The Establishment (Pakistan)

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This article is about the military interference and dominance in civilian administration matters in Pakistan. For the general usage of the term, see The Establishment.
Not to be confused with Establishment Division.

The Establishment in Pakistan is a terminology used to refer to the deep state cooperative federation of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the Pakistani intelligence community and other pro-military government officials and civilians. Responsible for various military coups, the military-dominated Establishment has directly ruled Pakistan for nearly half of its existence since its creation in 1947, while frequently exerting covert dominance over the political leadership during the remainder.[1][2] The Establishment in Pakistan includes the key decision-makers in the country's military and intelligence services, national security, as well as its foreign and domestic policies, including the state policies of aggressive Islamization during the military dictatorship of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.[3]

In the 2000s, the military establishment later reversed its support of political Islam under General Pervez Musharraf, who pursued enlightened moderation, leading Pakistan to join the United States-led War on Terror and subsequently becoming designated as a major non-NATO ally by the Bush administration.[4] Furthermore, in the 2010s, General Raheel Sharif pursued a policy of hardline crackdowns on Islamist militant groups, continuing this reversal of Zia-ul-Haq's aggressive pro-Islamist policies.[5] Civilian members of the military-dominated Establishment have included: Sharifuddin Pirzada, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Tariq Azim,[6] A. K. Brohi,[7] Ghulam Ishaq Khan[8] and Zafar Ahmed Ansari.[9]

The core principles and values of the Establishment are the policies of treating India as an arch-rival and existential threat, the Kashmir dispute, Islamization of Pakistan, maintaining Punjab as the heartland of Pakistan, the strategic use of non-state militants and the formation of alliances with other Muslim-majority nations.[10]

Reinforcement of deep-state dominance[]

The Establishment is notable for its covert interventions and organization of military coups against the civilian government, and was reportedly behind the 1953–54 Constitutional Coup in the Dominion of Pakistan.[11][12] Additionally, it has also organized the coups of 1958,[12] 1977,[13][14][15] and 1999.[16] The Pakistan Army has been involved in enforcing martial law against elected civilian governments under the claim of restoring law and order in the country as is its role in the Constitution of Pakistan. It has dismissed the legislative branch and parliament a total of four times since Pakistan's creation, and maintains wider commercial, foreign, and political interests in the country. Due to this misbalance of power, the Pakistani military has faced allegations of acting as state within a state.[17][18][19][20][21]

Characteristics and composition[]

Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani journalist and scholar, notes that the Establishment is overwhelmingly dominated by the Pakistani military forces (i.e. serving and retired officers, SPDF personnel, military-sponsored think-tanks etc.), with its core members also including civil bureaucrats, politicians, media houses and major economic players.[22][23] Abubakar Siddique, a Bangladeshi writer, observed that the civilians involved with the Establishment, such as politicians and judges, are also very "pro-military".[24] American political scientist Stephen Cohen says in his book, The Idea of Pakistan:[6] "Of all of Ayub’s achievements, the most enduring was an informal political system that tied together the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other elites. Subsequently dubbed the “Establishment," it resembles a classic oligarchy. Pakistani poltician, Mushahid Hussain, told that members of the Establishment included members of the business community; journalists, editors, and media experts; and a few academics and members of think tanks. At times, some foreign ambassadors with particularly close ties to the leadership were de facto members [...] Military officers and civilian bureaucrats above a certain level were potential members. As Hussain notes, the informality of the Establishment ensures that occupying a particular post does not confer membership.

Over time, the civil–military power equation has undergone changes, such as increased power sharing between the civilian government and the military as well as the convergence of interests in major aspects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.[25] During the tenure of General Ayub Khan, the Establishment's code and tenants included the following (as outlined in Cohen's book): India was the main, existential threat to Pakistan, and accordingly the Pakistani military was a priority in all affairs of the state.[26] Since Pakistan could not take on India alone, military alliances were important and essential to the state's survival.[26] Likewise, natural allies included other moderate Islamic states, which were seen as role models.[26] Domestically, the military was a role model for the Pakistani people. Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region that served as the core territorial conflict hotspot between India and Pakistan, was always an issue for the Establishment, to the extent that it became an integral reason for the existence of Pakistan.[26] Quick reforms and revolutions were considered problematic.[26]

Foreign aid from the United States, Japan, and then the People's Republic of China (after 1963) was a driver of the economy.[27] The Establishment ensured control over information dissemination through the media and academia.[27] Radical and/or violent Islamic groups were slowly tolerated.[27] The Establishment theoretically tolerated democratic rule and never seriously imposed Islam; the army being less tolerant of Islamists. Just by surviving, Pakistan and its Establishment would be defeating India.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a founding member of the Establishment,[28] started looking for a new identity for Pakistan, chiefly one that it did not share with neighbouring rival India. Accordingly, Pakistan started to look towards the Middle East for "aid, ideology, and strategic cooperation"; while at the same time turning its back away from its own shared history with India in South Asia.[29] Further building on Ayub Khan-era policies, Kashmir remained important for the Establishment for a variety of reasons; most notably due to its strategic importance to Pakistan. Furthermore, it was seen as a chance for Pakistan to fulfil its vision of its founding, the two-nation theory—that of being a "homeland for oppressed Indian Muslims".[26] (Though very few, the number of those in the Establishment who want Pakistan to get out of the Kashmir conflict with India are growing.)[30] Outside of the Kashmir conflict, India as a nation was perceived as an existential threat to Pakistan in every way,[31][32][33] particularly after the 1971 secession of Muslim-majority Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), and the latter's belief that India did not pose an existential threat, effectively endangering the two-nation theory.[34]

Criticism[]

Main article: Criticism of the Pakistan Armed Forces
Anti-establishment powershow in Bannu attended by thousands of people.

In Pakistan, many voices have been taken and there have been several protests against the Establishment but these are not shown by Pakistani media channels since they aren't allowed by the Establishment.[35] In Pakistan, especially in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there is a famous slogan "ye jo dehshatgardi hai, iske peeche wardi hai" (Those in uniform are behind terrororism).[36][37] Due to the popularity of the slogan, Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) adopted it.[38]

In September 2020, the Pakistan Democratic Movement was formed with the main objective to remove Establishment's association with the politics of Pakistan.[39] The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement openly criticizes the Pakistan Army and accuses the Pakistani state of violating the basic human rights of the Pashtuns.[40] Balochi people have also taken voice against the Establishment.

Apart from political movements, many journalists have also taken voice against the Establishment. Hamid Mir, Pakistan's most well-known journalist, spoke against the Establishment many times. Assassination attempts have been made on many journalists who spoke against the Establishment including Hamid Mir,[41] Asad Ali Toor,[42] and many other journalists. Prominent journalist Matiullah Jan was also abducted and Jan accused the Establishment of abducting him. These journalists are also banned to be on television. There is no freedom of journalism in Pakistan.[43]

See also[]

References[]

Notes[]

Citations[]

  1. ^ Jaffrelot, Christophe (2015). The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience. Oxford University Press. p. 586. ISBN 978-0-19-023518-5. The civil-military establishment ruled Supreme for 60 years - from 1947 to 2007 - by crushing or betraying social movements and preventing the development of society.
  2. ^ Pakistan Extends Powerful Army Chief’s Term, Wall Street Journal, 19 August 2019. "... critics of the military say it helped Mr. Khan win the 2018 election, as a new force in Pakistani politics and it is accused of being behind a campaign against the country's two established political parties."
  3. ^ Ḥaqqānī, Husain (2005). Pakistan: between mosque and military. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1. Retrieved 23 May 2010. Zia ul-Haq is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. Undoubtedly, Zia went farthest in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state, and he nurtured the jihadist ideology ...
  4. ^ "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation", by Pervez Musharraf, 1 June 2004, The Washington Post
  5. ^ Boone, Jon (15 June 2014). "Pakistan begins long-awaited offensive to root out militants from border region". The Guardian. Retrieved 17 September 2020.
  6. ^ Jump up to: a b Cohen 2004, pp. 68–70.
  7. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 85.
  8. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 146.
  9. ^ Haqanni 2005, p. 25.
  10. ^ Baloch, Qadar Bakhsh (2006). "[Book Review] The Idea of Pakistan". The Dialogue: 136–137. ISSN 1819-6470.
  11. ^ Pakistan Constitutional Beginnings PAKISTAN – A Country Study
  12. ^ Jump up to: a b declassified US Intelligence.[dead link]
  13. ^ Hyman, Anthony; Ghayur, Muhammed; Kaushik, Naresh (1989). Pakistan, Zia and After--. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications. p. 30. ISBN 81-7017-253-5. Operation Fair Play went ahead … as the clock struck midnight [on 4 July 1977] ... [Later,] General Zia [told Bhutto] that Bhutto along with other political leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties would be taken into what he called 'protective custody'.
  14. ^ Dossani, Rafiq; Rowen, Henry S. (2005). Prospects for Peace in South Asia. Stanford University Press. p. 42. ISBN 978-0-8047-5085-1. Zia-ul-Haq, however, chose not to abrogate the 1973 Constitution. Rather, Zia's government suspended the operation of the Constitution and governed directly, through the promulgation of martial law regulations … Between 1977 and 1981 Pakistan did not have legislative institutions.
  15. ^ Cohen 2004.
  16. ^ Hassan Abbas (2005). Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and America's war on terror. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 16–40. ISBN 978-0-7656-1496-4.
  17. ^ Javid, Hassan (23 November 2014). "COVER STORY: The Army & Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan". DAWN.COM. Dawn Newspapers. Dawn Newspapers. Archived from the original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
  18. ^ Aqil, Shah (1973). The army and democracy : military politics in Pakistan. ISBN 9780674728936.
  19. ^ Haqqani 2005
  20. ^ Aziz, Mazhar (2007). Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State. Routledge. ISBN 9781134074099. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
  21. ^ Chengappa, Bidanda M. (2004). Pakistan, Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy. APH Publishing. ISBN 9788176485487.
  22. ^ "Mapping the establishment – by Ayesha Siddiqa". LUBP. 15 January 2010. Retrieved 8 December 2019.
  23. ^ Ahmad, Ishtiaq; Rafiq, Adnan (3 November 2016). "Mapping the 'Establishment' - Ayesha Siddiqa". Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence. Routledge. pp. Chapter 3. ISBN 978-1-317-23594-1.
  24. ^ Siddique, Abubakar (15 June 2014). "The Military's Pashtun Wars". The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hurst. pp. Chapter 6. ISBN 978-1-84904-499-8.
  25. ^ Ahmad, Ishtiaq (3 November 2016). "Pakistan's third democratic transition". In Ahmad, Ishtiaq; Rafiq, Adnan (eds.). Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence. Taylor & Francis. pp. 31–33. ISBN 978-1-317-23595-8.
  26. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Cohen 2004, p. 71.
  27. ^ Jump up to: a b c Cohen 2004, p. 72.
  28. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 73: "In this Ayub had been egged on by his activist foreign minister, the young Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was ambitious, ruthless, and a charter member of the Establishment."
  29. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 170.
  30. ^ Murthy, Gautam (2008). International Economic Relations. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House. p. 71. ISBN 978-81-7835-615-0.
  31. ^ Fair, C. Christine (2014). Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. Oxford University Press. p. 173. ISBN 978-0-19-989270-9. [...] conviction of Pakistan's defense establishment that India is fundamentally opposed to Pakistan's existence, rejects the two nation theory, and seeks every opportunity to undo history [...] the two states are thus locked in an existential conflict with no obvious resolution.
  32. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 121.
  33. ^ Haqqani 2005, p. 15.
  34. ^ Cohen 2004, p. 282.
  35. ^ Censorship, Index on (22 August 2019). "Pakistan's media forced into self-censorship". Index on Censorship. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  36. ^ Quint, The (14 April 2019). "Hunger Strike, Protests in Pak's Balochistan After Quetta Blast". TheQuint. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  37. ^ "The rise of a 'Pashtun Spring': An open letter to Pashtuns". Global Village Space. 24 December 2018. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  38. ^ "Redefining citizenship in Pakistan". sayhoon.com. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  39. ^ "Sharif checkmates Pakistani establishment". Asia Times. Retrieved 26 October 2020.
  40. ^ Taha Siddiqui (13 January 2018). "The PTM in Pakistan: Another Bangladesh in the making?". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  41. ^ "Am I a traitor?". Committee to Protect Journalists. 8 May 2014. Retrieved 27 June 2021.
  42. ^ Welle (www.dw.com), Deutsche, Pakistan: Journalist critical of military attacked at home | DW | 26.05.2021, retrieved 27 June 2021
  43. ^ Kugelman, Michael. "Pakistan's Press Enters a Dark Era". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 27 June 2021.

Bibliography[]

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