Operation Tupac

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Operation Tupac
Part of the Kashmir conflict and the wider India–Pakistan conflict
Operational scopeProvision of intelligence, funding and armaments for Kashmiri separatists and militants in Indian-administered Kashmir
Location
Jammu and Kashmir (predominantly), India (by extension)[1][2]
Planned by Pakistan
Target India[3]
Date1989–present
Executed byInter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
Outcome

Operation Tupac is the alleged codename of an ongoing military-intelligence contingency program that has been active since the 1980s and run by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. It has a three-part action plan to provide covert support to anti-India separatists and militants in Indian-administered Kashmir. The program was authorized and initiated in 1988 by the order of the then-President of Pakistan, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.[1][6][7]

The codename of the program is derived from the name of Túpac Amaru II, an 18th-century Peruvian revolutionary who led a large Andean uprising against Spanish colonial rule in Peru.[8] The program is thought to be actively ongoing as the ISI has maintained its support for Kashmiri separatists, Islamists and other ideological militants in their fight against the Indian administration in Jammu and Kashmir.[8]

While all Kashmiri separatist groups received funding and support, organizations that espoused an explicit pro-Pakistan stance in the Kashmir conflict were more heavily favoured by the Pakistani state.[1] Under this program, the ISI helped create six separatist militant groups in Indian-administered Kashmir, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, which notoriously perpetrated the 2008 Mumbai attacks in India.[6][9] American intelligence officials have speculated that the ISI has continued to provide protection, support and intelligence to Lashkar-e-Taiba, among other militant groups in the region.[9]

Scope and objectives of the program[]

The primary objectives of Pakistan's Operation Tupac upon its execution were:[1][10]

  • to provide arms support and finance to separatists, militants and Islamists in India
  • to trigger a Balkanization of India
  • to utilize the spy network to act as an instrument of sabotage
  • to exploit porous borders with Nepal and Bangladesh to set up bases and conduct operations[1][11]

See also[]

References[]

  1. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e John Pike (25 July 2002). "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence". Federation of American Scientists. Archived from the original on 15 May 2008.
  2. ^ Winchell, Sean P. (2003), "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16 (3): 374–388, doi:10.1080/713830449
  3. ^ Winchell, Sean P. (2003), "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16 (3): 374–388, doi:10.1080/713830449
  4. ^ Rashid (2013), p. 48.
  5. ^ Ghosh 2000 pg.8
  6. ^ Jump up to: a b Juan Cole (12 December 2008), "Does Obama understand his biggest foreign-policy challenge?", Salon, archived from the original on 15 February 2009
  7. ^ Mukhtar Khan (9 January 2009). "India's Sikh Militants Forming Ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Pakistani Intelligence" (PDF). The Jamestown Foundation. Archived (PDF) from the original on 29 August 2012.
  8. ^ Jump up to: a b "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence". GlobalSecurity.org. Archived from the original on 15 May 2008. Retrieved 12 May 2008.
  9. ^ Jump up to: a b Richard A. Oppel Jr.; Salman Masood (1 January 2009), "Pakistani Militants Admit Role in Siege, Official Says", The New York Times, archived from the original on 15 December 2018
  10. ^ Winchell, Sean P. (2003), "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16 (3): 374–388, doi:10.1080/713830449
  11. ^ Winchell, Sean P. (2003), "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16 (3): 374–388, doi:10.1080/713830449


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