I," "H" and "M" transit March 19–24
- Companies "C," "G," "K" and "L" transit March 19–28
- Companies "A," "B," "E," "H" and *'M" (1st Battalion)
- Ordered to Harper's Ferry, WV, and guard duty along Baltimore & Ohio Railroad March 31 – May 19
- Moved to Strasburg and operations in the Shenandoah Valley May 15 – June 17
- Action at Woodstock May 21
- Strasburg (Cos. "H" and "M") May 22
- Middletown May 24
- Winchester May 25
- Retreat to Williamsport May 25–26
- Winchester June 3. Milford June 24
- Reconnaissance to Front Royal June 29–30.
- Luray June 30.
- Rejoin Regiment at Warrenton July 10.
- Companies "C," "D," "F," "G," "I," "K" and "L" (Regiment, 2nd and 3rd Battalions)
- Depart Washington, DC for Warrenton Junction, VA April 5
- Fairfax Court House April 5
- Manassas Junction April 6
- Warrenton Junction April 7
- In camp at Warrenton Junction April 7 – May 12
- Reconnaissance to the Rappahannock April 15 (Co. "C")
- Reconnaissance to Liberty Church, VA April 16 (Detachment)
- Reconnaissance to Culpeper Court House, VA May 4–5.
- Move via Elk Run and Stafford Court House to Falmouth, VA May 12–14
- In camp at Falmouth May 12–25
- Depart Falmouth for Alexandria, rerouted to join McDowell at Manassas Junction May 25
- Milford July 2
- Winchester July 3
- Sperryville July 5
- Regiment scouting on the Rappahannock during July
- Reconnaissance to James City July 22–24.
- Slaughter House August 7.
- Robinson River August 8.
- Battle of Cedar Mountain August 9
- Pope's Campaign in Northern Virginia August 16 – September 2.
- Stevensburg, Raccoon Ford and Brandy Station August 20
- Beverly Ford August 20. Fords of the Rappahannock August 21–23
- Rappahannock Station August 24–25
- Sulphur Springs August 27
- Thoroughfare Gap August 28
- Groveton August 29
- Bull Run August 30
- Mountsville, Centerville, Chantilly, and Germantown August 31
- Chantilly September 1
- Frederick, Md., September 7 and 12.
- South Mountain September 14. Antietam September 16–17
- At Frederick, Md., till November 2
- Manassas Junction October 24
- Middleburg October 30
- Aldie October 31
- Salem, New Baltimore and near Warrenton November 4
- Rappahannock Station November 7–9
- Battle of Fredericksburg December 12–15
- In camp at Falmouth December 15–28
- Dumfries December 28
1863[]
- "Mud March" January 20–24
- Rappahannock Bridge April 14
- Stoneman's Raid April 29 – May 8
- Kelly's Ford April 29
- Louisa Court House May 1–2
- South Anna Bridge near Ashland May 3
- Bealton May 10
- Operations on Northern Neck May 20–26 (Detachment)
- Brandy Station and Beverly Ford June 9
- Aldie June 17
- Middleburg June 18–19
- Upperville June 21
- Hanover, Pa., June 30
- Battle of Gettysburg, Pa., July 1–3
- Steven's Furnace July 5
- Hagerstown July 11
- Funkstown, Md., July 12
- Shephardstown and near Harper's Ferry July 14
- Halltown and Charlestown July 15
- Shephardstown July 16
- Little Washington August 5
- Beverly Ford August 15
- Brandy Station September 6
- Advance from the Rappahannock to the Rapidan September 13–17
- Culpeper Court House September 13
- Hazel River September 13
- Raccoon Ford September 14
- Culpeper September 20
- White's Ford September 21–22
- Bristoe Campaign October 9–22
- Gaines' Cross Roads October 12
- Warrenton or White Sulphur Springs October 12–13
- Auburn and Bristoe October 14
- St. Stephen's Church October 14
- Blackburn's Ford October 15
- Culpeper October 20
- Near Bealton October 22
- Rappahannock Crossing October 22
- Rappahannock Station October 23
- Advance to line of the Rappahannock November 7–8
- Mine Run Campaign November 26 – December 2
- Morton's Ford November 26
- New Hope Church November 27
- Parker's Store November 29
- Expedition to Luray December 21–23
1864[]
- Reconnaissance to Front Royal January 1–4
- Near Salem January 3 (Detachment)
- Kilpatrick's Raid to Richmond February 28 – March 4
- Beaver Dam Station February 29
- Fortifications of Richmond March 1
- Brook's Turnpike March 1
- Old Church March 2
- Near Tunstall Station March 2
- Overland Campaign May 3 – June 15
- Battle of Todd's Tavern May 5–6
- Battle of the Wilderness May 6–7
- Todd's Tavern May 7–8
- Sheridan's Raid May 9–24
- Battle of North Anna River May 9–10
- Battle of Ground Squirrel Church and Yellow Tavern May 11
- Diamond Hill May 11
- Brook Church or Fortifications of Richmond May 12
- Battle of Meadow Bridge May 12
- Battle of Jones' Bridge May 17
- Haxall's Landing May 18
- Milford May 20
- Haw's Shop May 28
- Battle of Old Church May 29–30
- Battle of Cold Harbor May 31 – June 1
- About Cold Harbor June 1–7
- Sumner's Upper Bridge and McGee's Mills June 2
- Sheridan's Trevillian Raid June 7–24
- Elliott's Mills June 8
- Trevillian Station June 11–12
- Black Creek, Tunstall Station, June 21
- White House, St. Peter's Church, June 21
- St. Mary's Church June 24
- Second Swamp June 28
- Siege operations against Petersburg and Richmond June 1864, to April 1865
- Warwick Swamp and Lee's Mill July 12
- Deep Bottom July 27–28
- New Market July 28
- Malvern Hill July 29
- Lee's Mills July 30
- Near Sycamore Church August 9
- Gravel Hill August 14
- Strawberry Plains August 14–18
- Deep Run August 16
- Nelson's Farm August 18
- Ream's Station August 23–25
- Dinwiddie Road near Ream's Station August 23
- Yellow Tavern September 2
- Stony Creek Station September 15
- Belcher's Mills September 17
- Lee's Mills September 18
- Vaughan Road September 26
- Wyatt's Farm September 29
- Poplar Springs Church September 29 – October 1
- Vaughan and Duncan Road October 1
- Boydton Plank Road or Hatcher's Run October 27–28
- Old members mustered out November 4, 1864
- Stony Creek Station December 1
- Bellefield Raid December 7–11
- Bellefield December 9–10
1865[]
- Dabney's Mills, Hatcher's Run, February 5–7
- Appomattox Campaign March 28 – April 9
- Dinwiddle Court House March 30–31
- Five Forks April 1
- Namozine Church and Jettersville April 3
- Fame's Cross Roads and Amelia Springs April 5
- Sailor's Creek and Deatonville Road April 6
- Briery Creek and Farmville April 7
- Appomattox Station April 8
- Appomattox Court House April 9
- Surrender of Lee and his army
- Duty at Petersburg and in the Dept. of Virginia April 10 – July 24
- Transit to Augusta, Maine July 24–31
- Mustered out August 1, 1865
Casualties[]
This Regiment lost greatest number killed in action of any Cavalry Regiment in the entire army:[221] 15 Officers and 159 Enlisted men killed and mortally wounded; 3 Officers and 341 Enlisted men died of disease, a total of 518[222] The regiment also suffered 447 men wounded and 612 (246 having been 1st DC Cavalry prior to their absorption into the 1st Maine) were captured by rebel forces.[223]
Armament[]
Troopers in the 1st Maine were initially armed only with a Model 1860 Light Cavalry Saber and two Colt .44 "Army" pistols.[224] Some of the officers and senior NCOs received the Model 1840 Cavalry Saber.[225] They were also issued ten Sharps Carbines per company.[226] They continued with this as standard armament, although a few officers and men privately purchased Burnside, Merrill, Sharps, and Smith carbines.[227] In February 1863, the 1st and the rest of the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Division of the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps were completely armed with carbines (while retaining sabers and their brace of pistols.[228] The 1st drew single-shot Burnside breech-loading carbines[180] that used a metallic cartridge which, as stated above, they found to be an asset when fording waterway.[229] A handful of individuals kept their Sharps if they were modified to accept metal cartridges, or if they were the newer models that used metallic cartridges.[230] On September 10, 1864, all Burnside and Sharps carbines were turned in and the regiment was issued new Spencer carbines. The men from the 1st DC Cavalry had brought enough Henrys with them when they joined to arm four companies in one battalion. From that point to the end of hostilities one battalion was armed with sixteen-shot Henry rifles and two battalions were armed with seven-shot Spencers.[231]
- Issued weapons
"Old Wristbreaker," Model 1840 Cavalry Saber
Sharps carbine
Spencer seven-shot carbine, issued weapon
Henry sixteen-shot rifle, issued weapon
- Privately purchased weapons mentioned in histories and memoirs
Notable personnel[]
- Daniel W. Ames, future state legislator
- Jonathan Prince Cilley, ended the war a Brigadier General, was the son of Maine Congressman Jonathan Cilley,[232] great grandson of Major General Joseph Cilley, and nephew of Joseph Cilley
- Llewellyn Garrish Estes, U.S. Medal of Honor winner
- Charles H. Smith, U.S. Medal of Honor winner
- Sidney W. Thaxter, U.S. Medal of Honor winner
- Edward Parsons Tobie, Jr., U.S. Medal of Honor winner
Monuments and memorials[]
During the 1880s, planning was undertaken to erect a monument on the Gettysburg National Battlefield which would honor the 1863 service of the 1st Maine Volunteer Cavalry at Gettysburg. That monument was subsequently dedicated in a formal ceremony held at the battlefield on October 3, 1889.[233]
See also[]
- List of Maine Civil War units
- Maine in the American Civil War
- Cavalry in the American Civil War
- Army of the Potomac
- Army of the Shenandoah
Notes/references[]
- ^ Dyer (1908), p. 1018.
- ^ Dyer (1908), p. 1216; Hodsdon (1867), p. 8.
- ^ Federal Publishing Company (1908), p. 47.
- ^ Cooke (1861), p. 37
Almost all volunteer cavalry regiments mustered into the United States Army using infantry terminology in organization with company vice troop. - ^ Gray (1910), p. 10
General Order 16, May 4, 1861, set the organization for a cavalry regiment as consisting of twelve companies. A squadron was two or three companies commanded by the senior company commander. A battalion, commanded by a major, was two squadrons with each squadron made of at two companies. A colonel, assisted by a lieutenant colonel, commanded the three battalions in the regiment – totaling twelve companies per regiment. On an ad hoc basis, a squadron occasionally included a third company. - ^ Field (2015), p. 11
Over the course of the men's service this number was rarely maintained - ^ Federal Publishing Company (1908), p. 60.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 3.
- ^ Gould (1869), pp. 30–34.
- ^ a b c Dyer (1908), p. 1216.
- ^ Carter (1979), p. 5; Uschan (2003), pp. 7–8.
- ^ Tobie (1887), pp. 3–4
Almost forgotten, "Charles O'Malley, the Irish Dragoon" by English novelist Charles Lever had been a best-selling novel from 1841. - ^ Tobie (1887), p. 15.
- ^ Field (2015), p. 14.
- ^ Tobie (1882), p. 5
War Department had little faith in the idea of volunteer cavalry. Consequently, offers of mounted troops were steadily refused during the first summer. It was only after the terrible summer of 1861 that the idea of a short war was dashed and a provision for cavalry regiments was included with Lincoln's call for three-year volunteers. - ^ Wittenberg (2010), p. 23.
- ^ Johnston (2016), p. 20.
- ^ Tobie (1882), p. 8.
- ^ Uschan (2003), p. 9.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 14.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 24.
- ^ Tobie (1882), pp. 6–8.
- ^ Tobie (1887), pp. 15–16
Company K was an example of the aforementioned "sailor on horseback" formed from mariners and was known through the regiment and its future brigades for using nautical terminology while in service. - ^ Tobie (1887), p. 25.
- ^ Field (2015), p. 23; Tobie (1882), p. 9; Tobie (1887), p. 15.
- ^ Starr (1965), p. 143.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 17.
- ^ a b Merrill (1866), p. 40.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 25; Merrill (1866), p. 40.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 24,
Sabers, especially brand-new ones, were issued with blunt edges that troopers were required to sharpen. The 1st Maine also received revolvers as a pair vice a single to compensate the lack of carbines. - ^ Tobie (1882), p. 9,
Merrills were manufactured in Baltimore and sold not far from the train stations. - ^ Dyer (1908), p. 1215; Tobie (1887), p. 27.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 27.
- ^ Tobie (1882), p. 95.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 49.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 25
In June 1861, then militia COL Thomas Jackson attacked the B&O contrary to the famous May 23, 1861, Martinsburg raid since revealed to be a postbellum, "Lost Cause" fiction. - ^ a b Rawlins (1866), p. 760.
- ^ NPS Valley Turnpike,
This now approximates as U.S. Route 11 in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. In original sources and current usage,"Up the Valley" in this context refers to movement to higher altitude and indicates a southward direction.
This was the Native American tribes' Great Path migratory route between what is now Georgia and Canada. As white settlers began to move up the valley in the eighteenth century, it became known as the "Great Wagon Road. - ^ NPS Valley Turnpike.
- ^ Avirett (1867), p. 28; Clark (1984), p. 135
Referred to as such as Ashby kept on recruiting companies so that by the time he was mortally wounded and Richard Henry Dulany took command of the regiment, it had swelled to 29 companies. - ^ Tanner (1976), p. 192.
- ^ Federal Publishing Company (1908), p. 61, Vol.I.
- ^ Hodsdon (1867), pp. 4–42, Appendix D.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 29
Tobie mistakenly recalled it as Black River Creek. - ^ Johnson & Buel (1887b), p. 283; Tobie (1887), pp. 30–31
B was briefly stationed further west at Great Cacapon for a few days until Miles moved it to the resort to better cover the stretch of the railroad as it came around the northward jut of the mountains at Hancock.
Incidentally Berkeley Springs was then known as Bath and had served as one of Jackson's encampments over the 1861–1862 winter. - ^ Merrill (1866), p. 26.
- ^ Hodsdon (1867), p. 4, Appendix D.
- ^ Tobie (1887), pp. 30–33.
- ^ Noyolas (2021), pp. 38–45.
- ^ Dickenson, The Maine Bugle, Campaign I, Call 2, pp. 147–161.
- ^ U.S. War Department (1885a), pp. 573–575, 587–593,
Reports to HQ Cavalry of BGEN Hatch, May 30, 1862, LTCOL Doughty, May 27, 1862, and MAJ Collins, June 4, 1862 - ^ Hodsdon (1867), p. 215.
- ^ Merrill (1866), pp. 27–28.
- ^ Tobie (1882), pp. 6–7.
- ^ U.S. War Department (1885a), pp. 523–524
Report to Sec Stanton of MGEN Banks, May 21, 1862 - ^ U.S. War Department (1885a), p. 525
Report to Sec Stanton of MGEN Banks, May 23, 1862 - ^ U.S. War Department (1885a), p. 527
Telegram from Banks to Stanton, 07:50, 24 May 1862. - ^ Johnson & Buel (1887b), p. 289.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k U.S. War Department (1885a), pp. 573–575, 587–593.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 31,
Throughout this detached duty, MAJ Collins would act as Douty's second-in-command. - ^ Donnell & Donnell (2013), p. 139-140,
Belle Grove was a colonial-era mansion that had been the home of Major Isaac Hite, brother-in-law of President James Madison and friendly neighbor of President Thomas Jefferson, who had personally designed the limestone dwelling for Hite in 1794. - ^ a b Donnell & Donnell (2013), p. 140.
- ^ Cozzens (2008), p. 316.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 31; Tobie (1882), p. 18.
- ^ a b c NPS First Winchester.
- ^ Donnell & Donnell (2013), p. 141.
- ^ Cozzens (2008), p. 315
The 7th Virginia Cavalry was actually by this time a combined arms unit that had 27 infantry and cavalry companies as well as an attached light artillery battery, much larger than a typical Civil War regiment and more akin to the Revolutionary war era Legions. Ashby was also hampered by the lack of enough staff officers to exercise efficient command. One result was a lack of discipline despite his tireless personal patrols of his long picket lines. An end result of this laxity was the failure to accomplish basic tasks like reporting back contact with the enemy, holding off from a distance and shadowing, and efficient rallying after charges. - ^ a b NPS Battle of Middletown.
- ^ Tanner (1976), p. 219.
- ^ Johnson & Buel (1887b), p. 309,
This was in fact, Hatch burning all stores of military value that could not be carried off by his retreating troops. - ^ Clark (1984), p. 135.
- ^ a b Donnell & Donnell (2013), p. 142.
- ^ a b c Tanner (1976), p. 220.
- ^ Cozzens (2008), p. 315,
Interestingly, Strother was Hotchkiss' counterpart as the cartographer for Banks. - ^ Johnson & Buel (1887b), p. 310.
- ^ a b Merrill (1866), p. 31.
- ^ Donnell & Donnell (2013), p. 143.
- ^ a b Merrill (1866), p. 32.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 35.
- ^ Cozzens (2008), p. 370.
- ^ a b Clark (1984), p. 136; Tanner (1976), p. 220.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 36.
- ^ Carter (1979), p. 46; Merrill (1866), p. 33.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 35,
Believed to be present day Cougill Rd. - ^ Douglas (1940), p. 61.
- ^ Avirett (1867), p. 58; Douglas (1940), p. 61; Neese (1911), pp. 56–57.
- ^ Merrill (1866), pp. 34–35.
- ^ Neese (1911), p. 57
Collins was taken prisoner and remained in Confederate custody until liberated six days later by 1st Rhode Island Cavalry in Front Royal. - ^ Avirett (1867), p. 59.
- ^ Tobie (1882), p. 14.
- ^ Dickenson, The Maine Bugle, Campaign I, Call 2, pp. 152–157.
- ^ Donnell & Donnell (2013), p. 147.
- ^ Dickenson, The Maine Bugle, Campaign I, Call 2, p. 158.
- ^ Clark (1984), pp. 133–135; Cozzens (2008), pp. 349–368, 373–377; Salmon (2001), pp. 42–44.
- ^ Cozzens (2008), p. 377; Clark (1984), p. 136; Kennedy (1998), p. 82; Tanner (1976), p. 219.
- ^ Tobie (1882), p. 16.
- ^ Cozzens (2008), p. 377; Kennedy (1998), p. 82
Explains that casualty figures are difficult to calculate because the Union forces reported combined losses for Front Royal and First Winchester, amounting to 71 killed, 243 wounded, and 1,714 missing or captured; for those same 3 days, May 23–25, the Confederates reported 68 killed, 329 wounded, and 3 missing. - ^ Federal Publishing Company (1908), pp. 60–61; Tobie (1887), p. 669; U.S. War Department (1885a), pp. 573–575, 587–593.
- ^ Dickenson, The Maine Bugle, Campaign I, Call 2, pp. 158–160.
- ^ a b Merrill (1866), p. 51; Tobie (1887), pp. 69–70.
- ^ Merrill (1866), pp. 35–39; Tobie (1882), p. 10.
- ^ "Echoes," Tobie(ed.), The Maine Bugle, April 1, 1894, Campaign I, Call 2, pp. 94–97
Some of the men were mounted on horses that originally belonged to other U.S. and rebel cavalrymen. - ^ Merrill (1866), p. 38.
- ^ Eicher, McPherson & McPherson (2001), p. 211
McClellan was relieved of his position as general in chief in March to concentrate on the field operations of his Army of the Potomac. - ^ Clark (1984), pp. 157–158; Cozzens (2008), pp. 424–428, 438–440; Eicher, McPherson & McPherson (2001), p. 263; Krick (1996), pp. 21, 26–32; Robertson (1997), pp. 428–429; Salmon (2001), p. 46.
- ^ Clark (1984), p. 140.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 40,
Hatch placed subordinate to Crawford. - ^ Clark (1984), p. 157; Merrill (1866), pp. 35–39
5th Connecticut, 10th Maine, 28th New York, and 46th Pennsylvania. - ^ Merrill (1866), p. 40; Tobie (1887), p. 49.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 50.
- ^ Liebertz (2010), pp. 14–15
Largest of the Washington Forts, built in 1861, it guarded the Virginia side of the Long Bridge as well as the Columbia and Washington-Alexandria Turnpikes. - ^ Liebertz (2010), p. 15
Fort Albany was built to mutually support Runyon and control the Columbia Turnpike. - ^ Tobie (1887), p. 50,
Although macadamized, the Columbia Turnpike was getting worn from its constant use by Federal forces. - ^ Merrill (1866), pp. 40–41.
- ^ Liebertz (2010), p. 17
Originally intended to cross the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Shenandoah River to reach the coal fields in the western part of Hampshire County. When the war started it only reached Leesburg in Loudoun County. - ^ Harwood (2000), pp. 12–15; Williams (1989), pp. 4, 8–10
Because of its proximity to Washington, D.C., the line saw much use and disruption during the war. - ^ Merrill (1866), p. 40; Tobie (1887), p. 50.
- ^ Merrill (1866), pp. 40–41; Tobie (1887), p. 50.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 41,
The history of the American Revolution was commonly known throughout the United States during the Civil War as it was still very much in common memory. Virginia's part in the Revolution was very much known to the common trooper in the regiment. - ^ Merrill (1866), p. 41; Tobie (1887), pp. 50–51.
- ^ a b c Tobie (1887), p. 51.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 42.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 42; Tobie (1887), p. 50.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 52.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 56.
- ^ Dyer (1908), p. 1216; Federal Publishing Company (1908), p. 60.
- ^ Tobie (1887), pp. 59–64.
- ^ U.S. War Department (1885a), p. 424
Report of CAPT Robert F. Dyer, Company C, April 15, 1862. - ^ U.S. War Department (1885a), p. 425
Report of LTC Willard Sayles, 1st Rhode Island Cavalry, April 17, 1862. - ^ Tobie (1882), p. 10.
- ^ Wittenberg (2002), p. 24.
- ^ U.S. War Department (1885a), pp. 451–455,
Report of BGEN Hartsuff to War Dept, May 7, 1862 & report of MAJ Stowell, May 5, 1862. - ^ Tobie (1887), p. 61.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 45; Tobie (1887), p. 62; U.S. War Department (1885a), pp. 451–455
Merrill reported despite strong current, the only patrol member to get immersed during the crossing was the Surgeon, George W. Colby.
Tobie reported that the difficulty of this fording taught the men so well that they never had another issue fording streams for the remainder of the war. - ^ Tobie (1887), p. 62.
- ^ a b c d e f g U.S. War Department (1885a), pp. 451–455.
- ^ a b Merrill (1866), p. 46.
- ^ Tobie (1887), pp. 62–63.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 63.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 63; U.S. War Department (1885a), pp. 451–455
All of 1st Maine's horses were dark colored apart from the band. The prisoners were armed but in civilian clothes and two were recognized as local visitors to the regiment's encampment at Warrenton Junction. Of note, one of the prisoners, and old man thought to be of little use to the rebels and so released, ended up being one of the clerks processing Maine troopers captured at Brandy Station a year later. - ^ Federal Publishing Company (1908), p. 61; Tobie (1887), pp. 63–64
The rebels destroyed the O & A railroad bridge across the Rappahannock on their retreat from Manassas. - ^ Dyer (1908), pp. 1215–1216.
- ^ Merrill (1866), pp. 45–47
Merrill and Tobie seemed to indicate this stop as in the vicinity of the junction of Virginia state routes 616 and 609 in present-day Catlett, Virginia. - ^ a b c Tobie (1887), p. 65.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 66.
- ^ Merrill (1866), pp. 46–47; Tobie (1887), p. 66.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 47; Tobie (1887), pp. 66–67.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 47; Tobie (1887), pp. 67–68.
- ^ Carter (1979), p. 47.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 49; Tobie (1887), p. 68.
- ^ Neese (1911), pp. 57–58.
- ^ a b "Echoes," Tobie(ed.), The Maine Bugle, July 1, 1896, Campaign III, Call 3.
- ^ Johnson & Buel (1887b), p. 311.
- ^ Douglas (1940), p. 61; Neese (1911), pp. 57–58.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 50; Tobie (1887), p. 69.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 50
Several memoirs and letters to The First Maine Bugle/Maine Bugle recalled the harassment and mistreatment of prisoners and local Unionists at the hands of local rbel civilians. - ^ Merrill (1866), pp. 51–52; Tobie (1887), pp. 69–70
Retracing their route was faster than skirting the feet of the Blue Ridge mountains via Summit Point and Berryville as they would be traveling on a macadamized road in the wet weather - ^ Dickenson, The Maine Bugle, Campaign I, Call 3, p. 241.
- ^ McPherson (1988), p. 525.
- ^ Henderson (1898), p. 402.
- ^ Salmon (2001), p. 127.
- ^ Henderson (1898), p. 403.
- ^ McDonald (1907), p. 80.
- ^ Henderson (1898), pp. 405–407.
- ^ a b Henderson (1898), p. 407.
- ^ Salmon (2001), p. 132.
- ^ a b Salmon (2001), p. 134.
- ^ Henderson (1898), pp. 408–409.
- ^ Henderson (1898), pp. 409–410; Wood (1997), pp. 64–65.
- ^ NPS Cedar Mountain.
- ^ Robertson (1997), pp. 531–533; Salmon (2001), pp. 134–135.
- ^ Henderson (1898), p. 411.
- ^ a b Salmon (2001), p. 135.
- ^ McDonald (1907), p. 81; Welcher (1989), p. 919.
- ^ Hearn (2005), p. 98.
- ^ Wood (1997), p. 68.
- ^ Henderson (1898), p. 414.
- ^ McPherson (1988), p. 526.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 150.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 124.
- ^ Dyer (1908), p. 1215; Wittenberg (2010), p. 30.
- ^ a b c Johnson & Buel (1887a), p. 153.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 128.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 134.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 131.
- ^ Johnson & Buel (1887a), pp. 152–153.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 143.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 144.
- ^ a b Sears (2003), p. 74.
- ^ Kennedy (1998), p. 202; Salmon (2001), pp. 198–199.
- ^ Longacre (1986), p. 62.
- ^ Kennedy (1998), pp. 202–203; Salmon (2001), pp. 198–199.
- ^ Kennedy (1998), p. 204.
- ^ a b NPS Brandy Station.
- ^ Tobie (1882), p. 18.
- ^ Salmon (2001), p. 200.
- ^ Longacre (1986), pp. 75–76; Salmon (2001), pp. 199–201; Wittenberg (2010), p. 351.
- ^ a b Merrill (1866), p. 109.
- ^ Wittenberg (2010), p. 353.
- ^ Moore (1865), p. 59.
- ^ Glazier (1872), p. 219.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 111.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 112.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 113; Tobie (1887), p. 150.
- ^ Kennedy (1998), p. 204; Salmon (2001), p. 202.
- ^ Eicher, McPherson & McPherson (2001), p. 492; Salmon (2001), p. 202.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 672.
- ^ Glazier (1872), p. 219; Merrill (1866), p. 112; Tobie (1887), p. 153.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 153.
- ^ Clark (1985), p. 22; Coddington (1968), pp. 64–65; Loosbrock (2000), p. 274; Sears (2003), p. 74; Wittenberg & Petruzzi (2006), p. xviii.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 155.
- ^ Petruzzi (2013).
- ^ Kennedy (1998), p. 206.
- ^ a b Tobie (1887), p. 159.
- ^ DiMarco (2008), p. 235.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 161.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 162.
- ^ DiMarco (2008), p. 236.
- ^ Dyer (1908), p. 1215.
- ^ Dyer (1908), pp. 1215–1216; Hodsdon (1867), p. 1051.
- ^ Dyer (1908), p. 1216; Field (2015), p. 10.
- ^ Federal Publishing Company (1908), p. 61.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 690.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 24-27.
- ^ Merrill (1866), p. 25-27.
- ^ Mapoles (2020), p. 14–15.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 40
Many individuals in the regiment privately purchased a third revolver in the Army (.44) caliber. If they could not obtain a Colt, they bought a Remington Model 1858, a Colt Model 1848, or a Colt Walker M1847 revolver - ^ Hodsdon (1867), p. 54.
- ^ Mapoles (2020), pp. 14–21; Tobie (1887), p. 143
The Sharps carbines used a coated linen cartridge with a paper base which was sheared open with the closing action of the breech. They were issued in small waterproof ten round boxes. While the linen cartridges were more water resistant than paper cartridges, the linen and the powder inside could still get wet and unusable with immersion. This remained a problem until Sharps began using copper and brass cartridges; copper being the more common as it was cheaper. The Burnside cartridge was a conical brass cartridge with a tiny hole in the base for the flame from the separate musket cap to reach the powder. The brass could also be reloaded many times in the field with no complicated tools. Even though the Burnside cartridge was not waterproof like the later Spencers, it was still a further improvement. - ^ Thomas (1981), App. E.
- ^ Tobie (1887), p. 361.
- ^ Franscell (2012), p. 37; Ginn (2016), p. 79; Hastings (1886), p. 136; White (1900), p. 109
He was a member of Bowdoin's famed class of 1825, which included Nathaniel Hawthorne and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. While at Bowdoin, Cilley also became close friends with future U.S. President Franklin Pierce, a member of the class of 1824. Deciding to stay in Maine after graduating from Bowdoin, Cilley studied law with John Ruggles, was admitted to the bar in 1828, and practiced in Thomaston. He served part of one term in the 25th Congress, and died as the result of a wound sustained in a duel with another Congressman, William J. Graves of Kentucky. - ^ Maine Gettysburg Commission (1898), pp. 470–472.
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External links[]
- 1st Maine Cavalry Living History Organization
- 1st Maine Cavalry Regimental Standard reproduced by Steven Hill.
- History of the 1st Maine Cavalry at Google Books (downloadable for free)
- FamilySearch – 1st Regiment, Maine Cavalry
- The Civil War Archive – Maine 1st Regiment Cavalry
- Maine Memory Network – 1st Maine Cavalry
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- Units and formations of the Union Army from Maine
- 1861 establishments in Maine
- Military units and formations established in 1861
- Military units and formations disestablished in 1865