Ken Alibek

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Ken Alibek
Қанатжан Байзақұлы Әлібеков
Ken Alibek in 2003
Born	Kanatzhan "Kanat" Alibekov 1950 Kauchuk, Kazakh SSR
Nationality	Soviet Union (until 1991) Kazakhstan (1991–1992) United States (1992–present)
Education	Tomsk Medical Institute
Occupation	Physician, microbiologist, and bioweaponeer
Years active	1975–1991
Era	Cold War
Known for	Creating the most virulent strain of anthrax ever synthesized.
Children	5
Ken Alibek Allegiance  Soviet Union Branch Soviet Army Years of service 1975–1991 Rank Colonel Commands held Biopreparat

Kanatzhan "Kanat" Alibekov (Kazakh: Қанатжан Байзақұлы Әлібеков, Qanatjan Baızaquly Álibekov; Russian: Канатжан Алибеков, Kanatzhan Alibekov; born 1950) – known as Kenneth "Ken" Alibek since 1992 – is a Kazakh-American physician, microbiologist, and biological warfare (BW) expert. He rose rapidly in the ranks of the Soviet Army to become the First Deputy Director of Biopreparat, with a rank of Colonel, during which time he oversaw a vast program of BW facilities.

During his career as a Soviet bioweaponeer, in the late 1970s and 1980s, Alibekov oversaw projects that included weaponizing glanders and Marburg hemorrhagic fever, and created Russia's first tularemia bomb.^[1] His most prominent accomplishment was the creation of a new "battle strain" of anthrax, known as "Strain 836", later described by the Los Angeles Times as "the most virulent and vicious strain of anthrax known to man".^[2][3]

In 1992, he defected to the United States; he has since become an American citizen and made his living as a biodefense consultant, speaker, and entrepreneur. He had actively participated in the development of biodefense strategy for the U.S. government, and between 1998 and 2005 he testified several times before the U.S. Congress and other governments on biotechnology issues.

Alibek is currently working as a Senior Vice President for research and development at Locus Fermentation Solutions in Ohio, USA. Apart from this, he is actively involved in research on autism and its infectious etiology.^[4]

Biography[]

Youth and early career[]

Alibek was born Kanat Alibekov in Kauchuk, in the Kazakh SSR of the Soviet Union (in present-day Kazakhstan), to a Kazakh family. He grew up in Almaty, the republic's former capital.

His academic performance while studying military medicine at the Tomsk Medical Institute and his family's noted patriotism led to his selection to work for Biopreparat, the secret biological weapons program overseen by the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers. His first assignment (1975) was to the Eastern European Branch of the Institute of Applied Biochemistry (IAB) near Omutninsk, a combined pesticide production facility and reserve biological weapons production plant intended for activation in a time of war. At Omutninsk, Alibek mastered the art and science of formulating and evaluating nutrient media and cultivation conditions for the optimization of microbial growth. It was here that he expanded his medical school laboratory skills into the complex skill set required for industrial-level production of microorganisms and their toxins.^[5]

After a year at Omutninsk, Alibek was transferred to the Siberian Branch of the IAB near Berdsk (another name of the branch was the Berdsk scientific and production base). With the assistance of a colleague, he designed and constructed a microbiology research and development laboratory that worked on techniques to optimize the production of biological formulations.

After several promotions, Alibek was transferred back to Omutninsk, where he rose to the position of Deputy Director. He was soon transferred to the Kazakhstan Scientific and Production Base in Stepnogorsk (another reserve BW facility) to become the new Director of that facility. Officially, he was Deputy Director of the Progress Scientific and Production Association, a manufacturer of fertilizer and pesticide.

At Stepnogorsk, Alibek created an efficient industrial scale assembly line for biological formulations. In a time of war, the assembly line could be used to produce weaponized anthrax. Continued successes in science and biotechnology led to more promotions, which resulted in a transfer to Moscow.^[6]

Work at Biopreparat-Moscow[]

In Moscow, Alibek began his service as Deputy Chief of the Biosafety Directorate at Biopreparat. He was later promoted (1988) to First Deputy Director of Biopreparat, where he not only oversaw the biological weapons facilities but also the significant number of pharmaceutical facilities that produced antibiotics, vaccines, sera, and interferon for the public.

In response to a Spring 1990 announcement that the Ministry of Medical and Microbiological Industry was to be reorganized, Alibek drafted and forwarded a memo to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposing the cessation of Biopreparat's BW work. Though Gorbachev approved the proposal, an additional paragraph had been secretly inserted into Alibek's draft, resulting in a presidential decree that ordered the end of Biopreparat's BW work but also required them to remain prepared for future production.

Though disappointed by the double-dealing, Alibek used his position at Biopreparat and the authority granted to him by the first part of the decree to begin the destruction of the BW program. Specifically, he ordered the dismantling of BW production and testing capabilities at a number of research and development facilities, including Stepnogorsk, Kol'tsovo, Obolensk and a number of others. He also negotiated a concurrent appointment to a Biopreparat facility called Biomash. Biomash designed and produced technical equipment for microbial cultivation and testing. He planned to increase the proportion of its products sent to hospitals and civilian medical laboratories beyond the 40% allocated at the time.^[6]

Life in the United States[]

Alibek was subsequently placed in charge of intensive preparations for inspections of Soviet biological facilities by a joint American and British delegation. When he participated in the subsequent Soviet inspection of American facilities, his growing suspicion that the United States did not have an offensive bioweapons program was confirmed before his return to Russia (the Soviet Union dissolved while he was in the US). In January 1992, not long after his return from the US, Alibek, protesting against the continuation of bioweapons work, resigned from both the Soviet Army and Biopreparat. In October 1992 he emigrated with his family to the US.^[6]

After moving to the US, Alibekov has provided the government with a detailed accounting of the former Soviet BW program, and has testified before the US Congress multiple times (see also Sverdlovsk anthrax leak). He has provided guidance to the intelligence, policy, national security, and medical communities.

He was the impetus behind the creation of a biodefense graduate education program at George Mason University serving as Distinguished Professor of Medical Microbiology and the program's Director of Education. He also developed the plans for GMU's biosafety level three (BSL-3) research facility and secured $40 million of grants from the federal and state governments for its construction.^[6]

In 1999, Alibek published an autobiographical account of his work in the Soviet Union and his defection.^[7]

Entrepreneur and researcher[]

Alibek was the President, Chief Scientific Officer and Chief Executive Officer at AFG Biosolutions, Inc in Gaithersburg, Maryland,^[8] where he and his scientific team continued their development of advanced solutions for antimicrobial immunity. Motivated by the lack of affordable anti-cancer therapies available in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, AFG was using Alibek's biotechnology experience to plan, build, and manage a new pharmaceutical production facility designed specifically to address this problem.

Alibek created this new pharmaceutical production company, MaxWell Biocorporation (MWB), in 2006 and served as its CEO and President. Based in Washington, D.C., with several subsidiaries and affiliates in the United States and Ukraine, MWB's main goal is said to be the creation of a new, large-scale, high-technology, ultra-modern pharmaceutical 'fill-and-finish' facility in Ukraine. Off-patent generic pharmaceuticals produced at this site are supposed to target severe oncological, cardiological, immunological, and chronic infectious diseases.

Construction of the Boryspil facility began in April 2007 and was completed in March 2008; initial production was scheduled to begin in 2008. The stated intention was that high-quality pharmaceuticals would be produced and become an affordable source of therapy for millions of underprivileged who currently have no therapeutic options.^[9] Abilek stepped down as President of MWB in the summer of 2008 shortly after the facility opened.

The main focus of Alibek's current research is to develop novel forms of therapy for late-stage oncological diseases and other chronic degenerative pathologies and disorders. He focuses on the role of chronic viral and bacterial infections in causing age-related diseases and premature aging. Additionally, he develops and implements novel systemic immunotherapy methods for late-stage cancer patients.^[9]

Alibek has a wife and five children (two sons and three daughters); one of his daughters is autistic.

Work in Kazakhstan[]

In 2010, by invitation, he began working in Kazakhstan as an educator and researcher at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. During his stay, he published a number of articles in research journals and taught various courses in various fields of biology and medicine. He focuses on a possible role of chronic infections, metabolic disorders, and immunosuppression on cancer development. In 2011, he was awarded a prize from the Deputy Prime Minister for his contribution to the development of the educational system in Kazakhstan. In 2014, he was awarded a medal by the Minister of Education and Science of Kazakhstan for his contribution to research in Kazakhstan. He continues his work as a physician and a research and education professor. He keeps his American citizenship and residence and his family lives in the United States.

In 2016, Ken Alibek was chosen as one of the nominees in the "Science" category of the national project «El Tulgasy» (Name of the Motherland) The idea of the project was to select the most significant citizens of Kazakhstan whose names are now associated with the achievements of the country. More than 350,000 people voted in this project, and Alibek was voted into 10th place in his category.^[10]

Autism research[]

Starting from 2007, Ken Alibek in addition to his other project, started doing research in autism. He considers the disorder to be the result of prenatal viral and bacterial infections. In 2019, five articles on autism have been published by Alibek. Using antiviral, antibacterial, and immune-modulatory methods he treats children from different countries, free of charge using a telemedicine approach. In his studies, he describes the cases of successful treatment of infections and inflammation resulting in improvements of autistic symptoms.^[11]

Publications[]

Books

• Alibek, Ken and Steven Handelman (1999), Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World – Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It, Random House, ISBN 0-385-33496-6.
• "The Anthrax Vaccine: Is It safe? Does it Work?" (2002), Reviewer. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Institute of Medicine.
• Biological Threats and Terrorism: Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities (2002), Workshop Summary, Contributor. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Institute of Medicine.
• Weinstein, R.S. and K. Alibek (2003), Biological and Chemical Terrorism: A Guide for Healthcare Providers and First Responders, Thieme Medical Publishing, New York.
• Alibek, K., et al. (2003), Biological Weapons, Bio-Prep, Louisiana.
• Fong, I. and K. Alibek (2005), Bioterrorism and Infectious Agents: A New Dilemma for the 21st Century, Springer.
• Fong, I. and K. Alibek (2006), New and Evolving Infections of the 21st Century, Springer.

Book chapters

• "Firepower in the Lab: Automation in the Fight Against Infectious Diseases and Bioterrorism" (2001), Chapter 15 of Biological Weapons: Past, Present, and Future, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Institute of Medicine.
• Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (2002), Second Edition, F. R. Sidell, W. C. Patrick, T. R. Dashiell, K. Alibek, Jane's Information Group, Alexandria, VA.
• K. Alibek, C. Lobanova, "Modulation of Innate Immunity to Protect Against Biological Weapon Threat" (2006). In: Microorganisms and Bioterrorism, Springer.

Op-Eds

• The New York Times
  • "Russia's Deadly Expertise", March 27, 1998.
  • "Smallpox Could Still Be a Danger", May 24, 1999.
• The Wall Street Journal
  • "Russia Retains Biological Weapons Capability", February, 2000.
  • "Bioterror: A Very Real Threat", October, 2001.
• The Washington Post
  • "Anthrax under the Microscope", with Matthew Meselson, November 5, 2002.

Selected Congressional Testimony

• Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, May 1998: "Terrorist and Intelligence Operations: Potential Impact on the US Economy"
• Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, June, 1999^{[citation needed]}
• Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, October, 1999
• Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, May, 2000
• Testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, October 2001: "Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat of a Biological Weapons Attack", House Serial No. 107-103
• Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, December, 2001: "Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of Anthrax, Smallpox, and Other Bioterrorist Weapons"
• Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations, November, 2001
• Testimony before the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, Committee on Homeland Security, US House of Representatives, July 28, 2005: "Implementing a National Biodefense Strategy"
• House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, March 1999 Biological Warfare Threats
• Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, July, 2005: "Engineering Bio-terror Agents: Lessons Learned from the Offensive US and Russian Biological Weapons Programs"

Criticism[]

Some observers have questioned the scientific credibility of Alibek's recent work and his motivations:^[12]

• In a September 2003 news release, Alibek and another professor suggested, based on their laboratory research, that smallpox vaccination might increase a person's resistance to HIV. The work was touted by GMU but was rejected after peer-review by the Journal of the American Medical Association and The Lancet and is no longer being pursued. According to smallpox expert and former White House science advisor Donald A. Henderson, "This is a theory that... does not hold up at all, and it does not make any sense from a biologic point of view... This idea ... was straight off the wall. I would put no credence in it at all." In 2010 an article coauthored by Alibek appeared in the scientific journal, Biomed Central - Immunology, [Weinstein, et al. BMC Immunology 201011:23 DOI: 10.1186/1471-2172-11-23] that outlined the results of their research showing that prior immunization with vaccinia (Dryvax) may confer resistance to HIV replication.

• Alibek and colleagues have sought to develop a product that would protect against an array of deadly viruses and bacteria, rather than just a single organism. In his lab, mice had survived doses of smallpox and anthrax. His "cocktail approach" – mixing more than one drug with other ingredients – was touted at news conferences in 2002 and 2004 by U.S. Representative H. James Saxton (R-N.J.), as "a potential new defense against bioterrorism". This scientific approach is very difficult to assess accurately and has not withstood scientific peer review.

• Alibek has used his notoriety to promote "Dr. Ken Alibek's Immune System Support Formula," a dietary supplement sold over the Internet. This concoction of vitamins, minerals, and a proprietary bacterial mix will purportedly "bolster the immune system".^[13]

• Alibek resigned as executive director of GMU's in September 2006, despite his position as a tenured Distinguished Professor. A University spokeswoman confirmed his resignation, but declined to comment on the circumstances surrounding his departure. According to a 2007 Los Angeles Times article, "Alibek said the college administration had grown displeased with his company's role in sharing grant-funded research. The university, he said, requested that he dismantle or leave AFG Biosolutions. He chose to resign from George Mason."^[14]

• Some experts question Alibek's characterizations of bioterrorism threats. Some have asserted that Alibek has a vested interest in raising fears, since he profits from government contracts related to countering bioterrorism. Retired Army major general and physician , while impressed by Alibek's knowledge of the former Soviet Union's production of anthrax, "began to think that Ken was more fanciful than precise in some of his recollections" where genetically engineered smallpox was concerned. Russell also remarked on "... the issue of putting Ebola genes into smallpox virus. That was viewed, at least in many of our minds, as somewhat fanciful. And probably not true."^[15]

References[]

Further reading[]

• "Interview Dr. Ken Alibek", Journal of Homeland Security (September 18, 2000)

External links[]

• Appearances on C-SPAN