Territorial disputes in the South China Sea

Territorial claims in the South China Sea

South China Sea claims and agreements

Map of various national outposts in the Spratly Islands

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims by several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually,^[1] which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade.^[2] 80 percent of China's energy imports and 39.5 percent of China's total trade passes through the South China Sea.^[1]

The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. There are further disputes, such as the waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which many do not regard as part of the South China Sea.^[3] Claimant states are interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing stocks, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping lanes. Maritime security is also an issue, as the ongoing disputes present challenges for shipping.^[4]

In 2013, the PRC began island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands region.^[5] According to Reuters, island building in the South China Sea primarily by Vietnam and the Philippines has been going on for decades; while China has come late to the island building game, its efforts have been on an unprecedented scale as it had from 2014 to 2016 constructed more new island surface than all other nations have constructed throughout history and as of 2016 placed military equipment on one of its artificial islands unlike the other claimants.^[6] A 2019 article in Voice of America that compared China and Vietnam's island building campaign in the South China Sea similarly noted that the reason why Vietnam in contradistinction to China has been subject to little international criticism and even support was because of the slower speed and widely perceived defensive nature of its island-building project.^[7]

China's actions in the South China Sea have been described as part of its "salami slicing"/"cabbage wrapping" strategies,^[8][9] and since 2015 the United States and other states such as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the region.^[10] In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims in Philippines v. China.^[11] The tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries.^[12][13] Both the People's Republic of China and the country of Taiwan stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants.^[14] On 17 September 2020, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint note verbale recognizing the PCA ruling and challenging China's claims.^[15]

Disputes in the South China Sea region[]

The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and islands.^[16] There are several disputes, each of which involves a different collection of countries:

1. The nine-dash line area claimed by the Republic of China (1912–1949), later the People's Republic of China (PRC), which covers most of the South China Sea and overlaps with the exclusive economic zone claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
2. Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
3. Maritime boundary north of Borneo between the PRC, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, and Taiwan.
4. Islands, reefs, banks and shoals in the South China Sea, including the Paracel Islands, Pratas Island and the Vereker Banks, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and parts of the area also contested by Malaysia and the Philippines.
5. Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna Islands between the PRC, Indonesia and Taiwan^[17]
6. Maritime boundary off the coast of Palawan and Luzon between the PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
7. Maritime boundary, land territory, and the islands of Sabah, including Ambalat, between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
8. Maritime boundary and islands in the Luzon Strait between the PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

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Location of the major islands in Spratly Islands

Legend：
 Republic of China 1：Taiping 2：Zhongzhou
 People's Republic of China 1：Yongshu 2：Meiji 3：Zhubi 4：Huayang 5：Nanxun 6：Chiguo 7：Dongmen
 Vietnam 1：Southwest Cay 2：Sand Cay 3：Namyit Island 4：Sin Cowe Island 5：Spratly Island 6：Amboyna Cay 7： [zh]
8： [zh] 9： [zh] 10： [zh] 11： [zh] 12：Ladd Reef 13： [zh]
14： [zh] 15： [zh] 16： [zh] 17：Cornwallis South Reef 18： [zh] 19： [zh]
20：Collins Reef 21： [zh] 22：Bombay Castle 23： [zh] 24： [zh] 25： [zh]
26： [zh] 27： [zh] 28： [zh] 29： [zh]
 Philippines 1：Flat Island 2：Lankiam Cay 3：Loaita Cay 4：Loaita Island 5：Nanshan Island 6：Northeast Cay 7：Thitu Island
8：West York Island 9：Commodore Reef 10：Irving Reef 11：Second Thomas Reef
 Malaysia 1：Swallow Reef 2：Ardasier Reef 3：Dallas Reef 4：Erica Reef 5：Investigator Shoal 6：Mariveles Reef

 Brunei 1：Louisa Reef

History[]

South-east facing aerial view of PRC-settled Woody Island. The island is also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam.

By May 1939, the Japanese had laid claim and occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands.^[18] During World War II, the Empire of Japan used the islands in the South China Sea for various military purposes and asserted that the islands were not claimed by anyone when the Imperial Japanese Navy took control of them.^[19][20] Historical accounts note that at least France had controlled some of the features in the region during the 1930s.^[21] After the war, Imperial Japan had to relinquish control of the islands in the South China Sea in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco which, however, did not specify the new status of the islands.^[22] The People's Republic of China made various claims to the islands during the 1951 treaty negotiations and the 1958 First Taiwan Strait Crisis.^[23]

Chinese claims in the South China sea are delineated in part by the nine-dash line. This was originally an "eleven-dashed-line," first indicated by the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947, for its claims to the South China Sea. When the Communist Party of China took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China in 1949, the line was adopted and revised to nine dashes/dots, as endorsed by Zhou Enlai.^[24] China's 1958 declaration described China's claims in the South China Sea islands based on the nine-dotted line map.^[25] The legacy of the nine-dash line is viewed by some PRC government officials, and by the PRC military, as providing historical support for their claims to the South China Sea.^[26]

The Geneva Accords of 1954,^[27] which ended the First Indochina War, gave South Vietnam control of the Vietnamese territories south of the 17th Parallel, which included the islands in the Paracels and Spratlys.^[28]

In 1974, when a North Vietnamese victory in the Vietnam War began to seem probable, the PRC used military force in the Paracel Islands and took Yagong Island and the Crescent group of reefs from South Vietnam.^[21][29] The government of the PRC wanted to prevent the Paracel islands from falling under the control of North Vietnam, which at the time was an ally of the Soviet Union and, after not resisting during the initial Vietnamese attack, launched what they regarded as a "counterattack in self-defense".^[29] The United States, in the middle of détente with the PRC, gave a non-involvement promise to the PRC, which enabled the People's Liberation Army Navy to take control of the South Vietnamese islands.^[30]

In the later half of 1970s, the Philippines and Malaysia began referring to the Spratly Islands as included in their own territory.^[31] On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 1596, declaring the north-western part of the Spratly Islands (referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island Group) as Philippine territory.^[31]

In 1988, PRC and Vietnam fought each other near the Johnson Reef.^[32] The PRC had obtained a permit from the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission to build five observation posts for the conduction of ocean surveys, and one of the permitted observation posts was allowed to be located in the Spratly islands region.^[33] The PRC chose to built its observation post on the Fiery Cross Reef, which was isolated from the other islands in the region and was not occupied by any state at the time. When it started to build the observation post in the terra nullius Fiery Cross Reef, Vietnam sent its navy to the area to monitor the situation.^[34] The two states clashed near the Johnson Reef, and after the clash, China occupied the Johnson Reef.^[33]

Fiery Cross Reef being transformed by the PRC in May 2015

In 1994, the PRC occupied Mischief Reef, located some 250 miles from the Philippine coast. Occupation was made in the middle of an energy resources race in the Spratlys, where China lacked a presence while the other countries were starting their oil exploration businesses.^[34] Mischief Reef marked the first time when the PRC had a military confrontation with the Philippines,^[35] an ally of the United States.

The occupation and/or control of most parts of the Spratly and Paracel islands has not changed significantly since the middle of 1990s.^{[36][circular reference]} The PRC controls all of the features in the Paracels. In the Spratlys, Vietnam controls most features with 29 in total, while the Philippines has control of eight features, Malaysia with 5, the PRC with 5, and the ROC with 1. Balance of power in the Spratlys has greatly shifted since 2013, when the PRC started its island building activities in the region.^[5]

In 2012, the PRC took the Scarborough Shoal as a response to the Philippine navy's actions of stopping Chinese fishing boats in the area.^[37][38]

In September 2018, a South Korean navy destroyer traveled into what China sees as its territorial waters and a violation of Chinese law requiring permission to enter waters within 12-nautical-mile-wide of the Paracel Islands. A South Korean government official said the navy destroyer was taking refuge from a typhoon and not challenging maritime claims, though declined to comment on whether South Korea believes these disputed waters belong to China.^[39]

On 22 December 2020, the PRC claimed that the guided missile destroyer John S McCain had been "expelled" after it “trespassed” into Chinese territorial waters close to the Spratly Islands.^[40] However this claim has been disputed by the US Navy.^[41]

In March 2021, 220 Chinese fishing boats were seen moored around Whitsun Reef in the Spratly Islands, a reef claimed by the Philippines as part of its exclusive economic zone. Philippines Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana accused China of "provocative action of militarizing the area".^[42]

2011 agreement[]

On 20 July 2011, the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam agreed a set of preliminary guidelines on the implementation of the DOC (Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) which would help resolve disputes.^[43] This set of guidelines is based on an earlier agreement, also called DOC, from 2002, between China and the ASEAN Member States.^[44]

The agreement was described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, as "an important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries".^[43] Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects such as "marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime", although the issue of oil and natural gas drilling remains unresolved. "Following the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), China and ASEAN countries actively advanced the consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea,"^[45] with the forecast that the COC will be completed by 2021.^[46]

Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil exploration[]

On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the PLA Navy and stating that the ship was entering PRC waters.^[47][48] A spokesperson for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft was visible, the INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."^[47]

In September 2011, shortly after the PRC and Vietnam signed an agreement seeking to contain a dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited, had signed a three-year agreement with PetroVietnam for developing long-term co-operation in the oil sector, and that it had accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea. However, this agreement between India and Vietnam has provoked attacks from the PRC^[49] In response, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, without referring to India by name, stated:

"As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute."^[50][51]

An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and we have conveyed this to the Chinese."^[50] The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times.^[49][51]

Chinese policy on the South China Sea[]

In Spring 2010, PRC officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea was "an area of 'core interest' that is as non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on the national agenda. However, Beijing appeared to have backed away from that assertion in 2011.^[52][53][54]

In October 2011, the PRC's Global Times tabloid, published by the Communist Party's People's Daily group, editorialised on the South China Sea territorial disputes under the banner "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". The article referenced incidents earlier that year involving the Philippines and South Korea detaining PRC fishing boats in the region. "If these countries don't want to change their ways with China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved."^[55] Responding to questions about whether this reflected official policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated the country's commitment "to resolving the maritime dispute through peaceful means."^[56]

In July 2014, Professor Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales was reported as saying that the Chinese government appeared to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed waters as a matter of policy.^[57]

From 2013 to the beginning of 2018, China carried out land reclamation in the South China Sea. The construction of the islands has been completed. The three island airports of Meiji Reef, Zhubi Reef, and Yongshu Reef have been completed.^[58][59]

In August 2019, China's paramount leader Xi Jinping told Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte that China would not recognise or abide by the Arbitration decision. This occurred during a visit by Duterte to Beijing, with discussions between the two leaders.^[60] Such a stance by Beijing is in line with the July 2019 publishing of a Chinese White Paper, "China's National Defense in the New Era," which details China's armed strength and repeatedly mentions deployment in the South China Sea.^[61] On 22 September 2020, in a recorded speech at the opening of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, the Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte reaffirmed the Hague ruling rejecting most of China's claims to disputed waters, and said "The award is now part of international law, beyond compromise and beyond the reach of passing governments to dilute, diminish, or abandon." ^[62]

Oil and gas development[]

The area is said to be rich in oil and natural gas deposits; however, the estimates are highly varied. The Chinese Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining estimated that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion barrels of crude oil,^[63] compared to the oil rich country of Kuwait which has 13 billion barrels. In the years following the announcement by the PRC ministry, the claims regarding the South China Sea islands intensified. However, other sources claim that the proven reserves of oil in the South China Sea may only be 7.5 billion barrels, or about 1.1 billion barrels.^[64] According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s profile of the South China Sea region, a US Geological Survey estimate puts the region's discovered and undiscovered oil reserves at 11 billion barrels, as opposed to a PRC figure of 125 billion barrels.^[65] The same EIA report also points to the wide variety of natural gas resource estimations, ranging from 190 trillion cubic feet to 500 trillion cubic feet, likely located in the contested Reed Bank".^[65]

The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion RMB (US$30 billion) in the next 20 years to exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25 million metric tons of crude oil and natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the next five years.^{[citation needed]}

Competing claims in the oil and gas-rich South China Sea have stifled the development and exploitation of these resources. To break from this, the Philippines and China agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development in November 2018, where joint-use of, and not ownership over assets underlies the agreement. In the past, aggressive Chinese naval patrols deterred Manila from exploring gas deposits in disputed waters, like the Reed Bank, such that this type of agreement may allow for the claimant states to jointly develop the natural gas in the offshore area. The mechanism of joint agreements is not new, with Malaysia and Vietnam having forged a similar mechanism in 1992, while Malaysia and Thailand reached understandings in 1979 and 1990 over the development of gas-rich disputed waters.^[66]

Philippines[]

The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the area began in Reed Bank/Tablemount.^[67] In 1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a well.^[68] However, the PRC's complaints halted the exploration.^{[citation needed]} On 27 March 1984, the first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an island province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea.^[69] These oil fields supply 15% of annual oil consumption in the Philippines.^[70]

Vietnam[]

Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the South China Sea.^{[citation needed]} By 2012 Vietnam had concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration and production contracts with various foreign companies.^[71] In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil field in the South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year, followed by "The Bear" and "Dragon" oil fields.^[72] Offshore exploration activities in 2011 increased Vietnam's proven oil reserves to be the third largest in the Asia-Pacific region.^[73] However, the country is a net importer of oil products.^[74] In 2009 petroleum accounted for 14 percent of Vietnamese government income, down from 24 percent in 2004.^[75]

In 2017, after Chinese pressure, the Vietnamese government ordered Spain's Repsol to stop drilling in the disputed area.^[76][77] A joint-venture of Japanese Inpex and Petrovietnam plans to start drilling in the disputed area in 2021.^[78]

China[]

China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China Sea is the Ocean Oil 981 (海洋石油981). The major shareholders are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (19%), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (14%), T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and affiliates (6%), and BlackRock, Inc. (5%).^[79] It began operation on 9 May 2012 in the South China Sea, 320 kilometres (200 mi) southeast of Hong Kong, at a depth of 1,500 m and employing 160 people.^[80] On 2 May 2014 the platform was moved near to the Paracel Islands,^[81] a move Vietnam stated violated their territorial claims.^[82] Chinese officials said it was legal, stating the area lies in waters surrounding the Paracel Islands which China occupies and militarily controls.^[83]

China has attributed^[timeframe?] a large portion of its military budget, $200 million, to the development of CQB missiles as a demonstration of their de facto sovereignty in the South China Sea.^{[citation needed]}

Incidents involving fishermen[]

Prior to the territorial disputes, fishermen from involved countries tended to enter each other's controlled islands and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) leading to conflicts with the authorities that controlled the areas as they were unaware of the exact borders. As well, due to depletion of the fishing resources in their maritime areas, they were forced to fish in the neighbouring countries' areas.^[84][85][86]

A Taiwanese fisherman was machine gunned to death by the coast guard of the Philippines in May 2013.^[87][88]

In the spring of 2014, China and Vietnam clashed again over China's Haiyang Shiyou oil rig in Vietnam's EEZ. The incident left seventeen Vietnamese^{[clarification needed]} injured and damaged ships of both countries.^[89]

Although Indonesia is not part of claims in the South China Sea dispute, after Joko Widodo became President of the country in 2014, he instituted a policy in 2015 that, if any foreign fishermen were caught illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, their vessels would be destroyed. The president wanted to make maritime resources, especially fisheries, a key component of his administration's economic policy.^[90][91] Since the policy's initiation, fishing vessels drawing from many neighbouring countries were destroyed by Indonesian authorities. On 21 May 2015, around 41 fishing vessels from China, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines were destroyed.^[92] On 19 March 2016, the China Coast Guard prevented the detention of Chinese fishermen by Indonesian authorities after Chinese fishermen were caught fishing near the waters around Natuna, leading to a protest by Indonesian authorities; the Chinese ambassador was subsequently summonsed as China had considered the areas to be "Chinese traditional fishing grounds".^[93][94] Further Indonesian campaigns against foreign fishermen resulted in the destruction of 23 fishing boats from Malaysia and Vietnam on 5 April 2016.^[95]

Until late 2016, most fishing vessels blown up by Indonesian authorities were Vietnamese fishing vessels.^[96][97] Although Indonesian authorities increased their patrols to detect foreign fishing vessels, the areas in the South China Sea had already become known for Indonesian pirates, with frequent attacks on Malaysian, Singaporean and Vietnamese vessels as well as leading to hijacking such as the MT Orkim Harmony and MT Zafirah hijacking incidents. The continuing war against foreign fishermen by Indonesia led to protests by Vietnam in late 2016, when a Vietnamese fisherman was killed after being shot by Indonesian authorities.^[85][86] Attacks have also come from Filipino and Moro pirates arriving from the Sulu Sea; a Vietnamese fisherman was killed by Filipino pirates in late 2015.^[98]

Teodoro Locsin Jr., the Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs, said the Philippines was building a maritime fleet that could swarm areas in the South China Sea.^[99] He said the fleet build up was because of China which was also doing the same thing.^[99] He also said if one of the vessels got hit, the Filipino defense treaty with the United States would also be activated.^[99]

Security summits[]

The Shangri-La Dialogue serves as the "Track One" exchange forum on security issues surrounding the Asia-Pacific region. The South China Sea territorial disputes has dominated proceedings at the conference in recent years.^{[100][101][102]} The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific is the "Track Two" forum for dialogue on security issues.^[103][104]

In February 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama initiated the US-ASEAN Summit at Sunnylands in Rancho Mirage, California for closer engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea were a major topic, but its joint statement, the "Sunnylands Declaration", did not name the South China Sea, instead calling for "respect of each nation's sovereignty and for international law". Analysts believe it indicates divisions within the group on how to respond to China's maritime strategy.^[105][106]

Non-claimant views[]

Third-party analysis[]

Sinologist asserts that the bulk of international experts weigh against the validity of Chinese claims in the South China Sea.^[107]

Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji said in a journal article that when it came to China's advance in the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands, the assumption amongst many Japanese people that the territory of the Philippines was being invaded was incorrect. According to him, "in the 1898 Treaty of Paris in which Spain ceded the Philippines to the US, the object of cession was east of 118 degrees longitude (116 in the South); and the Spratly Islands fall outside (West) of that line. The US therefore did not claim these islands to be the US territory when in 1938 Japan declared them to be Japanese territory and incorporated them as connected to Taiwan under the name of ‘Shinnan Gunto’. The Japanese government now considers the territorial status of these islands ‘undetermined.’"^[108]

UNCLOS tribunal[]

In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an internationally agreed arbitration tribunal sitting in the Hague and constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ruled comprehensively against the Peoples Republic of China's South China Sea maritime claims in Philippines v. China.^[109] This tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands^[110] or delimit maritime boundaries.^[12][13]

However, both mainland China and Taiwan stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants.^[111] On 17 September 2020, France, Germany and the UK issued a joint note verbale recognizing the PCA ruling and challenging Chinese claims.^[112]

Australia[]

Ships of the Malaysian, Singapore, British, Australian and New Zealand Navy in the South China Sea during Exercise Bersama Lima, 2018

On 25 July 2020 Australia rejected China's claims to the South China Sea and filed a statement with the United Nations that said: "Australia rejects any claims to internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf based on such baselines," and there is "no legal basis" to draw the nine-dash line around the Four Sha archipelagos, Paracel and Spratly Islands or low-tide maritime zones. They encourage the claimants to resolve their disputes peacefully.^[113]

Cambodia[]

Cambodia has backed China over the dispute in ASEAN meetings, preventing consensus over unified ASEAN action.^[114] Anti-Vietnamese sentiment due to Vietnam's conquest of previously Cambodian lands, giving the Vietnamese a privileged status and encouragement of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia during French colonial rule, and the occupation of Cambodia after the ousting of the Khmer Rouge has led to anti-Vietnamese feelings against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and against Vietnam, and in turn has led to pro-China sentiment among the Cambodian government and the Cambodian opposition, including in the South China Sea.^[115]

India[]

India says that the South China Sea was "part of global commons and India has an abiding interest in peace and stability in the region... We firmly stand for the freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in these international waterways, in accordance with international law, notably UNCLOS." This was seen as largely backing the US position.^[116]

Indonesia[]

Since early in the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia has repeatedly asserted its position as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute,^[117] and often positioned itself as an "honest broker".^[118] However, parts of China's unilaterally claimed nine-dash line overlap Indonesia's exclusive economic zone near the Natuna islands. Although China has acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty over the Natuna islands,^[119] the PRC has argued that the waters around the Natuna islands are Chinese "traditional fishing grounds". Indonesia quickly dismissed China's claim, asserting that China's nine-dash line claim over parts of the Natuna islands has no legal basis.^[120] In November 2015, Indonesia's security chief Luhut Panjaitan said Indonesia could take China before an international court.^[121] Indonesia filed a comment with the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding China's claim in the case of Philippines v. China.

Chinese fishing vessels – often escorted by Chinese coastguard ships – have repeatedly been reported to have breached Indonesian waters near the Natuna islands. On 19 March 2016, for example, Indonesian authorities tried to capture a Chinese trawler accused of illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, and arrested the Chinese crew. They were prevented from towing the boat to harbour by a Chinese coast guard vessel which reportedly "rammed" the trawler in Indonesian waters. "To prevent anything else occurring, the Indonesian authorities let go of the Chinese boat and then left toward Natuna, still with eight fishermen and the captain on board," said Arrmanatha Nasir, a spokesman for Indonesia's Foreign Ministry. Indonesia still has the Chinese crew in custody.^[122] On 21 March 2016, minister for fisheries and maritime affairs Susi Pudjiastuti summoned the Chinese ambassador, Xie Feng, and discussed this matter.^[122] Indonesia insists that they have the right to prosecute the Chinese trawler crew, despite Beijing's demand to release their eight fishermen. Arif Havas Oegroseno, the government official of maritime security, said that the Chinese claim of "traditional fishing grounds" was not recognised under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This incident prompted security minister Luhut Pandjaitan to deploy more troops and patrol boats, and to strengthen the Ranai naval base in the area.^[123]

Following the clashes, on 23 June 2016, Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited the Natuna islands on a warship to demonstrate Indonesia's authority. He led a high-level delegation, which included the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and state ministers. Security Minister Luhut Panjaitan said it was meant to send a "clear message" that Indonesia was "very serious in its effort to protect its sovereignty".^[124]

Following the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on 12 July 2016, Indonesia called on all parties involved in the territorial dispute to exercise self-restraint and to respect applicable international laws.^[125]

Indonesia challenged the Chinese nine-dash historical claim by arguing that if the historical claims can be used on presenting the territorial naval claims, Indonesia might also use its historical claims on the South China Sea by referring to the ancient influence of the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires.^[126]

KRI Sutedi Senoputra 378 (background), KRI Tjiptadi 381 (centre), and KRI Teuku Umar 385 (foreground). These ships are often stationed in the Natuna Regency to protect Indonesian territory and its EEZ.

Indonesia's EEZ extends 200 nautical miles (370 km) from its shores, which around Natuna means it is slightly intersected by China's Nine-Dash Line, defining its widely disputed claim to most of the South China Sea. In 2014–2015, the presence of the Indonesian National Armed Forces on the islands was reinforced, which the Indonesian government hoped would reduce the chance of any conflict.^[127] Then in early 2020, a further 600 troops were deployed and eight navy warships from the Indonesian Navy including Ahmad Yani-class frigates, Bung Tomo-class corvettes, and Kapitan Pattimura-class ASW corvettes were sent to the area with support from the Indonesian Navy Naval Aviation CN-235 MPA, the Indonesian Air Force also sent 4 F-16 and a Boeing 737-2x9 Surveillance, and put BAE Hawk aircraft nearby on alert after Chinese fishing vessels increased illegal activity within the EEZ, escorted by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel. A recent visit to the area by President Joko Widodo displayed Indonesia's resolve to not overlook such incursions.^[128]

Japan[]

Japan has used "normative power" via strategic foreign aid to certain claimants in the dispute such as the Philippines and Vietnam in order to assert its presence in the region as promoting the "rule of law at sea."^[129]

Laos[]

Laos has supported China by refusing to accept the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on China's sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.^[130]

Singapore[]

Singapore has reiterated that it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute and has offered to play a neutral role in being a constructive conduit for dialogue among the claimant states. ^[131]

Thailand[]

Thailand as one of the member of ASEAN played a coordinating role in facilitating China and ASEAN members involved in the dispute in hope of reaching peaceful resolution. Despite its domestic political turmoil, the Thai government relied on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs' expertise on international dispute. It took the initiative to hold several meetings with parties concerned. Thailand's first attempt was hosting the ASEAN–China Senior Officials' Meeting Retreat in Pattaya, Thailand 2012. Via this meeting, Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister called for a joint development of resources in South China Sea. Bangkok was viewed as an South China Sea neutral player because it is not a claimant and did not have disputes in the South China Sea with China. After several meetings, the 6th ASEAN–China SOM on DOC was the first official consultation on the Code of Conduct (COC) was formed with all parties agreement to push forward the drafting of COC. Thai-China relationship was generally seen as positive. Thailand's neutral position enabled it to act as a mediator and influence discussions among parties involved.^[132]

United States[]

SOUTH CHINA SEA: UP FOR GRABS (INR, 1971)

In 1974, the PRC got a non-involvement promise from the United States when it occupied the Yagong Island and the Crescent Group from South Vietnam.^[30] The United States officially addressed the South China Sea dispute for the first time in 1995, when its statement focused on the peaceful resolution of disputes, peace and stability, freedom of navigation, neutrality over the question of sovereignty, and respect of maritime norms.^[133] The 1995 statement did not name any states by their names.

The 1995 policy was changed in 2010, when the administration of the President Obama felt that even though the United States cannot take sides in the dispute, it still has to make a statement that it is not passively accepting the assertive actions taken in the region.^[134] At the July 2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech on resolving the disputes in the region without coercion and unequivocally stating that the South China Sea was a matter of U.S. national interest.^[135][136] Her comments were countered by China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as "in effect an attack on China," and he warned the United States against making the South China Sea an international issue or multilateral issue.^[137]

In 2012, a United States State Department press statement identified the PRC as an assertive state in the region and communicated United States concerns about the developments in the area.^[138] Also in 2012, Secretary Clinton testified in support of congressional approval of the Law of the Sea Convention, which would strengthen U.S. ability to support countries that oppose Chinese claims to certain islands in the area.^[139] On 29 May 2012, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed concern over this development, stating that "non-claimant Association of South East Asian Nations countries and countries outside the region have adopted a position of not getting involved into territorial disputes."^[140] In July 2012, the United States Senate passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by Senator John Kerry, stating (among other things) the United States' strong support for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, reaffirms the United States' commitment to assist the nations of Southeast Asia to remain strong and independent, and supports enhanced operations by the United States armed forces in the Western Pacific.^[141]

In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other nations by saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law for these extensive maritime claims."^[142] USN CNO Jonathan Greenert then pledged American support to the Philippines in its territorial conflicts with the PRC.^[143] The Chinese Foreign Ministry asked the United States to maintain a neutral position on the issue.^[144] In 2014 and 2015, the United States continued freedom of navigation operations, including in the South China Sea.^[145] Sources closer to the Pentagon have also said that the US administration is planning to deploy some more naval assets within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands. In response to this announcement, Beijing issued a warning and said that she would not allow any country to violate China's territorial waters in the name of "Freedom of Navigation".^[146] In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter warned China to halt its rapid island-building.^[147] On 27 October 2015, the US destroyer USS Lassen navigated within 12 nautical miles of reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of "Freedom of Navigation Operations".^[148] This was the first time since 2012 that the US has directly challenged China's claims of the island's territorial limit.^[149] On 8–9 November 2015, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in the area of the Spratly Islands and were contacted by Chinese ground controllers but continued their mission undeterred.^[150]

The USS Carl Vinson underway in the South China Sea, 2017

President Trump's administration increased the freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea region as a part of their dynamic force employment strategy.^[151] The new U.S. strategy was unpredictable and deployed ships to the area without notice.^[152] As of May 2019, the United States had conducted four freedom of navigation operations in the Spratlys during early 2019.^[151] In 2019, the United States also twice flew B-52 Stratofortress bombers near the PRC-claimed islands in the Spratlys.^[153]

In June 2020, US Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft sent a letter to the U.N. secretary general explaining the US position on China’s "excessive maritime claims."^[154] On 14 July 2020, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared China's claims and coercions of in parts of the South China Sea “completely unlawful”.^[155] On 26 August 2020, the US sanctioned individuals and 24 Chinese companies linked to construction and militarization of the artificial islands.^[156]

Publications by US think tanks have made recommendations for courses of actions that the United States could take in response to PRC activities in the South China Sea.^[157][158]

The US Navy has conducted freedom of navigation drills in the South China Sea to counter Vietnamese claims in the region, particularly around the Côn Đảo islands.^[159]

See also[]

• Continental Shelf
• East China Sea EEZ disputes
• First island chain
• Great wall of sand
• Philippines v. China
• Scarborough Shoal standoff
• List of maritime features in the Spratly Islands
• Territorial claims in the Arctic
• Territorial claims in Antarctica
• South China Sea
• South China Sea Islands
• Spratly Islands
• Spratly Islands dispute
• Senkaku Islands
• Senkaku Islands dispute
• Sinophobia
• Chinese Century
• Chinese expansionism
• 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

References[]

Citations[]

Sources[]

• Bateman, Sam; Emmers, Ralf, eds. (2008). Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a co-operative management regime (illustrated ed.). Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-203-88524-6. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
• Kivimäki, Timo, ed. (2002). War Or Peace in the South China Sea?. Contributor Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (illustrated ed.). NIAS Press. ISBN 978-8791114014. ISSN 0904-597X. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
• Morley, James W.; Nishihara, Masashi, eds. (1997). Vietnam Joins the World. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-0-7656-3306-4. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
• Nordquist, Myron H.; Moore, John Norton (1998). Security Flashpoints: Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation; [twenty-first Annual Seminar Held at the UN Plaza Hotel in New York City from February 7 ��� 8, 1997]. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 978-90-411-1056-5.
• Pak, Hŭi-gwŏn (2000). The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia: A Challenge for Cooperation. Publications on Ocean Development. 35. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 978-9041114075. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
• Severino, Rodolfo (2011). Where in the World is the Philippines?: Debating Its National Territory (illustrated ed.). Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ISBN 978-9814311717. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
• Wortzel, Larry M.; Higham, Robin D. S. (1999). Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military History (illustrated ed.). ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-0-313-29337-5. Retrieved 10 March 2014.

Further reading[]

• Dupuy, Florian; Dupuy, Pierre-Marie (2013). "A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea". American Journal of International Law. 107 (1): 121–141. doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.1.0124. S2CID 55162381.
• Kittrie, Orde (2016). Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 161–168. ISBN 9780190263577. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
• Lorteau, Steve (2018). "China's South China Sea Claims as 'Unprecedented': Sceptical Remarks". Canadian Yearbook of International Law. 55: 79–99. doi:10.1017/cyl.2018.6. S2CID 158337369.
• Bautista, Lowell B. (December 2011). "Philippine Territorial Boundaries: Internal Tensions, Colonial Baggage, Ambivalent Conformity" (PDF). JATI – Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 16: 35–53. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 July 2013.
• Bonnet, Francois-Xavier (November 2012). "Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal" (PDF). Irasec's Discussion Paper. Institut de Recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est Contemporaine - Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia. No 14.
• Corr, Anders (2017). Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea. US Naval Institute Press.
• Raine, Sarah; Le Miere, Christian (2013). Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes. Routledge for IISS.
• Rowan, Joshua P. (2005). "The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute" (PDF). Asian Survey. 45 (3): 414–436. doi:10.1525/as.2005.45.3.414. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 August 2010.
• Townsend-Gault, Ian; Miller, Meredith; Schofield, Clive; Storey, Ian; Cook, Tim; Djalal, Hasjim (July 2011). "From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia". NBR Special Report. The National Bureau of Asian Research. 30.
• Cook, Tim (17 June 2011). "Rising Tensions in the South China Sea - An interview with Ian Storey". The National Bureau of Asian Research. Retrieved 5 February 2020.
• Tupaz, Edsel (27 April 2012). "Sidebar Brief: The Law of the Seas and the Scarborough Shoal Dispute". JURIST.
• Weissmann, Mikael (2010). "The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A study in conflict prevention and peace building" (PDF). Asian Perspectives. 34 (3): 35–69. doi:10.1353/apr.2010.0013. S2CID 54492222. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 July 2014.
• Yea, Andy (2011). "Maritime territorial disputes in East Asia: a comparative analysis of the South China Sea and the East China Sea". Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. 40 (2): 165–193. doi:10.1177/186810261104000207.
• Zhang. Ketian. “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion in the South China Sea,” International Security 44:1 (Summer 2019): 117–159.

External links[]

• Website of the Chinese National Institute for South China Sea Studies
• Website of the Vietnamese Program for South China Sea Studies Chương trình nghiên cứu Biển Đông (in Vietnamese)