Pink tide

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Not to be confused with red tide or Crimson Tide.
Foro.svg Foro sao paulo members.svg
Map of Latin America showing countries with members of the São Paulo Forum ruling parties (red) and non-São Paulo Forum ruling parties (blue) in 2011 and 2021 left to right.

The Pink tide (Spanish: marea rosa, Portuguese: onda rosa, French: marée rose), or turn to the left (Spanish: giro a la izquierda, Portuguese: volta à esquerda, French: tournant à gauche), was a political wave and perception of a turn towards left-wing governments in Latin American democracies moving away from the neoliberal economic model at the start of the 21st century. As a term, both phrases are used in contemporary 21st-century political analysis in the media and elsewhere to refer to a move toward more progressive economic or social policies in Latin America.[1][2][3]

The Latin American countries viewed as part of this ideological trend have been referred to as pink tide nations,[4] with the term post-neoliberalism being used to describe the movement as well.[5] Some pink tide governments such as those of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela[6] have been varyingly characterized by some of its critics as being "anti-American",[7][8] populist[9][10][11][12][13] and authoritarian-leaning.[10][14]

The pink tide was followed by the conservative wave, a political phenomenon that emerged in the early 2010s as a direct reaction to the pink tide. Scattered resurgences of the pink tide, however, were kicked off by Mexico in 2018 and Argentina in 2019, and further established by Bolivia in 2020 and Peru in 2021.

Background[]

See also: Operation Condor and United States involvement in regime change in Latin America
Raúl Castro of Cuba and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, the man who was the key figure for the Pink Tide[citation needed]

During the Cold War, a series of left-leaning governments were elected in Latin America. These governments faced coups sponsored by the United States government as part of its geostrategic interest in the region.[15][16][17][18] Among these were the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, 1964 Brazilian coup d'état, 1973 Chilean coup d'état and 1976 Argentine coup d'état. All of these coups were followed by United States-backed and sponsored right-wing military dictatorships as part of the United States government's Operation Condor.[16][17][18]

These authoritarian regimes committed several human rights violations including illegal detentions of political opponents, suspects of be one and/or their families, tortures, disappearances and child trafficking.[19] As these regimes started to decline due to international pressure, internal outcry in the United States from the population due to the involvement in the atrocities forced Washington to relinquish its support for them. New democratic processes began during the late 1970s and up to the early 1990s.[20]

With the exception of Costa Rica virtually all Latin American countries had at least one experience with a United States-supported dictator:[21] Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, the Somoza family in Nicaragua, Tiburcio Carias Andino in Honduras, Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala, Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez in El Salvador, Manuel Noriega in Panama, Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Hugo Banzer in Bolivia, Juan María Bordaberry in Uruguay, Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentina, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, François Duvalier in Haiti, Artur da Costa e Silva and his successor Emílio Garrastazu Médici in Brazil, Manuel Odria and Alberto Fujimori in Peru,the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico[22] and Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, which caused a strong anti-American sentiment in wide sectors of the population.[23][24][25][26]

History[]

Rise of the left: 1990s and 2000s[]

Following the third wave of democratization in the 1980s, the institutionalization of electoral competition in Latin America opened up the possibility for the left to ascend to power. For much of the region's history, formal electoral contestation excluded leftist movements, first through limited suffrage and later through military intervention and repression during the second half of the 20th century.[27] The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the geopolitical environment as many revolutionary movements vanished and the left embraced the core tenets of capitalism. As a result, the United States no longer perceived leftist governments as a security threat, creating a political opening for the left.[28]

In the 1990s, the left exploited this opportunity to solidify their base, run for local offices and gain experience governing on the local level. At the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the region's initial unsuccessful attempts with the neoliberal policies of privatization, cuts in social spending and foreign investment left countries with high levels of unemployment, inflation and rising inequality.[29] This period saw increasing numbers of people working in the informal economy and suffering material insecurity, and ties between the working classes and the traditional political parties weakening, resulting in a growth of mass protest against the negative social effects of these policies, such as the piqueteros in Argentina, and in Bolivia indigenous and peasant movements rooted among small coca farmers, or cocaleros, whose activism culminated in the Bolivian gas conflict of the early-to-mid 2000s.[30] The left's social platforms, which were centered on economic change and redistributive policies, offered an attractive alternative that mobilized large sectors of the population across the region who voted leftist leaders into office.[31]

ALBA was founded by left-wing populist leaders such as Nicaraguan revolutionary Daniel Ortega, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and Bolivian president Evo Morales.

The pink tide was led by Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, who was elected into the presidency in 1998.[32] According to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, a pink tide president herself, Chávez of Venezuela (inaugurated 1999), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil (inaugurated 2003) and Evo Morales of Bolivia (inaugurated 2006) were "the three musketeers" of the left in South America.[33] National policies among the left in Latin America are divided between the styles of Chávez and Lula as the latter not only focused on those affected by inequality, but also catered to private enterprises and global capital.[34]

Commodities boom and growth[]

Further information: 2000s commodities boom

With the difficulties facing emerging markets across the world at the time, Latin Americans turned away from liberal economics and elected leftist leaders who had recently turned toward more democratic processes.[35] The popularity of such leftist governments relied upon by their ability to use the 2000s commodities boom to initiate populist policies,[36][37] such as those used by the Bolivarian government in Venezuela.[38] According to Daniel Lansberg, this resulted in "high public expectations in regard to continuing economic growth, subsidies, and social services".[37] With China becoming a more industrialized nation at the same time and requiring resources for its growing economy, it took advantage of the strained relations with the United States and partnered with the leftist governments in Latin America.[36][39] South America in particular initially saw a drop in inequality and a growth in its economy as a result of Chinese commodity trade.[39]

As the prices of commodities lowered into the 2010s, coupled with overspending with little savings by pink tide governments, policies became unsustainable and supporters became disenchanted, eventually leading to the rejection of leftist governments.[37][40] Analysts state that such unsustainable policies were more apparent in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela,[39][40] who received Chinese funds without any oversight.[39][41] As a result, some scholars have stated that the pink tide's rise and fall was "a byproduct of the commodity cycle's acceleration and decadence".[36]

Some pink tide governments, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, allegedly ignored international sanctions against Iran, allowing the Iranian government access to funds bypassing sanctions as well as resources such as uranium for the Iranian nuclear program.[42]

End of commodity boom and decline: 2010s[]

The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff gave rise to the Conservative wave in late 2010s

Chávez, who was seen as having "dreams of continental domination", was determined to be a threat to his own people according to Michael Reid in American magazine, Foreign Affairs, with his influence reaching a peak in 2007.[43] The interest in Chávez waned after his dependence on oil revenue led Venezuela into an economic crisis and as he grew increasingly authoritarian.[43] The death of Chávez in 2013 left the most radical wing without a clear leader as Nicolás Maduro did not have the international influence of his predecessor. By the mid-2010s, Chinese investment in Latin America had also begun to decline,[39] especially following the 2015–2016 Chinese stock market crash.

In 2015, the shift away from the left became more pronounced in Latin America, with The Economist saying the pink tide had ebbed[44] and Vice News stating that 2015 was "The Year the 'Pink Tide' Turned".[33] In that year's Argentine general election, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's favoured candidate for the presidency Daniel Scioli was defeated by his centre-right opponent Mauricio Macri, against a background of rising inflation, reductions in GDP, and declining prices for soybeans - a key export for the country, leading to falls in public revenues and social spending. Shortly afterwards the impeachment of Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff began, culminating in her removal from office. In Ecuador, retiring president Rafael Correa's successor was his vice-president, Lenín Moreno, who took a narrow victory in the 2017 Ecuadorian general election, a win which received a negative reaction from the business community at home and abroad: however, after his election Moreno shifted his positions rightwards, resulting in Correa branding his former deputy as "a traitor" and "a wolf in sheep's clothing".[30][45] By 2016, the decline of the pink tide saw an emergence of a "new right" in Latin America,[46] with The New York Times stating "Latin America's leftist ramparts appear to be crumbling because of widespread corruption, a slowdown in China's economy and poor economic choices", with the newspaper elaborating that leftist leaders did not diversify economies, had unsustainable welfare policies and disregarded democratic behaviors.[47] In mid-2016, the Harvard International Review stated that "South America, a historical bastion of populism, has always had a penchant for the left, but the continent's predilection for unsustainable welfarism might be approaching a dramatic end".[6]

Resurgence since late-2010s[]

Although the conservative wave weakened the Pink Tide and restored right-wing governments across Latin America throughout the 2010s, some countries have pushed back against the trend in recent years and elected more left-leaning leaders, such as Mexico with the electoral victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in the 2018 Mexican general election and Argentina where the incumbent right-wing president Mauricio Macri lost against center-left Peronist Alberto Fernández in the 2019 Argentine general election.[48][49][50] This development has been strengthened by the landslide victory of left-wing MAS and its presidential candidate Luis Arce in Bolivia in the 2020 Bolivian general election.

In the 2021 Peruvian general election, Peru elected the indigenous, socialist union leader Pedro Castillo in contrast to the previous leaders who embraced neoliberal populism.[51]

A series of violent protests against austerity measures and income inequality scattered throughout Latin America have also recently occurred including the 2019-2020 Chilean protests, 2019–2020 Colombian protests, 2018–19 Haitian protests, 2019 Ecuadorian protests and the 2021 Colombian protests.[48][52]

Economy and social development[]

The pink tide governments aimed to improve the welfare of the constituencies that brought them to power, which they attempted through measures intended to increase wages, such as raising minimum wages, and softening the effects of neoliberal economic policies through expanding welfare spending, such as subsidising basic services and providing cash transfers to vulnerable groups such as the unemployed, mothers outside of formal employment and the precariat.[30]

Morales's government was praised internationally for its reduction of poverty, economic growth[53] and the improvement of indigenous, women[54] and LGBTI rights[55] in the very traditionally-minded Bolivian society. During his first five years in office, Bolivia's Gini coefficient saw an unusually sharp reduction from .6 to .47, indicating a significant drop in income inequality.[30]

Before Lula's election, Brazil suffered from one of the highest rates of poverty in the Americas, with the infamous favelas known internationally for its levels of extreme poverty, malnutrition and health problems. Extreme poverty was also a problem in rural areas. During Lula's presidency several social programs like Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) were praised internationally for reducing hunger in Brazil,[56] poverty and inequality while also improving the health and education of the population.[56][57] Around 29 million people became middle class during Lula's eight years tenure.[57] During Lula's government, Brazil became an economic power and member of BRICS.[56][57] Lula ended his tenure with 80% approval ratings.[58]

In Argentina, the administrations of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner restored sectoral collective bargaining, strengthening trade unions: unionisation increased from 20 percent of the workforce in the 1990s to 30 percent in the 2010s, and wages rose for an increasing proportion of the working class.[30] Universal allocation per child, a conditional cash transfer programme, was introduced in 2009 for families without formal employment and earning less than the minimum wage who ensured their children attended school, received vaccines and underwent health checks:[59] by 2013 it covered over two million poor families,[30] and by 2015 it covered 29 percent of all Argentinian children. A 2015 analysis by staff at Argentina's National Scientific and Technical Research Council estimated that the programme had increased school attendance for children between the ages of 15 to 17 by 3.9 percent.[59] The Kirchners also increased social spending significantly: upon Fernández de Kirchner leaving office in 2015, Argentina had the second highest level of social spending as a percentage of GDP in Latin America, behind only Chile. Their administrations also achieved a drop of 20 percentage points in the proportion of the population living on three US dollars a day or less. As a result, Argentina also became one of the most equal countries in the region according to its Gini coefficient.[30]

In Venezuela, as well as increasing spending on social welfare, housing and local infrastructures, Chávez established the Bolivarian missions, decentralised programmes which delivered free services in fields such as healthcare and education as well as subsidised food distribution.[30]

Economist from the University of Illinois[60] Rafael Correa was elected as President of Ecuador in the 2006 presidential election following the harsh economic crisis and social turmoil that caused right-wing Lucio Gutiérrez resignation as president. Correa, a practicing Catholic influenced by liberation theology,[60] was pragmatic in his economical approach in a similar manner to Morales in Bolivia[32] and Ecuador soon experienced a non-precedent economic growth that bolstered Correa's popularity to the point that he was the most popular president of the Americas' for several years in a row,[60] with an approval rate between 60 and 85%.[61]

Lugo's government was praised for its social reforms, including investments in low-income housing,[62] the introduction of free treatment in public hospitals,[63][64] the introduction of cash transfers for Paraguay's most impoverished citizens[65] and indigenous rights.[66]

Some of the initial results after the first pink tide governments were elected in Latin America included a reduction in the income gap,[5] unemployment, extreme poverty,[5] malnutrition and hunger[2][67] and rapid increase in literacy.[2] The decrease in these indicators during the same period of time happened faster than in non-Pink Tide governments.[68]

Countries like Ecuador,[69][70] El Salvador, Nicaragua[71] and Costa Rica[72] experienced notable economic growth during this period whilst Bolivia and El Salvador both saw a notable reduction in poverty according to the World Bank.[73][74][improper synthesis?]

Economic hardships occurred in countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela as oil and commodity prices declined and according to analysts because of their unsustainable policies.[39][40][75] In regard to the economic situation, President of Inter-American Dialogue Michael Shifter stated: "The United States–Cuban Thaw occurred with Cuba reapproaching the United States when Cuba's main international partner, Venezuela, began experiencing economic hardships".[76][77]

Political outcome[]

Following the initiation of the Pink Tide's policies, the relationship between both left-leaning and right-leaning governments and the public changed.[78] As leftist governments took power in the region, rising commodity prices funded their welfare policies, which lowered inequality and assisted indigenous rights.[78] The overspending of leftist governments in the 2000s resulted in the election of more conservative governments in the 2010s by citizens in the region seeking a sustainable economy.[78] However, enduring legacies from the Pink Tide changed the location of Latin America's center of the political spectrum,[79] forcing right-wing candidates and succeeding governments to adopt more socially-conscious administrations.[78]

Under the Obama administration, which held a less interventionist approach to the region after recognizing that interference would only boost the popularity of populist pink tide leaders like Chávez, Latin American approval of the United States began to improve as well.[80] By the mid-2010s, "negative views of China were widespread" due to the substandard conditions of Chinese goods, unjust professional actions, cultural differences, damage to the Latin American environment and perceptions of Chinese interventionism.[81]

Term[]

As a term, the pink tide had become prominent in contemporary discussion of Latin American politics in the early 21st century. Origins of the term may be linked to a statement by Larry Rohter, a New York Times reporter in Montevideo who characterized the 2004 presidential election of Tabaré Vázquez as leader of Uruguay as "not so much a red tide [...] as a pink one".[13] The term seems to be a play on words based on red tide (a biological phenomenon rather than a political one) with red – a color long associated with communism – being replaced with the lighter tone of pink to indicate the more moderate socialist ideas that gained strength.[82]

Despite the presence of a number of Latin American governments which professed to embracing a leftist ideology, it is difficult to categorize Latin American states "according to dominant political tendencies, like a red-blue post-electoral map of the United States".[82] According to the Institute for Policy Studies, a leftist think-tank based in Washington, D.C.:

While this political shift was difficult to quantify, its effects were widely noticed. According to the Institute for Policy Studies, 2006 meetings of the South American Summit of Nations and the Social Forum for the Integration of Peoples demonstrated that certain discussions that used to take place on the margins of the dominant discourse of neoliberalism, now moved to the center of public debate.[82]

In the 2011 book The Paradox of Democracy in Latin America: Ten Country Studies of Division and Resilience, Isbester states:

Ultimately, the term "the Pink Tide" is not a useful analytical tool as it encompasses too wide a range of governments and policies. It includes those actively overturning neoliberalism (Chávez and Morales), those reforming neoliberalism (Lula), those attempting a confusing mixture of both (the Kirchners and Correa), those having rhetoric but lacking the ability to accomplish much (Toledo), and those using anti-neoliberal rhetoric to consolidate power through non-democratic mechanisms (Ortega).[79]

Reception[]

López Obrador with Pedro Sánchez in January 2019

In 2006, The Arizona Republic recognized the growing pink tide, stating: "A couple of decades ago, the region, long considered part of the United States' backyard, was basking in a resurgence of democracy, sending military despots back to their barracks", further recognizing the "disfavor" with the United States and the concerns of "a wave of nationalist, leftist leaders washing across Latin America in a 'pink tide'" among United States officials.[83]

A 2007 report from the Inter Press Service news agency said how "elections results in Latin America appear to have confirmed a left-wing populist and anti-U.S. trend – the so-called "pink tide" – which [...] poses serious threats to Washington's multibillion-dollar anti-drug effort in the Andes".[84]

In 2014, Albrecht Koschützke and Hajo Lanz, directors of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation for Central America, discussed the "hope for greater social justice and a more participatory democracy" following the election of leftist leaders, though the foundation recognized that such elections "still do not mean a shift to the left", but that they are "the result of an ostensible loss of prestige from the right-wing parties that have traditionally ruled".[85]

Writing in Americas Quarterly in 2021 after the election of Pedro Castillo in Peru, Paul J. Angelo and Will Freeman warned of the risk of Latin American left-wing politicians embracing regressive social values, "leaning into traditionally conservative positions on gender equality, abortion access, LGBTQ rights, immigration, and the environment". They cited Castillo blaming Peru's femicides on male “idleness” and criticizing what he called "gender ideology" taught in Peruvian schools, as well as Ecuador, governed by left-wing leaders for almost twenty years, having one of the strictest anti-abortion laws worldwide. On immigration they mentioned Mexico’s southern border militarization to stop Central American migrant caravans and Castillo's proposal to give undocumented migrants 72 hours to leave the country after taking office, while on the environment they cited Ecuadorian progressive presidential candidate Andrés Arauz insisting on oil drilling in the Amazon, as well as Bolivian President Luis Arce allowing agribusinesses unchecked with deforestation.[86]

Head of the states and governments[]

Presidents[]

Below are left-wing and centre-left presidents elected in Latin America since 1999. Incumbents are in bold.

Note that centre-left presidents are marked with * while Venezuela is under a presidential crisis since 2019, indicated with ‡.

Disputed Pink Tide leaders[]

The following left-wing and centre-left presidents are sometimes included as part of the pink tide and sometimes excluded, as the countries they lead are in the broader LAC region but are not technically part of Latin America:

Timeline[]

The below timeline shows periods where a left-wing or center-left leader governed over a particular country, beginning with Hugo Chávez in 1999. Note that countries on the Disputed Pink Tide leaders list are indicated with (parentheses).

See also[]

References[]

  1. ^ Lopes, Dawisson Belém; de Faria, Carlos Aurélio Pimenta (January–April 2016). "When Foreign Policy Meets Social Demands in Latin America". Contexto Internacional (Literature review). Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. 38 (1): 11–53. doi:10.1590/S0102-8529.2016380100001. No matter the shades of pink in the Latin American 'pink tide', and recalling that political change was not the norm for the whole region during that period, there seems to be greater agreement when it comes to explaining its emergence. In terms of this canonical interpretation, the left turn should be understood as a feature of general redemocratisation in the region, which is widely regarded as an inevitable result of the high levels of inequality in the region.
  2. ^ Jump up to: a b c Abbott, Jared. "Will the Pink Tide Lift All Boats? Latin American Socialisms and Their Discontents". Archived from the original on 6 April 2017. Retrieved 5 April 2017. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  3. ^ Oikonomakis, Leonidas (16 March 2015). "Europe's pink tide? Heeding the Latin American experience". Retrieved 5 April 2017. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  4. ^ "COHA Statement on the Ongoing Stress in Venezuela" Archived 2008-11-20 at the Wayback Machine.
  5. ^ Jump up to: a b c Fernandes Pimenta, Gabriel; Casas V M Arantes, Pedro (2014). "Rethinking Integration in Latin America: The "Pink Tide" and the Post-Neoliberal Regionalism" (PDF). FLACSO. Retrieved 28 December 2017. In general, one must say that these governments have as defining common feature ample and generous social inclusion policies that link effectively for social investments that certainly had an impact on regional social indicators (LIMA apud SILVA, 2010a). In this sense, so far, all of these countries had positive improvements. As a result, it was observed the reduction in social inequality, as well as the reduction of poverty and other social problems (SILVA, 2010a)
  6. ^ Jump up to: a b Lopes, Arthur (Spring 2016). "¿Viva la Contrarrevolución? South America's Left Begins to Wave Goodbye". Harvard International Review. 37 (3): 12–14. South America, a historical bastion of populism, has always had a penchant for the left, but the continent's predilection for unsustainable welfarism might be approaching a dramatic end. ... This "pink tide" also included the rise of populist ideologies in some of these countries, such as Kirchnerismo in Argentina, Chavismo in Venezuela, and Lulopetismo in Brazil.
  7. ^ da Cruz, Jose de Arimateia (2015). "Strategic Insights: From Ideology to Geopolitics: Russian Interests in Latin America". Current Politics and Economics of Russia, Eastern and Central Europe. Nova Science Publishers. 30 (1/2): 175–185.
  8. ^ Lopes, Dawisson Belém; de Faria, Carlos Aurélio Pimenta (Jan–Apr 2016). "When Foreign Policy Meets Social Demands in Latin America". Contexto Internacional (Literature review). Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. 38 (1): 11–53. doi:10.1590/S0102-8529.2016380100001. ... one finds as many local left-leaning governments as there are countries making up the so-called left turn, because they emerged from distinct institutional settings ... espoused distinct degrees of anti-Americanism ...
  9. ^ Lopes, Dawisson Belém; de Faria, Carlos Aurélio Pimenta (Jan–Apr 2016). "When Foreign Policy Meets Social Demands in Latin America". Contexto Internacional (Literature review). Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. 38 (1): 11–53. doi:10.1590/S0102-8529.2016380100001. The wrong left, by contrast, was said to be populist, old-fashioned, and irresponsible ...
  10. ^ Jump up to: a b Isbester, Katherine (2011). The Paradox of Democracy in Latin America: Ten Country Studies of Division and Resilience. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. p. xiii. ISBN 978-1442601802. ... the populous of Latin America are voting in the Pink Tide governments that struggle with reform while being prone to populism and authoritarianism.
  11. ^ "The many stripes of anti-Americanism". Boston Globe. Retrieved 30 October 2018.
  12. ^ "South America's leftward sweep". BBC News. Retrieved 30 October 2018.
  13. ^ Jump up to: a b "Latin America's 'pragmatic' pink tide" Archived 16 May 2016 at the Portuguese Web Archive Pittsburgh Tribune-Herald.
  14. ^ Lopes, Dawisson Belém; de Faria, Carlos Aurélio Pimenta (Jan–Apr 2016). "When Foreign Policy Meets Social Demands in Latin America". Contexto Internacional (Literature review). Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. 38 (1): 11–53. doi:10.1590/S0102-8529.2016380100001. However, these analytical and taxonomic efforts often led to new dichotomies ... democrats and authoritarians ...
  15. ^ "Los secretos de la guerra sucia continental de la dictadura" (The secrets of the continental dirty war of the dictators), Clarin, 24 March 2006 (in Spanish).
  16. ^ Jump up to: a b McSherry, J. Patrice (2011). "Chapter 5: "Industrial repression" and Operation Condor in Latin America". In Esparza, Marcia; Henry R. Huttenbach; Daniel Feierstein (eds.). State Violence and Genocide in Latin America: The Cold War Years (Critical Terrorism Studies). Routledge. p. 107. ISBN 978-0415664578.
  17. ^ Jump up to: a b Greg Grandin (2011). The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. University of Chicago Press. p. 75. ISBN 978-0226306902.
  18. ^ Jump up to: a b Walter L. Hixson (2009). The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy. Yale University Press. p. 223. ISBN 0300151314.
  19. ^ Society, National Geographic (17 December 2013). "Archives of Terror Discovered". National Geographic. Retrieved 17 December 2013.
  20. ^ Klein, Naomi (2007). The Shock Doctrine. New York: Picador. p. 126. ISBN 978-0312427993.
  21. ^ Stanley, Ruth (2006). "Predatory States. Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America/When States Kill. Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror". Journal of Third World Studies. Retrieved 24 October 2007.
  22. ^ "Massacres, disappearances and 1968: Mexicans remember the victims of a 'perfect dictatorship'".
  23. ^ "CIA acknowledges involvement in Allende's overthrow, Pinochet's rise". BBC News. 19 September 2000. Archived from the original (– search) on 8 November 2007. Retrieved 5 December 2007.
  24. ^ "World Publics Reject US Role as the World Leader" (PDF). The Chicago Council on Public Affairs. April 2007. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 April 2013.
  25. ^ "Argentina: Opinion of the United States". Pew Research Center. 2012.
  26. ^ "Argentina: Opinion of Americans (Unfavorable) – Indicators Database". Pewglobal.org. Retrieved 18 August 2014.
  27. ^ Levitsky, Steven; Roberts, Kenneth. "The Resurgence of the Latin American Left" (PDF). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  28. ^ Levitsky, Ibid.
  29. ^ Rodriguez, Robert G. (2014). "Re-Assessing the Rise of the Latin American Left" (PDF). The Midsouth Political Science Review. Arkansas Political Science Association. 15 (1): 59. ISSN 2330-6882.
  30. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h Rojas, René (Summer 2018). "The Latin American Left's Shifting Tides". Catalyst. 2 (2): 6–71. Retrieved 13 September 2020.
  31. ^ Levitsky, Ibid.
  32. ^ Jump up to: a b McMaken, Ryan (2016). Latin America's Pink Tide Crashes On The Rocks. Mises Institute.
  33. ^ Jump up to: a b Noel, Andrea (29 December 2015). "The Year the 'Pink Tide' Turned: Latin America in 2015". Vice News. Retrieved 30 December 2015.
  34. ^ Miroff, Nick (28 January 2014). "Latin America's political right in decline as leftist governments move to middle". The Guardian.
  35. ^ Reid, Michael (September–October 2015). "Obama and Latin America: A Promising Day in the Neighborhood". Foreign Affairs. 94 (5): 45–53. ... half a dozen countries, led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, formed a hard-left anti-American bloc with authoritarian tendencies...
  36. ^ Jump up to: a b c Lopes, Dawisson Belém; de Faria, Carlos Aurélio Pimenta (Jan–Apr 2016). "When Foreign Policy Meets Social Demands in Latin America". Contexto Internacional (Literature review). Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. 38 (1): 11–53. doi:10.1590/S0102-8529.2016380100001. The fate of Latin America's left turn has been closely associated with the commodities boom (or supercycle) of the 2000s, largely due to rising demand from emerging markets, notably China.
  37. ^ Jump up to: a b c Lansberg-Rodríguez, Daniel (Fall 2016). "Life after Populism? Reforms in the Wake of the Receding Pink Tide". Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Georgetown University Press. 17 (2): 56–65. doi:10.1353/gia.2016.0025. S2CID 157788674.
  38. ^ Fisher, Max; Taub, Amanda (1 April 2017). "How Does Populism Turn Authoritarian? Venezuela Is a Case in Point". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2 April 2017. Retrieved 2 April 2017.
  39. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Reid, Michael (2015). "Obama and Latin America: A Promising Day in the Neighborhood". Foreign Affairs. 94 (5): 45–53. As China industrialized in the first decade of the century, its demand for raw materials rose, pushing up the prices of South American minerals, fuels, and oilseeds. From 2000 to 2013, Chinese trade with Latin America rocketed from $12 billion to over $275 billion. ... Its loans have helped sustain leftist governments pursuing otherwise unsustainable policies in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, whose leaders welcomed Chinese aid as an alternative to the strict conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund or the financial markets. ... The Chinese-fueled commodity boom, which ended only recently, lifted Latin America to new heights. The region – and especially South America – enjoyed faster economic growth, a steep fall in poverty, a decline in extreme income inequality, and a swelling of the middle class.
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  41. ^ Piccone, Ted (November 2016). "The Geopolitics of China's Rise in Latin America". Geoeconomics and Global Issues. Brookings Institution: 5–6. [China] promised to impose no political conditions on its economic and technical assistance, in contrast to the usual strings-attached approach from Washington, Europe, and the international financial institutions, and committed to debt cancellation 'as China's ability permits.' ... As one South American diplomat put it, given the choice between the onerous conditions of the neoliberal Washington consensus and the no-strings-attached largesse of the Chinese, elevating relations with Beijing was a no-brainer.
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