Abdi House raid

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Bloody Monday/Abdi House raid
Part of UNOSOM II
An AH-1 Cobras firing its 20 mm cannon at Abdi Hassan Awale's villa during the gathering of clan elders on 12 July 1993
One of six AH-1 Cobras firing its 20 mm cannon at Abdi Hassan Awale's villa during the gathering of clan elders on 12 July 1993
Date12 July 1993
Location
Mogadishu, Somalia
Result Sharp rise in animosity towards UN troops, especially towards the American forces among Somalis
Commanders and leaders
United States Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery
Strength

United States Six AH-1 Cobras United States Four OH-58 Kiowa

United States Five UH-60 Black Hawks
Casualties and losses

United Nations United States UNOSOM II:

None

Somalia Somalis:

Somali claim -

73 killed & 200 wounded

Red Cross claim -

54 killed & 161 wounded

UNOSOM II claim -

7 - 20 killed (All combatants)
  • Not considered a battle as there was no sustained fight between any organized armed forces during the raid.

The Abdi House raid, better known to Somalis as Bloody Monday (Somali: Isniinta Dhiigii), was an American surprise attack that took place in Mogadishu on 12 July 1993 as part of the U.N. intervention in the Somali Civil War.[1] It marked a decisive turning point in the UNOSOM II, as it inflamed anti-UN and anti-American sentiments among Somalis, which contributed immensely to the scale of resistance that the U.S. military faced during the Battle of Mogadishu three months later.[2][1][3][4] As part of the campaign to capture or kill General Mohammed Farah Aideed following the 5 June attack on the Pakistani Peacekeepers, and with the direct authorization of the Clinton White House, U.S. forces conducted a deadly 17 minute raid on a home belonging to Aideed's Interior Minister Abdi Hasan Awale during a major gathering of Somalis.[5][6][7] The meeting was being attended by high ranking elders of Aideed's clan, the Habr Gidr and had been planned in order to discuss a diplomatic resolution to the conflict between him and UNOSOM.[8][9][6][3][10]

The Meeting and American/UN Justification for Strike[]

The 12 July gathering at Abdi Hassan Awale's villa in Mogadishu[]

The conference of high ranking elders, intellectuals, clansmen and militia leaders of the Habr Gidr (also including prominent members of others clans such as the Ogadeni, Dir, and Majerteen) was taking place in order to discuss how to respond to a peace initiative from the head of the UN operation in Mogadishu, retired Admiral Johnathan Howe.[3][8]

A handful of the elders had met with him the day preceding and Howe requested of them to look for a peaceful resolution to the then four week long conflict between the Aideeds S.N.A. and UNOSOM, this request prompted the unusually high profile of the 12 July gathering.[10][3] The meeting had been publicized in Mogadishu's newspapers as a peace conference the day before and an American journalist in Mogadishu who was a witness of the raid, Scott Peterson, corroborates the Somali account that a group of elders had gathered to discuss to how to end the violence between the SNA and U.N. forces.[10][8][11][9]

A CIA informant inside the clan passed intelligence that a meeting was to take place and present among the gathered would be some of those who had part taken in the 5 June attack.[12][6] Aideed himself did not approve of the meeting taking place, as his role as clan leader was being held in question.[10] He was tipped off that something would happen to the conference a few hours prior, either by his own intelligence network or by the Italian element of UNOSOM II, who were allegedly sympathetic to him.[13]

Rationale and planning phase[]

The UNOSOM effort to capture or kill Aideed following the attack on the Pakistanis in June and early July had repeatedly failed, leading to a mounting frustration that led American and UN officials to believe the best solution for the conflict would be to deal a severe blow to his S.N.A. power base. Commenting on the frustration of UNOSOM Black Hawk Down author Mark Bowden claims, "...the plan to attack the Abdi House reflected that."[6] Several U.N. sources claim that during the planning phase of the raid, the Pakistanis had been asked to surround the house so those meeting inside could be forced out and arrested. They also claim that Pakistan had refused, leading American commanders to conclude that they had no option but to destroy the house and kill the occupants.[1] Detailed planning for a strike on a future gathering at Abdi Hassan Awales home began on 7 July.[12]

Mark Bowden further reported that Turkish commander of UNOSOM II, Gen. Cevik Bir and his deputy Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery wanted an attack without warning in order to decapitate the leadership of the S.N.A.[6] Howe had proposed issuing a warning or just storming the villa, but was told that such an approach would expose the American troops to an unacceptable risk of losses and that the 10th Mountain Division did not possess the capability to perform the kind of "snatch-and-grab" tactics used by Delta Force.[6] In an unprecedented decision that would break the mold of previous UNOSOM II raids in Mogadishu, no warning would be given, as eliminating the "SNA command center" and its inhabitants depended entirely on maintaining the element of total surprise.[7][14] The UNOSOM command regarded the planned assault as, "a legitimate defensive action, one that would undermine Aideeds support in the Habr Gidr clan" and also believed that the Italian contingent of the force had been making a secret unilateral agreement with Aideed, which ran the risk of increasing his support if completed.[15]

The White House would directly sign off on permission for the operation, but it is disputed if President Clinton knew if Somalis were being directly targeted when he did.[7] The strike would be overseen first hand by the deputy commander of UNOSOM II, Thomas M. Montgomery, who would be seated in one of the Cobras participating in the strike.[13][2] The planned surprise attack would be unique and historic, in that it would the first attack where the target would be actual Somalis instead of weapon caches or other structures and is referred to by Washington Post reporter Keith B. Richburg as "the UN's first ever officially authorized assassination".[1][11] A 2004 U.S. military sanctioned case study of the operation in Somalia would comment on the unprecedented raid that the, "Liberalization of the rules of engagement mirrored the shift to combat operations."[15] According to officials involved in the decision making, senior American and U.N. military personal were aware that the attack would mark a watershed moment for UNSOM II and agonized over whether to commit to it for more than two weeks.[1]

The American Quick Reaction Force had been on standby for the attack order for well over a week and was prepared to launch the operation on just a five minutes notice.[15]

The Attack[]

On the morning of 12 July 1993, Operation Michigan was commenced by the 10th Mountain Division of the American Quick Reaction Force in Mogadishu under the provisions of UN Resolution 837.[6] Around 10:18 am a CIA informant named Omar Hassan Ganay walked out of the meeting to the main gate of the compound in full view of the waiting attack helicopters encircling the villa, wearing an arranged set of clothing as a strike signal.[10] Seconds later, following visual confirmation of the target, six AH-1 Cobras and four OH-58 Kiowas launched a total of sixteen TOW missiles and 2,200 rounds of 20 mm caliber cannon fire into the gathering for a total of six minutes.[12][2][3][16][15] The Cobras specifically targeted the stairwells of the villa in the opening salvo of the strike to prevent escape, and then launched the TOWs into the top floor, where the meeting was taking place.[12]

Moments before Abdi Awale had just begun addressing the crowd of about 80 to 90 Somalis that had gathered on the second story of the villa.[6] Present among them were prominent sheikhs, former judges, famous poets, professors, and intellectuals who represented the most respected and best-educated of the Habr Gidr.[6][3] Other eminent Somalis from other clans were also present at the meeting.[8] Present among the gathered was Habr Gidr's most senior elder Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, over 90 years old, who was instantly killed in the first TOW missile volley along with other elders, as they were all directly sitting against the walls of the conference room.[6][3] Aideed himself was not present at the meeting.[2][3][6]

Vantage point of an American solider looking over the smoldering ruins of Abdi Hassan Awales home

"You could really feel the savagery of this action...there was a lot of blood shed and it was vicious, like an animal attack." A Somali survivor recounts during a 1999 interview with Scott Peterson in Mogadishu[10]

At 10:23 am, one minute after the Cobras had stopped their assault on the villa, three of the waiting Black Hawk helicopters landed in the vicinity of the decimated building. One of the Black Hawks, containing the support platoon tasked with covering the assault platoon, landed on the roof of the French Embassy, which provided a vantage point of the villa.[12] Two other separate Black Hawks, landed on the street in front of the meeting and troops from them quickly streamed out and set up a cordon around the house.[12] Helicopters participating in the raid would drop a total of 22 CS gas grenades to chase away gathering crowds of onlookers.[15] According to the 22nd Infantry Regiment, a primary participant in the raid, the assault platoon then made its way from the street into the compound and into the house to search for surviving "SNA leadership" and any "valuable intelligence"[12] According to a Somali survivor, American troops stormed the compound after the strike and killed 15 survivors at close range with pistols, a charge American commanders deny.[10]

A Cobra flies over crowd of Somalis gathering around the Abdi Hassan Awales residence

According to the U.N. account detailed in the "Blue Book", it took nine minutes for troops to clear the area, search the villa, and depart, all while leaving earlier than expected marking the "Abdi House Attack" as the fastest operation that had been conducted by UNSOM II.[2] The attack was designed to destroy Aideed’s power base, but instead it counterproductively resulted in an increased support for Aideed and intensified opposition to U.S. and UN forces.[17] According to the U.N., "The raid was carried out on the basis of information that meetings would be held at the center, and that the militia leaders would likely attend."[18]

In the two and half years since the civil war had come to Mogadishu, Bloody Monday represented the deadliest loss from a single attack the city had seen. CNN had received footage of the raid from a Somali cameraman, but it was deemed too gruesome to show on air.[10] Former National Security Adviser to the Clinton Administration Anthony Lake commented while being interviewed in 1998 by Mark Bowden that the raid "was not specifically designed to kill people."[6] According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, there were 54 Somalis killed and 161 wounded but this was entirely based on a survey of the dead and injured at two large hospitals in Mogadishu. The actual casualty count is likely higher as only two medical facilities in the entire city were canvassed, and since many Somalis follow the Islamic tradition of burying the dead immediately.[16] The Somalis claim 73 people killed and 200 wounded, another charge which American and U.N. officials deny.[13] UNOSOM initially only claimed that 7 Somalis had been killed, all men and all combatants.[19] American war correspondent Scott Peterson who was present on these scene of the attack claimed that the raid was far deadlier than U.S. and U.N. officials acknowledged.[16] The exact target of the operation is disputed as U.N. officials later claimed Aideed rarely attended the meetings and was not the target.[19][17]

Aftermath and Consequences[]

Prelude to the Battle of Mogadishu[]

Sign at an anti American protest in Mogadishu depicting the attack

"I guess we created trouble for those who followed." First Sergeant Buckley of 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry reflecting on his participation in the raid.[15]

The raid was the first time the U.N. forces in Somalia had deliberately targeted people instead of buildings or armaments caches, marking a decisive turning point in what had until then been a low-level intensity conflict.[1] Many Somalis, U.N. personal and relief agencies believed that the strike had marked an unnecessary escalation that had devolved the U.N. peacekeepers into yet just another belligerent faction involved in the Somali Civil War, fears that were exacerbated by comments from U.N. officials who publicly warned that UNOSOM had a list of ten more "command and control" centers to be hit in a similar fashion.[10][2][5] To the Habr Gidr, including the former moderates and even other clans that had formerly opposed them, the attack marked a declaration of outright war from the United States and signified the point where a diplomatic solution to the "Somalia problem" had become inconceivable.[2][1][3][6] In the view U.S. special envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley the incident, “caused a number of non–Habr Gidr to sympathize, and even join forces with, the SNA” and furthermore increased “Aideed’s support among those Habr Gidr who had not previously been with him.”[17]

To many Somalis, Aideed's anti-UNOSOM rhetoric warning of an ever growing neocolonialist and imperialist international intervention had been validated, which greatly enabled him to consolidate and expand power across the divisive clan lines of war torn Mogadishu, making the city far more dangerous for international troops to operate in, the complete opposite of the planners intended result.[6][1] The events of Bloody Monday would lead Aideed to make the decision to specifically target American soldiers for the first time and would result in the 8 August killings of U.S. troops that would push President Clinton to send in Delta and the Rangers to capture him.[7][2]

U.N. and international reaction[]

"For the first time in Somalia there has been a killing under the flag of humanitarianism."

Rony Brauman, then president of Doctors Without Borders[10]

The reason for the meeting, how many people were killed and even the very inhabitants of the house at the time is disputed by UNOSOM officials who claimed that it was the gathering of an S.N.A. war council at a major "command and control center", and that operation was a successful strike.[13][2] Among the claims UNOSOM officials put forward were:

  • A senior United Nations military official would claim that the attack was "...a very heavy hit on the S.N.A. leadership"[19]
  • Johnathan Howe would claim, “There was no evidence of non-combatant casualties from the raid itself” and that Operation Michigan had been "flawless". He would also say that the footage recorded by the Somali cameraman was "suspect".[10][2]
  • Maj. Leann Swieczkowski, an army spokeswoman, said that the photographs taken inside the house proved that it was an S.N.A. "forward command center," although UNOSOM later claimed that evidence of Somali casualties had not been recorded because the U.N. military photographer's camera had broken.[8]
  • An after action report on Somalia prepared by Montgomery and others, claimed that among those killed were a number of top financiers and military planners, including the overall planner of the June 5th ambush of Pakistani soldiers.[2] Montgomery would later concede that elders were in fact killed, but that they had been combatants.[10]

The strike also caused an outcry among U.N. civilian staffers and disenchantment over the direction of UNOSOM II for employees of the humanitarian section.[5][20][1] Ann Wright, the top U.N. justice official in Somalia tasked helping rebuild the decimated police force and judicial system, would go on to write a memo to Johnathan Howe stating:

“We believe as a matter of policy, short prior notice of the destruction of a building with humans inside must be given.  From the legal, moral and human rights perspective, we counsel against conducting military operations that give no notice of attack to occupants of buildings.” Ann Wright, Chief of the UNOSOM Justice Division[5]

She would further go on to state that it “...undercuts U.N. credibility when we can not with accuracy state how many persons were killed or injured, who they were and why they were in the facility.”[21][2][5] At least nine U.N. civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or just left their posts in protest, several of those who stayed on commenting that the United Nations had relinquished its "moral authority" in its war against Aideed.[1] Multiple relief organizations in Mogadishu approached the U.N. command with copies of the Geneva Convention, specifically in relation to the articles concerning attacks on civilians and proportional retaliation.[10] Human Rights Watch went as far as to claim that the attack "looked like mass murder."[8]

Poster at an anti U.N. protest in Mogadishu depicting the Italians split with Howe over the escalation of force in UNSOM II

The attack exposed deep rifts among states contributing troops to UNOSOM II, primarily the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation a few days later citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led campaign against Mohammed Farah Aideed.[16][20][1][22] The surprise assault became front page news in Italy and the newspaper representing the nations Catholic bishops, Avvenire, referring to it as a "vile American raid."[19] The Italians, who had ruled Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack against the Habr Gidr threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN peacekeeping force.[22][23] The dissension in the U.N. ranks with the Italians and others over what had occurred on 12 July led to a significant lull in UNOSOM operations in Mogadishu until the 8 August killings of American soldiers.[5]

The conclusion of the independent inquiry the U.N. had setup into the massacre was so controversial that U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali personally asked for the commission to revise their report, to which they refused. The U.N. allowed only the envoys of the 15th member Security Council view the report on the top floor of the headquarters in New York and they could only view a single copy of the report, chained to a desk, with photocopying or photos forbidden.[10]

Somali Reaction[]

The unprecedented strike invoked outrage in Somalia.[19] The atmosphere in Mogadishu became very tense and humanitarian work in the city more or less came to a halt as the risk towards foreigners, especially Americans, had become the worst it had ever been since the start of the intervention. In some parts of the city armed gangs had formed going from agency to agency inquiring about the location of American citizens and the Somali CIA informant who had signaled for the strike was assassinated.[10] The S.N.A. allegedly put out a bounty for any American solider or U.N. personal killed.[18]

A significant amount of the international press on the incident was primarily focused on the deaths of four journalists—Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, Hansi Kraus, and Anthony Macharia—who were killed by an enraged mob when they arrived to cover the incident.[24][25][6] Relief worker had to be put on hold and Michael McDonaugh, director of Concern Worldwide an Irish humanitarian organization in Somalia would comment, "There's an anger directed against all foreigners now...more than ever before, we're all targets. How can we work?"[19] Because of the killings most western news organizations completely withdrew from Somalia which greatly contributed to the lack of any substantial press during the Battle of Mogadishu on 3–4 October 1993.[19]

References[]

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Richburg, Keith B. (6 December 1993). "IN WAR ON AIDEED, U.N. BATTLED ITSELF". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 12 March 2022.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Megas, Natalia (6 January 2019). "Did the U.S. Cover Up a Civilian Massacre Before Black Hawk Down?". The Daily Beast. Retrieved 17 May 2020.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i Bowden, Mark (1999). Black Hawk Down. Canada: Grove Press. pp. 71–76. ISBN 978-0-8021-4473-7.
  4. ^ Kaus, Mickey (21 January 2002). "What Black Hawk Down leaves out". Slate Magazine. Retrieved 13 March 2022.
  5. ^ a b c d e f Richburg, Keith B. (5 August 1993). "U.N. REPORT CRITICIZES MILITARY TACTICS OF SOMALIA PEACE KEEPERS". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o "A Wrong Turn In Somalia-- An Ill-Conceived Copter Raid Turned Many Somalis Against U.S. Forces, 1998, Mark Bowden, The Philadelphia Inquirer".
  7. ^ a b c d Wheeler, Nicholas (2000). Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford. p. 197. ISBN 0-19-829621-5.
  8. ^ a b c d e f "SOMALIA". www.hrw.org. Retrieved 18 March 2019.
  9. ^ a b "Hoover Institution - Policy Review - African Atrocities and the "Rest of the World"". 6 December 2008. Archived from the original on 6 December 2008. Retrieved 20 March 2022.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Peterson, S. (2000). Me against my brother: at war in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda: a journalist reports from the battlefields of Africa. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0415921988. OCLC 43287853.
  11. ^ a b Keith, Richburg (1997). Out Of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa. p. 79. ISBN 0465001882.
  12. ^ a b c d e f g "1st Battalion 22nd Infantry Somalia Page 4". 1-22infantry.org. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  13. ^ a b c d "Interviews - General Thomas Montgomery | Ambush in Mogadishu | FRONTLINE | PBS". www.pbs.org. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  14. ^ Weingast, Matthew (1997–1998). "Journal of Legal Studies". Journal of Legal Studies. 8: 109–159 – via Google Books.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
  15. ^ a b c d e f Bauman, Robert (2004). My Clan Against the World: US Forces in Somalia. Combat Studies Institute Press.
  16. ^ a b c d Richburg, Keith B. (16 July 1993). "U.N. HELICOPTER ASSAULT IN SOMALIA TARGETED AIDEED'S TOP COMMANDERS". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  17. ^ a b c Hosmer, Stephen (2001). Operations Against Enemy Leaders. United States: RAND. ISBN 0-8330-3028-0.
  18. ^ a b The United Nations and Somalia 1992 - 1996. United States: United Nations. 1996. p. 404. ISBN 92-1-100566-3.
  19. ^ a b c d e f g Lorch, Donatella (14 July 1993). "U.N. Says It Will Press Effort to Disarm Somalis". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  20. ^ a b Cowell, Alan (16 July 1993). "ITALY, IN U.N. RIFT, THREATENS RECALL OF SOMALIA TROOPS". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 12 March 2022.
  21. ^ "How Military Operations in Somalia 25 Years Ago Influence Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen Today". CODEPINK - Women for Peace. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  22. ^ a b Bernstein, Richard (15 July 1993). "Italian General Who Refused Order in Somalia Is Removed". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 12 March 2022.
  23. ^ Kennedy, Frances (22 July 1993). "Opinion | In Somalia, Machiavelli Vs. Rambo". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 17 March 2022.
  24. ^ Bowden, p. 95.
  25. ^ Nicholson, Ralph (18 July 1993). "Sole Surviving Reuters Journalist Describes Somali Mob's Attack : Africa: 'I thought to myself, hell! I don't want to die like this! I don't know where I got the strength, but I managed to get up. . . . '". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 12 March 2022.

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