Election of Ali to the caliphate

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Ali ibn Abi Talib was acclaimed in 656 CE as the fourth caliph after the death of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Following the 656 assassination of the third caliph Uthman in Medina by provincial rebels who had grievances about injustice and corruption, the prophet's cousin and son-in-law was elected to the caliphate by the rebels, the Ansar (early Medinan Muslims), and the Muhajirun (early Meccan Muslims). While the election of Ali faced little opposition, his support was limited among the Quraysh, some of whom aspired to the caliphate. The Umayyads (Uthman's tribesmen) and some others thereby left Medina––some thus breaking their oaths of allegiance––and soon rebelled against Ali.

Background[]

Opposition to Uthman[]

Ali frequently accused the third caliph Uthman (r. 644–656) of deviating from the Quran and Sunna,[1][2][3] and he was joined in this criticism by most of the senior companions.[2][4] Uthman was also widely accused of nepotism[5] and corruption,[6] and Ali is known to have protested Uthman's nepotism[7] and his lavish gifts for his kinsmen.[8][3] Ali also often protected outspoken companions, such as Abu Dharr and Ammar,[9] against the caliph's wrath.[10]

Some supporters of Ali were part of the pious opposition to Uthman's conduct,[11][12] joined in their efforts by Muhammad's companions Talha[13] and Zubayr, and his widow Aisha.[14][11] These supporters wanted to see Ali as the next caliph, though there is no evidence that he communicated or coordinated with them.[15] Among them were al-Ashtar and the other religiously-learned[16] qurra (lit. 'Quran readers').[3] Ali is said to have rejected the requests to lead the rebels,[1][17] though he might have sympathized with their grievances about injustice.[18][17] It is likely that some companions supported the protests with the hope of either deposing Uthman[11] or changing his policies,[19] thus underestimating the severity of the opposition to Uthman.[19]

Assassination of Uthman[]

Main article: Assassination of Uthman

As their grievances mounted, discontented groups from provinces began arriving in Medina in 35/656.[20] On their first attempt,[21] the Egyptian opposition sought the advice of Ali, who urged them to send a delegation to negotiate with Uthman, unlike Talha and Ammar who are said to have encouraged the Egyptians to advance on the town.[22] Ali similarly asked the Iraqi opposition to avoid violence, which was heeded.[23] During the second siege, Ali urged Uthman to publicly repent, which he did, asking Muslims for advice.[24] Marwan reportedly convinced him that this show of weakness would only embolden the opposition, and Uthman thus retracted his statement.[25]

Ali also acted as a mediator between Uthman and the provincial dissidents[20][26][18] more than once[27] to address their economical[28] and political[20] grievances. In particular, he acted as a guarantor for Uthman's promises to the opposition but possibly declined to intervene further when the Egyptians intercepted an official letter ordering their punishment upon their return to Egypt.[29][9] Uthman was assassinated shortly afterward in 656 by the Egyptians[30] in a raid on his residence in Medina.[31][32][33][34]

Was Ali involved?[]

Ali played no role in this attack,[1][35] and his son Hasan was injured while standing guard at Uthman's besieged residence at the request of Ali.[36][37][11][36] He also convinced the rebels not to prevent the delivery of water to Uthman's residence during the siege.[29][9]

Beyond this, historians disagree about Ali's measures to protect the third caliph.[19] Jafri and Madelung highlight Ali's multiple attempts for reconciliation during the two sieges,[11][38] and Hinds believes that Ali could not have done anything more for Uthman, supporting whom would have meant supporting the infamous Umayyads.[9] Donner[19] and Gleave[2] suggest that Ali was the immediate beneficiary of Uthman's death, though this is challenged by Madelung, who observes that Aisha would have not actively undermined Uthman's regime if Ali had been the prime mover of the rebellion and its future beneficiary.[39] He and others note the deep-seated enmity of Aisha for Ali,[39][40][41][42] which resurfaced immediately after his accession.[39] On the other extreme, Veccia Vaglieri believes that Ali did not defend the caliph,[43] and Caetani goes further, labeling Ali as the chief culprit in Uthman's murder, even though the evidence seems to suggest otherwise.[44]

Ali may have been the first male to convert to Islam.[45]

Support[]

In the aftermath of Uthman's murder, the potential candidates for the caliphate were Ali and Talha,[46] though some suggest that Talha lacked popular support,[47] and Ali was thus the obvious choice.[43][48] After Uthman's murder, his tribesmen (the Umayyads) fled Medina,[1][46] and the rebels and their Medinan allies thus controlled the city. While Talha enjoyed some support among the Egyptian rebels,[46] Ali was preferred by the most of the Ansar (early Medinan Muslims) and the Iraqi rebels, who had earlier heeded Ali's opposition to the use of violence.[46][19][48] Alternatively, a report by al-Tabari (d. 923) suggests that the Basran and Kufan opposition supported Talha and Zubayr, respectively. After Uthman's murder, however, both groups switched sides to Ali.[20] Poonawala,[20] Momen,[17] Jafri,[11] Donner,[19] and Anthony[26] add the (prominent) Muhajirun (early Meccan Muslims) to the above list of Ali's supporters. The key tribal chiefs also favored Ali at the time, writes Lapidus.[49]

Reluctance of Ali[]

The caliphate was offered by these groups to Ali, who was initially reluctant to accept it.[17][20][2] Aslan attributes Ali's reluctance to the polarizing impact of Uthman's murder on the community,[50] while Durant writes, "[Ali] shrank from drama in which religion had been displaced by politics, and devotion by intrigue."[51] For Jafri, Ali must have been wary of implicating himself in Uthman's regicide by becoming the next caliph.[11] For Veccia Vaglieri, that Ali allowed himself to be nominated by the rebels was an error, because it left him exposed to accusations of complicity in Uthman's murder.[1]

Alternatively, Shaban and Anthony believe that Ali stepped in to prevent chaos in the power vacuum created by the regicide.[48][26] When writing about Ali's reluctance, some early reports emphasize that he accepted the caliphate only when it became clear that he enjoyed popular support.[2] Similarly, Shah-Kazemi[52] and Jafri maintain that Ali was compelled by popular pressure, with the latter author referring to an address by Ali at the Battle of the Camel in Nahj al-balagha as evidence.[53]

A Persian miniature from Khawran Namah depicts Ali killing a dragon with his sword Zulfiqar.

Pledges[]

Ali received the public pledges of allegiance in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina,[2] possibly the day after Uthman's murder,[54][19] though Poonawala places the ceremony several days later.[20] It appears that Ali personally did not force anyone for pledge. Among others, Sa'ad ibn Abi Waqqas, Abdullah ibn Umar, and Usama ibn Zayd refused to give their oaths,[55] though the case of Usama is challenged by Madelung who concludes that he pledged allegiance to Ali but did not fight in his battles.[56] While there is less evidence for any violence here than in Abu Bakr's case, writes Madelung,[57] many broke with Ali later, claiming that they had pledged under duress.[55]

Talha and Zubayr[]

Talha and Zubayr, both companions of Muhammad with ambitions for the high office,[58] gave their pledges though they later broke their oaths,[59][2][47] claiming that they had pledged allegiance to Ali under pressure.[60][58][11] Veccia Vaglieri views their claims of violence as an invented justification for violating their pacts.[37] Alternatively, Gleave dismisses the (Sunni) reports that the two did not pledge or did so under duress, saying that these reports reflect their authors' attempts to provide a fuller context for their subsequent rebellion against Ali in the Battle of the Camel.[2] Madelung similarly argues that the election of Ali could have not happened without the pledge of Talha, as Ali's main rival, though he also suggests that Talha did not come to the ceremony voluntarily and was dragged there by al-Ashtar.[54] Alternatively, Mavani refers to Nahj al-balagha in which Ali rebukes Talha and Zubayr before the Battle of the Camel for breaking their oaths after voluntarily offering their support to Ali.[61] Madelung also rejects the report by al-Tabari about Zubayr's refusal to pledge as legendary.[57]

Legitimacy[]

Kennedy[35] and Veccia Vaglieri[43] write that the election of Ali faced little opposition, and this is also implied by Shaban.[48] Jafri and Momen suggest that Ali was elected by a near-consensus, commenting that Ali was the only caliph in whose election the Muslim community had a voice.[58][47] Nevertheless, Ali had limited support among the Quraysh, some of whom aspired to the title of caliph.[40] Within the Quraysh, Madelung identifies two camps opposed to Ali: the Umayyads, who believed that the caliphate was their right after Uthman, and those who wished to restore the caliphate of Quraysh on the principles laid by Abu Bakr (r. 632–634) and Umar (r. 634–644) (rather than the caliphate of Muhammad's clan, the Banu Hashim). Madelung considers the latter group as the majority of the Quraysh.[59] Kennedy similarly writes that the Quraysh challenged Ali to preserve the status of their tribe.[35]

Exodus[]

The Umayyads fled Medina after Uthman's murder,[40] notable among them Marwan.[62] Some leading Quraysh figures also left Medina without giving an oath of allegiance to Ali or after breaking it.[40][26][59] Most of them gathered in Mecca, though some made their way to Damascus.[62] In particular, Talha and Zubayr left Medina on the pretext of performing the omra (lesser pilgrimage).[20][63] Muhammad's widow Aisha was already in Mecca,[40] having left Medina earlier for the omra[63] despite the pleas of Uthman, who believed her presence in Medina would restrain the rebels from attack.[64] When she learned about Ali's election, she immediately began to mobilize the rebel party against Ali in favor of her close relatives, Talha and Zubayr.[64] She did so ostensibly to seek justice for Uthman, though McHugo and Jafri question her motives, noting that she had earlier actively incited the Muslims against Uthman.[65][63]

Ali's views[]

Listing multiple pieces of evidence from Nahj al-balagha and other sources,[66] Mavani argues that Ali saw the general pledge of allegiance as a pivotal component in the legitimacy of his caliphate[67] and distinguished between his election and that of the first caliph Abu Bakr:[68] In the words of Ali and the second caliph Umar, the caliphate of Abu Bakr was decided hastily by a small shura (council), whereas Ali emphasized the general public's endorsement of his caliphate.[68]

Some authors maintain that Ali unequivocally viewed himself as the most qualified person to lead the Muslim community after Muhammad by virtue of his merits and his kinship with Muhammad.[69][70][71] Mavani and Madelung add that Ali further considered himself as the designated successor of Muhammad through a divine decree at the Ghadir Khumm.[72][73] Mavani also speculates that Ali would have not sought the title of caliph had Muslims withheld their support.[74] However, when the Muslim community favored Ali, Madelung writes, he no longer considered the caliphate just as his right, but also as his duty.[46]

First acts[]

At the time of Uthman's assassination, the key governorships were in the hands of his tribesmen,[58][75] the late conversion of most of whom to Islam[76] smacked of expediency to Ali and the Ansar.[76][42] Ali was nevertheless advised to initially confirm these governors,[62][20] some of whom were unpopular,[40] to consolidate his caliphate. He rejected this and replaced nearly all those who had served Uthman,[40] saying that the likes of those men should not be appointed to any office.[62]

In this and other decisions, Ali was driven by his sense of religious mission, writes Madelung,[77] while Poonawala suggests that Ali changed the governors to please the rebels.[20] Donner has a similar view to Madelung and Shah-Kazemi maintains that justice was the key principle that molded Ali's policies in all domains.[52] Mu'awiya, the governor of Syria and Uthman's cousin, soon challenged Ali and launched a campaign against him on the pretext of vengeance for Uthman, according to Daftary.[12]

Ali also distributed the treasury funds equally among Muslims,[78][1] which might have also been the method of Muhammad.[79] Shaban suggests that this change made Ali the rallying point of underprivileged groups.[80] As his official designation, Ali adopted the title amir al-mu'minin (lit. 'commander of the faithful'), which was also used earlier by Umar. He rejected the title caliph, which he perhaps found to be depreciated and tainted by his predecessor.[81]

See also[]

References[]

  1. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Veccia Vaglieri 2021a.
  2. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h Gleave 2021.
  3. ^ Jump up to: a b c Madelung 1997, p. 108.
  4. ^ Momen 1985, p. 21.
  5. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 87.
  6. ^ Veccia Vaglieri 1970, p. 67.
  7. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 113.
  8. ^ Jafri 1979, p. 53.
  9. ^ Jump up to: a b c d Hinds 1972, p. 467.
  10. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 109.
  11. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h Jafri 1979, p. 63.
  12. ^ Jump up to: a b Daftary 2014, p. 30.
  13. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 98.
  14. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 100–2.
  15. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 107–8.
  16. ^ Jafri 1979, p. 59.
  17. ^ Jump up to: a b c d Momen 1985, p. 22.
  18. ^ Jump up to: a b Jafri 1979, p. 62.
  19. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g Donner 2010, p. 157.
  20. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h i j Poonawala 1985.
  21. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 121.
  22. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 118–9.
  23. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 128.
  24. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 122.
  25. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 123.
  26. ^ Jump up to: a b c d Anthony 2013, p. 31.
  27. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 111.
  28. ^ Veccia Vaglieri 1970, p. 68.
  29. ^ Jump up to: a b Madelung 1997, p. 112.
  30. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 127.
  31. ^ Glassé 2003, p. 423.
  32. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 81.
  33. ^ Hinds 1972.
  34. ^ Donner 2010, p. 152.
  35. ^ Jump up to: a b c Kennedy 2015, p. 65.
  36. ^ Jump up to: a b Nasr & Afsaruddin 2021.
  37. ^ Jump up to: a b Veccia Vaglieri 2021b.
  38. ^ Madelung 1997, p. §3.
  39. ^ Jump up to: a b c Madelung 1997, p. 107.
  40. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g Donner 2010, p. 158.
  41. ^ Jafri 1979, p. 28.
  42. ^ Jump up to: a b McHugo 2018, §1.III.
  43. ^ Jump up to: a b c Veccia Vaglieri 1970, p. 69.
  44. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 106.
  45. ^ Watt 1961, p. 34.
  46. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e Madelung 1997, p. 141.
  47. ^ Jump up to: a b c Jafri 1979, p. 64.
  48. ^ Jump up to: a b c d Shaban 1970, p. 71.
  49. ^ Lapidus 2014, p. 56.
  50. ^ Aslan 2011, p. 132.
  51. ^ Durant 1950, p. 191.
  52. ^ Jump up to: a b Shah-Kazemi 2015, p. 41.
  53. ^ Jafri 1979, pp. 63–4.
  54. ^ Jump up to: a b Madelung 1997, p. 143.
  55. ^ Jump up to: a b Madelung 1997, pp. 144–5.
  56. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 146.
  57. ^ Jump up to: a b Madelung 1997, p. 144.
  58. ^ Jump up to: a b c d Momen 1985, p. 24.
  59. ^ Jump up to: a b c Madelung 1997, p. 147.
  60. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 141, 144–5.
  61. ^ Mavani 2013, pp. 109–10.
  62. ^ Jump up to: a b c d Madelung 1997, p. 148.
  63. ^ Jump up to: a b c Jafri 1979, p. 65.
  64. ^ Jump up to: a b Madelung 1997, p. 133.
  65. ^ McHugo 2018, §2.II.
  66. ^ Mavani 2013, pp. 106–13.
  67. ^ Mavani 2013, p. 106.
  68. ^ Jump up to: a b Mavani 2013, p. 111.
  69. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 141, 253.
  70. ^ Mavani 2013, p. 113-4.
  71. ^ Momen 1985, p. 62.
  72. ^ Mavani 2013, pp. 114, 117.
  73. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 253.
  74. ^ Mavani 2013, p. 115.
  75. ^ McHugo 2018, §2.I.
  76. ^ Jump up to: a b Donner 2010, p. 160.
  77. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 149.
  78. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 149–50.
  79. ^ Tabatabai 1975, p. 45.
  80. ^ Shaban 1970, p. 72.
  81. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 151.

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