Yugoslavism

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Yugoslav Committee
Celebration of establishment of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, in Zagreb
Proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Ljubljana
National Council addresses the Prince Regent, 1 December 1918
Corfu Declaration
Vidovdan Constitution
Decision promulgating the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution
1943 AVNOJ session affirmed the choice of a federal Yugoslavia
1945 AVNOJ session preparing the second Yugoslavia's Constitutional Assembly
Monument to the Unknown Hero by Ivan Meštrović on Avala Hill in Belgrade
From top left to right: Yugoslav Committee in 1916, Celebration of establishment of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in the St. Mark's Square, Zagreb, Proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Ljubljana's Congress Square, National Council delegation addressing the Prince Regent Alexander, Corfu Declaration, Vidovdan Constitution, Decision on promulgation of the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution, 2nd session of AVNOJ in Jajce, 3rd session of AVNOJ in Belgrade preparing for the second Yugoslavia's Constitutional Assembly, Monument to the Unknown Hero by Ivan Meštrović on Avala Hill in Belgrade.

Yugoslavism[a] or Yugoslavdom[b] refers to an ideology supporting the notion that the South Slavs, namely the Bosniaks, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes, but also Bulgarians, belong to a single Yugoslav nation separated by diverging historical circumstances, forms of speech, and religious divides. During the interwar period, Yugoslavism became predominant, and then official ideology of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. There were two major forms of Yugoslavism in the period: the regime favoured the integral Yugoslavism promoting unitarism, centralisation, and unification of the ethnic groups in the country in a single Yugoslav nation by coercion if necessary. The approach was also applied to languages spoken in the Kingdom. The main alternative was the federalist Yugoslavism advocating autonomy of the historical lands in the form of a federation, and gradual unification without outside pressure. Both agreed on the concept of National Oneness developed as an expression of strategic alliance of South Slavs in Austria-Hungary in the early 20th century. The concept was meant as a notion that the South Slavs belong to a single "race", were of "one blood", and had shared language. It was considered neutral regarding the choice of centralism or federalism.

The Yugoslavist idea has roots in the 1830s Illyrian movement in Habsburg Croatia, where a group of intellectuals saw unity of South Slavs within the Austrian Empire or outside of it, as a protection against Germanisation and Magyarisation. Cooperation talks were started, with limited success, with Serbian politicians, and work to standardise the Serbo-Croatian as a common language with orthographer Vuk Karadžić. Following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the concept was rivalled by Trialism. Control of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary prevented practical implementation of Yugoslavist ideas until the former was pushed out from the Balkans in the 1912 First Balkan War and the latter disintegrated in the final days of the World War I. During the war, preparations for unification began in the form of Niš Declaration of Serbian war aims, establishment of the Yugoslav Committee to represent South Slavs living in Austria-Hungary, and adoption of the Corfu Declaration on principles of unification. The short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was proclaimed in the South Slavic lands formerly ruled by the Habsburgs at the end of the World War I. Its leadership primarily wanted unification with the Serbia on a federal basis, while Serbia preferred a centralised state.

The unification took place on 1 December 1918 when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed. In the first years of the new kingdom, politics became increasingly ethnic as individual political parties became identified with particular nations within the country. Similarly, the integral Yugoslavism became associated with the regime, and the political struggle against the government was increasingly equated with ethnic struggle between the Serbs (identified with the regime) and various ethnic groups – most often the Croats as the most vocal political opposition to the regime. Alliances shifted over time and were not always ethnic-based. They largely depended on the form of Yugoslavism adopted by those concerned. The result of the political debates of the first few years of the new country resulted in the Vidovdan Constitution – deemed illegitimate by many – and in regime- and opposition-sponsored violence. The state abandoned the integral Yugoslavism in 1939 when a settlement was reached with the Croat opposition leader Vladko Maček in the Cvetković–Maček Agreement. The regime attempted to unify the common language. Lack of standardisation of the Serbo-Croatian brought about the practice of publication of official documents in the Ekavian speech favoured in Serbia and often in Cyrillic script not normally used to write by the Croats or the Slovenes. Serbian Orthodox Church was given preference by the regime. The regime tried to reduce power of the Catholic Church in the Kingdom, promoting conversions and rival churches, and refraining from ratification of the Concordat with the Holy See over Serbian Orthodox Church protests. Before the World War I, a synthetic Yugoslavist culture was largely confined to Croat artists and writers. Ivan Meštrović became the most prominent among them at an 1911 exhibition in Rome. Most artists and writers distanced themselves from the synthetic culture disilussioned after the unification.

After the World War II in Yugoslavia, the country was ruled by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) which adopted a formal commitment to federalism in a highly centralised state, promoting social Yugoslavism and diversely interpreted notion of "brotherhood and unity". The 1948 Tito–Stalin split pushed the KPJ to gradual decentralisation until mid-1950s when a Yugoslavist campaign was launched to reverse the course leading to a debate on levels of (de)centralisation. Centralist forces were defeated by mid-1960s. Significant decentralisation occurred during and in the aftermath of the Croatian Spring. Yugoslavism was cited by Slovenian intellectuals in 1987 as the main threat to Slovenian identity. The issues raised by them contributed to motivation for a 1990 proposal to restructure Yugoslavia as a confederation and for subsequent Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence marking the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Background[]

The South Slavs are a subgroup of Slavic peoples comprising the Bulgars, Croats, and Serbs whose national identity developed long before modern nationalism through collective memory of their medieval states. Furthermore, the South Slavs also include the Bosniaks (i.e. Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Slovenes.[1]

In the early 19th century, the Balkans were divided between the Austrian and the Ottoman empires. The Austrian Empire comprised the Slovene Lands, the Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia with significant Croat populations, and Vojvodina containing a substantial Serb population. Hofkriegsrat-controlled Military Frontier separated the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia from each other and Ottoman territory. Substantial Croat and Slovene populations lived in the Istria organised as the Kingdom of Illyria.[1][2] In the Ottoman Empire, the semi-independent Principality of Serbia developed in the early 19th century. [3] The empire included the Bosnia Eyalet, [4] as its westernmost part between Serbia and the Austrian realms.[5] There was also unrecognised Prince-Bishopric of Montenegro.[6]

Before Yugoslavia[]

Illyrian movement[]

Ljudevit Gaj led the Illyrian movement in the 1830s

The idea of South Slavic unity predates creation of Yugoslavia by nearly a century. The idea was first developed in Habsburg Croatia by a group of Croat intellectuals led by Ljudevit Gaj in 1830s. The concept developed through diverse forms of the proposed unity from varying levels of cultural and political cooperation or integration. Members of the Illyrian movement held that the South Slavs could unite around a shared origin, variants of a shared language, and the natural right to live in their own polity.[7] They argued that Croatian history is a part of a wider history of South Slavs and that Croats, Serbs as well as potentially Slovenes and Bulgarians were parts of a single Illyrian nation. The movement started as a cultural one, promoting Croatian national identity and integration of all Croatian provinces within the Austrian Empire.[8] The reference to "Croatian provinces" was normally interpreted as a reference to the Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, and sometimes a part of or entire Bosnia and Herzegovina.[5] A wider objective was gathering all South Slavs or Jugo-Slaveni[c] for short in a commonwealth within or outside the Empire. The two directions of the movement became known as Croatianism and Yugoslavism respectively, meant to counter Germanisation and Magyarisation.[8] In 1830s and 1840s, the proponents of the Illyrian idea were very few, and virtually all of them were Croats from the ranks of intellectuals – clergy, officials, artists, students, and soldiers. By 1910, they rallied around the People's Party (HPS) but accounted for barely 1% of population.[9]

Illyrian contribution to linguistic unity[]

Vuk Karadžić held that a common language was the foundation of a nation

Since the Middle Ages, the Croats spoke three dialects – named after forms of the word whatChakavian, Kajkavian, and western Shtokavian. The Serbs spoke two – eastern Shtokavian and the Prizren–Timok dialect. From the 12th century, the two Shtokavian dialects grew increasingly mutually similar and more distinct from the other dialects.[10]

Gaj supported the idea proposed by Serbian orthographer Vuk Karadžić that a common language was the foundation of a nation. Karadžić held that the Serbs and Croats could be united by a common orthography.[11] To support this aim, the Illyrian movement chose to promote Shtokavian as the standard literary language because nearly all Serbs spoke it. This represented a sacrifice made on purpose – most prominent Illyrians spoke Kajkavian normally used in Zagreb. This led to the Vienna Literary Agreement on standardisation of the Serbo-Croatian language as the common language. This also produced nationalist claims that Serbs were Eastern Orthodox Croats and that Croats were Roman Catholic Serbs, as well as that the Slavic Muslims were Islamised Serbs or Croats – denying existence of the "rival" ethnic groups.[12] Despite the agreement, the Illyrians did not adopt the standard proposed by Karadžić for another four decades.[13]

Gaj's linguistic determination of a nation was not universally accepted by Croats. The founder of the Party of Rights (HSP) Ante Starčević held that existence of the state gives creates nations, citing France and England as examples. Starčević referred to this as the concept of the  [hr]. Josip Frank, Starčević's successor at the helm of the HSP argued that nations had different racial traits, assuming an anti-Serbian stance.[11]

The Illyrians found little support among Serbs in Habsburg lands,[14] as they viewed Serbia as a nucleus of South-Slavic unification ascribing it the role played by Piedmont in Italian unification.[15] Most Serb intellectuals dismissed the modified Shtokavian as a threat to the liturgical Church Slavonic, and the Gaj's Latin alphabet – recommending Croats to use the Cyrillic script as a truly Slavic alphabet.[16] In 1913, there was an attempt to create a Serbo-Croatian standard by Serbian literary critic Jovan Skerlić. He proposed Croats to accept the "Eastern dialect" while Serbs would abandon the Cyrilic script. The plan had mixed reception in Croatia and was abandoned at the outbreak of the war.[17]

Trialism in Austria-Hungary[]

A proposed trialist administrative reform of Austria-Hungary from 1905

While the Illyrians achieved the goal of raising Croatian national awareness by 1850, they failed elsewhere.[8] In 1850s, the Illyrian idea was championed by the HPS and Roman Catholic bishops Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Rački.[9] Fearing Drang nach Osten, they believed Germanisation and Magyarisation could only be resisted through unity with other Slavs, especially the Serbs. They advocated unification of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia as the Triune Kingdom expanded to include other South Slavs in Austria (or Austria-Hungary after the Compromise of 1867) before joining other South Slavic polities in a federation or confederation.[18] The proposed consolidation of variously defined Croatian or South Slavic lands led to proposals for trialism in Austria-Hungary accommodating a South-Slavic polity with a rank equal to the Kingdom of Hungary.[15] Croatia and Slavonia were consolidated with the Military Frontier into Croatia-Slavonia in 1881.[19] Nonetheless, divisions remained as it was among the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen – the Hungarian part of the monarchy – while Dalmatia and Istria were included in Austrian Cisleithania. There was also a significant Croatian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1908. Unification of those lands became the central issue for Croatia-Slavonia politics in the trialist context.[20]

In the mid-19th century Slovene Lands, early Slovenian nationalists felt closer to Czechs or Russians than other South Slavs, seeking solutions within the existing framework or a trialist Austria-Hungary.[21] Support for Serbo-Croat cooperation grew as a reaction to ongoing Germanisation, but most Slovene intellectuals rejected the Illyrian ideas.[22]

Béni Kállay, the administrator of the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, introduced the concept of Bosnians, rejecting ethnic and religious divisions.[23] Kállay's project entailed a campaign to standardise the Bosnian language. It was viewed as having key cultural, social, and political role in strengthening the Austro-Hungarian rule.[24] Kállay's language policy coincided with formal introduction of the ortographic norms set out by the Vienna Literary Agreement by the administration of Ban Károly Khuen-Héderváry in Croatia-Slavonia in the 1890s. At the same time, linguistic differences grew with departure of Belgrade-based Serbian standard from the Karadžić-proposed form by adoption of Ekavian speech. The shift was prompted by the start of the Austrian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina – and consequent reorienting Serbian political priorities: Macedonia became the priority and Ekavian was deemed better suited for expansion into the region.[13] During the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a religious community developed to preserve cultural and religious autonomy of the Islamic population, renouncing nationalist agenda. Secular Bosnian Muslim intelligentsia was divided into pro-Croat and pro-Serb factions declaring themselves as Croats or Serbs of Islamic faith instead.[23]

19th-century Serbia and the Yugoslavist idea[]

Ilija Garašanin wrote on establishment of Greater Serbia, and worked with Josip Juraj Strossmayer on an anti-Ottoman South Slavic coalition.

Vojvodina Serbs favoured closer ties with or joining the de facto independent Serbia over the Illyrian ideas. Serbia discouraged their irredentism to preserve good relations with Austria.[25] In 1860s, within the framework of efforts by Prince Mihailo Obrenović to establish an anti-Ottoman coalition, Strossmayer and Serbian Foreign Minister Ilija Garašanin, agreed to work towards establishing a Yugoslav state independent of Austria and Ottomans.[26] The plan inspired by Risorgimento called for unification of the lands from Carinthia, Carniola and Southern Styria in the north to Albania, Bulgaria, and Thrace in the south. The scheme was mostly used to promote unification of South Slavic lands in Austria-Hungary around Croatia and South Slavic regions of the Ottoman Empire around Serbia. The plan was abandoned after assassination of Mihailo and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.[27]

As Serbia achieved independence through the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, the Yugoslav idea became irrelevant in the country. Before the 1912 First Balkan War, Serbia was mono-ethnic and Serbian nationalism sought to include (those considered to be) Serbs into the state. It portrayed Strossmayer's and Rački's work as a scheme to establish Greater Croatia.[28] There was pressure to expand Serbia by a group of Royal Serbian Army officers known as the Black Hand. They carried out the May 1903 coup installing the Karađorđević dynasty to power and then organised nationalist actions in "unredeemed Serbian provinces" specified as Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Old Serbia (meaning Kosovo), Macedonia, Croatia, Slavonia, Syrmia, Vojvodina, and Dalmatia.[29] This echoed Garašanin's 1844 Načertanije – a treatise anticipating the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, calling for establishment of Greater Serbia to pre-empt Russian or Austrian expansion into the Balkans, and unifying all Serbs in a single state.[30]

End of two empires[]

Branching concept[]

Frano Supilo co-founded the Croat-Serb Coalition with Svetozar Pribičević

In the first two decades of the 20th century, Yugoslavism was adopted in different, conflicting, or mutually exclusive forms by various Croat, Serb, and Slovene national programmes. Yugoslavism became a pivotal idea for establishment of a South Slavic political union. For most Serbs, the idea was equated with Greater Serbia under a different name or a vehicle to bring all Serbs into a single state. For many Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavism was a form of protection against Austrian and Hungarian challenges to preservation of their Croat and Slovene identities and political autonomy.[31]

Different forms of Yugoslavism were pursued by proponents of the political union – the unitarist or integral Yugoslavism and the federalist Yugoslavism were the two major categories. The former denied existence of separate nations or sought to supersede them by introduction of a single Yugoslav nation.[31] Some sources draw distinction between unitarists and integralists. According to them, the unitarists believe that South Slavs are a single ethnic unit, but refrain from active unification – unlike the integralists who actively work to amalgamate the Yugoslav nation.[32] The federalists acknowledged existence of separate nations and wanted to accommodate them in a new political union through a federation or another system affording various South Slavic nations political and cultural autonomy.[31] Some sources also identify a group associated with the concept of Yugoslavism as the pseudo-Yugoslavs tactically choosing to pursue apparently Yugoslavist agenda to implement specific national interests.[32]

The concept of National Oneness[d] was first developed by the Croat-Serb Coalition (HSK) as an expression of strategic alliance of South Slavs in Austria-Hungary in the early 20th century. It did not imply unitarist Yugoslavism.[33] While the concept was meant as an expression of the notion that the South Slavs belong to a single "race", were of "one blood", and had shared language, it was considered neutral regarding the possibility of centralised or decentralised government in a common state.[34]

Defeat of the Ottoman Empire[]

Existence of the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans was a barrier to political unification of the South Slavs.[8] This started to change in late 1912 with the outbreak of the First Balkan War. In the conflict, the Ottomans lost most of the Balkan possessions as Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria took control of Vardar, Aegean, and Pirin Macedonia respectively.[35] Borders in the region were to be adjusted under mediation of Nicholas II of Russia. However, the war produced a rivalry between Bulgaria on one side and Greece and Serbia on the other. Bulgaria was dissatisfied with the size of its territorial gains after suffering the greatest losses in the war. To protect against Bulgaria, Greek–Serbian Alliance of 1913 was concluded, and the allies specified territorial claims against Bulgaria. In 1913, Bulgaria attacked Serbia starting the Second Balkan War,[36] to expand its territory but ended in further losses.[35]

Outbreak of the First World War[]

Depiction of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
Ante Trumbić led the Yugoslav Committee in the run-up to creation of Yugoslavia

On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir presumptive to the throne of Austria-Hungary was assassinated in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip – a Bosnian Serb member of Young Bosnia movement.[37] The organisation, supported by the Black Hand, consisted of Yugoslavist nationalists advocating political union of Serbs, Croats, Slavic Muslims, and Slovenes through revolutionary actions.[38] The July Crisis and outbreak of the First World War followed the assassination.[37]

Since the outbreak of the hostilities, Serbia considered the war an opportunity for territorial expansion beyond Serb-inhabited areas. A committee tasked with determining war aims produced a programme to establish a Yugoslav state by addition of Croatia-Slavonia, Slovene Lands, Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia.[39] In the Niš Declaration, the National Assembly of Serbia announced the struggle to liberate and unify "unliberated brothers".[40]

In 1915, the Yugoslav Committee was established as an ad-hoc group with no official capacity.[41] Its members thought that the Yugoslavist idea entered the final phase in 1903. That was the year when Khuen Hedervary administration ended, the year when Kallay died, and the year of the dynastic change in Serbia.[34] The committee, partially funded by the Serbian government, consisted of intellectuals and politicians from Austria-Hungary claiming to represent interests of South Slavs.[42] The president of the committee was Ante Trumbić,[43] but its most prominent member was Frano Supilo, the co-founder of the ruling HSK in Croatia-Slavonia. Supilo urged establishment of a Yugoslav state as a federation with Serbia (including Vojvodina), Croatia (including Slavonia and Dalmatia), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Montenegro as its federal units. Supilo distrusted Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, a proponent of Greater Serbia, and cautioned the committee about Pašić's likely intentions. On the other hand, the committee learned of the Treaty of London awarding the Kingdom of Italy parts of the Slovene Lands, Istria, and Dalmatia by the Triple Entente in return for Italian alliance.[44]

In May 1917, members of the Yugoslav Deputies' Club of the Imperial Council in Vienna drafted the May Declaration on unification of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs within Austria-Hungary and a trialist restructuring of the empire. Starčević's faction of the HSP, and the Croatian People's Peasant Party (HSS) led by Stjepan Radić supported the declaration in the Diet of Hungary where Croatia-Slavonia was represented. Frank's faction of the HSP rejected the idea. The declaration was debated in press for a year before the imperial authorities outlawed the proposal.[45]

In June–July 1917, the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee held a series of meetings on Corfu. They discussed the future common state and produced the Corfu Declaration that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were one "tri-named" people, that the Karađorđević dynasty would reign in the new unified state organised as a parliamentary, constitutional monarchy. The document did not say if the state would be federal or centralised. Trumbić proposed to establish a provisional government of the new state, but Pašić declined – to avoid undermining diplomatic advantage enjoyed by Serbia in the unification process as a recognised state. Supilo died two months later.[46]

State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs[]

Proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in front of the Sabor in Zagreb.

On 5–6 October 1918, representatives of Slovene, Croat, and Serb political parties in Austria-Hungary established the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to work towards independence from the empire. The same month, Emperor Charles I of Austria offered to reorganise Austria-Hungary as a federation, but his proposal was rejected as belated. On 18 October, the National Council declared itself the central organ of the new State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. On 29 October, Croatian Sabor was convened to formally sever ties with Austria-Hungary and establish the new state. It elected the leader of the Slovene People's Party (SLS) Anton Korošec as the president of the state. President of one of HSP splinter parties Ante Pavelić, and Croatian Serb, HSK co-founder Svetozar Pribićević were elected vice presidents.[46]

Representatives of the National Council, the Serbian government and opposition, and the Yugoslav Committee met in Geneva on 6–9 November to discuss unification. The National Council and the Yugoslav Committee requested Pašić to renounce centralist government in the future state.[47] Pressured by France, and no longer enjoying the support of Russia, Pašić complied and signed the Geneva Declaration.[48] In response, Prince Regent Alexander of Serbia compelled him to resign. The new cabinet declined to honour the declaration, annulling Serbia's commitment to a federal state.[47]

The National Council was faced with threats of revolutionary unrest and Italian invasion. Therefore, it invited the Serbian Second Army to preserve order. In mid-November, Italian troops entered Istria, captured Rijeka on 17 November and were stopped before Ljubljana by city defenders including a battalion of Serbian prisoners of war. The National Council unsuccessfully appealed for international help. On 25 and 26 November assemblies in Vojvodina and Montenegro voted to join Serbia.[49] In the latter case, the Podgorica Assembly was convened as an ad-hoc body to depose the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty in favour of Karađorđevićs.[50]

Pressed by the Italian threat, the National Council dispatched a delegation to Prince Alexander to arrange a unification in a federation. The delegation ignored the instructions when it addressed the Prince Regent on 1 December. The Prince Alexander accepted the unification offer on behalf of Peter I of Serbia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established.[51] No ethnic or religious group had an absolute majority in the population of the kingdom.[52]

Defining the South Slavic kingdom[]

Provisional government[]

As the Interior Minister, Svetozar Pribičević centralised administration of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes before adoption of constitution.

After unification, the Prince Regent appointed Stojan Protić the Prime Minister. Korošec was appointed his deputy, Trumbić the foreign minister, Pribičević the interior minister, and Ljubomir Davidović the education minister. Protić and Davidović were drawn from the largest Serbian parties – the People's Radical Party (NRS) and the Independent Radical Party respectively. The latter soon afterwards went through a series of mergers to form the Democratic Party (DS). While the Prince Regent promised in the 1 December declaration that the Temporary National Representation would be appointed from a list of candidates approved by agreement of the Serbian Assembly and the National Council, the list was drawn up by government minister Albert Kramer instead.[53]

While Pribičević wanted the maximum centralisation, Protić advocated autonomous regions,[54] as he saw advantages of maintaining administrative authority of historical provinces.[55] The NRS thought necessary to preserve Serb nation as the group having the dominant role in the unification – but opposed federation. This led the NRS to insist naming the country the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, rejecting the name of Yugoslavia.[56] The latter was the preferred by advocates of decentralisation.[57] The debate on the constitutional system produced three proposed constitutions – providing for a centralised state, a federation and a compromise put forward by Pribičević, Radić, and Protić respectively.[55]

Before the Constitutional Assembly was convened, and while the system of government was formally yet to be determined, the provisional government took measures to strengthen centralisation of the country. Pribičević moved to dismantle any pre-1918 administrative and representative bodies. In Croatia, the process contributed to increased tensions and disorder.[58] The early centralisation processes were accompanied by government efforts in linguistic unification – by declaring the so-called Serbo-Croato-Slovenian or Yugoslavian language, also referred to as the state or national language, the sole official language.[59] The Cyrillic script was made formally equal in use to the Latin script – the latter previously employed as the sole Croatian and Slovenian script.[60] In practice, the bulk of the official publications were made in ekavian Serbo-Croatian (also referred to as Yugoslav) language,[59] largely printed in Cyrilic script only. Thus Serbian became de facto official while Croatian and Slovenian were declared dialects of Serbian, relegating Croatian and Slovenian culture to a secondary status,[60] and echoing Pašić's views of South Slavic unity.[61] In the military, use of Latin script was often regarded as anti-state sentiment and contributed to decision by many non-Serbs to resign commissions – increasing Serb numerical domination among the officer corps.[62] Macedonian language was banned entirely.[63] Even before standardisation of school curricula, the doctrine of a "three-named people" was introduced into the education system.[64]

Initial political opposition[]

Anton Korošec, former president of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, led the Slovene People's Party

Over time, the centralisation–decentralisation debate turned primarily, but not exclusively, into a conflict between the Serbs and the Croats.[54] Historian Ivo Banac pointed to the manner of the unification as the source of ethnic conflicts and instability of the country.[57] Radić was particularly vocal opponent of the monarchy while he, and the HSS, supported federal or confederal Yugoslavism affording Croatia the maximum autonomy.[65] In February, the HSS started a petition addressed to the Paris Peace Conference demanding a "neutral Croat peasant republic". Radić was imprisoned for a year in response.[66] Even though the HSS was less influential than the HPS and the HSP in Croatia before the war, imprisonment of Radić and other HSS members made them the champions of the Croatian national cause in public opinion,[67] and a de facto Croatian national movement.[68]

While largely welcoming unification, Slovenes generally rejected integral Yugoslavism and worked to preserve their language and culture. Initially, Korošec-led SLS advocated the federalist system of government and Slovenian autonomy. Centralist Slovene Liberals were the most influential political opponents of the SLS in 1920, but their influence waned, leaving the SLS as the main representatives of the Slovenes in the interwar period – regardless of their support or opposition to the regime or Slovenian autonomy.[69]

Interests of the Muslim Slavic population of Bosnia and Herzegovina were represented by the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO),[70] while the Islamic population elsewhere in the state was represented by the Džemijet.[71] The JMO supported Yugoslavism as a protection against assimilation by the Serbs and the Croats. While denouncing Yugoslav nationalism of the DS, the JMO allied itself with the NRS for its support of the preservation of Bosnian Muslim identity.[70]

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) initially supported centralisation and unitarist positions. Soon after establishment of the kingdom, the KPJ reversed its position under instructions from the Communist International and advocated breakup of the country.[72]

Early unrest and violence[]

A protest against the monarchy held in Zagreb on 5 December 1918

The period immediately after the unification saw significant violence and civil unrest in the country. There were revolutionary actions in Slavonia and Vojvodina inspired by the Hungarian Soviet Republic.[63] Macedonia and Kosovo – known as the Southern Serbia then – saw a Serbianisation campaign and a colonisation programme. The Macedonians fought back through the Bulgaria-based Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO).[73] In Kosovo, there were instances of retribution for killings by Albanians during the First World War Serbian Great Retreat and acts of Albanian retaliation culminating in the failed 1919 uprising by the Committee for the National Defence of Kosovo and massacres of Albanians by the regime forces.[74] 50,000 police and troops were deployed to the region, supported by Chetnik paramilitaries led by Jovan Babunski.[73]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serbs attacked Muslim landowners and peasants – killing about 2,000 and evicting 4,000 from their homes by 1920. Several hundred Muslims were killed by Montenegrins in the Sandžak region in the same period. The violence was motivated by the desire to seize Muslim-owned land and compel the Muslim population to leave the country.[75] In Montenegro, pro-independence Greens launched the unsuccessful Christmas Uprising against pro-Serbian Whites in 1919.[76] In early December 1918, there was an anti-monarchy protest in Zagreb suppressed by force. The same winter, violence swept through Croatian countryside – peasants looted large estates and shops, but there was also some inter-ethnic violence. After a lull, a peasant revolt broke out in Croatia in late March 1919 in response to a campaign of branding of draft animals for army use.[66]

Vidovdan Constitution[]

Prime Minister Nikola Pašić had the deciding role in selecting among different draft constitutions.

Following the 1920 election, the DS and the NRS became the largest parliamentary parties but did not have the majority in the Constitutional Assembly. The KPJ and the HSS – the third and the fourth largest parliamentary parties – refused to participate in the assembly over the rule that the new constitution would be adopted by a simple majority instead as a form of a consensus foreseen by the Corfu Declaration. A further dispute arose when the parliament members were asked to swear an oath to the king. This was refused by all parties except the DS and the NRS.[77]

The Constitutional Assembly adopted the Vidovdan Constitution based on the Pribičević draft on 28 June 1921. The choice was made on Prime Minister Pašić's urging as the version providing the least concessions to parties advocating decentralisation. Since the DS and the NRS did not have the votes to adopt the constitution they obtained support of the JMO and Džemijet in return for compensation to Muslim landowners for lost property.[78]

Even though ideological divisions existed in all lands of the kingdom,[49] the politics quickly became largely ethnic-based. Any criticism of government was portrayed by the parties in power as tantamount to treason.[79] Regardless of the ethnic nature of the politics in the country, there were political parties crossing that boundary at certain times – Serb parties opposing the regime or non-Serb ones supporting it. The constitution was a product of Serb minority, but it confirmed Serb primacy, marking the start of a long political crisis. The integral Yugoslavism was firmly associated with the royal regime.[80] In the 1920 election, the KPJ achieved considerable success in large cities, in Montenegro, and Macedonia through protest votes against the regime, from unemployed urban voters and from voters in regions having no other attractive national or regional opposition.[81]

Vidovdan Constitution was dysfunctional and ultimately it failed because it was illegitimate and did not ensure the rule of law, individual rights, neutrality of the state in the matters of religion and national culture. The national question was a product of the dysfunctional nature of the constitution. The fault primarily lies with the policies adopted by the king and Pašić as well as by Davidović and Pribičević in the first years of the kingdom. They viewed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes essentially as an expansion of Serbia and the conflicts were a response to the Serbian hegemonism and the constitution designed to serve only a particular interpretation of Serbian national interests.[82]

State ideology[]

Violence in service of ideology[]

Photo of ORJUNA members in Celje.

The interior minister Milorad Drašković cancelled the KPJ victory in 1920 Belgrade city election, prompting the communist terrorist group Crvena Pravda to assassinate him. This in turn led to outlawing of the KPJ and enactment of legislation allowing the government to legally prosecute political opponents.[83]

The regime was involved in organising paramilitary forces outside the legal framework: The Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA) was established in Split in 1921 by the royal administrator for Croatia. It was funded through the provincial government and operated under protection of a DS faction loyal to Pribičević. Its purpose was to carry out extralegal actions against communists, Croatian separatists, and other real or perceived enemies of the state, including federalists, on behalf of the regime. By 1925, ORJUNA Action Groups had 10,000 members,[84] supplied weapons by the White Hand organisation – a Black Hand splinter group with military ties.[85] ORJUNA was an openly terrorist group advocating unitarism and dictatorship of Yugoslav nationalists, potentially under royal patronage, and abolishing parliamentarism. It had similarities with the Italian Fascist Blackshirts,[86] including glorification of violence.[87]

The Serbian National Youth (SRNAO) and the Croatian National Youth (HANAO) were formed in response. They employed similar methods of operation. The HANAO, established as a Croatian defence against the ORJUNA,[87] and initially backed by the HSS, became the main opponent of the ORJUNA.[88] The SRNAO was backed by the NRS as the party viewed the ORJUNA insufficiently Serbian. The officially sanctioned Chetnik organisation splintered in 1924 along the same ideological lines which separated the ORJUNA from the SRNAO.[87] Until that point, the Chetnik movement was under the influence of DS and the party was imposing Yugoslavist ideology. Following the NRS electoral victory over the DS in 1925, NRS's Puniša Račić became the dominant figure in the movement and went on to reverse its ideological course. That meant that Serbian identity, instead of the Yugoslav nation, was to assimilate other ethnic identities. Chetnik units pursued this aim by terrorising Croat and Muslim villages in Croatia and Bosnia.[89]

Dysfunctional parliamentarism[]

Stjepan Radić led the Croatian Peasant Party as one of the most vocal political opponents of the regime.

The centralism–federalism conflict evolved in 1920s. The HSS ended its parliamentary boycott in 1924 aiming to vote against the NRS government, but its deputies were denied the right to vote for 16 weeks on pretext of verification of credentials. That year, Davidović-led DS split and Pribičević formed the Independent Democratic Party (SDS).[90] Pribičević realised that the regime used the Croatian Serbs – his primary constituents – to antagonise Croats, stirring up ethnic tensions only to abandon Croatian Serbs leaving them vulnerable to retribution whenever profit could be extracted from compromise with Croats.[91]

In late 1924, HSS campaigning was banned, and Radić imprisoned on charges of communist anti-state activity after the HSS joined the Krestintern. Despite this, the HSS received more votes in 1925 election than in 1923. The NRS and the HSS established a coalition government in 1925 as the HSS formally renounced republicanism and changed the party name to the Croatian Peasant Party, abandoning the demand for a federation, and limiting its aims to Croatian autonomy. Radić was released from prison on the day the government was formed.[92] The coalition ended during the 1927 local election campaign when HSS campaigning in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Vojvodina was interfered with by the police. The NRS Interior Minister Božidar Maksimović confirmed the accusations adding that the NRS would prefer Croats in Vojvodina declared themselves as Bunjevci or Šokci.[93]

Following the split with the DS, Pribičević rejected centralism but retained belief in the National Oneness. Since Radić remained open to the idea of a common Yugoslav identity, this allowed SDS–HSS cooperation.[94] Radić was ready to accept that Serbs and Croats were linguistically and ethnically one people mutually distinguished by their political cultures.[95] In 1927, the SDS and the HSS established the  [hr] (SDK) ostensibly to fight against taxation system which placed disproportionately higher tax burden on areas not included in pre-1918 Kingdom of Serbia.[96] Rearrangement of forces in the centralism–federalism struggle was completed by establishment of the ruling DS–NRS–JMO coalition joined by the SLS which abandoned demands for Slovenian autonomy.[97]

Death of Stjepan Radić[]

Vladko Maček succeeded the helm of the Croatian Peasant Party after Stjepan Radić's death.

In 1928, relations between the ruling coalition and the SDK deteriorated over accusations of unfair taxation and government corruption. Calls for violence against the SDK and specifically against Radić further inflamed the situation resulting in shouting matches and physical altercations in the Assembly. On 20 June, after being accused of corruption in the Assembly, Račić took the floor, drew a revolver, and shot five HSS delegates – killing two and wounding three including Radić.[98] Račić turned himself in but was never tried. In the immediate aftermath of the shootings, 19,000 people gathered in the centre of Zagreb demanding secession from Serbia. In ensuing violence, three more people were killed, 40 wounded and 180 arrested. The government resigned, the king offered the mandate to several people who failed or declined to form a new government before turning to Korošec.[99]

Radić died on 8 August. A large crowd attended his funeral and there were numerous public displays of mourning in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Five days after his death, Vladko Maček was elected to lead the HSS.[100] Unlike Radić, Maček dismissed the idea of a common Yugoslav nation. He claimed that the ideology of National Oneness was based on linguistic unity was insufficient to forge a single nation.[101] In immediate aftermath of the shooting, the king dismissed any possibility of federalism, but offered Radić, Pribičević, and Maček "amputation" to remove Slovenia and Croatia from the country. They declined the offer for fear that the offer entails transferring parts of Croatia to expanded Serbia. Instead, the SDK adopted a resolution breaking off relations with Serbia-based parties and declaring they no longer recognised the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – returning to advocating a republic.[102]

The Frankist faction of the HSP saw the killings as an opportunity to tout opposition to Yugoslavism as the central issue among Croats. As the crisis coincided with the tenth anniversary of establishment of the kingdom, Frankist leaders Ante Pavelić and  [hr] portrayed Radić as the most recent in a long line of Croatian victims suffered at the hand of Serbs in their All Saints' Day and 5 December decennial speeches. Pavelić exaggerated the significance of the Frankists at the time, but there was a shift in attitude towards Serbian primacy.[103] While ten years of unity and liberty were celebrated in Serbia, the decennial was spoken of as ten bloody years in the former Habsburg lands of the South Slavic kingdom.[104]

Royal dictatorship[]

Alexander I of Yugoslavia introduced the Royal Dictatorship in 1929 and imposed 1931 Constitution, enforcing integral Yugoslavism as official state ideology.

The king proclaimed royal dictatorship on 6 January 1929 and integral Yugoslavism became the official ideology of the regime.[105] In October, country was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to augment the National Oneness.[106] "Tribal" symbols were prohibited and the country was administratively reorganised to obliterate remnants of historical borders.[107] All ethnically specific organisations, including non-political ones, were suppressed or discouraged, and "Yugoslav" counterparts set up as replacements.[108] The regime used the "blood and sacrifice" rhetoric as justification – referring to Serbian wartime losses – privileging Serbs and denigrating or excluding others.[109] Even though Serbs and Montenegrins (deemed Serbs by the regime) constituted 39% of population in 1932, it was the government policy to recruit most staff of key ministries among Serbs. Employees of the justice, interior, and education ministries were 85%, 89%, and 96% Serb respectively.[110]

Strict censorship was introduced, and there were arrests of opposition leaders.[111] Police became instrumental in imposing the integral Yugoslavism,[112] using terror groups – mostly composed of police personnel – for extralegal actions against dissidents. Pavelić and Perčec left the country days after the dictatorship was announced,[113] and HSS vice president and secretary – August Košutić and Juraj Krnjević – left by August.[114] The police kept surveillance of politically active people.[114]

By spring, even the centralist DS held that an arrangement must be found with the HSS and monarchy abolished, or at least a significant autonomy given to parts of Yugoslavia. The regime was under increasing international criticism,[115] especially after a police agent killed Frankist scholar Milan Šufflay in 1931. The event drew a protest from a group of intellectuals including Heinrich Mann and Albert Einstein.[116] Urged by the British, French, and Czechoslovak allies and possibly influenced by toppling of Alfonso XIII of Spain,[109] king Alexander negotiated with the NRS and the SLS to broaden his base of support – resulting in the Octroic Constitution.[117] It forbade most political activities and gave broad powers to the king and the executive.[118] The Yugoslav Radical Peasants' Democracy (later renamed the Yugoslav National Party) (JNS) was established as the regime party to carry out the political programme effectively determined by the king. The JNS ran unopposed in the 1931 election boycotted by the opposition.[117]

In 1931, exiled Pavelić established the fascist organisation Ustaše – rejecting Yugoslavist traditions, sharing views with Hungarian revisionists and ideology with Italian Fascists. After a failed 1932 incursion in Lika, Ustaše focused on assassinations.[119] A plot to kill the king in Zagreb in 1933 was uncovered and the regime executed about one hundred people in retribution – even though most of them were unrelated to the plot or Ustaše. Working with the VMRO, Ustaše assassinated the king during his visit to France in 1934.[120]

Abandoning integral Yugoslavism[]

Prince regent Paul tasked the Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković to resolve the Croatian question with Vladko Maček.

Before the end of 1934, the JNS government was compelled to resign by the head of three-person regency Prince Paul. The 1935 election was contested by the united opposition running against the JNS Prime Minister Bogoljub Jevtić. The JNS list won, but the opposition threatened to boycott the Assembly due to electoral fraud determined by foreign observers. In response, Prince Paul replaced Jevtić with Milan Stojadinović. In one of his early speeches in the role of the prime minister, Stojadinović announced his intention to negotiate a settlement of what came to be called the Croatian question, but nothing specific was done in that respect until the 1938 election.[121] The united opposition led by Maček won 45% of votes coming behind Stojadinović's Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ). However, the opposition won 78% and 82% of votes in Littoral and Sava banovinas (roughly corresponding to Croatian lands) respectively.[122]

Prince Paul gave the highest priority to resolution of the Croatian question but was aware that Maček would not negotiate with Stojadinović. Shortly after the election, minister Bogoljub Kujundžić gave a speech in the Assembly claiming Serbs were superior to Croats and Slovenes prompting five ministers to resign. Prince Paul did not allow Stojadinović to nominate another cabinet – instead he appointed Dragiša Cvetković the prime minister, tasking him with negotiating with Maček. HSS was simultaneously negotiating with Cvetković and with Italy – receiving Italian promises of support if the HSS started an uprising – in return for territorial concessions and turning over defence and foreign relations of Croatia to Italy. In talks with Cvetković, Maček asked for federal reorganisation of Yugoslavia, but the proposal was turned down. Instead, they agreed on a dualist formula modelled on Austria-Hungary where Banovina of Croatia would be established from Sava and Primorje banovinas and other territories to be determined by a series of plebiscites. After Prince Paul vetoed the arrangement objecting to the plebiscites,[123] Maček resumed contacts with Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano. Shortly thereafter, Cvetković and Maček restarted talks and came to an agreement on borders of Banovina of Croatia. Prince Paul accepted the new arrangement and the Cvetković–Maček Agreement was signed on 26 August 1939.[124] After the agreement, the state no longer insisted on National Oneness,[125] and abandoned Yugoslavism as official ideology.[126]

Synthetic culture[]

Ivan Meštrović was nicknamed the "Prophet of Yugoslavism" for of his contribution to the 1911 International Exhibition of Art in Rome.

There was no unitary Yugoslav culture.[127] The pre-First World War cultural Yugoslavism was largely confined to Croat writers and artists.[128] The central model of cultural unification espoused by 19th century Yugoslavist thinkers involved coalescing around Serbian culture, but this concept was largely abandoned by 1900.[129] In 1911, at the International Exhibition of Art in Rome, Croat and Serb artists from Austria-Hungary chose to exhibit in the Serbian pavilion to allow themselves greater presence than possible in a pavilion shared with the rest of the empire. Eighteen of them contributed 203 works out of total of 236 exhibited in the pavilion – nearly half of that number Ivan Meštrović's sculptures. This established him as the "Prophet of Yugoslavism" even though his works or contemporary works of other artists such as Jozo Kljaković did not particularly incorporate any South Slavic elements in interpretation of national themes, but personal interpretations of Art Nouveau.[130]

The aftermath of the First World War dampened the enthusiasm for unification of Yugoslav culture and such attempts were generally rejected by postwar writers and artists. The most vocal critic of unitary culture was writer Antun Branko Šimić. Some, like Miroslav Krleža, and August Cesarec turned to radical socialism and criticised monarchist and bourgeoise Yugoslavia. This group was joined in the critique by those, like Tin Ujević, who went through a phase of supporting the cultural unification. Finally, nearly all Croat writers and artists associated with pre-war Yugoslavism abandoned the ideology, with few exceptions such as Ivo Andrić, and Niko Bartulović.[131][132] As the Yugoslavism in general and Yugoslavist synthetic culture in particular lost support in the interwar period, even Meštrović (and to a lesser degree Andrić) drew criticism. In Croatia, Meštrović's works portraying Serbian cultural figures were resented, while in Serbia he was criticised because those same figures were not depicted wearing Serbian military hats and peasant shoes.[133]

Religious centralisation and conflict[]

King Alexander pursued unification in the religious matters too. He incorporated the Montenegrin Orthodox Church into the structure of the Serbian patriarchate in 1920. Ten years later, the king revoked the Habsburg-era statute allowing autonomous administration of Islamic religious affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, he ordered the seat of the Reis-ul-ulema moved from Sarajevo to Belgrade. When the sitting Reis-ul-ulema refused and resigned in protest, the king appointed a pro-regime politician  [bs] to the post.[134]

The Roman Catholic Church structures in the country refused to bend to the king's will. Instead, the regime sought to reduce its power in the country through disproportionately low subsidies, promotion of the Old Catholic Church as a rival, and downplaying the historical role of the Roman Catholic Church in school curricula while stressing the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The latter accepted the role it was given by the regime and publicly accused the Roman Catholics and the Roman Catholic Church of threatening sovereignty of Yugoslavia. Various forms of pressure were applied to Roman Catholics to convert to Orthodoxy and thousands did so.[135] By late 1930s, the Concordat was negotiated between the Holy See and Yugoslavia – only to be shelved by the regime following protests from the Serbian Orthodox Church. Following the protests, the Roman Catholic Church felt rejected by the regime and deemed Yugoslavia an agency of hostile Serbian Orthodox Church.[136]

Socialist Yugoslavism[]

Federalism and conflict with Stalin[]

Josip Broz Tito was the leader of the Communist Party-ruled socialist Yugoslavia.

Following the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941, the KPJ launched armed resistance,[137] which spread, by the end of 1941 to all areas of the country except Macedonia.[138] Building on experience in clandestine operation, the KPJ organised the Yugoslav Partisans,[139] as resistance fighters led by Josip Broz Tito.[140] In November 1942, the Partisans established a pan-Yugoslav assembly – the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). It adopted the federalist approach to state building,[141] and acknowledged the failure of integral Yugoslavism.[142] AVNOJ's decision was confirmed by the Tito–Šubašić Agreements with the royal Yugoslav government-in-exile in 1944 and 1945 – and the government-in-exile with was replaced by the Provisional Government of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia with Tito as the Prime Minister.[143] Official policy of the KPJ was that national identities would be replaced by a supranational Yugoslav working class identity. Postwar socialist Yugoslavia was centralised, with a formal commitment to weak federalism.[144] 1946 Yugoslav Constitution was proclaimed by reading quarters of the document in Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian languages – but it specified no official language.[145]

Tito's foreign policy sought to integrate Albania into the Yugoslav federation, support the Greek communist guerrillas,[146] and broaden ties with Bulgaria–potentially uniting the countries. Conclusion of the 1947 Bled Agreement with Bulgaria,[147] and imminent deployment of the Yugoslav Army to Albania prompted a political confrontation with the Soviet Union.[148] The clash culminated with the Tito–Stalin split in 1948. For political reasons, the rift was presented as ideological rather than geopolitical one.[149] In response, the KPJ purged real and perceived Soviet supporters and regime opponents.[150] Tito understood that the Yugoslav government had to differ from the interwar centralism and Soviet-style socialism,[151] therefore the KPJ gradually moved away from party centralism, introducing self-management. This led to debates about the level of (de)centralisation and a power-struggle which increasingly equated the struggle for centralism with unitarism and Serbian interests at the expense of other republics of Yugoslavia.[152] The KPJ proclaimed shift of its role from a ruler to a leader, decentralised its structure, and rebranded itself as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) at its sixth congress in 1952.[153]

Yugoslavist campaign[]

Vice President of Yugoslavia Aleksandar Ranković supported integral Yugoslavism until the 1960s.

In 1953, Tito was convinced Yugoslav nations would merge. When SKJ ideologue Milovan Đilas pointed out that king Alexander thought the same, Tito insisted that socialism made the difference. Between 1957 and 1966, the political conflict developed with factions allied with the Foreign Minister Edvard Kardelj (a Slovene) and the Yugoslav vice-president and Tito's likely successor Aleksandar Ranković (a Serb).[154] Ranković supported integral Yugoslavism,[155] claiming that South Slavic unity stemmed from ethnic relatedness. Kardelj thought that Yugoslav nations were primarily bound by common interests of struggle against imperialism.[154]

In 1958, the SKJ became more centralised by revoking many powers given to its republican branches. The party programme published at the 7th Congress praised emerging Yugoslav consciousness and a series of articles was published advocating creation of unified Yugoslav culture. This followed introduction of the option of declaring one's ethnicity as Yugoslav in the 1953 census,[156] and the régime-sponsored 1954 Novi Sad Agreement between cultural organisations Matica srpska and Matica hrvatska on the single Serbo-Croatian language.[157] The socialist Yugoslavism campaign sought to replace federalism with unitarism,[158] but proponents of the socialist Yugoslavism stopped short of declaring an intention of nation-building.[159]

The regime promoted the notions of "socialist Yugoslav consciousness",[160] and "Yugoslav socialist patriotism" as the feeling or awareness and love of the socialist self-management community as concepts unrelated to nationalism and ethnicity. The Yugoslav social patriotism was also claimed to support values and traditions of ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia rather than aimed at creating a new Yugoslav nation.[161][160] Tito endorsed the concept of "organic Yugoslavism" as a harmonious symbiosis of national specificities and affection for the Yugoslav federation as a community.[155]

The intra-SKJ debate over future of the federation took place by proxy: Dobrica Ćosić was representing pro-centralisation views he attributed to leading Serbian communist Jovan Veselinov and Tito. The opposing argument was championed by Slovene communist writer Dušan Pirjevec backed by Slovene communist leader Boris Kraigher. Ćosić claimed pursuit of republican interests leads to disintegration of Yugoslavia and threatens Serbs outside Serbia, and Pirjevec accused Ćosić of unitarism and Serbs generally of expansionism.[162]

The Ćosić–Pirjevec debate mirrored interpretations of the Partisan-era "brotherhood and unity". The motto was used for wartime mobilisation largely in place of revolutionary slogans.[163] After the war, the KPJ/SKJ used it to stress the party's role of establishing brotherhood and unity among nations of Yugoslavia, especially Serbs and Croats.[164] However, it was generally interpreted by the Serbs as meaning the Yugoslav nations are true siblings, while Croats, Slovenes, and others largely interpreted the motto as implying the nations were friendly relatives living in unity.[165]

Defeat of centralist forces[]

Edvard Kardelj persuaded Josip Broz Tito to remove Aleksandar Ranković from his political functions in 1966.

The Yugoslavist campaign was publicly criticised through an exchange of letters published in SKJ organ Borba. Campaign proponents, largely ethnic Serbs, were accused of plotting to abolish the federation and resurrect Greater Serbian chauvinism.[166] Most opposition came from SKJ branches in Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina.[167] In early 1963, Tito felt compelled to publicly warn about chauvinism and reassure non-Serbs that no of nations was intended, but he still defended Yugoslavism. In 1964, at the 8th Congress of the SKJ, Tito and Kardelj criticised proponents of merger of the Yugoslav nations as advocates of bureaucratic centralisation, unitarism, and hegemony. Yugoslavism was not mentioned again at the Congress, and the SKJ transferred some of its powers to its republican branches.[166] The SKJ regime abandoned Yugoslavism in favour of decentralisation.[168][169] Siding with the Kardelj's ideas meant that only Tito was permitted to defend Yugoslavism. All other supporters were dismissed by the SKJ leadership as a unitarists.[170]

In the spring of 1966, Kardelj persuaded Tito to remove Ranković from the SKJ central committee and the position of the vice president of Yugoslavia. Ranković was accused of plotting to seize power, ignoring the decisions of the 8th Congress, and abusing the State Security Administration directly or through allies.[171] He was accused of illegally wire-tapping SKJ leadership, including Tito,[172] removed from official posts, and expelled from the SKJ.[171] The SKJ replaced Ranković in all his former posts with Serbs, but his ouster was generally perceived in Serbia as a Serbian defeat, resulting in resentment.[173] Republican leaderships, including that of Serbia, supported Kardelj against Ranković because none of them could effectively influence federal government on their own, especially with Tito in control. They saw the ouster as an opportunity to limit future federal power by eliminating the possibility of anyone inheriting Tito's authority.[174]

Croatian Spring[]

Photograph of the front page of the Telegram newspaper
The Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language was first published in the literary newspaper Telegram.

In 1967 and 1968, the Yugoslav constitution was amended, reducing federal authority in favour of the constituent republics.[175] This was shortly followed by appointment of new leadership of the Serbian SKJ branch – favouring economic reforms and a policy of non-interference in other republics' affairs.[176] At the 9th congress of the SKJ in 1969 Croatian and Macedonian branches pressured the SKJ to adopt the principle of unanimity in decision-making, obtaining a veto power for the republican branches.[177] Further Croatian economic demands centred on contributing less tax to the federal budget,[178] and addressing underrepresentation of Croats in the police, security forces, and the military, as well as in political and economic institutions throughout Yugoslavia.[179] By the end of the 1960s, economic relations between Croatia and federal government were increasingly framed by Croatian media and authorities as an ethnic struggle.[180] The situation was worsened by a genuine perception among Croatian nationalists of cultural and demographic threats to Croatian national sentiment, language, and territory of Croatia.[181][182]

A major point of contention were first two volumes of the Dictionary of Serbo-Croatian Literary and Vernacular Language based on the Novi Sad Agreement published in 1967. They sparked controversy about whether Croatian was a separate language: The dictionary excluded common Croatian expressions or treated them as local dialect while Serbian variants were presented as the standard. The unrelated 1966 Serbo-Croatian dictionary published by  [sr] further inflamed the situation by omitting the term "Croat" from the vocabulary. The Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language issued by 130 Croatian linguists in response criticised the 1967 dictionary and called for formal recognition of Croatian as a separate and official language in Croatia. The declaration marked the beginning of the four-year long period of increased Croatian nationalism commonly referred to as the Croatian Spring.[183] Matica srpska took position that Croatian was only a dialect of Serbian and Matica hrvatska withdrew from the Novi Sad Agreement in 1970. It went on to publish a new Croatian dictionary and orthography, which was condemned by Serbia,[184][185] but endorsed by the Croatian branch of the SKJ.[182]

In December 1971, the Croatian Spring was suppressed by Tito, and the Croatian leadership compelled to resign.[186] Purges targeting politicians, officials, media professionals, writers, filmmakers, and university staff continued until late 1972.[187] In early 1972, reformists were removed or forced to resign in Slovenia, Macedonia, and Serbia.[188] Nonetheless, the reformist achievements were preserved, as the 1974 Constitution.[189]

Breakup of Yugoslavia[]

Dimitrij Rupel, editor and an author of the Contributions to the Slovene National Program identified Yugoslavism as a threat to Slovenian identity.

In 1987, editors of Slovene Nova Revija Niko Grafenauer, and Dimitrij Rupel published the Contributions to the Slovene National Program as a special edition of the magazine. In a series of articles, anti-communist intellectuals argued for independence of Slovenia and identified Yugoslavism as the main threat to Slovenian identity. Most of the Slovenia's population backed this view.[190] Those views were supported by Slovene non-communist DEMOS coalition which won the 1990 Slovene parliamentary elections. Croatian reformed League of Communists tried to mediate in conflict between Slovenia and Slobodan Milošević-led Serbia by formulating a compromise. In the weeks that separated the Slovene and Croatian parliamentary election, this was seen in Croatia as weakness and boosted popularity of nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) led by Franjo Tuđman as a counterweight to displays of expansionist Serbian nationalism. HDZ, advocated the end of Yugoslavism as "compulsory brotherhood" instead of dismantling Yugoslavia.[191]

Lacking international support for independence, the Slovene and Croatian leaderships proposed a confederal reform of Yugoslavia, but diverging circumstances made Croatian–Slovene cooperation difficult. Slovenia had no large Slovenian populations in other parts of Yugoslavia and therefore no reason to negotiate with others. Milošević and his allies in the Yugoslav Presidency chaired by Borisav Jović had different approaches to the two republics since Slovenia, unlike Croatia, had no sizable Serb minority – and told Slovenian authorities they supported Slovenian independence while Croatia saw Serb revolt known as the Log Revolution.[192] Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia negotiated about preserving Yugoslavia – the first two proposing a confederal system – only because it was politically difficult to be openly anti-Yugoslav. This was the result of pressure to preserve Yugoslavia in some form by the international community.[193] The confederal reform proposal became increasingly unfeasible as it was rejected by Milošević who proposed recentralisation of Yugoslavia instead,[194] by re-establishing the political system in existence before the fall of Ranković in 1966.[195] In 1988–1994, Yugoslavist ideas proposed by Serb intellectuals, but they were abandoned as unfeasible.[196]

See also[]

  • Austro-Slavism – political concept promoting cooperation of all the Slavs in Austria-Hungary
  • Czechoslovakism – ideology advocating existence of a unified Czechoslovak nation
  • Pan-Slavism – ideology advocating universal unity of Slavs
  • Serbian–Montenegrin unionism – ideology advocating unity of the Serbs and the Motntenegrins in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the successor State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
  • Yugo-nostalgia – concept described as nostalgic emotional attachment to some aspects of the socialist Yugoslavia after its breakup

Notes[]

  1. ^ Serbo-Croatian: јugoslavizam / југославизам; Slovene: јugoslavizem; Macedonian: југословизмот
  2. ^ Serbian: југословенство / jugoslovenstvo; Croatian: jugoslavenstvo; Slovene: јugoslovanstvo; Macedonian: југословенството
  3. ^ Coined by compounding Croatian language nouns Jug and Slaveni meaning South and Slavs respectively[8]
  4. ^ Serbo-Croatian: Narodno jedinstvo

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  120. ^ Ramet 2006, pp. 91–92.
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  157. ^ Rusinow 2003, p. 19.
  158. ^ Ramet 2006, p. 216.
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  162. ^ Miller 2007, pp. 182–183.
  163. ^ Rusinow 2007, p. 131.
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  181. ^ Ramet 2006, pp. 229–230.
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  184. ^ Ramet 2006, p. 232.
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  187. ^ Ramet 2006, p. 259.
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  189. ^ Rusinow 2007, p. 144.
  190. ^ Jović 2007, pp. 260–261.
  191. ^ Jović 2007, pp. 261–263.
  192. ^ Jović 2007, pp. 263–266.
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  194. ^ Jović 2007, pp. 268–269.
  195. ^ Jović 2003, p. 180.
  196. ^ Pavković 2003, pp. 259–265.

Sources[]

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